2026:HHC:30541 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 26 of 2013-A Reserved on: 14.07.2026 Date of Decision: 23.07.2026. Khuddu Ram alias Vijay ...Appellant Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Lakshay Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.01.2013, passed by learned Special Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the appellant (accused before learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of an offences punishable under Sections 20 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:30541 two years, pay a fine of ₹20,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. It was asserted that SI Prem Lal (PW-11), SI Ajay Kumar (PW-8), HC Dhan Pal, Constable Ashok Kumar (PW-3), Lady Constable Saroj Kumari and HHG Manjit Kumar had gone for patrolling on 31.10.2010. They saw the accused at Sungraad near the shop of Baljeet Sharma (PW-2). The accused started running away after seeing the police. The police became suspicious of the conduct of the accused and apprehended him on the spot. The police called Baljeet Singh (PW-2) and Ashok Kumar (PW-1) to the spot. The accused disclosed his name as Khuddu Ram alias Vijay. SI Prem Lal (PW-11) informed the accused that he (SI Prem Lal) was suspecting the possession of some contraband and the search of the accused was required to be taken. The accused had the legal right to be searched before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. 3 2026:HHC:30541 The accused opted to be searched by the Police. Memo (Ext.PW- 3/A) was prepared. The police gave their personal search to the accused. The accused had a blue cloth bag (Ext.P1) with him. The police searched the bag and found a transparent polythene (Ext.P3) containing black and brown substances in the form of sticks. SI Prem Lal (PW-11) tested it by burning it and found it to be Charas (Ext.P4). The Charas was weighed on the electronic weighing machine, and its weight was found to be 515 grams. The Charas was put in the cloth bag in the same manner in which it was recovered. The cloth bag was put in a cloth parcel (Ext.P5). The parcel was sealed with three seals of ‘स’. NCB-I Form in triplicate (Mark ‘K’) was filled, and an impression of the seal ‘स’ was put on the Form. A sample seal was taken on a separate piece of cloth (Ext.PW-8/B), and the seal was handed over to witness Ashok Kumar after its use. The Charas was seized vide Memo (Ext.PW-8/A). SI Prem Lal (PW-11) prepared a Rukka (Ext.PW- 11/B) and sent it to the Police Station, where an F.I.R. (Ext.PW- 7/A) was registered. SI Prem Lal (PW-11) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-11/C), arrested the accused vide memo (Ext.PW-11/G), and recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their versions. The police party went to the 4 2026:HHC:30541 Police Station along with the accused. SI Prem Lal (PW-11) produced the accused, the case property and the case file before Desh Raj (PW-7), the Station House Officer. Desh Raj resealed the parcels with three seal impressions of ‘T’, obtained the Sample seal (Ext.PW-7/C) on a separate piece of cloth, put the Seal impression on the NCB-I form, and handed over the parcels, NCB-I form and seal impression to MHC Jaswant Singh (PW-9), who made an entry in the register of Malakhana at No. 506/10 (Ext.PW-9/A) and deposited the case property in Malkhana. He handed over the case property to HHC Chuni Lal (PW-6) on 01.11.2010 with a direction to take it to FSL Junga, vide RC No. 123/10 (Ext.PW-9B). HHC Chuni Lal (PW-6) deposited all the articles at FSL Junga and handed over the receipt to MHC on his return. SI Prem Lal (PW-11) prepared a Special Report (Ext.PW5/A) and sent it to the Additional Superintendent of Police, who made an endorsement on the Special Report and handed it over to HC Jagdish Chand (PW-5), who made an entry in his register and retained the Special Report with him. The result of the analysis (Ext.PW-7/E) was issued, stating that the exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas that contained 32.17% W/W resin in it. The statements of witnesses 5 2026:HHC:30541 were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial Court. 3. The Learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with a commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Ashok Kumar (PW-1) and Baljeet Sharma (PW-2) are the independent witnesses to the recovery, but they did not support the prosecution's case. Constable Ashok Kumar (PW-3) and SI Ajay Kumar (PW-8) are the official witnesses to the recovery. HHC Suresh Kumar (PW-4) carried the Special Report to the Additional SP. HC Jagdish Chand (PW-5), working as a Reader to the Additional SP to whom the Special Report was handed over. HHC Chunni Lal (PW-6) carried the case property to FSL Junga. Desh Raj (PW-7) resealed the case property. HC Jaswant Singh (PW-9) was working as MHC, with whom the case property was deposited. Lashkari Ram (PW-10) did not support the 6 2026:HHC:30541 prosecution's case. SI Prem Lal (PW-11) effected the recovery and investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He claimed that he was innocent, but he did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of official witnesses corroborated each other. Minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses were not sufficient to discard them. There was nothing in the cross-examination of the official witnesses to show that they had any enmity with the accused. The mere fact that independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution's case was not sufficient to cast doubt on the prosecution's case. The non-production of the seal was not material because there was no legal requirement under the law to produce the seal before the Court. The integrity of the case property was duly established. Therefore, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal, asserting that the prosecution had not complied with the 7 2026:HHC:30541 requirement of Section 55 of the NDPS Act. There were material contradictions in the statements of official witnesses, which made the prosecution's case doubtful. The weight of the Charas was found to be 515 grams on the spot, whereas it was found to be 512 grams in the laboratory, which showed that there was tampering with the case property. There was an overwriting on the exhibits, and the signatures of the witnesses were not visible on some of the exhibits, which created doubt in the prosecution's case. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lakshay Thakur, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State 9. Mr Lakshay Thakur, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution's case, which made the prosecution's case suspect. SI Prem Lal (PW-11) had provided three options to the accused to be searched before the Magistrate, Gazetted Officer or the Police and giving the third option to be searched before the police is violative of Section 50 8 2026:HHC:30541 of the NDPS Act. The police claimed that they had given their personal search to the accused, but no memo of the personal search was produced, which made the prosecution's version highly doubtful. There were material contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, which falsified the prosecution's case. The learned trial Court had not looked into these contradictions and brushed them aside by holding that the contradictions were minor. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court be set aside. He relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranjan Kumar Chadha vs. State of H.P.:2023INSC:878 and judgment of this Court in State of H.P. vs Anil Kumar @ Rinku Latest HLJ 2026 HP (1) 410 in support of his submission. 