2026:HHC:30212 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No. 673 of 2023 Date of Decision: 22.07.2026 _____________________________________________________________ Amit Kumar ……...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & another …....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Petitioner: Mr. Ashwani Kaundal, Advocate. For the Respondent(s): Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for the respondent-State. Mr. Dixit Sahotra, Advocate vice Mr. Sanjeev K. Suri, Advocate, for respondent No.2. _________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR No. 178 of 2017, dated 25.11.2017, under Sections 506 and 507 of IPC, registered at Police Station, Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh alongwith consequential proceedings pending adjudication in the 2026:HHC:30212 2 Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties, are that FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, came to be lodged at the behest of respondent No.2, Smt. Indra Sharma, wife of Sh. Vinod Sharma (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Complainant’), alleging therein that her husband, who is a heart patient, had been receiving threat calls from mobile number 98162-59906. Complainant alleged that sender of the messages extended threats that he would kill her husband and his family by entering their house. Though, after completion of the investigation, police has presented challan in competent Court of law, but before same could be taken to its logical end, petitioner has approached this Court in instant proceedings for quashing of FIR on the ground that no case much less under Section 506 and 507 of IPC is made out against the petitioner. 3. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in the grounds of the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Ashwani Kaundal, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that FIR, sought to be quashed, has been lodged to wreak vengeance upon the petitioner, who otherwise 2026:HHC:30212 3 happens to be brother of Smt. Anita, daughter-in-law of the complainant. Mr. Kaundal, submitted that his brother-in-law, namely Tushar, has expired and thereafter, Smt. Anita, wife of the deceased, has been thrown out of the matrimonial house. He further contended that since sister of the petitioner had filed an application, seeking her impleadment in the proceedings pending before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kangra, instituted at the behest of the complainant and her family, seeking compensation on account of death of their son, Tushar, false FIR has been lodged against him. While inviting attention of this Court to Sections 506 and 507 of IPC, Mr. Kaundal, attempted to persuade this Court to agree with his contention that no case is made out against petitioner for the reason that the person, who actually received threat calls, never made any complaint. Secondly, bare contents of so-called threat messages nowhere suggest that petitioner extended any kind of threats, rather, he cautioned husband of the complainant and his family that in case, he doesn't stop sending messages, he would kill everybody. Mr. Kaundal submitted that since criminal case instituted pursuant to the FIR, sought to be quashed, is bound to fail for the reason that victim has not lodged any complaint, coupled with the fact that alleged messages, cannot be construed to constitute “criminal intimidation” as defined under Section 2026:HHC:30212 4 503 of IPC, continuation of the criminal proceedings initiated pursuant to the FIR, sought to be quashed, would amount to sheer abuse of process of law. In such circumstances, petitioner would be subjected to the ordeal of protracted trial, which is otherwise bound to fail. 4. To the contrary, Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, representing the respondent-State and Mr. Dixit Sahotra, learned counsel representing respondent No. 2, vehemently argued that the present petition is not maintainable for the reason that FIR, sought to be quashed, has culminated into charge-sheet. They also submitted that there is overwhelming evidence adduced on record suggestive of the fact that petitioner had extended threats to kill the husband of the complainant and his family. They further submitted that complaint filed by the wife of the victim is maintainable, and no illegality can be said to have been committed by the police authorities, while taking action upon the same. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 6. Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of the aforesaid submissions and counter submissions made on behalf of learned counsel representing the parties, this Court deems it necessary to discuss 2026:HHC:30212 5 /elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the FIR as well as criminal proceedings, while exercising power under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. 7. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under:- “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 2026:HHC:30212 6 (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the 2026:HHC:30212 7 Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).” 8. From the aforesaid exposition of law, it is clear that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.( Now section 528 of BNSS) can be exercised in the following conditions:(i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably. 9. 9. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-vis factual matrix of the case. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record, this Court finds that FIR, sought to be quashed, is result of matrimonial discord inter se sister of the petitioner and her in-laws, at whose instance FIR, sought to be quashed, came to be instituted. Since, after the death of brother-in-law of the petitioner, namely Tushar, his sister, 2026:HHC:30212 8 namely Anita, was allegedly compelled to leave her matrimonial house and is presently residing with the petitioner and she also moved an application for her impleadment in the proceedings initiated before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, seeking therein compensation on account of death of her husband. FIR, sought to be quashed, came to be instituted against the present petitioner on the allegation that he had extended threats that, in case any messages were sent, he would kill everybody. 11. Admittedly, in the case at hand, messages were sent on the mobile phone of husband of the complainant, who, though stated to be a heart patient, but no explanation has been rendered on record for his having not lodged the complaint. To invoke Sections 506 and 507 of IPC, the aggrieved person ought to have filed complaint. In the instant case, the wife of the so-called aggrieved person has lodged the FIR. It is not a case where the victim, on account of suffering from any serious ailment, was unable to depose or make a statement before the police authorities. 