[2025:RJ-JP:50624] (1 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1386/2025 Kumari Mrinalini Jai Singh D/o Shri Jaideep Singh, Aged About 32 Years, R/o C-42, Jyoti Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur, Presently Residing At Flat No. 502, Pearl Prem, B-129, Rajendra Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur. ----Appellant Versus 1. Jaideep Singh S/o (Late) Thakur Shri Vijay Singh, Aged About 59 Years, R/o C-42, Jyoti Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur, Presently Residing At - Flat No. 502, Pearl Prem, B-129, Rajendra Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur Now Residing At Flat No. 203, Second Floor, Brij Villa Apartment, Rajendra Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur. 2. Jr Resorts And Realty Llp, Registered Office S-9, Mohan Nagar, Gopalpura Bypass, Jaipur Through Partner Shri Manoj Parwani S/o Shri Jhangiram Parwani 3. Smt. Shruti Bhargava W/o Shri Dr. Ranjit Bhargava, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Naval Kishore Estate, 75, Opposite Hazratganj Police Station, Mg Road, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. 4. Smt. Smriti Kumar W/o Shri Vijendra Singh Rana, R/o House No. 1102, Chandigarh. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Ms. Suruchi Kasliwal with Ms. Alisha Chopra For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sharwan Singh Rathore Mr. Avi Airun Mr. Jitendra Mituka HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA Judgment Reportable Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments 09.12.2025 Date on which the judgment was reserved 09.12.2025 Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced Full Judgment Date of pronouncement 06.01.2026 [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (2 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] 1. The present appeal arises out of an order dated 07.01.2025 passed by learned Additional District & Session Judge No.8, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, Jaipur, whereby the temporary injunction application filed by the plaintiff-appellant was dismissed. 2. Briefly noted facts of the case are that the plaintiff-appellant had filed a suit for partition. In the suit, a temporary injunction application was filed. 2.1 The case of the plaintiff-appellant is that the Plot No.C-42, Jyoti Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur was purchased by his grandfather- Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh from the income of Hindu Undivided Family (hereinafter referred to as ‘H.U.F.’) on 10.07.1961. The father of the appellant-plaintiff namely Shri Jaideep Singh was residing as a member of H.U.F. in the said property and she along with her parents was residing there by birth and thus had an inherent right in the H.U.F. property. Thereafter, the grandfather- Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh of the plaintiff-appellant expired on 07.10.2007 and her grandmother expired on 15.03.2022. It is pertinent to note that no will was executed either by grandfather- Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh or grandmother-Smt. Rajendra Kumari. 2.2 There has been no partition by metes and bounds in the disputed property. The appellant-plaintiff thus claimed one & half of share in the Plot No.C-42, Jyoti Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur by virtue of her coparcenary rights. 2.3 Further, it was stated in the plaint that a Memorandum of Understanding, with the consent of the plaintiff as well as plaintiff’s mother, was unilaterally entered upon by non-applicant No.1-Mr. Jaideep Singh with non-applicant No.2-J.R. Resorts & Realty LLP (hereinafter referred to as ‘Builder’) to construct multi- [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (3 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] storey building. Out of the said constructed flats in the multi- storey building, the appellant-plaintiff was entitled for 1/2 of the flats from the flats which were to be made available to the non- applicant No.1-Mr. Jaideep Singh. 2.4 The building had now been constructed but non-applicant No.1-Mr. Jaideep Singh in collusion with the Builder are bent upon to sell the flats that form a share of the appellant-plaintiff. The plaintiff further stated that as per the Development Agreement, all the 17 flats that has come in the share of the non-applicant No.1, the plaintiff also holds a share upto one-half. Therefore, she was entitled for 8.5 number of flats in the multi-storey building and for that purpose, she claimed a partition and during the pendency of the suit an injunction may be issued for the 17 flats that have not been divided by metes and bound and are coming in the share of non-applicant no. 1 as per the memorandum of understanding. 3. The non-applicant No.1 denied the averments made in the temporary injunction application and contended that the disputed property was a self-acquired property of late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh. 3.1 During the life time of late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh by way of a settlement deed dated 12.02.1999, a compromise decree dated 12.02.1999 was passed in a manner that the disputed property was divided into three portions ; One share was of grandfather-Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh, second share was of grandmother-Smt. Rajendra Kumari and the third share was of the non-applicant No.1-Mr. Jaideep Singh. 3.2 On the demise of Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh on 07.10.2007, the 1/3rd share that belonged to Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh was succeeded by Smt. Rajendra Kumari, Smt. Shruti [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (4 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] Bhargava, Smt. Smriti Kumar and Shri Jaideep Singh. Smt. Shruti and Smt. Smriti by way of registered release deeds dated 27.01.2010 and 25.04.2016 respectively released their share in favour of their brother i.e. non-applicant No.1 Mr. Jaideep Singh. 3.3 Similarly, Smt. Rajendra Kumari w/o Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh also through a registered power of attorney dated 08.6.2012 granted all rights to non-applicant No. 1 Shri Jaideep Singh and thereafter also executed a will and relinquishment deed dated 16.06.2021. 