2026:CGHC:8768-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 239 of 2019 State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Mujgahan, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus 1 - Mohammad Sohail @ Subodh Singh S/o Late Shri Kailash Prasad Singh Aged About 32 Years R/o Raghunathpur, Police Station- Tajpur, District- Samastipur, Bihar, Present Address- Aviva Green City, Village- Dunda, Police Station- Mujgahan, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Dhanesh Sahu S/o Shri Raghuram Sahu Aged About 22 Years R/o Village- Dunda, Police Station-Mujgahan, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Rishi Raj Pithawa, Dy. Govt. Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. Shivendu Pandya and Mrs. Indira Tripathi, Advocates. Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal, JJ Judgment on Board (19th February, 2026) Per Rajani Dubey, J Challenge in this appeal is to the legality and validity of the judgment dated 15.10.2018 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Raipur in Special Sessions Trial No.82/2017 acquitting the respondents/accused of the charges under Section 376(2)(n), 506 Part-II of IPC and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 02. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 16.10.2016 the prosecutrix made a written complaint to the police that she is 17 years old and studies in Class IX. About five months back during summer vacation she was at home; at that time her neighbour accused Dhanesh established physical relation with her on the pretext of marriage and repeated the said act whenever he found her alone. She further alleged that she used to work as maid in the house of one Arshi Bhabhi and there her husband accused Mohd. Sohail used to make physical relation with her on the threat of life. He made such relations 3-4 times. On 15.10.2016 as she was running fever and also vomiting, her mother took her to doctor who after examination found her pregnant. Based on this complaint, offence under Sections 376, 506, 34 of IPC and Section 3(A), 4 of POSCO Act was registered against the accused persons vide FIR of Ex.P/8. During investigation, statements of the witnesses including the prosecutrix were recorded, spot maps were prepared; admission-discharge register of the school was seized vide Ex.P/12; the prosecutrix was subjected to medical examination and the seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical analysis. After completing usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused persons under sections 376, 506, 34 of IPC and Sections 3(A) & 4 of POSCO Act. 03. Learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 376(2)(n), 506 Part-II of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act against accused persons, who denied the charges and prayed for trial. In order to substantiate its case the prosecution examined 13 witnesses in all. Statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of CrPC wherein they denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. 04. After hearing counsel for the respective parties and appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court acquitted the respondents/accused of all the charges by the impugned judgment. Hence this appeal. 05. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on record. Learned trial Court on due appreciation has though rightly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved that the prosecutrix was a minor girl of 17 years on the date of incident but while considering Issue Nos. 2 & 3, despite there being clear and specific evidence of the prosecutrix against respondent No.1/accused regarding commission of rape upon her, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that version of the prosecutrix is duly supported by other witnesses. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and the respondents/accused are liable to be held guilty of the charges leveled against them and sentenced accordingly. 06. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/accused supporting the impugned judgment jointly submit that the learned trial Court having minutely examined the oral and documentary evidence rightly recorded a finding of acquittal in favour of the accused and there is nothing on record to suggest that the said finding is unjust or perverse. They submit that the prosecution has not proved in accordance with law that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the relevant time. Therefore, the appeal being devoid of any substance is liable to be dismissed. 07. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 08. It is clear from the record of learned trial court that respondents/accused were charged under Sections 376(2)(n) & 506 Part-II of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence learned trial Court acquitted both of them of all the charges by the impugned judgment on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against them beyond reasonable doubt. 