2026:JHHC:17187 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No. 1297 of 2021 ----- 1. Sunil Kumar, aged about 66 yrs, S/O Late Birsa Sahu @Birsa Mahto, 2. Ashok Kumar, aged about 61 yrs, S/O Late Birsa Sahu @Birsa Mahto, 3. Baldeo Sahu @ Mahto, aged about 79 yrs, S/O Late Anand Sahu @ Anand Mahto, 4. Anil Kumar, aged about 28 yrs, S/O Late Laldeo Sahu, 5. Parwati Devi, aged about 72 yrs, W/O Late Devilal Ganjhu @ Ram Ganjhu @ Devilal Ram, 6. Motilal Ganjhu, aged about 45 yrs, S/O Late Rukmani /0 Devi, 7. Ishwarlal Ganjhu, aged about 44 yrs, S/O Late Rukmani Devi, 8. Kishorilal Ganjhu, aged about 39 yrs, S/O Late Rukmani Devi, 9. Sita Devi, aged about 82 yrs, W/O Late Mahadeo Sahu, 10. Ramawtar Kumar, aged about 49, yrs S/O Late Ketki Devi, All R/O- village Kutiyatu, P.O- Tetri, P.S- Namkum, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand, PIN-834010. ....Petitioner(s). Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. The Union of India through Ministry of Defence, PO+ PS New Delhi, New Delhi. 3. The Defence Estate Officer, JOB Circle, Danapur Cantt., Danapur, P.O & P.S- Danapur, District-Danapur, Patna, Bihar. 4. The Deputy Commissioner-Cum-Competent Authority appointed under section 2(b) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 having its office at District Collectorate, Ranchi, Block A, P.O-G.P.O Ranchi, P.S- Kotwali, District- Ranchi. 5. The District Land Acquisition Officer, having its office at District Collectorate, Ranchi, Block-A, P.O-G.P.O Ranchi, P.S- Kotwali, District- Ranchi. …Respondent(s). ------ CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. ------ For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. A.K. Das, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, C.G.C. …...... 15/11.06.2026 Petitioners in this writ petition have prayed for following reliefs: “1) In the instant writ application the petitioner prays for issuance of appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s), particularly in the nature of mandamus, commanding 2026:JHHC:17187 2 upon the concerned respondents to extend the same and similar benefits to the present writ petitioners as that was granted to the writ petitioners of W.P.C No. 1619/2014; Kandru Mahto and Others vide order dated 21/04/2016. As because all the lands of the present writ petitioners as well as of the writ petitioners of W.P.C No. 1619/2014; Kandru Mahto and Others falls within the same village i.e. village-Kutiyatu, having same Thana number i.e. 330 and same district i.e. Ranchi. AND/OR The present petitioners further pray in alternative, for a direction for appointment of an Arbitrator for fixing just compensation.” 2. The brief fact of the case of the petitioners is that they are residents of Village Kutiyatu, P.S. Namkum, District Ranchi and their lands were acquired by the Ministry of Defence under Notification dated 12.02.1987 for establishment of the Khojatoli Military Cantonment. As the compensation awarded was inadequate, some of the villagers filed C.W.J.C. No. 3567 of 1998 before this Hon’ble Court seeking appointment of an Arbitrator for determination of fair compensation. The writ petition was allowed and affirmed by the Division Bench and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3595 of 2003. Thereafter, Arbitrator was appointed who gave an award dated 30.09.2011 granting enhanced compensation at ₹2,00,000/- per acre along with solatium, interest, and costs. Since, the present petitioners were not parties to the arbitration proceedings they submitted a representation on 18.12.2020 seeking extension of the same benefits, but the respondents failed to take any action, compelling them to approach the Hon’ble Court for redressal. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that similarly situated landowners was granted enhanced compensation along with solatium, interest, and costs by an Arbitrator in award dated 30.09.2011. It is further submitted that although the lands of the present petitioners were acquired under the very same notification and they stand on an identical footing as the beneficiaries of the aforesaid 2026:JHHC:17187 3 award, they were not parties to the arbitration proceedings due to financial constraints and, consequently, were deprived of the benefits extended to other similarly situated landowners. Thus, he submitted that the petitioners, being similarly situated land loosers, are entitled to the same benefits arising out of the arbitral award. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposes the prayer of the petitioners and submits that land of the petitioners was acquired in the year 1987 and compensations were already paid as per award prepared in the L.A. Case No.6(MTY)/1986-87 to the ancestors of the present petitioners in the year 1989. The present petitioners or their predecessors never filed any objection or representation before competent authority and after the lapse of about 31 years they filed a representation dated 18.12.2020 and the present writ petition in the year 2021 seeking parity of treatment. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that on the ground of delay alone, the writ petitions cannot be entertained and are liable to be dismissed. 5. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties and perusing the records, I find that land of the petitioners was acquired for establishment of Military Cantonment namely Khojatoli Camp by the Ministry of Defence vide notification dated 12.02.1987 issued under Section 7(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,1952 (In short as “the RAIP Act, 1952”). The land particulars of the petitioners are mentioned at serial no.43 of the said notification. The principles and method of determining compensation for any property acquired under this act is given under Section 8(1) of the RAIP Act, 1952. Section 8(1)(a) & (b) of the Act is quoted as under: 8. Principles and method of determining compensation. — (1) Where any property is requisitioned or acquired under this Act, there shall be paid compensation the amount of which shall be determined in the manner and in accordance with the principles hereinafter set out, that is to say, — 2026:JHHC:17187 4 (a) where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement; (b) where no such agreement can be reached, the Central Government shall appoint as arbitrator a person who is, or has been, or is qualified for appointment as, a Judge of a High Court; (c) ........... (d)……….. Section 8(1)(a) of the RAIP Act, 1952 provides that where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement. Further, it appears from the Section 8(1)(b) of the RAP Act, 1952 that where no such agreement can be reached, the Central Government shall appoint the arbitrator. Admittedly, the ancestors of the present petitioners had received compensation as per the award prepared in the L.A. Case No.6(MTY)/1986-87 on 31.08.1989. The contention of the petitioners that the matter is still alive, cannot be accepted as the ancestors of the petitioners agreed to the compensation so fixed and they received it without any objection long ago i.e. in 1989 itself. It is also an admitted fact that the present petitioners or their ancestors at any point of time had not filed their objection or represented before appropriate authority and they also had not filed any application for the appointment of arbitrator. After about 32 years petitioners woke up from their deep slumbers and filed this writ petition. It also needs to be taken note here that the Award which the petitioners are relying, which is in respect of other land loosers, whom the petitioners claim to be similar to them, was also passed in 2010 itself. It is a settled principle that delay, laches, and acquiescence disentitle a litigant from claiming parity of treatment. 6. In U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ram Gopal, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 101 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they 2026:JHHC:17187 5 are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. The paragraph 16 of the judgement reads as under: 16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence- sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu v. State of Kerala, this Court observed thus: “17. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. …It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment.” 7. Further, in Special Leave Petition (C) No.5619 of 2024 (Damor Nanabhai Manabhai & Ors. v. The State of Gujarat & Ors.) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that belated representation does not furnish a fresh cause of action or revive the stale claims. Paragraph no.8 of the judgment reads as under: “8. This Court has repeatedly disapproved the practice of seeking to revive stale or dead claims by the device of repeated representations, followed by a prayer for a direction to “consider” and a consequential challenge to the order passed on such consideration. In Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, this Court held that even where a belated representation is considered and rejected pursuant to a court’s direction, the rejection does not furnish a fresh cause of action. The question of limitation, delay and laches has to be examined with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed on a representation in compliance with such a direction. We believe that a court or tribunal, before issuing a direction for “consideration” without examining the merits, must first satisfy itself that the claim relates to a live issue. If the claim pertains to a stale or dead issue, the court must put an end to the matter rather than enable avoidable, successive rounds of litigation.” 2026:JHHC:17187 6 8. The petitioners, who are fence-sitters, cannot be permitted to derive the benefit of an Award by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court after an inordinate lapse of 32 years. Persons who failed to challenge the action in their own cases, acquiesced therein, and chose to awake only after a long delay, cannot claim same and similar benefits which were extended to similarly situated land loosers. Further, so far as the representation of the petitioner is concerned, the same was also filed after a long delay, I hold that mere filing of a representation cannot waive the delay, much less the delay of 31 years. Thus, I find no merit in the writ petition. 9. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. 10. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of. (ANANDA SEN, J.) 11.06.2026 Tanuj/CP-3 Uploaded on 22.06.2026