10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned trial Court had properly appreciated the evidence on record. The mere fact that independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution's case is not sufficient to discard it. Minor contradictions were bound to come with time. The scales used to weigh the Charas on the spot and in the laboratory were different, and some 9 2026:HHC:30541 difference was bound to come. The recovery was effected from the bag being carried by the accused, and the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. There is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records. 12. Ashok Kumar (PW-1) stated that he had gone to the police station for the verification of his labour. The police obtained his signature for verification. No recovery was effected in his presence. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he denied that the police had apprehended the accused, searched the bag being carried by the accused and recovered 515 grams of Charas. He denied that the charas was weighed and sealed on the spot. He denied the previous statement recorded by the Police. 13. Baljeet Sharma (PW-2) stated that he was working as an agent of the insurance. Nothing had happened in his presence. He was also permitted to be cross-examined. He admitted that his father was running a shop in Soongarwal village. He denied that the police were on patrol duty, and the police saw the 10 2026:HHC:30541 accused, who started running away after seeing the police. He denied that police apprehended the accused, and the accused revealed his name. He denied that the police searched the accused after completing the formalities and recovered 515 grams of Charas. He denied that the police weighed and sealed the Charas and prepared the documents on the spot. He stated in cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that his signatures were obtained by the police for verification. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 14. SI Prem Lal (PW-11) specifically stated that he had recorded the statement of Ashok Kumar (Ext PW-11/D) and Baljeet Sharma (Ext. PW11/E) as per their versions. This was not challenged in the cross-examination, which means that this part of his testimony has been accepted as correct. Therefore, witnesses Ashok Kumar and Baljeet Sharma are shown to have made two inconsistent statements on two different occasions, which cannot stand together, and their credit has been impeached under Section 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his 11 2026:HHC:30541 statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed: “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross- examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” 15. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed: “12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross- examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Court observed: 12 2026:HHC:30541 "It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony. 16. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4254, the prosecution's version cannot be discarded because the independent witnesses did not support it. It was observed: Though the independent witnesses, PW-1 Rajiv Kumar and PW-2 Hira Lal, were declared hostile and were cross- examined, however, the law in respect of appreciating the testimonies of such witnesses is well settled. Hon'ble Apex Court in Sudru versus State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 8 SCC 333, relying upon Bhajju versus State of M.P., 2010 4 SCC 327, has again reiterated the well-settled principle that evidence of a hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution version. Merely because a witness has turned hostile, the same does not render his evidence or testimony inadmissible in a trial, and such a conviction can be based upon such testimony, if it is corroborated by other reliable evidence. In a case titled Raja and Others versus State of Karnataka (2016) 10 SCC 506, the Apex Court observed that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be altogether discarded, and as such, it is open for the Court to rely on the dependable part of such evidence which stands duly corroborated by other reliable evidence on record. In a case titled Selvaraj @ Chinnapaiyan versus State represented by Inspector of Police, (2015) 2 SCC 662, the Apex Court has observed that in a situation/case, wherein the witness deposes falsely in his/her cross-examination, that itself is not sufficient to outrightly discard his/her testimony in examination-in-chief. The Court held that a 13 2026:HHC:30541 conviction can be recorded believing the testimony of such a witness given in examination-in-chief; however, such evidence is required to be examined with great caution. In Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 123, it has been held as under: - "The seizure witness turning hostile may not be very significant by itself, as it is not an uncommon phenomenon in criminal trials, particularly in cases relating to the NDPS Act.” 17. Thus, the testimonies of these witnesses cannot be used to discard the prosecution's case. 18. SI Prem Lal (PW11) stated that he, ASI Ajay Kumar, HHC Dhanpal, Constable Ashok Kumar, Lady Constable Saroj Kumari and HHG Manjeet Singh were on patrolling duty. They were present near the shop of Baljeet Sharma at about 02.15 p.m., when the accused, having a blue cloth bag in his hand, was found coming towards the shop of Baljeet Singh (PW-2). He returned after seeing the police and started running. The police apprehended him and called Ashok Kumar and Baljeet Singh. The accused identified himself as Khuddu Ram alias Vijay. The accused was suspected of possessing some contraband. Hence, he was told about his right to be searched before a Magistrate, the Gazetted Officer, or the Police. The accused opted to be searched by the police vide Memo (Ext.PW3/A). The police gave their personal search to the accused and searched the blue cloth bag 14 2026:HHC:30541 being carried by the accused. An orange cloth bag was found inside the blue cloth bag, and a transparent polythene envelope containing black brown substance in the form of sticks was recovered. The substance was checked and was found to be Charas. The Charas was weighed with the help of an electronic scale brought from the shop of Baljeet Singh. The weight of Charas was found to be 515 grams. The Charas was wrapped in the same cloth bag. The cloth bag was put in a separate cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with three seals ‘स’. The NCB-1 form was prepared in triplicate, and the seal impression was put on the NCB-1 form. The sample seal was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The Charas was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-8/A). Rukka was prepared and sent to the police station. He carried out the investigations on the spot. 19. Similar statements were made by Constable Ashok Kumar (PW-3) and SI. Ajay Kumar (PW-8). 20. It was submitted that the police had given an option to the accused to be searched before a Magistrate, a Gazetted Officer or the Police, which is contrary to the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, the whole search and recovery is vitiated. This submission will not help the accused 15 2026:HHC:30541 because, in the present case, the recovery was effected from the carry bag being carried by the accused in his hand. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the State of Punjab v. Baljinder Singh, (2019) 10 SCC 473: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 22: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1408, that where the recovery was effected from the bag, briefcase, etc., non-compliance with section 50 is not fatal. It was observed at page 480: 13. The law is thus well settled that an illicit article seized from the person during a personal search conducted in violation of the safeguards provided in Section 50 of the Act cannot by itself be used as admissible evidence of proof of unlawful possession of contraband. But the question is, if there be any other material or article recovered during the investigation, would the infraction with respect to personal search also affect the qualitative value of the other material circumstance? 