2026:JHHC:17379-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No.221 of 2024 With I.A. No.4027 of 2024 ----- 1. The State of Jharkhand through its Chief Secretary, Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi. 2. The Secretary, Department of Higher and Technical Education, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Yojna Bhawan, Nepal House Campus, Doranda, Ranchi. .......... Appellants. -Versus- 1. Shiv Vilas Sah, son of Late Prahlad Sah, resident of Rameshwar Apartment, Flat No.302, Radium Road, Kotwali, Ranchi. 2. Satya Deo Ram, son of Late Panchratan Ram, resident of Sarvamangala Apartment, P.N. Bose Compound, Lalpur, Ranchi. 3. Ram Prakash Sharma, son of Late Hanuman Sharma, resident of B.I.T. Campus, Sindri, Dhanbad. 4. Sheo Kumar, son of Late Kapil Deo Sharma, resident of village Naubatpur, Sona, Piplawan, Patna, Bihar. 5. Krishna Murari, son of Late Ram Nandan Sharma, resident of Quarter No.0/21, B.I.T., Sindri, Dhanbad. 6. Shyam Kishor Kumar, son of Late Permanand Kumar, resident of B.I.T. Sindri, Near Devi Mandir, Sindri, Dhanbad. 7. Ganesh Prasad, son of Late Jagnnath Shaw, resident of village Amba, Kutumba, Aurangabad, Bihar. 8. Birendra Prasad, son of Late Harihar Prasad, resident of Babudih, P.O. B. Polytechnic, P.S. Dhanbad. 9. Kaushal Kishore Sinha, son of Late Chulhan Singh, resident of Babudih, P.O. B. Ploytechnic, P.S. Dhanbad. 10. The Principal Accountant General (A&E), Government of Jharkhand, Doranda, Ranchi. .......... Respondents. ----- CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Appellants : Mr. Anish Mishra, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-I For the Res. No.10 : Mrs. Richa Sanchita, Advocate ----- Order No.07 Date: 16.06.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. I.A. No.4027 of 2024 seeks condonation of delay of 202 days in filing the present Letters Patent Appeal against the learned 2026:JHHC:17379-DB 2 single judge’s order dated 22nd August, 2023 disposing of W.P.(S) No.5268 of 2022. 3. In paragraphs nos.3 to 7, there are vague and unverifiable statements mostly pertaining to movement of files from table to table. Based upon such vague and unverifiable statements made casually, there is no question of condoning the delay. 4. In paragraph no.3, there is reference to the Department placing the file before the learned Advocate General for his opinion. There is no indication as to when this was done. 5. In paragraph no.4, there is reference to the learned Advocate General’s opinion for filing the L.P.A. Again, there is no reference to the date on which such opinion was rendered. 6. In paragraph no.4, there is reference to grounds of appeal being drafted and approved by the Department. Again, no particulars are provided. 7. In paragraph no.5, there is reference to file being sent back to the department. Ultimately in paragraph no.6, there is an omnibus statements “that in completing the formalities some delay occurred in filing the present appeal. The delay occurred due to departmental formalities”. 8. This appeal was stated to be connected with L.P.A. No.531 of 2025 which was filed after delay of 558 days. By a detailed order made today, we have declined to condone this delay. By adopting the reasoning therein, we see no good ground to condone the delay. The distinction that in this case the delay is of 202 days whereas in the earlier case the delay was 558 days 2026:JHHC:17379-DB 3 does not appeal to us. Ultimately, the cause shown has to be examined and upon such examination, we are satisfied that the same cannot be regarded as sufficient to explain the 202 days’ delay. The quality of the cause and not the length of the delay is most crucial in such matters. 9. Based upon the above pleadings, we are afraid that no case whatsoever has been made out for condoning the inordinate delay of 202 days. This is a case of utter lethargy, tardiness and indolence to borrow the phrases used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191. 10. In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the difference between ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier decisions wherein it is held that there is a point beyond which even the Courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is the Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Since the law of limitation binds everybody, beyond a particular point, no indulgence can be shown, even to the Government which functions through an impersonal machinery. 11. In Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012)3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government Department or the persons/persons 2026:JHHC:17379-DB 4 concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court has held that in absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, the delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or the wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several noting cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 12. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of delay is a relevant matter which the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that from the tenor or the approach of the appellants, it appeared that they wish to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which the law has prescribed the period of limitation. Once, it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations. 2026:JHHC:17379-DB 5 13. The Court also held that when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. The ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 14. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous 2026:JHHC:17379-DB 6 and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said but courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at the later stages. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to 2026:JHHC:17379-DB 7 contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 16. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no case has been made for condonation of the delay of 202 days in instituting the instant appeal. I.A. No.4027 of 2024 is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed without any order for costs. 17. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the interim application(s) (if any) therein will not survive are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) 16th June, 2026 Sanjay/Rohit Uploaded on 22.06.2026