2026:HHC:30635 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1169 of 2026 Date of Decision: 24.07.2026 Raj Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Vinod Chauhan, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General with SI Anup Kumar I.O. P.S. Sadar, District Mandi, H.P. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (oral) The petitioner has filed the present petition for regular bail in FIR No. 48 of 2026, dated 04.02.2026, registered at Police Station Sadar District Mandi, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 109, 118(1) and Section 352 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the informant Jitender Kumar, Prem Sagar, Labhu and Anku had gone 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:30635 to Ranibain. An altercation took place in the petitioner’s garage between the petitioner and Prem Sagar, and Prem Sagar sustained injury on the left side of his chest. The police seized the broken knife, CCTV footage installed in the garage, a blood sample and other material. The police arrested the petitioner on 05.02.2026. The police have completed the investigation, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The prosecution's case itself discloses that Prem Sagar and other persons had entered the petitioner’s garage, where the altercation had taken place. This shows that the informant party was the aggressor. The petitioner had also filed a complaint before the police, but no FIR was registered. The prosecution's case shows that the incident had occurred all of a sudden, without any premeditation. The petitioner is the sole earner of the family, and there is no other person to look after his family members. He would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant and other persons had gone to the petitioner’s garage on 04.02.2026. Raj Kumar (present petitioner) 3 2026:HHC:30635 and Kaku were found at the gate of the garage. Raj Kumar and Prem Sagar had an argument, which turned into a scuffle. The informant and other persons rescued Prem Sagar and took him out of the garage. They found that the left chest of Prem Sagar was bleeding. One retired police official checked Prem Sagar and found that a broken piece of a knife was embedded in the chest. The piece of the knife was removed. The remaining portion of the knife was found inside the garage. Prem Sagar disclosed on the way to the hospital that the knife blow was inflicted by Kaku. The police investigated the matter and checked the CCTV footage. It was found that the informant party had entered the petitioner’s garage, where they argued with Raj Kumar. Raj Kumar took out a knife from his pocket and inflicted a blow on the left chest of Prem Sagar. Raj Kumar threw the handle on the spot. The police arrested Raj Kumar and seized the material objects. The CCTV footage was taken into possession and was sent to SFL for analysis. The Medical Officer stated that the injury was endangering the life of the patient, and the nature of the injury was grievous. DNA of Prem Sagar was found on his clothes. It was not possible to compare the facial features in the photograph and the CCTV footage due to the long distance. As per the opinion of the Medical 4 2026:HHC:30635 Officer, the injury could have been caused by means of a knife. The charge sheet was filed before the Court, and the matter is listed on 04.08.2026 for consideration of the charge, hence the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Vinod Chauhan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, and learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Vinod Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. Prem Sagar had revealed on the way to the hospital that the knife blow was inflicted by Kaku, whereas this version was changed during the investigation, and the petitioner was stated to be the person who had inflicted the knife blow. This made the prosecution's case highly doubtful. The police have filed the charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner is the sole earner of the family, and his family members would suffer from his incarceration. The status report also mentions that Prem Sagar and other persons had visited the petitioner's garage with the intent to cause hurt to him. Therefore, the petitioner had a right of 5 2026:HHC:30635 private defence. The petitioner has roots in society, and there is no chance of his absconding. He would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the informant party was not armed. The petitioner had kept a knife in his pocket, which he used to inflict an injury on the victim. The carrying of a knife showed that the act was premeditated. The injury was inflicted on the left side of the chest and was dangerous to life. The charge sheet has been filed, and the petitioner would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while 6 2026:HHC:30635 elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. 7 2026:HHC:30635 While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 8 2026:HHC:30635 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) 9 2026:HHC:30635 xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed on page 308: 10 2026:HHC:30635 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The police relied upon the CCTV footage to determine the assailant, and found from the CCTV footage that the petitioner had taken out a knife from his pocket and used it to inflict injury on the victim. Therefore, the fact that the victim had named Kaku as the assailant, but the police had mentioned the petitioner as an assailant, would not make any difference. The police had based the finding on the CCTV footage, which contains the visual account of the incident. 12. The CCTV footage also shows that the victim and the other persons had entered the petitioner’s garage. It was submitted that the victim and other persons were the aggressors and the petitioner had a right to private defence. This submission 11 2026:HHC:30635 cannot be accepted. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the state that the victim was not armed with any weapon. Therefore, the petitioner could not have any threat to his life. However, the petitioner took out a knife from his pocket and used it to inflict an injury on the left side of the victim's chest. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that carrying a knife in the pocket showed premeditation. 13. The Medical Officer has certified that the injury was dangerous to life, moreover, the injury was caused on the left side of the chest, a vital part, with a knife, a sharp-edged weapon, and had the death been caused, petitioner would have been guilty of the murder because causing an injury with a sharp-edged weapon on the vital part of the body shows the intention to cause death. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner is involved in the commission of an offence punishable under Section 109(2) of the BNS. The offence under Section 109(2) of BNS is punishable by death or imprisonment for life, which means the remainder of the natural life of that person. Thus, the offence is heinous and severely punishable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 12 2026:HHC:30635 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed on page 244: “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point, three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party 13 2026:HHC:30635 would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 14. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail considering the severity of the punishment and the nature of the offence. 15. It was submitted that the petitioner was arrested on 05.02.2026, and the prosecution has not completed the trial, which violates the petitioner's right to a speedy trial. This submission is only stated to be rejected. The charge sheet has been filed, and the matter is listed on 04.08.2026. It takes time to investigate the matter and complete various formalities before the Trial can commence. Considering the nature of the offence, the period of five months does not show any delay. 16. No other point was urged. 17. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 14 2026:HHC:30635 18. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) 24th July, 2026. Judge (Ravinder)