Order cao 707.2026.odt 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. Civil Application (CAO) No. 707 of 2026 in Misc. Civil Application (Review) St. No. 10490 of 2026 in Writ Petition No. 4740 of 2018 (D) [Katol Sale Purchase Society, Katol through its Chairman and anr. vs. The State of Maharashtra, Urban Development Department through its Secretary and ors.] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Office Notes, Office Memoranda Court's or Judge's orders of Coram, Appearances, Court's orders or directions and Registrar's orders. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. H. S. Chitaley, Advocate for the applicants Mr. S. S. Bissa, AGP for the State/respondent nos. 1 to 3 Mr. M. I. Dhatrak, Advocate for respondent no. 5 Mr. M. P. Khajanchi, Advocate for respondent nos. 6 and 7 CORAM : ANIL L. PANSARE AND NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, JJ. DATE : 08-10-2026. For the reasons set out in the application and since there is no objection, the trivial delay of ten days in filing review application is condoned. The application is allowed. 2. The review application be registered and processed as per the rules. Misc. Civil Application (Review) No. 718 of 2026 3. Heard. 4. The applicants - original petitioners are seeking review of order dated 25-03-2026 passed in Writ Petition No. 4740/2018. The petition was argued 2026:BHC-NAG:13564-DB Order cao 707.2026.odt 2 by Advocate Mr. O. A. Ghare whereas in the review application, the petitioners have engaged services of Advocate Mr. H. S. Chitaley. In fact, certificate of good grounds is also issued by Mr. Chitaley. 5. In the light of above, the counsel for respondent raised preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the review application where the counsel, who has issued certificate of good grounds and who is representing the petitioners is not the one, who argued the writ petition. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Sow Chandra Kante Vs. Sheikh Habib, [(1975) 1 SCC 675], has highlighted this issue in following manner:- “Mr. Daphtary, learned Counsel for the petitioners, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the earlier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that a review proceeding virtually amounts to a re-hearing. May be, we were not right in refusing special leave in the first round; but, once an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different Counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of Counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the Court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of Order cao 707.2026.odt 3 dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for Counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as Counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality. 2. We dismiss the petition unhesitatingly, but with these observations hopefully.” Thus, the Supreme Court held that review of the judgment, being a serious step, must be in accordance with the rules and cannot be entertained lightly. The Court observed that only where the glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in, the parties and Court should be reluctant to invoke the review jurisdiction. The Supreme Court then held that a mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip, over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are insufficient. Accordingly the Court indicated that there should be strict compliance with these factors and is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel’s certificate, which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. The issuance of certificate of good ground as a routine is thus deprecated. Order cao 707.2026.odt 4 7. The findings mentioned above highlights the importance of the counsel, who argued the petition and, therefore, except in exceptional circumstances, the parties should not and the Court would not invoke review jurisdiction at the instance of the petitioner engaging another counsel. In fact, it is the duty of counsel as well to refrain from appearing in such matters. The exceptional circumstance may be where the review is sought purely on law point. 8. In the present case, a certificate of good grounds reads as under : “CERTIFICATE I, Hrishikesh Chitaley, Advocate for the above named Applicants do hereby certify that in my judgment, grounds of review in the petition/application present by me on behalf of the said Applicants/ applicants are good grounds of review. Signed on this 29th day of April, 2027.” As could be seen, the certificate as issued, on the face of record, appears to have been issued as mere formality. Not a single fact or law is referred, to show as to how counsel has arrived at a conclusion that there are good grounds to file review. In our view, the counsel should disclose in the certificate as to on what basis, he has arrived at a conclusion that there are good grounds to seek review. In that sense, issuance of certificate should be the first step, which should be followed by filing review application. In the present case, the review application is drafted first and the Order cao 707.2026.odt 5 grounds put forth in the application are said to be good grounds. This is not the purpose for which the certificate of good grounds is insisted. Thus, on this count alone, the application is liable to be rejected. 9. That apart, the petitioner's counsel did not really respond to the preliminary objection but commenced his argument saying that the interpretation of the Court as regards Section 92 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 (for short ‘the Act of 1965’) that Council is not empowered to renew the lease beyond the total period of 9 years is incorrect. 