2026:HHC:30607 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 310 of 2014 Reserved on: 16.07.2026 Date of Decision: 24.07.2026 State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Sumit Vaidya & Ors ...Respondent _______________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General For the Respondents : Mr Ankit Dhiman, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 12.05.2014 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 341, 323 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:30607 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 147, 149 and 323 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Prema Devi (not examined) was running a dhaba in the name and style of Nisha Dhaba at Hathithan. The accused, Prem Lal, Sumit Vaidya, Raju and three other boys came to her dhaba on 02.05.2006 at about 06.00 p.m. They enquired about Budhi Singh. The informant replied that he had gone towards the backyards. All of them went to search for Budhi Singh. They brought him near the dhaba after some time, accused him of stealing Prem Lal’s motorcycle, and started beating him. The informant objected and told the assailants to take Budhi Singh to the police station if he had committed the theft. Prem Lal asked Budhi Singh to board the motorcycle, and both of them proceeded towards the Police Post. The other person followed the motorcycle in a car. Budhi Singh got off the motorcycle near Y.M. Hospital and ran towards the river. Prem Lal and his friends ran after him, shouting thief. Budhi Singh jumped into the river, and he could not be found. The incident was witnessed by Khem Chand (PW5), Rakesh Kumar and other persons. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ex.PW10/A) was registered in the police station. Inspector Badri Singh (PW11) went 3 2026:HHC:30607 for the verification of the information. Prema Devi made a statement (Ex.PW11/A) which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW11/B) was registered. Inspector Badri Singh investigated the matter. He prepared the site plans (Ex.PW11/C and Ex.PW11/D) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He seized the motorcycle and car vide memos (Ex.PW8/A and Ex.PW8/B). Subsequently, the dead body of Budhi Singh was recovered. An inquest on the dead body was conducted. Dr Bhupender Chauhan (PW6) conducted the postmortem examination and found that the cause of death was head injury and drowning. He issued the report (Ex.PW6/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to them for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 341 and 323 read with Section 149 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Amriti (PW1), Promila (PW4), Khem Chand (PW5) and Dinesh Sharma (PW7) did not support the prosecution's case. Om Prakash 4 2026:HHC:30607 (PW2) is the father of Budhi Singh, to whom the incident was narrated. Amar Nath (PW3) was also told about the beatings being given to Budhi Singh. Chand Kumar (PW8) witnessed the recovery. SI Durga Dass (PW9) went to the spot after the discovery of the dead body. HHC Mohar Dass (PW10) proved the entry in the daily diary. Inspector Badri Singh (PW11) investigated the matter. Bala Ram (PW12) is an eyewitness. Inspector Sarwan Kumar (PW13) prepared the challan. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. They claimed that they were innocent and that they were falsely implicated. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution had only examined Bala Ram (PW12) as the witness to the incident. The informant, Prema Devi, was not examined. The incident occurred on 02.05.2006, and the statement of Bala Ram was recorded on 30.05.2006. No explanation was provided for the delay. He had seen the accused for the first time on the date of the incident, and there was no Test Identification Parade. It was highly unsafe to rely upon 5 2026:HHC:30607 the testimony of Bala Ram to record a conviction. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the testimony of Bala Ram was not shattered in the cross-examination, and the learned Trial Court erred in discarding his testimony. The statements of Om Prakash, Amar Nath and Balaram proved the prosecution's version. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were duly corroborated by the postmortem report. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned Counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the Appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other in material particulars, and the medical evidence corroborated the eye witnesses’ testimony. The learned Trial Court erred in discarding the prosecution's case. 6 2026:HHC:30607 Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the prosecution had not examined the informant. The testimony of Bala Ram was doubtful because no explanation was provided for his delayed examination. The eyewitnesses had not supported the prosecution's case, and they were declared hostile. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against the acquittal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418, and Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89 in support of his submission. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is 7 2026:HHC:30607 patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 14. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: 8 2026:HHC:30607 “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and (f) The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 9 2026:HHC:30607 16. Om Prakash (PW2) stated that he had received a phone call from Prema Devi on 02.05.2006, who told him that the accused were beating Budhi Singh near her dhaba. She also said that they had taken Budhi Singh towards Police Station, and Budhi Singh jumped into the river. He stated in his cross-examination that he was residing at Dhakrah and was not present on the spot. 17. Amar Nath (PW3) stated that he had received a call on 02.05.2006, at about 06.15 p.m., from Prema Devi that Prem Lal and 6-7 other persons were beating Budhi Singh. She also said that they followed Budhi Singh and took him towards the river. He also admitted that in his cross-examination that he was not present on the spot, and he could not say what had happened on the spot. 18. The statements of these witnesses show that they were trying to prove what was narrated to them by Prema. The prosecution had not examined Prema Devi, and the statements made by these witnesses would be hearsay in nature. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.D. Jain v. State Bank of India, (1982) 1 SCC 143, that the statement of a witness made by a person who is not called as a witness is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It was observed: - 10 2026:HHC:30607 “20. The next question is, is the evidence in the domestic enquiry really hearsay, as held by the Tribunal? 