14. At this stage, we may also consider the following observations from the decision of this Court in Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 3 SCC 746: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 475]: (SCC pp. 752-53, para 15) “15. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the provision of Section 50 of the Act would also apply while searching the bag, briefcase, etc., carried by the person, and its non-compliance would be fatal to the proceedings initiated under the Act. We find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel. It requires to be noticed that the question of compliance or non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act is relevant only where a search of a person is involved, and the said section is not applicable or attracted where no search of a person is involved. Search and recovery from a bag, briefcase, container, etc., does not come within the ambit of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, because 16 2026:HHC:30541 firstly, Section 50 expressly speaks of the search of a person only. Secondly, the section speaks of taking the person to be searched by the gazetted officer or a Magistrate for the purpose of search. Thirdly, this issue in our considered opinion is no more res integra in view of the observations made by this Court in Madan Lal v. State of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664, the Court has observed: (SCC p. 471, para 16) ‘16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in the case of a personal search of a person. It does not extend to search of a vehicle or a container or a bag or premises (see Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 8 SCC 257: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1422], State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080] and Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana, (2001) 3 SCC 28: 2001 SCC (Cri) 426). The language of Section 50 is implicitly clear that the search has to be in relation to a person as contrasted to a search of premises, vehicles or articles. This position was settled beyond doubt by the Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080]. Above being the position, the contention regarding non- compliance with Section 50 of the Act is also without any substance.” 21. This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 197: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1223, and it was observed at page 204: - “16. Simultaneously, the arguments advanced by the appellant regarding non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act are bereft of any merit because no recovery of contraband from the person of the accused has been made, to which compliance of the provision of Section 50 of the NDPS Act has to follow mandatorily. In the present case, in the search for a motorcycle in a public place, the seizure of contraband was made, as revealed. Therefore, compliance 17 2026:HHC:30541 with Section 50 does not apply in the present case. It is settled in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 1 SCC 609 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 497 that in the case of personal search only, the provisions of Section 50 of the Act is required to be complied with but not in the case of vehicle as in the present case, following the judgments of Surinder Kumar [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767] and State of Punjab v. Baljinder Singh, (2019) 10 SCC 473 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 22. Considering the facts of this Court, the argument of non- compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act advanced by the counsel is hereby repelled.” 22. Similar is the judgment in Dayalu Kashyap v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 12 SCC 398: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 334, wherein it was observed at page 400:- “4. The learned counsel submits that the option given to the appellant to take a third choice other than what is prescribed as the two choices under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the Act is something which goes contrary to the mandate of the law and in a way affects the protection provided by the said section to the accused. To support his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand, (2014) 5 SCC 345: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 563, more specifically, SCC para 19. The judgment in turn, relied upon a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080 to conclude that if a search is made by an empowered officer on prior information without informing the person of his right that he has to be taken before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts, failure to take his search accordingly would render the recovery of the illicit article suspicious and vitiate the conviction and sentence of the accused where the conviction has been recorded only on the basis of possession of illicit articles recovered from his person. The third option stated to be given to the accused to get himself searched from the Officer concerned, not being 18 2026:HHC:30541 part of the statute, the same could not have been offered to the appellant, and thus, the recovery from him is vitiated. 5. In the conspectus of the facts of the case, we find that the recovery was in a polythene bag which was being carried on a kanwad. The recovery was not in person. The learned counsel seeks to expand the scope of the observations made by seeking to contend that if the personal search is vitiated by a violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, the recovery made otherwise also would stand vitiated and thus cannot be relied upon. We cannot give such an extended view as is sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. 23. This judgment was followed in Ranjan Kumar Chadha v. State of H.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1262: AIR 2023 SC 5164, and it was observed: “126. As such, there is no direct conflict between SK. Raju (supra) and Baljinder Singh (supra). It is pertinent to note that in SK. Raju (supra), the contraband was recovered from the bag that the accused was carrying, whereas in Baljinder Singh (supra), the contraband was recovered from the vehicle. This makes a lot of difference even while applying the concept of any object being “inextricably linked to the person”. Parmanand (supra) relied upon the judgment in Dilip (supra) while taking the view that if both the person of the accused as well as the bag are searched and the contraband is ultimately recovered from the bag, then it is as good as the search of a person and, therefore, Section 50 would be applicable. However, it is pertinent to note that Dilip (supra) has not taken into consideration Pawan Kumar (supra), which is of a larger Bench. It is also pertinent to note that although in Parmanand (supra) the Court looked into Pawan Kumar (supra), yet ultimately it followed Dilip (supra) and took the view that if the bag carried by the accused is searched and his person is also searched, Section 50 of the NDPS Act will have application. 19 2026:HHC:30541 This is something travelling beyond what has been stated by the large Bench in Pawan Kumar (supra). Baljinder Singh (supra), on the other hand, says that Dilip (supra) does not lay down good law. 127. In the facts of the present case, there is no scope for applying the ratio of Parmanand (supra) and SK. Raju (supra). At the cost of repetition, we may state that in the case at hand, there is nothing to indicate that the search of the person of the accused was also undertaken along with the bag that he was carrying on his shoulder. 