IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 National Insurance Company Ltd., Represented through its Officer-in-Charge, Cuttack Motor TP Hub, Cantonment Road, Cuttack …. Petitioner Mr. L. Pradhan, Advocate -versus- Bijay Laxmi Dora and Ors. … Opp. Parties CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH Date of Hearing: 01.05.2026 Date of Judgment: 22.05.2026 Chittaranjan Dash, J. 1. The Petitioner-Insurance Company, by means of the present writ petition, lays challenge to the award dated 29.10.2025 passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge-cum-3rd Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in M.A.C. Case No.84 of 2018. By the said award, the learned Tribunal awarded compensation of ₹52,757/- together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim application, i.e., 18.06.2018, in favour of Opposite Party No.1-claimant and directed the Petitioner-Insurance Company to satisfy the award in the first instance with liberty to recover the amount from Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3 in accordance with law. 2. The factual matrix of the case leading to this petition is that on 22.09.2017 at about 5:00 A.M., Opposite Party No.1-claimant was travelling in an auto-rickshaw bearing registration No. OD-02-J-6199 W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 near A.G. Square, Bhubaneswar. It was alleged that a car bearing registration No. OR-02-AL-7050, being driven in a rash and negligent manner, dashed against the said auto-rickshaw, resulting in injuries to the Claimant. Consequent upon the occurrence, Capital P.S. Case No.406 dated 22.09.2017 was registered under Sections 279/337/338 IPC and investigation proceeded. Thereafter, Opposite Party No.1 instituted M.A.C. Case No.84 of 2018 before the learned 2nd Additional District Judge-cum-3rd Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhubaneswar under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “MV Act”) claiming compensation on account of the injuries sustained in the accident. Upon notice being issued, the driver-cum-owner and owner of the offending vehicle, arrayed before the learned Tribunal as Opposite Party Nos.1 and 2 respectively, did not contest the proceeding and were set ex parte. The present Petitioner-Insurance Company entered appearance and filed its written statement disputing the claim. While denying the material averments made in the claim petition, it was, inter alia, contended that the claim was excessive and that the driver of the offending vehicle was not holding a valid driving licence at the time of the accident. The Petitioner-Insurance Company also questioned the claimant’s age, income and entitlement to the compensation claimed. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Tribunal framed the following issues: “ (i) Is the claim petition maintainable? (ii) Whether the injured Bijaya Laxmi Dora sustained injuries on account of motor vehicle accident involving a car bearing regd. No. OR-02-AL-7050? (iii) Whether the rider of the bus was driving the aforesaid vehicle in rash and negligent manner causing the accident? (iv) Whether the petitioner is entitled for any compensation, if so, to what extent and from which O.P.? W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 (v) To what relief, the claimant is entitled to?” 3. In support of her claim, Opposite Party No.1 examined herself and another witness and produced medical records and connected documents. The Petitioner-Insurance Company, though it did not adduce any oral evidence, relied upon certain documents including the FIR, final form, seizure list and zimanama. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned Tribunal recorded a finding that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending car bearing registration No. OR-02- AL-7050 and that Opposite Party No.1 had sustained injuries in the said accident. The learned Tribunal further found the claimant entitled to compensation and, taking into account the medical expenses proved by documentary evidence as well as the nature of injuries sustained, quantified the compensation at ₹52,757/- together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. While noticing the defence regarding absence of a valid driving licence, the learned Tribunal directed the Petitioner-Insurance Company to satisfy the award in the first instance and granted it liberty to recover the amount from the owner(s) of the offending vehicle in accordance with law. Aggrieved thereby, the present Writ Petition has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner-Insurance Company assails the impugned award dated 29.10.2025 on the ground that the same is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the materials available on record. It is contended that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that the registration records of the offending vehicle as well as the materials brought on record clearly established that the owner himself was driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident and was not W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 holding a valid and effective driving licence. According to learned counsel, once such breach of the policy condition stood established and the owner-insured himself was the person driving the vehicle without a valid licence, the learned Tribunal ought to have completely exonerated the Petitioner-Insurance Company from its liability and could not have directed it to satisfy the award in the first instance with liberty to recover the same from Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3. It is submitted that the direction to “pay and recover” in the facts of the present case is unsustainable in law. Learned counsel for the Petitioner-Insurance Company further contends that the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is excessive and unsupported by the evidence on record. It is submitted that, apart from medical bills amounting to ₹2,757/-, there was no cogent material before the learned Tribunal to justify the award of a further sum of ₹50,000/- towards pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. According to learned counsel, the said amount has been awarded on mere conjectures and surmises without any supporting evidence regarding permanent disability, loss of earning capacity or any other consequential loss. It is accordingly urged that the compensation awarded is disproportionate to the nature of injuries sustained by the claimant and is liable to be suitably reduced. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the Petitioner-Insurance Company has placed reliance upon the decisions of this Court rendered in MACA Nos.977 of 2017 and 391 of 2018, MACA No.108 of 2021, MACA Nos.445 of 2020 and 298 of 2020, and MACA No.669 of 2020, to contend that where the owner himself drives the offending vehicle without holding a valid driving licence, the W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 insurer cannot be saddled with liability by invoking the principle of “pay and recover”. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the Petitioner-Insurance Company and upon perusal of the materials available on record, this Court finds that the principal issue arising for consideration is whether, upon establishing that the owner-driver of the offending vehicle was not holding a valid and effective driving licence at the time of the accident, the learned Tribunal was justified in directing the Petitioner- Insurance Company to satisfy the award in the first instance with liberty to recover the same from the owner-insured. 6. The aforesaid issue is no longer res integra. The scope and ambit of the liability of an insurer in cases involving breach of policy conditions relating to driving licence as well as the applicability of the doctrine of “pay and recover” have been authoritatively considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and others, (2004) 3 SCC 297. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are reproduced below: “73. The liability of the insurer is a statutory one. The liability of the insurer to satisfy the decree passed in favour of a third party is also statutory. 74. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition Reissue, Volume 25, it is stated: “749. Judgments required to be satisfied. The first condition of the obligation of the insurers to pay on a judgment is that there is a judgment. The Second condition is that the judgment must be in respect of a liability which is required to be covered by compulsory insurance. In other words, the only person who can maintain a right of action direct against the insurers is a person falling within the class of third parties whose bodily injury or death or damage to whose property is required to be covered by a motor policy. W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 The third condition is that the liability is, in fact, covered by the terms of the policy, or would be covered but for the fact that the insurer is entitled to avoid or cancel, or has avoided or cancelled, the policy. For this purpose, conditions declared to be invalid as against a third party are ignored, but if, even after ignoring all such conditions, the relevant use of the vehicle puts it outside the scope of the policy, the insurers are left immune. The most important clause in this connection is the ‘description of use’ clause. The assured is criminally liable if he uses his car for purposes outside the scope of his insurance and, in addition to his criminal liability, he has to bear unaided the cost of compensating third parties injured by his use if he is negligent. Subject to the statutory provision rendering certain conditions invalid against third parties, the insurers are not obliged to carry a wider scope of liability that they have agreed by their policy to carry. The fourth condition is that the judgment must be against a person insured by the policy. This language covers a permitted driver as well as the person by whom the policy has been effected.” ××× 110. The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions are as follows: (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) Insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under Section 163 A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 inter alia in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act. (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g., disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish ‘breach’ on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefor would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/ are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insured under section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver, (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learner’s licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (ix) The claims tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained in sub-section (4) with proviso thereunder and sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse of by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of insurer against insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims.” 7. In Swaran Singh (supra), while examining the effect of absence, invalidity or disqualification of a driving licence on the liability of the insurer, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that notwithstanding proof of breach of policy conditions, the interests of innocent third-party victims remain protected and, in appropriate cases, W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 the insurer may be directed to satisfy the award and thereafter recover the amount from the insured. 