3.4 It was also contended that no challenge has been made with respect to the will dated 16.06.2021 and thus, contended that now, he is only the owner of the disputed property and the appellant-plaintiff has no right in the disputed property. Further, the property has been partitioned in the life time of Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh through the decree dated 12.02.1999 and therefore, the applicant has no independent legal right in any manner in the disputed property. 4. The non-applicant No.2-Builder filed a separate reply, contending that out of the 30 flats, the non-applicant No.1 is entitled for 12 flats as per the MOU and even the flats numbers have been mentioned in MOU. Further, the Builder contended that he had completed the construction of 30 flats and out of the same 1 or 2 units have also been sold. 5. Learned Trial Court after hearing both the parties decided prima facie case and balance of convenience against the applicant, and no irreparable loss was found in favour of the applicant and thus, the temporary injunction application was rejected vide order dated 07.01.2025. [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (5 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the family settlement dated 12.02.1999 has not been registered, and therefore, the compromise decree 12.02.1999 cannot be relied upon. 6.1 The plaintiff is a coparcener in the property and thus, the property remains a H.U.F. property and is entitled for one half share in the same. 6.2 Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that since no partition or testamentary deposition of the property took place before 20.12.2004 therefore, by virtue of amendment dated 09.09.2005 in Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred as ‘Act of 1956’), the appellant became a coparcener of the property along with her father. 6.3 It has further been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that out of 18 flats, 50% i.e. 9 flats belong to the appellant and therefore, injunction may be issued at least for 9 flats. 6.4 Counsel for the appellant further argued that wife is not entitled to claim partition of the co-parcenary property, however, on partition the wife is also entitled for the same share. 6.4 Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the co-parcenary Mr. Jaideep Singh has three members namely Shri Jaideep Singh himself, his wife and appellant-Kumari Mrinalini and out of 9 flats each coparcener is entitled for three flats and thus the appellant is also entitled for three flats out of 18 flats and therefore at least on 3 flats injunction may be issued. Further, it was argued that prima facie case do exist in favour of the appellant and balance of convenience is also there and if the [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (6 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] injunction is not issued then irreparable loss would be faced by the appellant. 6.5 Learned counsel for appellant has relied upon the following judgments to buttress his arguments: (i) Subraya M.N. vs Vittala M.N. and Ors.; (2016) 8 SCC 705. (ii) Yellapu Uma Maheshwari and Anr. Vs Buddha Jagadheeswararao and Ors.; (2015) 16 SCC 787. 7. Per contra learned counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that the property in dispute was partitioned by way of a compromise decree dated 12.02.1999. 7.1 After the decree of partition dated 12.02.1999 was executed, the property in dispute was no more a joint property or a HUF property or a coparcenary property. 7.2 After partition, the property which comes in the hands of an individual becomes his absolute self-acquired property. 7.3 Further, a female has no right as a ‘Coparcener’ in the property which has already been partitioned by way of decree prior to 20.12.2004. 7.4 Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 further contended that so far as 1/3rd share which belonged to Late Vijay Singh under the decree of partition dated 12.02.1999 is concerned, the said was succeeded by his wife, a son and two daughters namely Rajendra Kumari, Jaideep Singh, Shruti Bhargav and Smriti Kumari in equal share i.e. 1/4th each. Thereafter, all the successors have released their respective share in favour of Shri Jaideep Singh by way of registered release deeds. 7.5 The share of 1/3 of Rajendri kumari has also been given by her through the registered will to Jaipdeep. [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (7 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] 7.6 Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the property coming in the hand of Class - I heir under Section 8 of Act of 1956 is the self-acquired property of the Class I heir. 7.6 He further submitted that a granddaughter cannot claim any right in the property of her grandfather if her father is alive. 7.7 Learned counsel for the respondent thus submitted that there is neither there is any prima facie case in favour of appellant nor any balance of convenience and therefore, the appeal may be dismissed. 8. Further, learned counsel for non-applicant respondent No. 2 submits that the dispute purely pertains to the division of flats which form a share of Shri Jaideep Singh i.e respondent No.1. 8.1 Moreover, the plaintiff had clearly admitted that the MOU was entered between the non-applicant No. 1 and non-applicant No. 2 only after the consent of the plaintiff and her mother. 8.2 Learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiff has not claimed any right on the number of flats which has come to the share of non-applicant No. 2. 8.3 Thus, no injunction can be issued with regard to the flats which have come in the share of non-applicant No. 2, and therefore, prayed that the injunction application may be rejected qua him. 9. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. This Court on perusal of the record is of the view that undisputedly the property was purchased by Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh through the registered sale deed dated 10.07.1961. 11. Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh was survived by his wife Rajendra Kumari, son Jaideep and daughters Shruti and Smriti. [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (8 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] The present appellant is the daughter of Shri Jaideep Singh who is alive and is arrayed as respondent No.1 in the present case. The plaintiff-appellant has come out with a case that the property was purchased by Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh through the income of HUF, whereas on the other hand, the case of the respondent is that the property was the self-acquired property of Late Thakur Shri Vijay Singh. 