( 2026:JHHC:17439-DB ) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 132 of 2026 1. M/s Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited, Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Dhurwa, Ranchi, through its DGM In-Charge Personnel and Administration (HQ), HEC, namely Laurance Bhengra, aged about 55 years, Son of Joseph Bhengra, Resident of CD- 574/ OHС, Р.О.-Dhurwa, P.S.- Jagannathpur, District- Ranchi. 2. The Director (Personnel), Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi. …… Appellants Versus Hatia Majdoor Union, a registered trade Union having its office at Quarter No. B-44, P.O.- Dhurwa, P.S.-Jagarnathpur, District- Ranchi, through its General Secretary, Bhawan Singh, son of Marehu Singh, resident of P.O.- Dhurwa, P.S.- Jagarnathpur, District- Ranchi. …… Respondents ------ CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ------ For the Appellants : Mr Ritesh Ranjan, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr Subham Sinha, Advocate ----- 02 /Dated: 16.06.2026 I.A. No. 6457 of 2025 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of delay of 442 days in filing the accompanying appeal against the learned Single Judge’s judgment and order dated 28.08.2023, disposing of W.P.(L) No. 907 of 2009. 3. Though the application seeking condonation of delay is quite lengthy, all that it states is that the delay was caused due to the ‘weakened financial position of the appellant-Company’. It is pleaded that the appellant-Company has not paid its employees' salaries for about 27 months and is unable to procure the raw materials necessary to carry out its production activities. 4. The appellant, at the same time, has also pleaded in paragraph 10 that the employees and their dependent families are leading a life of extreme hardship and are not even in a position to pay school fees for their children or ( 2026:JHHC:17439-DB ) 2 access basic healthcare. It is pleaded that several offices and Bank accounts of the appellant have been attached to satisfy decrees/awards of statutory authorities. 5. It is pleaded that the employees, who were not paid their salaries, are resorting to strikes. The financial health of the appellant-Company has been discussed in the media and in the State Legislative Assembly and the Union Parliament. It is pleaded that the appellant is even unable to pay the professional fees of empanelled advocates, law firms and Arbitrators. It is pleaded that such precarious conditions have hindered the effective conduct of the litigations. 6. Based on the above reasons, we are afraid that we cannot condone the 442-day delay in instituting this appeal. This is more so because this appeal is against the learned Single Judge’s impugned order dated 28.08.2023, by which the Award was made by the Labour Court at the behest of the respondent-Hatia Mazdoor Union, representing the employees/workmen, came to be reversed, and certain financial benefits were awarded to 71 workmen. 7. The appellant has admitted that the employees, including the workmen, are also in a precarious financial condition, as they have not been paid their salaries for almost 27 months. The interim application has made no statement regarding the payment of salaries to the officers and other executives of the appellant-Company. If the appellant claims to be in a precarious financial position, we are sure that the financial condition of its workmen would be even more precarious. In fact, we have noted that the appellant has admitted to this position. ( 2026:JHHC:17439-DB ) 3 8. Apart from the fact that no sufficient cause is shown for explaining 442 days’ delay, any indulgence to the appellant-Company would be entirely at the cost of the 71 workmen, who are worse off than the appellant, their officers and executives. If the appellant finds it difficult to continue with this litigation on account of its weakened financial health, then the position of its employees and workmen, who will now be forced to attend this proceeding, should we condone the delay, would be even more precarious. 9. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D), through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of delay is a relevant matter which the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that from the tenor or the approach of the appellants, it appeared that they wished to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which the law has prescribed the period of limitation. Once, it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and, in such circumstances, the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations. 10. The Court also held that when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if sufficient cause is assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court ( 2026:JHHC:17439-DB ) 4 may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 11. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. The ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 12. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never-ending paraphernalia. Such litigation deserves to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek ( 2026:JHHC:17439-DB ) 5 justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 13. In any event, based upon the reasons now cited, the inordinate delay of 442 days cannot be condoned. There is no sufficient cause shown in the interim application. The above precedents emanating from the Hon’ble Supreme Court militate against accepting the cause shown or regarding it as sufficient for condoning this delay of 442 days. The I.A. is, therefore, dismissed. 14. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and any other I.As therein, do not survive and are disposed of. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.) ` (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 16, 2026 Ranjeet / R.Kr. Uploaded on 20.06.2026