09. Learned trial Court found that at the time of incident the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age. To prove age of the prosecutrix, the prosecution filed admission-discharge register of the school. PW-3 Dinesh Kumar, Head Master of the Govt. Primary School, Aamdi Para, Village-Parsada states that original admission-discharge register of the school is Ex.P/4 and its attested copy is Ex.P/4C in which name of the prosecutrix is entered at S.No.257 and her date of birth is recorded as 7.11.1999. She was admitted on 16.6.2006 in Class I and she left the school on 30.4.2011. He states that in the original admission-discharge register, ink has been applied on the year of the victim’s date of birth. In cross-examination he states in paras 5, 6 & 8 as under: “5. ्ቚपी-04 ेሰ पीडिता की जन्ेሰडिताथि ब से ब एवं से से से भा ग पीर सेहा यकी थि्ቌकी पीचा यता सेल की ेሰ र रजता की ቛኋ र जब ेሰ!ल पीज ेሰ डिकीसे ्ቤሹኌ$ता ቛኋ र स्य हा लग दी' गय उसेकी ब दी थिलखा गय हा*। यहा कीहाना सेहा हा* डिकी ्ቚपी-04 ेሰ ब से ब एवं से से से भा ग पीर ेሰर ቛኋ र हास्ता ्ቌर डिकीय गय हा*, सेल की ेሰ र ቛኋ र नाहा डिकीय गय हा*। यहा कीहाना सेहा हा* डिकी डिनायेሰ नासे र ्ቚपी-04 की ब से ब एवं से से से भा ग ेሰ जिजसेकी ቛኋ र ्ቚडिवंቖኌ/ की गय हा* उसे की ቛኋ र हास्ता ्ቌर डिकीय ज ना चा डिहाय। ्ቚपी-04 की ब से ब एवं से से से भा ग ेሰ ्ቚडिवंቖኌ/ डिकीसे दिदीना की की1 डिकीय गय हा* इसेकी की1ई उल्लखा नाहा5 हा*। 06 यहा कीहाना सेहा हा* डिकी ्ቚपी-04 ेሰ जहा  पीडिता की जन्ेሰडिताथि लखाब्ቍ की गय  उसे भा ग की1 थिचापीकी य गय हा*। 08 यहा कीहाना सेहा हा* डिकी आ቏ኌ9:कील ए की ्ቚडिवंቖኌ/ ्ቅेሰ की 24 ेሰ भा की 9छा 9 ( व्हा इ9नार लग हा*) की गय हा*। यहा कीहाना सेहा हा* डिकी पीडिता की जन्ेሰडिताथि की1 ्ቚेሰ णि?ता कीरना हाता की1ई भा  सेकीय दीस्ता वंज हाेሰ र  ल ेሰ उपील्ቓ नाहा हा*।" In para 9 he states that he cannot say on to on what basis the difference between the new and old entries is visible in the register of Article-A and the register of Ex.P/4 because when those two registers were maintained, he was not posted in that school. In para 14 he admits that there is no mention in Article A as to in whose instance the date of birth was recorded. In para 17 he admits that due to there being ink on Ex.P/4, date of birth of the victim is not clear and that page concerning date of birth of the victim in Ex.P/4 was torn which was later added. 10. PW-7 mother of the prosecutrix states that she does not remember the date of birth and age of the prosecutrix. She has no knowledge about he date of birth 7.11.1999 written in her progress report of Class VIII. In para 12 she admits that the police called her to police station for enquiring about the age of the victim and recording her statement, and she told the police that she cannot tell with certainty about the age of the victim. Learned trial Court only on the ground that no effective cross-examination of this witness (PW-7) was done by the defence, found that age of the prosecutrix is below 18 years. 11. The Supreme Court in the matter of Manak Chand alias Mani vs. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC Online SC 1397 has reiterated the law laid down by it in the matter of Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 (Supl.) SCC 604 and observed that the date of birth in the register of the school would not have any evidentiary value without the testimony of the person making the entry or the person who gave the date of birth. It was further reiterated that if the date of birth is disclosed by the parents, it would have some evidentiary value but in absence the same cannot be relied upon. For sake of brevity para No. 14 & 15 of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:- “14 This Court in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit (1988) Supp SCC 604 had observed that the date of birth in the register of a school would not have any evidentiary value without the testimony of the person making the entry or the person who gave the date of birth. “14…. The date of birth mentioned in the scholar’s register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry contained in the admission form or in the scholar’s register must be shown to be made on the basis of information given by the parents or a person having special knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned. If the entry in the scholar’s register regarding date of birth is made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have evidentiary value but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth such an entry will have no evidentiary value.” 