2026:JHHC:17370-DB ) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 747 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. The Principal Secretary, School Education and Literacy Department, Government of Jharkhand, Telephone Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, District- Ranchi. 3. The Director, Secondary Education, Government of Jharkhand, School Education and Literacy Department, Government of Jharkhand, Telephone Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, District- Ranchi. 4. The District Education Officer, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S.- Ranchi, District-Ranchi. ……. Appellants Versus 1. Mrs. Madhulika Bakhla, daughter of John Michael Kachhap, resident of Mohalla Basko Nagar, Haisang, P.O. Hatia, P.S.-Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi, PIN-834003. 2. Snehlata Lakra, daughter of Rev. Sushil Khakha, resident of Mohalla Basar Toli, P.O. Church Road, P.S.-Lower Bazar, District Ranchi, PIN- 834001. 3. Mrs. Jyoti Sharan, daughter of Philip Horo, resident of Mohalla Kokar, Khorha Toli, P.O.- G.P.O. Ranchi, P.S. Ranchi Sadar, District Ranchi, PIN- 834001. 4. Mrs. Gloria Aind, daughter of Basanth Kachhap, resident of Mohalla Hatudami Takra, P.O. Hatudami Hundigarah, P.S.-Khunti, District Khunti, PIN- 835210. 5. The Secretary, St. Margaret's Girls High School, Ranchi, P.O. Church Road, P.S. Lower Bazar Ranchi, District Ranchi. 6. The Head Master, St. Margaret's Girls High School, Ranchi, P.O. Church Road, P.S. Lower Bazar Ranchi, District Ranchi. …… Respondents ------ CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ------ For the Appellants : Mr Vineet Prakash, AC to SC-IV ----- 02 /Dated: 16.06.2026 I.A. No. 14541 of 2025 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 443 days in filing an appeal against the judgment and order dated 24.04.2024, disposing of W.P.(S) No. 1672 of 2018. 2026:JHHC:17370-DB ) 2 3. In paragraph-4, the reason stated for the delay is that in the year 2024, there were two general elections and therefore, no steps could be taken to file the present appeal. 4. Paragraph-4 further states that the learned Single Judge’s order is based upon the order disposing of W.P.(S) No. 1386 of 2009 in the case of Ursula Tirkey. He pointed out that this order was challenged by filing an L.P.A. No. 13 of 2024, which was since dismissed by order dated 22.04.2024. 5. As against the order dated 22.04.2024, the State has filed S.L.Ps. in which notices have been issued. were filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. 6. Paragraphs 4 and 5 then refer to the movement of files from table to table and from officer to officer for obtaining approvals, preparing a memo of appeal, etc. Apart from the fact that these excuses are unverifiable, they inspire no confidence whatsoever. 7. If an appeal had already been filed in Ursula Tirkey’s case, we fail to understand how the reason for two general elections in 2024 can now be cited. Similarly, if an appeal had already been filed in connected matters, we cannot accept that so much time was spent only on preparing the appeal memo, obtaining approvals and filing the appeal. 8. The record shows that after the connected appeal was dismissed and notices were issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.Ps., this appeal has been filed. There is a delay of 443 days. There are no reasons, but only the excuses, which do not make out a case of any sufficient cause. 9. Based upon the above pleadings, we are afraid that no case whatsoever has been made out for condoning the inordinate delay. This is a case of utter 2026:JHHC:17370-DB ) 3 lethargy, tardiness and indolence to borrow the phrases used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191.. 10. In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the difference between ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as a cause for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier decisions wherein it is held that there is a point beyond which even the Courts cannot help a litigant, even if the litigant is the Government, which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Since the law of limitation binds everybody, beyond a particular point, no indulgence can be shown, even to the Government which functions through an impersonal machinery. 11. In Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government Department or the persons concerned have not shown diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court held that, in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several noting cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 12. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble 2026:JHHC:17370-DB ) 4 Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant factor that the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or approach of the appellants, it appeared that they wished to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost the right to have the matter considered on the merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in such circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations. 13. The Court also held that, when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not begin with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. Only if the cause assigned by the litigant is sufficient and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced may the court bring the merits of the matter into account for the purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that, in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. 2026:JHHC:17370-DB ) 5 If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the ground of doing substantial justice. 14. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds unless a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, in which the State machinery is able to establish that it acted in good faith and remained vigilant throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said, but courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate procedure for a litigating State agency, which also equally suffers the bars of limitation in pursuing litigation due to its own lackadaisical attitude. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not to give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognisant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a broad scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never-ending paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be 2026:JHHC:17370-DB ) 6 disposed of at the very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 16. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, we dismiss this I.A. seeking condonation of the delay of 443 days in instituting the accompanying appeal. 17. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the I.As. therein, if any, do not survive and are disposed of. 18. No costs. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 16, 2026 Ranjeet / R.Kr. Uploaded on 20.06.2026