128. We do not propose to say anything further as regards SK. Raju (supra) as well as Baljinder Singh (supra). We adhere to the principles of law as explained by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh (supra) and the larger Bench answering the reference in Pawan Kumar (supra).” 24. In the present case, the recovery was effected from the carry bag, and the requirements of Section 50 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. Therefore, the prosecution's case cannot be rejected because of the violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. 25. In Anil Kumar alias Rinku(supra), the recovery was effected from a polythene tied beneath the knees. In the present case, the bag was not tied to the part of the body, and the cited judgment will not help the accused. 26. It was submitted that no memo or personal search of the police officials was prepared, and this makes the testimonies of prosecution witnesses doubtful that they had given their personal search to the accused. This submission is only stated to 20 2026:HHC:30541 be rejected. The Police officials have consistently stated that they had given their personal search to the accused, and there is nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were making false statements. Therefore, the testimonies of police officials are to be accepted as correct, and they cannot be discarded merely because the memo of personal search was not prepared by the police. 27. It was submitted that the testimonies of the police officials contradicted each other on material aspects. The following contradictions were highlighted: i) Constable Ashok Kumar (PW-3) stated that he and SI Prem Lal (PW-11) had proceeded from the Police Station, whereas SI Ajay Kumar (PW-8) stated that he and SI Prem Lal (PW-11) and other police officials had proceeded towards patrolling. A similar statement was made by SI Prem Lal (PW-11). ii) Constable Ashok Kumar (PW-3) stated that police went to the spot by taking the lift as well as on foot, and he could not tell the registration number of the vehicle in which the lift was taken. SI Ajay Kumar (PW-8) and SI Prem Prem Lal (PW-11) stated that they proceeded to the spot in the official vehicle. iii) Constable Ashok Kumar (PW-3) stated that the distance of the Tehsil Office from the spot was 2 to 3 kilometres. SI Ajay Kumar (PW-8) stated that the 21 2026:HHC:30541 Tehsil office was 4 kilometres away from the spot. SI Prem Lal (PW-11) stated that the Tehsil Office was 3 kilometres from the spot. iv) Constable Ashok Kumar (PW-3) and SI Ajay Kumar (PW-8) stated that they had remained on the spot for one hour. SI Prem Lal (PW-11) stated that they had stayed on the spot for about 2 to 3 hours. 28. It was submitted that the prosecution’s case has become suspect because of these contradictions, and the learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the statements of the prosecution witnesses. This submission will not help the accused. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly, keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the 22 2026:HHC:30541 witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. 23 2026:HHC:30541 VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that 24 2026:HHC:30541 witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)” 29. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 25 2026:HHC:30541 39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan 26 2026:HHC:30541 Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961]. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]]. 32. These are variations that would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minute- by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777].” 27 2026:HHC:30541 41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timings as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue 28 2026:HHC:30541 importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 30. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was observed: - “17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the injury to the informant, PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: "42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the 29 2026:HHC:30541 earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 31. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Achchar Singh vs. State of H.P., AIR 2021 SC 3426, that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded due to exaggeration alone. It was observed: “24. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false. Cambridge Dictionary defines "exaggeration" as "the fact of making something larger, more important, better or worse than it is". Merriam-Webster defines the term "exaggerate" as to "enlarge beyond bounds or the truth". The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as "enlarged or altered beyond normal proportions". These expressions unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an 'exaggerated statement' lies in a fact, to which fictitious additions are made to make it more penetrative. Every exaggeration, therefore, has the ingredients of 'truth'. No exaggerated statement is possible without an element of truth. On the other hand, the Advanced Law Lexicon defines "false" as "erroneous, untrue; opposite of correct, or true". Oxford Concise Dictionary states that "false" is "wrong; not correct or true". Similar is the explanation in other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked differential between an 'exaggerated version' and a 'false version'. An exaggerated statement contains both truth and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of truth in it (being the 'opposite' of 'true'). It is well said that to make a mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have to exist primarily. A Court of law, being mindful of such distinction, is duty-bound to disseminate 'truth' from 'falsehood' and sift the grain from the chaff in case of 30 2026:HHC:30541 exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and the chaff are so inextricably intertwined that, in their separation, no real evidence survives that the whole evidence can be discarded. [Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643, 18.] 25. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on Gangadhar Behera (Supra) to contend that even in cases where a major portion of the evidence is found deficient, if the residue is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, a conviction can be based on it. This Court in Hari Chand v. State of Delhi, (1996) 9 SCC 112 held that: "24. ...So far as this contention is concerned, it must be kept in view that while appreciating the evidence of witnesses in a criminal trial, especially in a case of eyewitnesses, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus cannot apply, and the court has to make efforts to sift the grain from the chaff. It is of course true that when a witness is said to have exaggerated in his evidence at the stage of trial and has tried to involve many more accused and if that part of the evidence is not found acceptable the remaining part of the evidence has to be scrutinised with care and the court must try to see whether the acceptable part of the evidence gets corroborated from other evidence on record so that the acceptable part can be safely relied upon..." 26. There is no gainsaying that homicidal deaths cannot be left to judicium dei. The Court, in their quest to reach the truth, ought to make earnest efforts to extract gold out of the heap of black sand. The solemn duty is to dig out the authenticity. It is only when the Court, despite its best efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the benefit of the doubt is extended. 