10. We have perused the order under question. We had referred to sub-section (3) of Section 92 of the Act of 1965 to opine that it commences with non obstante clause and provides that the Council may lease its immovable property for a period not exceeding 3 years, which can be renewed by the Council beyond the period of 3 years, however, the total period of the lease shall not exceed 9 years. Accordingly, we held that it will be impermissible for the Council to extend the lease beyond the period of 9 years in the light of the fact that the original petitioners were inducted as lessee in the year 2009. 11. Mr. Chitaley submits that where approval of the State Government is obtained, the lease may be extended beyond the period of 9 years. We immediately countered the said submission, saying that, this Order cao 707.2026.odt 6 argument was not made before us when the petition was argued and, therefore, there is no finding rendered based on such an argument, to which, Mr. Chitaley submits that pleadings to that effect have been made. We then indicated to Mr. Chitaley that in a given case, despite pleadings, the party and counsel choose not to highlight certain portion of the pleadings or let go the contention upon Court indicating flaws in the argument. This aspect can only be dealt with by the Counsel who argued the petition. 12. Mr. Chitaley, however, submits that the State Government, vide Government Resolution (G.R.) dated 26-4-2007, granted approval to the Municipal Council, Katol to renew the plot for 30 years. The preamble of the G.R. refers to certain plots which doesn't include the plot under question. In the decision, however, it is mentioned in the G.R. that the plots proposed by Municipal Council can be leased for a long term. Thereafter, on 15-1-2008, the State Government issued corrigendum to the aforesaid G.R. mentioning therein that the statement that the plots proposed by the Municipal Council can be leased for long term be read as plots bearing Survey Number 202, 324, 343, 356 and 564 for a period of 30 years. The plot under question is bearing Survey No. 369, which admittedly is not mentioned in the corrigendum. Thereafter, yet another corrigendum was issued on 16-07-2008, which relates to the charges to be levied while allotting plot on lease on long term basis. Order cao 707.2026.odt 7 13. We have accordingly indicated to Mr. Chitaley that the G. R. dated 26-4-2007, if read with the corrigendum, the renewal of lease on a long-term basis, if at all is permissible, will be permissible in respect of plots mentioned in the G.R. read with the corrigendum. Mr. Chitaley, however, referred to the lease executed in the year 2009 in favour of predecessor of the petitioner (Annexure D). The lease is executed for the period from 4-3-1983 till 3-3-2013. The lease deed refers to G.R. dated 26-4-2007 and two corrigendum. It also refers to provisions of the Act of 1965 and the Rules of Disposal of Property, 1983. The argument is in terms of the G.R. read with corrigendum, it is permissible to extend the lease beyond the period of 9 years, particularly, in the light of the lease deed mentioned above. 14. This argument appears to us to be misleading in as much as neither the G. R. dated 26-4-2007 nor the two corrigendum refer to the plot under question, Survey No. 369. The lease deed executed in the year 2009 was for the period of 4-3-1983 to 3-3-2013. It is based on incorrect reading of the G. R. read with corrigendum. Such a document, according to us, cannot be taken aid of to justify the claim that under the G.R. read with corrigendum, the Municipal Council was under the obligation to renew the lease of the plot for 30 years. 15. In any case, this argument was not made by the counsel, who appeared in writ petition, may be Order cao 707.2026.odt 8 because, he was aware that neither in the Government Resolution nor by way of the lease executed in the year 2009, the petitioners can justify their claim for long- term renewal of lease. In that sense, we find the conduct of earlier counsel to be fair. What is being tried by the present counsel is to twist the words incorporated in the lease deed so as to justify the prayer made in the petition. Thus, in a way, Mr. Chitaley made a misleading argument. 16. That being so, the present attempt to re-argue the petition, that too, by engaging another counsel is impermissible. Such practice has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, so also, in the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another Vs. N Raju Reddiar and another [(1997) 9 SCC 736]. The Supreme Court held that the practice of changing the Advocates and filing repeated petitions should be deprecated with a heavy hand for purity of administration of law and statutory and healthy practice. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the application with exemplary costs of 20,000/-. In the ₹ present case, we dismiss the application with exemplary costs of 50,000/- because we indicated to Mr. Chitaley ₹ that his first duty was to come out of the preliminary objection raised by the other side. He however, continued to argue the application. The costs shall be deposited within seven working days with the Public Welfare Account maintained with Union Bank of India, Order cao 707.2026.odt 9 High Court Branch, Civil Lines, Nagpur bearing Account No. 129712010001014 and IFSC Code UBIN0812978. 17. The application is disposed of in terms of above. (JUDGE) (JUDGE) wasnik Signed by: Mr. A. Y. Wasnik Designation: PS To Honourable Judge Date: 09/10/2026 19:28:53