12. In the present factual matrix, two situations arise, one that if the property concerned is a self- acquired property of Late Vijay Singh, then in that case after his death on 07.10.2007, the property will be succeeded by his successors in class I heir, namely his son Jaideep, daughters namely Shruti Bhargav and Smriti Kumar and wife namely Rajendra Kumari. 13. It is a settled position of law that self-acquired property, if succeeded by Class I heirs under the Act of 1956, then the property in their hands becomes the self-acquired property of the Class I heirs and during the life time of the father, a grandson or granddaughter has no right. It is only when the father is not alive then the grand son or granddaughter will succeed the share what their father would have succeeded. Since Mr. Jaideep, father of appellant is alive therefore the appellant has no prima facie right in the property. 14. The second situation is that if the property is treated as the property purchased by Late Shri Vijay Singh through the HUF income, then since a decree of partition dated 12.02.1999 took place between the members of the HUF therefore after the decree of partition between the members of the HUF, the property partitioned becomes the absolute property of the individual members in their hands and in that case also if a share which [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (9 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] came in possession would be his absolute property and after his death the share would be succeeded by the Class I heir and in that case also since father of the appellant is alive, the appellant being a granddaughter cannot claim in the property of the grandfather share which came in possession after the decree of partition dated 12.02.1999. 15 This Court finds support in arriving at the above conclusion on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex court in the case of Radha Bai versus Ram Narayan reported in 2019 Supreme (SC) 1289 wherein the Court observed and held as under: “20. The consistent view of this Court, including of three Judge Bench, is that the grand son or granddaughter is clearly excluded from heirs in Class-I. Saheblal himself was grandson of Sukhdeo, who predeceased Sukhdeo. After the demise of Sukhdeo in 1965, therefore, the ancestral suit property could be and came to be partitioned between Janakram and Pilaram in 1967. As a result of that partition, the suit property came to the exclusive share of Janakram in his individual capacity. He could, therefore, legitimately dispose of the same in the manner he desired and which he did in favour of his grandsons (defendant Nos.1 to 3 respectively) vide registered sale deed dated 21st July, 1979. Neither the stated partition of 1967 nor the registered sale deed in favour of respondents (defendant Nos.1 to 3) dated 21st July, 1979 has been challenged. The relief sought in the suit as filed by the appellant/plaintiff is only for partition and awarding share to the appellant/plaintiff alongwith possession. Suffice it to observe that, the granddaughter of Janakram (appellant herein) could not have claimed a higher right than the right of her father Saheblal.” [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (10 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] 16. Further, in the case of Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar ; (1987) 1 SCC 204, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “10.This question has been considered by this Court in CWT v. Chander Sen [(1986) 3 SCC 567 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 641] where one of us (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.) observed that under the Hindu law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in father's property and becomes part of the coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Normally, therefore whenever the father gets a property from whatever source, from the grandfather or from any other source, be it separated property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family with him. This Court observed that this position has been affected by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and, therefore, after the Act, when the son inherited the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8, he does not take it as karta of his own undivided family but takes it in his individual capacity. At p. 577 to 578 of the Report, this Court dealt with the effect of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the commentary made by Mulla, 15th Edn., pp. 924-26 as well as Mayne's Hindu Law, 12th Edn. pp. 918-19. Shri Banerji relied on the said observations of Mayne on Hindu Law, 12th Edn., at p. 918-19. This Court observed in the aforesaid decision that the views expressed by the Allahabad High Court, the Madras High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court appeared to be correct and unable to accept the views of the Gujarat High Court. To the similar [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (11 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] effect is the observation of learned author of Mayne's Hindu Law, 12th Edn., p. 919. In that view of the matter, it would be difficult to hold that property which devolved on a Hindu under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be HUF in his hand vis-à-vis his own sons. If that be the position then the property which devolved upon the father of the respondent in the instant case on the demise of his grandfather could not be said to be HUF property. If that is so, then the appellate authority was right in holding that the respondent was a licensee of his father in respect of the ancestral house.” 17. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgement rendered in the case of Trijugi Narain v. Sankoo ; (2021) 15 SCC 561 observed and held as under: “10.However, with the enforcement of the Succession Act with effect from 17-6-1956, any property inherited by an heir vide intestate succession in the event of death occurring after 17-6-1956 is absolute or individual property and not ancestral property. In the present case, we are not concerned with the concept of deemed partition of existing coparcenary property on death of a coparcener, execution of a will by coparcener of his undivided interest vide Section 30 of the Succession Act or the amendments made in the Succession Act vide Act 39 of 2005 applicable with effect from 9-9-2005.” 