27. An eye-witness is always preferred to others. The statements of P.W.1, P.W.11 and P.W.12 are, therefore, to be analysed accordingly, while being mindful of the difference between exaggeration and falsity. We find that the truth can be effortlessly extracted from their statements. The trial Court fell in grave error and 31 2026:HHC:30541 overlooked the credible and consistent evidence while proceeding with a baseless premise that the exaggerated statements made by the eyewitnesses belie their version.” 32. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arvind Kumar @ Nemichand and others Versus State of Rajasthan, 2022 Cri. L.J. 374, that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded because he had made a wrong statement regarding some aspect. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood, his entire statement is to be discarded does not apply to India. It was observed: - “48. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood, the evidence in its entirety has to be eschewed may not have a strict application to the criminal jurisprudence in our country. The principle governing sifting the chaff from the grain has to be applied. However, when the evidence is inseparable and such an attempt would either be impossible or would make the evidence unacceptable, the natural consequence would be one of avoidance. The said principle has not assumed the status of law but continues only as a rule of caution. One has to see the nature of the discrepancy in a given case. When the discrepancies are very material, shaking the very credibility of the witness, leading to a conclusion in the mind of the court that it is neither possible to separate it nor to rely upon, it is for the said court to either accept or reject." 33. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions, or discrepancies. The Court must consider whether the discrepancies negatively 32 2026:HHC:30541 affect the prosecution's case and whether they pertain to the core of the case rather than the details. 34. In the present case, the recovery was effected on 31.10.2010, and the statements of witnesses were recorded in September and October 2012 after the lapse of 2 years. Therefore, the memories were bound to fade with the passage of time, and Parrot-like testimonies could not have been expected. The discrepancy in the statement of Constable Ashok Kumar (PW3) can be due to the failure of memory to remember the mode of transportation and number of police officials, which will not make his testimony suspect, especially when he has deposed consistently about the other aspects of the prosecution case. 35. The discrepancy regarding the distance was natural because no person measures the distance with a measuring tape. Every person has a different perception of the distance, and the approximate distance given by two persons can never be the same. Thus, the discrepancy in the distance to the Tehsil Office will not be material. 36. The discrepancy regarding the time is also not material because no person remembers the time by looking at the watch, and the person makes an estimate of time, which may or 33 2026:HHC:30541 may not be correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 that people make their estimates by guesswork regarding the time on the spur of the moment, and one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. It was observed: - “(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person.” 37. Therefore, the contradictions regarding the time will not make the prosecution suspect. 38. The Trial Court had rightly pointed out that nothing was suggested to the witnesses that they had any motive to falsely depose against the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kripal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 5 SCC 646: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 680: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 207, that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be ignored because they are police officials. It was observed at page 656: “21. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that recovery has not been proved by any independent witness is of no substance for the reason that, 34 2026:HHC:30541 in the absence of an independent witness to support the recovery, in substance cannot be ignored unless proved to the contrary. There is no such legal proposition that the evidence of police officials, unless supported by an independent witness, is unworthy of acceptance or that the evidence of police officials can be outrightly disregarded.” 39. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri.L.J.4254 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be discarded on the ground that they belong to the police force. It was observed: “11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole testimony of the police official, which, if otherwise is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. There is also no rule of law that lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer, even if such evidence is otherwise trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more scrutiny of their evidence. Wherever the evidence of a police officer, after scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis of conviction, and the absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution’s case. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force.” 40. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh versus State, AIR 2003 S.C. 3011, wherein it was held: “The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the same manner as the testimony of any other witness, and there is no principle of law that, without 35 2026:HHC:30541 corroboration by independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be relied upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of police personnel as of other persons, and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no principle of general application can be laid down.” (Emphasis supplied) 41. This position was reiterated in Sathyan v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 986, wherein it was observed: 22. Conviction being based solely on the evidence of police officials is no longer an issue on which the jury is out. In other words, the law is well settled that if the evidence of such a police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, then basing the conviction thereupon cannot be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground. This Court in Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2013 (6) SCC 588after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh [1988 Supp SCC 686: 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [(2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri) 248] and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC 229 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana [(2013) 6 SCC 595: AIR 2013 SCW 3102] that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large shows its disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him, but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the police department should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that the quality of the evidence outweighs the quantity of evidence. 36 2026:HHC:30541 23. Referring to State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil 2001 (1) SCC 652, in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 674, this court held that: — “23. … That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot be rejected solely on the ground that independent witnesses have not been examined when, on the perusal of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the case put forth by the prosecution is trustworthy. When the evidence of the official witnesses is trustworthy and credible, there is no reason not to rest the conviction on the basis of their evidence.” 