8. The aforesaid principle has subsequently been reiterated and reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Nagendra vs. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2025 INSC 1270. The Hon’ble Supreme Court again emphasised that while a breach of policy conditions may entitle the insurer to recover the amount from the insured, such breach does not invariably defeat the claim of an innocent third party and the doctrine of “pay and recover” may be invoked to balance the competing rights of the insurer and the victim. 9. Taking cue from the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, learned counsel for the Petitioner-Insurance Company vehemently contended that where the owner himself drives the offending vehicle without holding a valid and effective driving licence, the insurer cannot be compelled to indemnify the insured. In support of such contention, reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in MACA No.977 of 2017. Particular emphasis was laid on paragraph-9 thereof wherein the Coordinate Bench observed as follows: “9. First coming to the challenge advanced by the insurer, it is seen that the offending motorcycle was driven by one Mr. Dillip Kumar Rath, who is Opposite Party No.1 before the Tribunal. He did not come to contest the case and there is no dispute about his ownership of the offending motorcycle. As per the claimants, said Dillip Kumar Rath was driving the offending motorcycle at the time of accident. Ext.B is the certified copy of the driving license of said Dillip Kumar Rath and as per Ext.B, though he was authorized to drive the light motor vehicle and light passenger motor vehicle, but he was not authorized to drive two-wheeler (motorcycle). As such, it is established that the driver-cum-owner of the offending motorcycle was not having a valid driving license on the date W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 of accident. Since the owner is the driver, the negligence and lack of reasonable care on his part to drive the motorcycle without a valid driving license is clearly established and therefore, in terms of the principle decided in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran Singh and others, (2004) 3 SCC 297, the insurer is not liable to indemnify the owner. As such the insurer is exempted from its liability to indemnify the compensation amount on behalf of the owner.” 10. Learned counsel further drew the attention of this Court to the decision rendered in MACA No.108 of 2021 wherein, after noticing that the owner himself was driving the offending motorcycle without possessing a valid driving licence on the date of accident, the Coordinate Bench, referring to the principles laid down in Swaran Singh (supra) as well as Nirmala Kothari vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 2020 SC 1193, held that the insurer stood absolved from its liability. The relevant observations read as follows: “4. Mr. Mahali submits on behalf of the insurer that the accused driver of the offending vehicle, i.e. motor cycle bearing registration number OD-08-D-3541 is the owner himself who did not have licence to drive the motor cycle on the date of accident. The copy of the driving licence produced under Ext.A on behalf of the insurer discloses that the licence was issued on 4th November, 2016, whereas the accident is dated 17th May, 2016. The owner – Respondent No.4 is unable to produce any material to controvert the fact that he was driving the vehicle without license. As per the principles expounded in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 as well as in the case of Nirmala Kothari vs. United India Insurance Company Limited, (2020) 4 SCC 49, the position has been clarified that when the owner has consciously permitted the vehicle to be driven by a person without having authorization to drive, the insurer is absolved of his liability. This court MACA No.445 of 2020 disposed of on 7th February 2023 and in MACA No.977 of 2017, disposed of on 28th October, 2022 have also observed that when the owner is the driver himself and did not have licence to drive the vehicle, the insurer is exempted from its liability. W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 7. In view of the discussions made above, the appeal is allowed and the insurer – Appellant is exempted from the liability. The owner – Respondent No.4 is directed to deposit the modified compensation amount of Rs.12,57,400/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim application till realization, within a period of two months from today, failing which it is open for the claimants to realize it from him. The amount shall be disbursed in favour of the claimants on such terms and proportion to be decided by learned tribunal.” 11. Placing reliance on the aforesaid decisions, it was contended that once the materials on record establish that the owner himself was driving the offending vehicle without possessing a valid driving licence, the breach of policy condition stands proved and the insurer cannot be saddled with the liability arising out of the contract of insurance. According to learned counsel, the learned Tribunal, despite recording a finding regarding absence of a valid driving licence, erred in directing the Petitioner-Insurance Company to satisfy the award and thereafter recover the amount from the owner-insured. 