2026:JHHC:17467-DB -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 798 of 2025 With I.A. No. 16053 of 2025 State of Jharkhand, through Director Higher Technical Education and Kaushal Vikash Department (Higher Education Directorate) 3rd floor Yojna Bhawan, Nepal House, Doranda, Post Office and Police Station Doranda, District Ranchi (Jharkhand). … … … Appellant Versus 1. Nawal Kishore Prasad Shrivastava, son of Late Kundan Prasad Shrivastava, resident of Merawal, Sindur, P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh (Jharkhand). 2. Vinoba Bhave University, through its Registrar, Hazaribagh, P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh (Jharkhand). 3. Finance Officer, Vinoba Bhave University, Hazaribagh, P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh (Jharkhand). … … … Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellant: Mr. Vineet Prakash, A.C. to S.C.-IV For Resp. No.1: Mr. Rajeev Kumar, Advocate For Resp. Nos. 2 & 3: Mr. Mithilesh Singh, Advocate Mr. Vishal Kumar Rai, Advocate --------- 02/Dated: 16.06.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. I.A. No. 16053 of 2025 seeks condonation of delay of 371 days in filing Appeal against the learned Single Judge’s judgment and order dated 13.08.2024 disposing of W.P.(S) No. 5655 of 2019. 3. We have perused the averments in paragraph 3 and 4 of the I.A. and we are satisfied that they do not constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The averments suggest the movement of files from table to table and from officers to officers. Similar reasons have been held by us as not constituting any sufficient cause. 2026:JHHC:17467-DB -2- 4. In paragraph 5 it is pleaded that “time taken in decision making process as mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present application were due to inter-departmental communications and opinion which required to be obtained in view of established standard operating procedure among the Government functionaries and the same was not deliberate”. 5. As noted in our order dated 16.06.2026 disposing of I.A. No. 15524 of 2025 in L.P.A. No. 766 of 2025, the Standard Operating Procedures vaguely referred to in paragraph 5 are nothing but excuses for not acting diligently and preferring the appeals within the prescribed period of limitation or at least within reasonable period thereafter. 6. Paragraph 6, an equally untenable reason has been stated for urging special consideration to appeals instituted by the Government and the Government functionaries. Paragraph 6 is transcribed below for the convenience of reference: - “6. That it is humbly stated and submitted that since the appellants are government functionaries having several layers of decision-making process, it took some time in completing the same. Further, sometime was consumed in obtaining legal opinion on the point of preferring appeal. 7. Based upon the above pleadings, we are afraid that no case whatsoever has been made out for condoning the inordinate delay of 371 days. This is a case of utter lethargy, tardiness and indolence to borrow the phrases used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others vs Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191. 8. In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the distinction between ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ proffered as a ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to 2026:JHHC:17467-DB -3- its earlier decisions, in which it is held that there is a point beyond which even the Courts cannot help a litigant, even if the litigant is the Government, which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Since the law of limitation binds everybody, beyond a particular point, no indulgence can be shown, even to the Government, which functions through an impersonal machinery. 9. In Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government Department or the persons concerned have not shown diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court held that, in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 10. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant factor that the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or approach of the appellants, it appeared that they sought to fix their own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost the right to have the matter considered on the merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in such 2026:JHHC:17467-DB -4- circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations. 11. The Court also held that when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. The ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 13. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all 2026:JHHC:17467-DB -5- throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said but courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at the later stages. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 2026:JHHC:17467-DB -6- 16. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no case has been made for condonation of the delay of 371 days in instituting the instant appeal. 17. I.A. No. 16053 of 2025 is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed without any order for costs. 18. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the interim application(s) (if any) therein will not survive and are disposed of. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 16, 2026 N.A.F.R. APK/VK Uploaded on 22.06.2026