24. We must note that in the former it was observed: — “21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature… If the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police, the court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions.” 25. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out memos, do not stand vitiated due to the absence of independent witnesses. 26. It is clear from the above propositions of law, as reproduced and referred to, that the testimonies of official 37 2026:HHC:30541 witnesses cannot be discarded simply because independent witnesses were not examined. The correctness or authenticity is only to be doubted on “any good reason”, which, quite apparently, is missing from the present case. No reason is forthcoming on behalf of the Appellant to challenge the veracity of the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, which the courts below have found absolutely to be inspiring in confidence. Therefore, basing the conviction on the basis of testimony of the police witnesses as undertaken by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court vide the impugned judgment, cannot be faulted with.” 42. Learned Trial Court had accepted the testimonies of police officials as correct. Nothing was shown to this Court that these findings are incorrect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) SCC Online SC 69 that the Appellate Court should not interfere with the findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses recorded by the learned Trial Court unless there is some illegality in it. It was observed: - “83. The trial court, after recording the testimony of the PW-10, and on consideration of the same, found her evidence trustworthy and credible. We see no reason to question the assessment of the credibility of the witness by the Trial Court, which had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness and all other witnesses. Nothing has been brought to our notice of any serious illegality or breach of fundamental law to warrant taking a different view of the evidence of PW-10. In this regard, we may keep in mind the valuable observations made by this Court in Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497, in the following words: 38 2026:HHC:30541 “28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should not be forgotten that the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and, hence, the trial court's conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court possesses the same powers as the original court, but they have to be exercised with proper care, caution and circumspection. When a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial court in the appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well- established principles of law or unreasonable. 29. ………………………………….. 30. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya [(1947-48) 75 IA 252: AIR 1949 PC 32] the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, after referring to relevant decisions on the point, stated [Quoting from Watt v. Thomas, [1947] 1 All ER 582, pp. 583 H-584 A.]: (IA p. 255) “…but if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight. This is not to say that the Judge of the first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when estimating 39 2026:HHC:30541 the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing how their evidence is given.” 43. SI Prem Lal (P-11) stated that he had produced the case property before the SHO. Desh Raj (PW7) stated that SI Prem Lal (PW-11) produced one sealed parcel. He resealed the parcel, obtained the seal impression on the separate piece of cloth and NCB-1 form and handed over the case property, sample seals and documents to Jaswant Singh (PW-9). He admitted in his cross- examination that there was an overwriting in Ext.PW-7/D. This overwriting is not material because it may have been due to a writing error. The seal impressions were obtained from a separate piece of cloth and the NCB-I form, and the seal impression ‘स’ is clearly visible. Thus, the mere overwriting will not make the statement of the SHO doubtful. 44. MHC Jaswant Singh stated that the case property was deposited with him. He made an entry in the register of Malkhana and sent the case property to FSL, Junga. His testimony is duly corroborated by the abstract of the Malkhana register and entry in the RC. His testimony is also corroborated by the statement of HHC Chuni Lal (PW6), who stated that he had carried the parcel sealed with three seals of seal ‘T’ and ‘स’ along 40 2026:HHC:30541 with sample seal ‘T’ and ‘स’ and NCB-I form. The testimonies of these witnesses are duly corroborated by the report of analysis (Ext.PW-7/E) in which it was mentioned that one seal cloth parcel bearing three seals of ‘स’ and three seals of ‘T’ was received through HHC Chuni Lal (PW-6). The seals were found intact and were tallied with specimen seals sent by the forwarding authority and a seal impression on the NCB1 form. This report shows that the case property remained intact till its receipt in the laboratory. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P 2007 HLJ 707, where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact, and the prosecution’s case that the case property remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed: “A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner, and the sample seal was separately sent and tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent to the expert also.” 45. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557, wherein it was held: “It has also come to evidence that to date, the parcels of the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, and the seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself 41 2026:HHC:30541 proves and establishes that there was no tampering with the previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, and the sample received by the analyst for chemical examination contained the same opium, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending the samples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to the appellant.” 46. In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC 402, the High Court had concluded that there could have been tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that case property was produced in the Court, and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed: “The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized after taking samples therefrom which were properly sealed. The defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure and seal put in the samples were in any manner tampered with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said examination, when it could not be proved that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by the High Court that the case property might have been 42 2026:HHC:30541 tampered with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot take the place of proof. 17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557 in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the samples were intact till they were handed over to the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal to the prosecution’s case. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case in this regard. 18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.” 47. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563, wherein it was held: - “10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant, Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), handed over the case property for producing the same before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after such production was not examined, as such link evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the case property before the Court, he returned the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the investigating officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13. The concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial 43 2026:HHC:30541 malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar till further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the SHO or the Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. 11. Further, he has returned the case property, after production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh did not, in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10, that the sample was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 48. Therefore, the prosecution’s version is to be accepted as correct that the case property remained intact till its analysis at FSL, Junga. 49. It was submitted that the sample seal was not produced before the Court, and this made the prosecution’s case doubtful. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Fredrick George v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 73: 2002 Cri LJ 4600 that there is no requirement to produce the seal before the Court. It was observed at page 4614: “62. It is a fact that the seals used for sealing and re- sealing the bulk case property, and the samples have not been produced at the trial. In Manjit Singh's case(2001 (2) 44 2026:HHC:30541 Cri LJ (CCR) 74) (supra), while dealing with the effect of non-production of the seal, this Court held as under: “In the absence of any mandatory provision in the law/Rules of procedure relating to sealing of the case property, that the seal used in sealing the case property must be produced at the trial, it cannot be said that failure to produce such seal at the trial will be fatal to the case of the prosecution. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether, by non- production of the seal at the trial, any doubt is raised about the safe custody of the case property or not.” 63. In view of the above position in law and the conclusion we have already arrived at hereinabove that there is unchallenged and trustworthy evidence that the case property was not tampered with at any stage, the non- production of the seals used for sealing and re-sealing of the bulk case property of the samples is also of no help to the accused.” 50. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Varinder Kumar Versus State of H.P. 2019 (3) SCALE 50 that failure to produce the seal in the Court is not fatal. It was observed: - “6. We have considered the respective submissions. PW10 is stated to have received secret information at 2.45 P.M. on 31.03.1995. He immediately reduced it into writing and sent the same to PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla. At 3.05 P.M., PW7, Head Constable Surender Kumar, stopped PW5, Naresh Kumar and another independent witness, Jeevan Kumar, travelling together, whereafter the appellant was apprehended at 3.30 P.M. with two Gunny Bags on his Scooter, which contained varying quantities of ‘charas’. PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla, who had arrived by then, gave notice to the appellant and obtained his consent for carrying out the search. Two samples of 25 gms. Each was taken from the two Gunny Bags and sealed with the seal ‘S’ and given to PW5. PW2, Jaswinder Singh, the Malkhana 45 2026:HHC:30541 Head Constable, resealed it with the seal ‘P’. The conclusion of the Trial Court that the seal had not been produced in the Court is, therefore, perverse in view of the two specimen seal impressions having been marked as Exhibits PH and PK. It is not the case of the appellant that the seals were found tampered with in any manner.” 51. It was specifically held in Varinder Kumar (supra) that when the sample seals were produced before the Court, the conclusion of the Trial Court that seals were produced before the Court was perverse. 52. In the present case, the sample seals (Ex. PW7/C and Ex. PW8/B) were produced before the learned Trial Court and the learned Trial Court had the seal impression for comparison. The learned Trial Court noticed while recording the statement of Ashok Kumar that the seals were intact. Hence, the non- production of the seal before the Court was not fatal. 53. The report of analysis mentions that the exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of Charas, which contained 32.17% of W/W resin in it. Thus, the report clearly establishes that the accused was found in possession of Charas. 54. It was submitted that weight of the Charas was found to be 515 grams on the spot and 512 grams in the laboratory, which showed that there was tampering with the case property. This submission cannot be accepted. It was rightly submitted on 46 2026:HHC:30541 behalf of the State that two different scales were used on the spot and in the laboratory. The scale on the spot would not be as accurate as the scale in the laboratory, which is apparent from the fact that the report of analysis mentions the weight as 512.0 grams, showing that the scale was accurate to the extent of 100 grams. Therefore, the discrepancy of 3 grams in the weight will not mean that there was some tampering with the case property. 55. It was submitted that the samples were not drawn and the bulk was sent, which is a violation of Section 52-A of the ND&PS Act, and the prosecution’s case became doubtful. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by this Court in Narayan Singh v. State of H.P. 2023 HHC 9715 that the provision of Section 52-A will not apply when the samples were not drawn, and the entire contraband was sent to the FSL for analysis. It was observed: - 19. After going through the aforesaid judgments, we are of the considered view that the same does not apply to the facts of the instant case. It would be noticed that in all the earlier judgments, the Hon’ble Court was dealing with cases where samples had been drawn from the bulk and then samples had been sent for chemical analysis, and the residue or bulk sample remained with the investigating agency. However, this is not the fact of the obtaining situation in the instant case. Here, the entire contraband had been sent for chemical analysis, that to be done on the very next date of its recovery. In such circumstances, there 47 2026:HHC:30541 could be no better and primary evidence for the purpose of the trial. 56. Similarly, it was laid down in Sandeep Kumar Vs State of H.P., 2022 Law Suits (HP) 149, that the provisions of Section 52-A are not mandatory and non-compliance with Section 52-A is not fatal to the prosecution case. It was observed: - “24. It has also been strenuously argued on behalf of the appellants that the investigating agency had failed to comply with the provisions of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act and thus cast a shadow of doubt on its story. The contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the rules framed for investigations under the NDPS Act are mandatory and have to be strictly followed. Neither the required sample was taken on the spot nor were the samples preserved by complying with Section 52-A of the Act. It has been argued that compliance with Section 52-A of the Act is mandatory….. xxxxxx 27. The precedent relied upon on behalf of the appellants, however, did not lay down the law that non-compliance with Section 52-A of the Act is fatal to the prosecution’s case under the NDPS Act. On the other hand, in State of Punjab vs. Makhan Chand, 2004 (3) SCC 453, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the question of the effect of non-compliance of Section 52-A, has held as under: - 10. This