12. There can be no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions that where the owner himself drives the vehicle without possessing a valid and effective driving licence, the insurer cannot ordinarily be compelled to indemnify the insured in view of the established breach of policy conditions. However, the question that falls for consideration in the present case is slightly different. The issue is not whether the insurer remains bound to indemnify the owner-insured notwithstanding such breach, but whether an innocent third-party claimant can be denied the benefit of the doctrine of “pay and recover”, particularly when the offending vehicle was admittedly covered by a valid policy of insurance on the date of the accident. W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 13. There can be no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the Petitioner- Insurance Company that where the owner himself drives the offending vehicle without possessing a valid and effective driving licence, the insurer cannot ordinarily be compelled to indemnify the insured in view of the established breach of policy conditions. The said proposition finds support from the principles enunciated in Swaran Singh (supra) and has been consistently followed in the decisions relied upon by the Petitioner. 14. At the same time, this Court is conscious of the observations contained in clause (vi) of paragraph 110 of Swaran Singh (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even where breach of a policy condition relating to the driving licence is established, the insurer may not be permitted to avoid its liability unless such breach is found to be fundamental in nature. Nevertheless, the judgment further underscores that, while construing policy conditions, the Tribunals are required to apply the “rule of main purpose” and the doctrine of “fundamental breach.” For a proper appreciation of the aforesaid principle, it would be profitable to refer to the earlier observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in very same judgment. The relevant observations are extracted hereinbelow: “31. A right of the victim of a road accident to claim compensation is a statutory one. He is a victim of an unforeseen situation. He would not ordinarily have a hand in it. The negligence on the part of the victim may, however, be contributory. He has suffered owing to wrongdoing of others. An accident may ruin an entire family. It may take away the only earning member. An accident may result in the loss of her only son to a mother. An accident may take place for variety of reasons. The driver of a vehicle may not have a hand in it. He may not be found to be negligent in a given case. Other factors W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 such as unforeseen situation, negligence of the victim, bad road or the action or inaction of any other person may lead to an accident. 32. A person suffering grievous bodily injury may require money for his survival/medical treatment. Statutory compensation paid to the next of kin of the victim of an accident may, thus, bring to a large number of families the only ray of light at the end of the tunnel. 33. In other words, what would also be covered by the contract of insurance vis-`-vis the beneficent statutory provisions like Sub-Section (2) of Section 149 of the said Act would be when a death or bodily injury has been caused as a result of assured’s own voluntary act. Even an unforeseeable result of assured’s deliberate act may come within the purview of the accident. Even if an accident has occurred due to negligent driving of the assured person, it may not prevent recovery under the policy and certainly thereby a third party would not be non-suited.” 15. The aforesaid observations leave no manner of doubt that while considering disputes relating to the liability of an insurer, the Court cannot lose sight of the underlying object of the legislation. The right of a victim of a motor accident to seek compensation is a statutory right and the provisions contained in Chapter XI of the MV Act have been enacted with a beneficent object of ensuring that innocent victims or their dependants are not left remediless. The emphasis, therefore, is not merely on the contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured but also on securing effective and expeditious compensation to third-party victims. 16. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the doctrine of “pay and recover” has evolved through judicial pronouncements. The principle strikes a balance between the insurer’s right to avoid contractual liability on account of a proven breach of policy conditions and the equally important statutory objective of ensuring that an innocent third- party claimant receives compensation without being driven to W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 prolonged and uncertain recovery proceedings against the owner of the offending vehicle alone. 17. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swaran Singh (supra) would reveal that while an Insurer may avoid its contractual obligation towards the Insured upon establishing a breach of the policy conditions, the same cannot be viewed in isolation divorced from the larger statutory scheme governing compensation to victims of motor accidents. The settled position of law is intended to ensure that the beneficial object underlying in the MV Act is not defeated by a purely technical construction of the terms of the insurance policy. 