18. In the case of Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur reported in (2020) 14 SCC 436, the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered the following judgment and observed as under: “7.5. After the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, this position has undergone a change. Post 1956, if a person inherits a self-acquired [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (12 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] property from his paternal ancestors, the said property If succession opened under the old Hindu law i.e. prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the parties would be governed by Mitakshara law. The property inherited by a male Hindu from his paternal male ancestor shall be coparcenary property in his hands vis-à-vis his male descendants up to three degrees below him. The nature of property will remain as coparcenary property even after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 becomes his self-acquired property, and does not remain coparcenary property. 19. In the present case since the property itself is purchased on 10.07.1961, i.e post coming in force of the Act of 1956, therefore there is no question of any coparcener interest accruing in favour of appellant as the property has been purchased after coming in force of act of 1956. 20. The argument of the appellant that the partition deed dated 12.02.1999 is not registered document and therefore the decree dated 12.02.1999 cannot be admissible in evidence and cannot accepted for the reason that as per Section 17(2)(v) of the Registration Act, 1908 otherwise is provided. The relevant provision is quoted as below: “17. Documents of which registration is compulsory. (1)The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely, (a)instruments of gift of immovable property; [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (13 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] (b)other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property; (c)non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest; and (d)leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent; (e)[ non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a Court or any award when such decree or order or award purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property Provided that the [State Government] [Substituted by A.O.1950, for "Provincial Government" .] may, by order published in the [Official Gazette] [Substituted by A.O.1937, for "Local Official Gazette" .], exempt from the operation of this sub- section any leases executed in any district, or part of a district, the terms granted by which do not exceed five years and the annual rents reserved by which do not exceed fifty rupees. [(1-A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001, and if such documents [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (14 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] are not registered on or after such commencement then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53-A.] [Inserted by Act 48 of 2001, Section 3 (w.e.f. 24.9.2001).] (2)Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub- section (1) applies to (i)any composition deed; or (ii)any instrument relating to shares in a joint stock company, notwithstanding that the assets of such company consist in whole or in part of immovable property; or (iii)any debenture issued by any such company and not creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest, to or in immovable property except insofar as it entitles the holder to the security afforded by a registered instrument whereby the company has mortgaged, conveyed or otherwise transferred the whole or part of its immovable property or any interest therein to trustees upon trust for the benefit of the holders of such debentures; or (iv)any endorsement upon or transfer of any debenture issued by any such company; or (v)[any document other than the documents specified in sub-section (1-A)] [Substituted by Act 48 of 2001, Section 3, for "any document" (w.e.f. 24.9.2001).] not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest; or (vi) any decree or order of a Court [except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject- [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (15 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] matter of the suit or proceeding] [Substituted by A.O.1937, for "and any award" .]; or (vii)any grant of immovable property by the [Government][Substituted by A.O.1950, for "Crown" .]; or(viii)any instrument of partition made by a Revenue Officer; Therefore, the decree for partition does not require registration for the suit property. 21. 21. The argument of the petitioner appellant to the effect that by virtue of amendment in Section 6 of Act of 1956, in the year 2005 she has acquired right in the property. This Court as found above in the judgment that there is no coparcener interest arising as the property by a Hindu has been acquired on 10.07.1961 post Act of 1956 and therefore, there is no applicability of Section 6 of the Act of 1956. 22. This Court also finds that the appellant has not challenged the decree dated 12.02.1999 as well as the “Will” of Smt. Rajendra Kumari and release deeds by Smriti and Shruti Bhargav and has merely claimed partition, which cannot be claimed till father is alive. 23. The judgment of Subraya M.N. (supra) cited by learned counsel for the appellant is on the issue that if family partition, is in writing, then it requires registration but in the present case there is a decree for partition which do not require registration hence there is no applicability of the judgment in the present case. 24. Further, the judgment of Yellapu Uma Maheshwari (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is again a judgment laying down law that a partition deed or relinquishment deed if unregistered is not admissible in evidence but can be read for collateral purpose. In the present case, there is a decree of [2025:RJ-JP:50624] (16 of 16) [CMA-1386/2025] partition and the release deeds are registered which have not been challenged by the appellant hence the authority cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are not applicable in the present case. 25. For the reasons mentioned above, this Court finds no prima facie case in favour of appellant and therefore the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 26. All pending applications stand disposed of. (BIPIN GUPTA),J