15. In our opinion, the proof submitted by the prosecution with regard to the age of the prosecutrix in the form of the school register was not sufficient to arrive at a finding that the prosecutrix was less than sixteen years of age, especially when there were contradictory evidences before the Trial Court as to the age of the prosecutrix. It was neither safe nor fair to convict the accused, particularly when the age of the prosecutrix was such a crucial factor in the case.” 12. In the case in hand, the prosecution has merely filed copy of admission-discharge register and progress report of Class VIII of the prosecutrix wherein her date of birth is recorded as 7.11.1999 and thus the prosecution attempted to show that she was below 18 years on the date of incident. However, it is clear from the statement of PW-3 Head Master of the Primary School that he is not author of the entry regarding date of birth of the prosecutrix, he admitted in cross- examination that somebody applied ink and whitener on the date of year of birth of the prosecutrix in the admission-discharge register of Ex.P/4 and that the page concerning her date of birth was also torn and new page was added. Thus, in view of the aforesaid evidence, the whole admission-discharge register of Ex.P/4 becomes doubtful. In light of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the nature and quality of evidence adduced by the prosecution, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove age of the prosecutrix to be below 18 years on the date of incident. 13. PW-6 prosecutrix states that she was working as maid in the house of accused Sohail and he made physical relations with her despite her resistance. She admits her signature on the written complaint Ex.P/7, FIR (Ex.P/8), spot maps Ex.P/9 & P/10, consent letter Ex.P/11 and seizure memo Ex.P/12. She also admits her signature on her statements recorded before the Child Welfare Committee, Mana and the Court of Magistrate i.e. Ex.P/13 & P/14. The prosecution declared her hostile and cross-examined where she admitted that accused Mohd. Sohail threatened her and had physical relations with her repeatedly. However, she specifically denied the suggestion that accused Dhanesh also had forcible sexual intercourse with her. She admitted in cross-examination that his wife and two daughters also reside with accused Sohail in his house. She admits that wife of accused Sohail always stays at home and takes care of the children. She admits that since the accused, Mohd. Sohail, works in the lift business, laborers frequently visit his house, and that the accused as well as his wife’s brothers also frequently visit the house. She denied the suggestion that she has relation with some boy. She states that she has come with one Yaqoob Ali who has been handling the entire matter after lodging of complaint. She admits that one file related to her case is also with Yakub Ali. She admits that Yaqoob Ali had told her as to what statement is to be given in the court and then states that he had not told her. She admits in para 44 that Yaqoob Ali was demanding money from the accused Mohd. Sohail on her behalf but no settlement took place. 14. The accused Mohd. Sohail in his statement u/s 313 of CrPC stated that his wife caught the prosecutrix committing theft and removed her from the job and therefore, she lodged a false report at the instance of Yaqoob Ali. 15. True it is that ordinarily the evidence of the prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if her evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. It is equally true that while rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim, a false allegation of rape causes equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication. Indisputably, in a case of sexual assault, the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para 36 as under:- “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- “(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive--inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” 17. In light of the aforesaid judgment, if we examine the facts and evidence emerging in the present case, it is found that the learned trial Court minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence, especially the evidence of the prosecutrix as also appreciated the fact that no DNA test was conducted to ascertain the paternity of the child of the prosecutrix and no satisfactory explanation is offered by the prosecutrix regarding belated FIR. Looking to the statements of the prosecutrix and her mother coupled with the conduct of the prosecutrix during the alleged incident and subsequent thereto as also the manner in which the incident is said to have taken place, their evidence does not inspire confidence. In these circumstances, no offence as alleged against the respondents/accused is made out and as such, the finding of their acquittal recorded by learned trial Court being based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record cannot be faulted with. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of any substance is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage itself and is hereby dismissed. Sd/ Sd/ (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Khan MOHD AKHTAR KHAN Digitally signed by MOHD AKHTAR KHAN Date: 2026.02.20 14:44:10 +0530