2026:HHC:30475 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 479 of 2026 Reserved on: 17.7.2026 Date of Decision: 23.7.2026. Nain Singh & ors. …. Petitioners Versus State of HP & ors. …. Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioners : Ms. Kiran Dhiman, Advocate. For Respondents No.1 & 2 : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For Respondent No.3 : Ms. Heena Chauhan, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 2 of 2026 dated 06.01.2026, registered at Police Station, Gohar, District, Mandi, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 352 and 351(2) read with Section 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act) and the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:30475 consequential proceedings arising out of it based on a compromise between the parties. 2. It has been asserted that matter has been amicably settled between the parties. The informant does not want to proceed further with the matter. Hence the petition. 3. When the matter was taken up for consideration, the State raised an objection that the victim had received compensation from the Government and she should return the same. Initially, the victim stated that she would return the money but subsequently she refused to return the money. 4. Heard. 5. The victim had lodged the FIR by asserting that she belongs to Scheduled Caste. She was abused in the name of her caste. The accused threatened to molest her. All these acts were done by the accused because she belonged to Scheduled Caste. The police investigated the matter and filed a charge sheet before the Court. The State has also disbursed a compensation of ₹25,000/- to the victim as being a member of the Scheduled Caste. She was oppressed by the members of non-Scheduled Caste. 3 2026:HHC:30475 6. The receipt of compensation by the victim shows that she had accepted the allegations made by her to be correct. Now she is trying to reconcile the matter which is not permissible because she cannot have the compensation for being oppressed and also settle the matter by claiming that there was no oppression. Therefore, conduct of the victim is such as would deprive her from invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, which is to be exercised sparingly. 7. The petitioners have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, which is to be exercised sparingly to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of A.P., (2008) 2 SCC 403: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 434: 2007 SCC OnLine SC 1445 that the High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal or Revision while exercising inherent jurisdiction, but exercises jurisdiction to do real and substantial justice in extraordinary situations. It was observed at page 405: 7. “6. … [Section 482] does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the 4 2026:HHC:30475 process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for the proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section that merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the [report], the court may examine the question of fact. When a [report] is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the 5 2026:HHC:30475 materials to assess what the [report] has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 7. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 8. In dealing with the last [category], it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden 6 2026:HHC:30475 death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) ‘102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 7 2026:HHC:30475 (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.’ 9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide, and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in the exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court, being the highest court of a State, should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court, and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.” [Ed.: State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89, pp. 94-96, paras 6-9.] (See State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar [(2006) 4 SCC 359: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 310: AIR 2006 SC 1937].) 8 2026:HHC:30475 8. In view of the above, the conduct of the victim is such as would prevent her from invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court. 9. Hence, the present petition fails and it is dismissed. 10. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd July, 2026 (Chander)