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2026 DAILYLAW 17360 (RAJ)

RAMGOPAL ASWAL v. STATE OF RAJ ANDORS

CW/13220/2009 · 2026-01-06

Anand Sharma

body2026

Judgment text

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[2026:RJ-JP:107] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13220/2009 Ramgopal Aswal S/o Shri Sarwan Kumar Khatik, aged around 30 years, R/o Village Agar, Tehsil Thanagaji, District Alwar. ----Petitioner Versus 1. The State Of Rajasthan through the District Collector, Alwar. 2. Zila Parishad through Chief Executive Officer, Alwar. 3. Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti Thanagaji, District Alwar. 4. Gram Panchayat through Sarpanch Agar, Panchayat Samiti, Thanagaji, Alwar 5. Gram Sevak cum Member Secretary, Gram Panchayat, Agar, Tehsil Thanagji, Alwar. 6. Shyam Singh Rana S/o Shri Rameshwar Rana, aged around 27 years, R/o Village & Post Agar, Tehsil Thanagaji, District Alwar. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Naina Saraf For Respondent(s) : Mr. Aditya Sharma for Mr. Kesar Singh Shekhawat, AGC HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Order 06/01/2026 1. Feeling aggrieved vide order dated 10.09.2009 whereby, services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondents, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing this writ petition under the provision of Section 226 of Constitution of India. 2. Facts in brief are that vide order dated 10.06.2008, the petitioner was appointed on the Post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak (Rural Employment Assistant) on contract basis and was posted in Panchayat [2026:RJ-JP:107] (2 of 6) [CW-13220/2009] Samiti Thanagaji, District Alwar. The contract/agreement executed between the parties has also been placed on record as Annexure-2. It is submitted that the contract was for a period of one year from the date of its execution, however, before completion of period of one year, the same was extended for a further period till 2010 however, before completion of contractual period, vide order dated 10.09.2009, services of the petitioner were terminated by leveling allegations of dereliction of duties and causing grave irregularities. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per the agreement dated 13.06.2009 (Annexure-2), only in two contingencies, the contract between the petitioner and respondents could have been terminated. Firstly, as per Clause-6 in case of any misconduct on the part of the employee, if proven after an enquiry, the employer would be entitled to terminate to the services of the employee; or secondly, as per Clause-7 where, contract could have been terminated by serving a notice of one month or as by depositing/paying one month's remuneration as per the contract. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no notice whatsoever was served upon the petitioner prior to passing order dated 10.09.2009 and no enquiry whatsoever was concluded by the respondents prior to the aforesaid order. The petitioner's termination was against the terms and conditions of the contract as well as in violation of principles of natural justice. Hence, the prayer has been made to quash the order dated 10.09.2009. 5. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Civil Appeal No. 9758/2024 decided on [2026:RJ-JP:107] (3 of 6) [CW-13220/2009] 22.08.2024 in Swati Priyadarshini Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that there were serious complaints against the petitioner therefore, in respect of complaints, an enquiry has been conducted after examining the contents of complaints as well as by taking measurement of the work allegedly conducted under the supervision of the petitioner and other relevant material in the enquiry report dated 09.10.2009, it was recommended for taking appropriate action against the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the action has been taken against the petitioner in view of Clause 6 of the contract entered into between the parties and since, during enquiry, even opportunity was given to the petitioner therefore, the action of the respondents cannot be said to be in violation of principles of natural justice. 8. Heard and considered. 9. It is an undisputed fact that the petitioner was although appointed on contractual basis subject to terms and conditions of the contract yet, the respondents were under an obligation to follow the terms and conditions of the contract entered into between the petitioner and respondents. 10. Bare perusal of termination order dated 10.09.2009 does not reflect that the respondents have issued any notice to the petitioner pursuant to Clause 7 of the contract nor have deposited one month's remuneration in lieu of notice. 11. So far as, the stand taken by learned counsel for the respondents is concerned that the respondents have invoked [2026:RJ-JP:107] (4 of 6) [CW-13220/2009] Clause 6 of the contract wherein, the services could have been terminated even prior to completion of the contract period by conducting an enquiry, it is clear from the facts of record that the enquiry report was submitted on 09.10.2009 and much prior to that on 10.09.2009, services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondents. Thus, it is clear from the facts that the termination of the petitioner with preoccupied mind where the respondents have pre-empted the guilt of the petitioner and without even waiting for conclusion of the enquiry, services of the petitioner were terminated. 12. In the case of Swati Priyadarshini (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was also dealing with a similar matter where, without giving any notice or conducting enquiry, services of the contractual employee was terminated at premature stage. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "31. Clause 4 of the RGPSM's General Service Conditions under the heading "Resignation/Termination" provides as below: "Persons working on contract can be terminated with one month notice if found inefficient. In case of persons found indulged in undesirable activities amounting to degradation of dignity of Mission, Mission Director shall reserve right to terminate him/her with immediate effect." 32. Perusal of Clause 4 makes it clear that ordinarily, for inefficiency, one month's notice is sufficient. The Clause also makes it clear that if someone is found to have indulged in "undesirable activities", the Mission Director was competent to terminate such person's service "with immediate effect". We are afraid that the respondents have placed themselves in a Catch-224 situation. If the order dated 30.03.2013 falls within the former part of Clause 4, as contended by the respondent, on [2026:RJ-JP:107] (5 of 6) [CW-13220/2009] the premise that it is a case of termination simpliciter and non-stigmatic, then one month's notice was required to be issued to the appellant, which admittedly was not done in the instant matter. Arguendo, where the order dated 20.03.2013 to be seen as falling under the latter part of Clause 4, it would be stigmatic, as made clear by the use of the words "indulged in undesirable activities amount to degradation of dignity of Mission". 33. In either of the above-noted eventualities, the Impugned Judgment would have to necessarily be set-aside. Nevertheless, let us examine the reasoning of the Division Bench, which opined that the order is non-stigmatic and simpliciter non- renewal of contract. The order dated 30.03.2013 was, quite obviously, the culmination of the process set into motion by the two SCNs, which has been overlooked by the Division Bench. The mere non- mention of the background situation or the SCNs in the order dated 30.03.2013 cannot, by itself, be determinative of the nature of the order. As held by this Court in Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 8315 and Anoop Jaiswal V. Government of India, (1984) 2 SCC6, the form of an order is not its final determinant and the Court can file out the real reason and true character behind terminating/removing an employee. Moreover, the Impugned Judgment also does not deal with Clause 4. Interestingly, this Clause also escaped the attention of or/and was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge either. 35. We would only be adding to verbosity by multiplying authorities. In view of the above dictum, it is clear that the Respondents did not comply with Clause 4 - either the first part or the second part thereof. The order dated 30.03.2013 does visit the appellant with evil consequences and would create hurdles for her re further employment." 13. In the light of aforesaid discussion as well as in view of the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Swati Priyadarshini (supra), this Court finds that the order [2026:RJ-JP:107] (6 of 6) [CW-13220/2009] dated 10.09.2009 suffers from violation of conditions of contract as well as violation of principles of natural justice hence, the same is hereby quashed and set-aside. The petitioner is entitled for all the consequential benefits as per terms and conditions of the contract executed between the petitioner and respondents. 14. It goes without saying that the respondents are at liberty to take legal action against the petitioner as per the terms and conditions of the contract after giving due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 15. Hence, the S.B. Civil Writ Petition stands allowed. (ANAND SHARMA),J NEERU/22