21. The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on the information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence). 22. The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed: "Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made." 19. It was held in Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri, (2011) 2 SCC 532: 2011 SCC OnLine SC 200 that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. It was observed at page 545: 37. Here comes the rule of appreciation of hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence is excluded on the ground that it is always desirable, in the interest of justice, to get the person whose statement is relied upon into court for his examination in the regular way, in order that many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness can be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination. The phrase “hearsay evidence” is not used in the Evidence Act because it is inaccurate and vague. It is a fundamental rule of evidence under Indian law that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. A statement, oral or written, made otherwise than by a witness in giving evidence and a statement contained or recorded in any book, document or record whatsoever, proof of which is not admitted on other grounds, are deemed to be irrelevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated. An assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral 11 2026:HHC:30607 evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted. That this species of evidence cannot be tested by cross-examination and that, in many cases, it supposes some better testimony which ought to be offered in a particular case, are not the sole grounds for its exclusion. Its tendency to protract legal investigations to an embarrassing and dangerous length, its intrinsic weakness, its incompetence to satisfy the mind of a judge about the existence of a fact, and the fraud which may be practised with impunity, under its cover, combine to support the rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. 38. The reasons why hearsay evidence is not received as relevant evidence are: (a) The person giving such evidence does not feel any responsibility. The law requires all evidence to be given under personal responsibility, i.e. every witness must give his testimony, under such circumstances as expose him to all the penalties of falsehood. If the person giving hearsay evidence is cornered, he has a line of escape by saying, “I do not know, but so and so told me” (b) Truth is diluted and diminished with each repetition, and (c) If permitted, it gives ample scope for playing fraud by saying “someone told me that…”. It would be attaching importance to false rumour flying from one foul lip to another. Thus, statements of witnesses based on information received from others are inadmissible.” 20. Therefore, the testimonies of these witnesses are inadmissible, and no conviction can be recorded based on their testimonies. 21. Promila Devi (PW4) stated that she heard some noise. She saw a boy floating in the river. She was permitted to be cross- examined. She denied that the accused had said that the person 12 2026:HHC:30607 floating in the river had committed the theft. She denied that he had jumped into the river after he was beaten by the accused. She denied the previous statement recorded by the police. Thus, it is apparent that she has not supported the prosecution's version. 22. Khem Chand (PW5) stated that he saw many people who were saying that Budhi Singh had jumped into the river. He was also permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the accused were beating Budhi Singh, and they were saying that Budhi Singh had committed theft of Prem Lal’s motorcycle. He denied that Budhi Singh had jumped into the river. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 23. Dinesh Sharma (PW7) stated that he had heard some noise and saw many people on the spot. He was permitted to be cross- examined. He denied that he saw Budhi Singh drowning in the river. He also denied that the accused were present on the spot. Therefore, this witness has also not supported the prosecution's case. 24. Bala Ram (PW12) stated that he was going to his home. He saw 5-6 people beating one person. He identified the accused as the assailant. Prema Devi enquired as to why the accused were beating Budhi Singh. They asked Budhi Singh to board the 13 2026:HHC:30607 motorcycle and took him towards Bhuntar. Budhi Singh jumped. The accused ran after him and pelted stones upon Budhi Singh, who jumped into the river and drowned. He admitted in his cross- examination that his statement was recorded on 31.05.2006, whereas the incident had taken place on 02.05.2006. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418, that the witness’s testimony becomes doubtful in the absence of any explanation for his delayed examination. It was observed: 16. As regards the incident of the murder of the deceased, the prosecution has produced six eyewitnesses to the same. The argument raised against the reliance upon the testimony of these witnesses pertains to the delay in the recording of their statements by the police under Section 161 CrPC. In the present case, the date of occurrence was 21-12-1993, but the statements of PW 1 and PW 5 were recorded after two days of the incident, i.e. on 23-12-1993. The evidence of PW 6 was recorded on 26-12-1993, while the evidence of PW 11 was recorded after 10 days of the incident, i.e. on 31-12-1993. Further, it is well-settled law that a delay in recording the statement of the witnesses does not necessarily discredit their testimony. The court may rely on such testimony if they are cogent and credible and the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court. [See Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra [Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106: 1993 SCC (Cri) 435]; Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. [Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1734]; Prithvi v. Mam Raj [Prithvi v. Mam Raj, (2004) 13 SCC 279: 2005 SCC (Cri) 198] and Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1385].] 14 2026:HHC:30607 17. However, Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra [Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 4 SCC 371: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1], is an authority for the proposition that delay in recording of statements of the prosecution witnesses under Section 161 CrPC, although those witnesses were or could be available for examination when the investigating officer visited the scene of occurrence or soon thereafter, would cast a doubt upon the prosecution case. (See also Balakrushna Swain v. State of Orissa [Balakrushna Swain v. State of Orissa, (1971) 3 SCC 192: 1971 SCC (Cri) 313]; Maruti Rama Naik v. State of Maharashtra [Maruti Rama Naik v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 10 SCC 670: 2004 SCC (Cri) 958] and Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab [Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 3 SCC 689: 2005 SCC (Cri) 893] .) Thus, we see no reason to interfere with the observations of the High Court on the point of delay and its corresponding impact on the prosecution case. 25. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in discarding his testimony. 26. Bala Ram admitted in his cross-examination that he had not met the accused before or after the incident. The police had revealed the names of the accused to him. Thus, it is apparent from his testimony that he had no personal acquaintance with the accused and had seen the accused for the first time on the date of the incident. The prosecution relied upon the identification made in the Court. However, not much advantage can be derived from the identification made for the first time in the Court. Professor Rupert Cross has stated in his celebrated treatise, Cross on Evidence, Fifth Edition, Butterworths, that identification of the accused for the first time in the dock is highly suspect. He observed: 15 2026:HHC:30607 "It might be thought that in criminal cases there could not be better identification of an accused than that of a witness who goes into the box and swears that the man in the dock is the one he saw coming out of a house at a particular time, or the man who assaulted him. Nevertheless, such evidence is suspect where there has been no previous identification of the accused by the witness, and this is because its weight is reduced by the reflection that, if there is any degree of resemblance between the man in the dock and the person previously seen by him. The witness may very well think to himself that the police must have got hold of the right person, particularly if he has already described the latter to them, with the result that he will be inclined to swear positively to a fact of which he is by no means certain. People have mistakenly identified friends and relations well known to them with sufficient frequency to make them question the propriety of convicting an accused person on nothing more than the visual identification of a single witness who may only have had a fleeting glance of him in poor light." 27. It has been stated in Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition Volume 2 that the identification of the accused for the first time in the Court is improper and the witness should be asked to identify the accused in a prior test identification parade. It has been observed in para 363: “A witness shouldn't be asked to identify the defendant for the first time in the dock at his trial; and as a general practice, it is preferable that he should have been placed previously in a parade with other persons, so that potential witnesses may be asked to pick him up.” 28. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Sasikumar v. State of T.N., (2024) 8 SCC 600: (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 791: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1652 that when the accused were not known to 16 2026:HHC:30607 the witnesses on the date of the incident, their identification in the dock is not acceptable. It was observed on page 605: “17. The admitted position in this case is that the test identification parade (hereinafter referred to as “TIP”) was not conducted. All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the Court, such as PW 1 and PW 5, were not known to the present appellant, i.e. Accused 2. They had not seen the present appellant before the said incident. He was a stranger to both of them. More importantly, both of them have seen the appellant/Accused 2 on the date of the crime while he was wearing a “green-coloured monkey cap”! xxx 21.It is well settled that TIP is only a part of the police investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of evidence, or what can be called evidence, is only dock identification, that is, identification made by a witness in court during the trial. This identification has been made in court by PW 1 and PW 5. The High Court rightly dismissed the identification made by PW 1 for the reason that the appellant, i.e. Accused 2, was a stranger to PW 1 and PW 1 had seen the appellant for the first time when he was wearing a monkey cap, and in the absence of TIP to admit the identification by PW 1 made for the first time in the court was not proper. xxxx 23. We are afraid the High Court has gone completely wrong in believing the testimony of PW 5 as to the identification of the appellant. In cases where the accused is a stranger to a witness, and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness (see: Kunjumon v. State of Kerala, (2012) 13 SCC 750: (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 406]). xxx 27. In the facts of the present case, the identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP, which has not been done. The emphasis of TIP in a given case is of vital importance, as has been shown 17 2026:HHC:30607 by this Court in the recent two cases of Jayanv. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 and Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 9 SCC 402: (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 404. 28. In Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, this Court disbelieved the dock identification of the accused therein by a witness, and while doing so, this Court discussed the aspect of TIP in the following words: (Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, SCC p. 44, para 18) “18. It is well settled that the TI parade is a part of the investigation, and it is not substantive evidence. The question of holding a TI parade arises when the accused is not known to the witness beforehand. The identification by a witness of the accused in the Court who has, for the first time, seen the accused in the incident of the offence is a weak piece of evidence, especially when there is a large time gap between the date of the incident and the date of recording of his evidence. In such a case, the TI parade may make the identification of the accused by the witness before the Court trustworthy.” 29. Therefore, the identification of the accused by the witnesses for the first time in the Court without any corroboration from previous Test Identification Parades is meaningless, and cannot be relied upon to record the conviction. 30. There was no other evidence to show that the accused had beaten Budhi Singh or that Budhi Singh had jumped into the river because of the fear of the beatings given by the accused. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. 18 2026:HHC:30607 31. No other point was urged. 32. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 33. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 34. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th July, 2026 (Nikita)