18. In the present case, the materials available on record unequivocally establish that the offending vehicle was being driven by its owner and that he was not holding a valid and effective Driving Licence on the date of the accident. The said aspect has also been duly noticed by the learned Tribunal. Consequently, there can be little dispute that there was a breach of the policy condition relating to holding of a valid Driving Licence and, therefore, the Petitioner- Insurance Company cannot be compelled to indemnify the owner- insured as though there had been due compliance with the terms of the policy. 19. The matter, however, does not rest there. The Claimant- Opposite Party sustained injuries in a road traffic accident while travelling as an occupant of the auto-rickshaw and is admittedly a third- party victim. The Claimant had no role either in the operation of the offending vehicle or in the breach committed by the owner-driver. Furthermore, it is not disputed that the offending vehicle was covered W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 by a valid policy of insurance on the date of the accident. In such circumstances, denying the Claimant the benefit of the award and relegating her to pursue recovery solely against the owner-insured would not advance the object sought to be achieved by the beneficial provisions of the MV Act. 20. The decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the Petitioner- Insurance Company undoubtedly recognise the Insurer’s right to avoid indemnification of the Insured where the owner himself drives the vehicle without possessing a valid Driving Licence. However, the said decisions cannot be read as laying down an inflexible proposition that in every such case an innocent third-party Claimant must necessarily be deprived of the benefit of the doctrine of “pay and recover”. On the contrary, the principles enunciated in Swaran Singh (supra) make it abundantly clear that the rights of the Insurer against the insured and the entitlement of a third-party victim to receive compensation operate in distinct spheres and are required to be suitably balanced. 21. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that although the Petitioner-Insurance Company cannot be held liable to indemnify the owner-insured in view of the established breach of the policy conditions, the direction issued by the learned Tribunal requiring the Petitioner-Insurance Company to satisfy the award in the first instance and thereafter recover the amount from the Owner-Insured cannot be said to suffer from any legal infirmity. Such a direction adequately protects the statutory right of the Claimant to receive compensation expeditiously while simultaneously preserving the Insurer’s right to recover the amount from the person responsible for the breach. W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 22. The principles emerging from the decisions referred to hereinabove make it clear that the defence available to an Insurer under Section 149(2) of the MV Act and the entitlement of a Claimant to receive compensation are not always co-extensive. While proof of absence of a valid Driving Licence may enable the Insurer to avoid its contractual liability towards the insured, the statutory framework governing third-party claims requires the Court to adopt an approach that advances the object of the legislation and secures just compensation to victims of motor accidents. 23. In the case at hand, it is not disputed that the offending vehicle was being driven by its owner, who was not holding a valid and effective Driving Licence on the date of the accident. The learned Tribunal has also returned a finding to that effect. Consequently, the Petitioner-Insurance Company cannot be fastened with the obligation of indemnifying the owner-insured in the ordinary course. 24. Equally undisputed is the fact that Opposite Party No.1 sustained injuries while travelling as an occupant of the auto-rickshaw and that the offending vehicle was covered by a valid policy of insurance at the relevant time. The Claimant had no connection with the breach attributed to the owner-driver. In such circumstances, compelling the Claimant to independently pursue recovery against the owner would run counter to the salutary object underlying the compensation regime envisaged under the MV Act. 25. The decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the Petitioner undoubtedly recognise the Insurer’s right to resist indemnification where the owner himself drives the vehicle without authorisation. However, those decisions do not detract from the principle recognised W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2026 in Swaran Singh (supra) that, in an appropriate case, the Tribunal may protect the interests of the victim by directing payment in the first instance with liberty to recover the amount from the person responsible for the breach. 26. Viewed thus, this Court finds no infirmity in the course adopted by the learned Tribunal. The direction requiring the Petitioner- Insurance Company to satisfy the award and thereafter realise the amount from the owner-insured appropriately balances the competing interests involved and accords with the principles governing third-party claims under the Act. 27. Insofar as the challenge to the quantum of compensation is concerned, this Court finds no perversity or patent illegality warranting interference. The compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal cannot be said to be so excessive or unreasonable as to justify judicial interference. 28. Accordingly, finding no merit in the present Writ Petition, the same stands dismissed. The award dated 29.10.2025 passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge-cum-3rd Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in M.A.C. Case No.84 of 2018 is hereby affirmed. Pending I.A.(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. (Chittaranjan Dash) Judge A.K.Pradhan/Bijay/Sarbani/Priyanka Designation: Junior Stenographer