contention, too, has no substance for two reasons. Firstly, Section 52A, as the marginal note indicates, deals with the "disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances". Under Sub- section (1), the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, is empowered to specify certain narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution, constraints of proper storage 48 2026:HHC:30541 space and such other relevant considerations, so that even if they are material objects seized in a criminal case, they could be disposed of after following the procedure prescribed in Sub-sections (2) & (3). If the procedure prescribed in Sub- sections (2) & (3) of Section 52A is complied with and upon an application, the Magistrate issues the certificate contemplated by Subsection (2), then Sub-section (4) provides that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, such inventory, photographs of narcotic drugs or substances and any list of samples drawn under Sub-section (2) of Section 52A as certified by the Magistrate, would be treated as primary evidence in respect of the offence. Therefore, Section 52A(1) does not empower the Central Government to lay down the procedure for the search of an accused but only deals with the disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 11. Secondly, when the very same standing orders came up for consideration in Khet Singh v. Union of India, 2002 (4) SCC 380, this Court took the view that they were merely intended to guide the officers to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the Officer- in-Charge of the investigation. It was also held that they were not inexorable rules, as there could be circumstances in which it may not be possible for the seizing officer to prepare the mahazar at the spot if it is a chance recovery, where the officer may not have the facility to prepare the seizure mahazar at the spot itself. Hence, we do not find any substance in this contention.” 57. It was laid down in Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 110, that non-compliance with 49 2026:HHC:30541 Section 52-A of the ND&PS Act does not vitiate the trial. It was observed: “50. We summarise our conclusion as under: — (I) Although Section 52A is primarily for the disposal and destruction of seized contraband in a safe manner yet it extends beyond the immediate context of drug disposal, as it serves a broader purpose of also introducing procedural safeguards in the treatment of narcotics substance after seizure inasmuch as it provides for the preparation of inventories, taking of photographs of the seized substances and drawing samples therefrom in the presence and with the certification of a magistrate. Mere drawing of samples in the presence of a gazetted officer would not constitute sufficient compliance with the mandate under Section 52A sub-section (2) of the NDPS Act. (II) Although there is no mandate that the drawing of samples from the seized substance must take place at the time of seizure as held in Mohanlal (supra), yet we are of the opinion that the process of inventorying, photographing and drawing samples of the seized substance shall as far as possible, take place in the presence of the accused, though the same may not be done at the very spot of seizure. (III) Any inventory, photographs or samples of seized substance prepared in substantial compliance of the procedure prescribed under Section 52A of the NDPS Act and the Rules/Standing Order(s) thereunder would have to be mandatorily treated as primary evidence as per Section 52A subsection (4) of the NDPS Act, irrespective of whether the substance in the original is actually produced before the court or not. (IV) The procedure prescribed by the Standing Order(s)/Rules in terms of Section 52A of the NDPS Act is only intended to guide the officers and to see 50 2026:HHC:30541 that a fair procedure is adopted by the officer in charge of the investigation, and as such, what is required is substantial compliance with the procedure laid therein. (V) Mere non-compliance of the procedure under Section 52A or the Standing Order(s)/Rules thereunder will not be fatal to the trial unless there are discrepancies in the physical evidence rendering the prosecution's case doubtful, which may not have been there had such compliance been done. Courts should take a holistic and cumulative view of the discrepancies that may exist in the evidence adduced by the prosecution and appreciate the same more carefully, keeping in mind the procedural lapses. (VI) If the other material on record adduced by the prosecution, oral or documentary, inspires confidence and satisfies the court as regards the recovery as well as conscious possession of the contraband from the accused persons, then even in such cases, the courts can, without hesitation, proceed to hold the accused guilty notwithstanding any procedural defect in terms of Section 52A of the NDPS Act. (VII) Non-compliance or delayed compliance of the said provision or rules thereunder may lead the court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution; however, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when such inference may be drawn, and it would all depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. (VIII) Where there has been a lapse on the part of the police in either following the procedure laid down in Section 52A of the NDPS Actor the prosecution in proving the same, it will not be appropriate for the court to resort to the statutory presumption of commission of an offence from the possession of illicit material under Section 54 of the NDPS Act, unless the court is otherwise satisfied as 51 2026:HHC:30541 regards the seizure or recovery of such material from the accused persons from the other material on record. (IX) The initial burden will lie on the accused to first lay the foundational facts to show that there was non-compliance of Section 52A, either by leading evidence of its own or by relying upon the evidence of the prosecution, and the standard required would only be preponderance of probabilities. (X) Once the foundational facts laid indicate non- compliance of Section 52A of the NDPS Act, the onus would thereafter be on the prosecution to prove by cogent evidence that either (i) there was substantial compliance with the mandate of Section 52A of the NDPS Act OR (ii) satisfy the court that such non- compliance does not affect its case against the accused, and the standard of proof required would be beyond a reasonable doubt. 58. Therefore, the non-compliance of Section 52-A of the ND&PS Act will not make any difference to the present case. 59. It was submitted that there is a violation of Section 55 of the NDPS Act. This submission cannot be accepted. It was duly proved by the testimony of SI Prem Lal (PW-11) and SHO Desh Raj that the case property was duly sealed and re-sealed. Thus, the SHO had complied with the requirement of Section 55 of the NDPS Act 60. Therefore, the learned trial Court had rightly held that the accused was found in possession of 512 grams of charas. 52 2026:HHC:30541 61. Learned trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. The accused was found in possession of 512 grams of Charas. The Central Government has declared 1 kg of Charas as a commercial quantity, which means that a person possessing 1 kg of Charas can be sent to prison for up to 10 years. Therefore, the sentence of 2 years for possessing 512 grams of Charas is on the lesser side after applying the principle of proportionality. The learned trial Court has already taken a lenient view, and further leniency is not required in the present case. 62. No other person was urged. 63 In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 64. Record of learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd July, 2026 (Ravinder)