( 2026:JHHC:17373-DB ) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 742 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. The Principal Secretary, Schedule Caste, Schedule Tribe, Minority and Other Backward Classes, Welfare Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. ……. Appellants Versus 1. Dr. Girish Chandra Prasad, aged about 67 years, son of Late Bhagwan Prasad, resident of Laxmi Niwas, Krishnapuri, Road No.-1, Chutia, Ranchi, P.O. Krishnapuri, P.S. Chutia, District Ranchi. 2. Dr. Shambhu Nath Bhagat, aged about 66 years, son of Sri Bhagwat Prasad Bhagat, resident of Goldag Patti, P.O. & P.S. Nath Nagar, District Bhagalpur. …… Respondents 3. The Principal Secretary, Planning and Finance Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.Ο. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. 4. The Principal Secretary, Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. 5. The Secretary, Health, Medical Education and Family Welfare Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, having its office at Nepal House, Doranda, P.O. and P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi. ……. Proforma Respondents ------ CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ------ For the Appellants : Mr Vibor Mayank, AC to AG ----- 02 /Dated: 16.06.2026 I.A. No. 14491 of 2025 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of delay of 358 days in filing the appeal against the judgment and order dated 24.09.2024, disposing of W.P.(S) No. 489 of 2021. 3. In paragraph 4 of this I.A, there is only an omnibus statement that the impugned order dated 24.09.2024 was made available to the Welfare Department on 18.10.2024. This cannot be accepted because the impugned order was made after hearing all the respondents, including the Welfare ( 2026:JHHC:17373-DB ) 2 Department, Government of Jharkhand. Therefore, this statement in paragraph-4 cannot be appreciated, nor based upon the same, can any condonation be considered. 4. The averments made in paragraphs-5 to 8 are not relevant in explaining the delay, except that there is a reference to the Health and Family Welfare Department preferring a Letters Patent Appeal against the order dated 24.09.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No. 507 of 2021, which was disposed of along with W.P.(S) No. 489 of 2021. There are no disclosures as to whether L.P.A. No. 507 of 2021 was filed within the prescribed period of limitation, and the fate of such L.P.A. 5. The remaining averments assert that the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate, but due to various reasons beyond the control of the appellants. The appellants have pleaded that they have a good case on the merits. 6. Based upon the above averments, no sufficient cause can be said to have been shown to explain the delay of 358 days in instituting the appeal. Such self-serving averments, which are mostly unverifiable, cannot constitute sufficient cause. 7. Based upon the above pleadings, we are afraid that no case whatsoever has been made out for condoning the inordinate delay. 8. In the case of State of Odisha and Others vs Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the difference between ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as a cause for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier decisions wherein it is held that there is a point beyond which even the Courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is the Government which is itself under the shackles of ( 2026:JHHC:17373-DB ) 3 bureaucratic indifference. Since the law of limitation binds everybody, beyond a particular point, no indulgence can be shown, even to the Government which functions through an impersonal machinery. 9. In Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government Department or the persons concerned have not shown diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court held that, in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several noting cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 10. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant factor that the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or approach of the appellants, it appeared that they sought to fix their own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost the right to have the matter considered on the merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in such circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations. ( 2026:JHHC:17373-DB ) 4 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if sufficient cause is assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. 12. The rules of limitation are grounded in sound public policy and equity. The ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the respondent’s head indefinitely, to be determined at the appellants’ whim and fancy. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to prejudice the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the ground of doing substantial justice. 13. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said, but courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating ( 2026:JHHC:17373-DB ) 5 State agency, which also equally suffers the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at the later stages. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 16. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, we see no good ground to condone the delay. Accordingly, I.A. No. 14491 of 2025 ( 2026:JHHC:17373-DB ) 6 is dismissed. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the I.As. therein do not survive and are disposed of. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 16, 2026 Ranjeet / R.Kr. Uploaded on 20.06.2026