12. For ascertaining whether a prima facie case under Section 506 IPC is made out or not, this Court deems it fit to take note of Section 506 IPC, which reads as under:- 2026:HHC:30212 9 “506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.— Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.— And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 13. Section 506 of IPC provides for punishment for the alleged act of criminal intimidation, which is otherwise defined under Section 503 of IPC. Bare reading of the definition of criminal intimidation reveals that there must be an act of threatening another person with injury to his person, reputation, or property, or to the person, reputation, or property of anyone in whom the threatened person is interested. Most importantly, the threat must be made with intent to cause alarm to the person threatened, or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. 14. In the case at hand, perusal of messages allegedly sent on the mobile phone of husband of the complainant reveals that petitioner/accused, being annoyed on account of receipt of uncalled-for messages, warned the sender to desist from sending messages, failing which, he would kill him and his faimly. After reading of aforesaid messages, it is difficult to conclude that, 2026:HHC:30212 10 while doing so, petitioner extended any threat of causing injury to the complainant, his family, reputation, or property, rather, he, being disturbed by the alleged utterances made against his family through messages, apprised the husband of the complainant that he should desist from sending messages, failing which, he would kill him as well as his family. 15. To establish an offence of criminal intimidation, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish that accused had the intention to cause alarm to the complainant or person threatened. There is nothing in the complaint, on the basis of which, FIR, came to be instituted, to suggest that petitioner herein had extended threats with the intention to cause harm to the complainant, rather same appears to have been sent to express his anguish qua sending of uncalled-for messages. 16. Section 507 of IPC provides that whoever commits the offense of criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication, or having taken precaution to conceal the name or abode of the person from whom the threat comes, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years. The aforesaid provision of law could not have been invoked in the case at hand for two reasons; first, the alleged criminal intimidation was not through anonymous communication, rather, as per own case of the prosecution, 2026:HHC:30212 11 same originated from the telephone of the accused/petitioner herein. Secondly, this Court, in the earlier part of the judgment, has already arrived at a conclusion that no offence of criminal intimidation, as defined under Section 506 of IPC is made out. If it is so, Section 507 of IPC cannot be said to be applicable in the case of the petitioner. 17. At this stage, this Court finds it necessary to take note of two judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, which aptly applies to the present case. In Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715, Hon’ble Apex Court, while interpreting Section 507 of Indian Penal Code, held that to attract said offence, there must be an act or conduct on the part of the accused, which must amount to intentional insult to a person with knowledge that it would provoke him to break public peace or to commit any other offence. Relevant paras of the afore judgment are extracted herein below:- “13. Section 504IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. : (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the 2026:HHC:30212 12 accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504IPC. 14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 504IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC.” 18. In Madhushree Datt vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2025) 3 Supreme Court Cases 612, Hon’ble Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the applicability of Sections 504, 506 and 507 of Indian Penal Code. Relevant paras of the afore judgment are extracted herein below:- “22. The next question for determination is, whether the mere assertion of “filthy language” allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of offences under Sections 504 and 509IPC. 23. In the above context, it would be apt to consider the provisions contained in Section 504 IPC. 24. A perusal of Section 504 IPC reveals that a mere act of insulting someone does not fulfil its requirements; the insult must be of such a nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace or the commission of any other offence. 26. In the instant case, the charge-sheet states that the appellants used “filthy language” while scolding the complainant; however, no such 2026:HHC:30212 13 allegation is made against the appellants in the complaint. Furthermore, it is nowhere alleged that this act of using filthy language and insulting the complainant by the appellants, has provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence. Therefore, from the materials on record, the ingredients of the offence under Section 504IPC, as explained in the above said decision, are not satisfied. 27. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section 509IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the meaning of the term “modesty”, to determine whether modesty has been insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in IPC, this Court has addressed the essence of a woman's modesty in the decision in Ramkripal v. State of M.P. [Ramkripal v. State of M.P., (2007) 11 SCC 265 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 674] Excerpts from the decision read as under : (SCC pp. 266-67, para 7) “7. … ‘12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex.’ ” (emphasis supplied) 28. Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 509IPC in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , observed as under : (SCC p. 206, para 15) “15. In State of Punjab v. Major Singh [State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1967 SC 63] a question arose whether a female child of sevenand-a-half months could be said to be possessed of “modesty” which could be outraged. In answering the above question Mudholkar, J., who along with Bachawat, J. spoke for the majority, held that when any act done to or in the presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of mankind that must fall within the mischief of Section 354IPC. Needless to say, the “common notions of mankind” referred to by the learned Judge have to be gauged by contemporary societal standards. The other learned Judge (Bachawat, J.) observed that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex and from her very birth she possesses the modesty which is the attribute of her sex. From the above dictionary meaning of “modesty” and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singh case [State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1967 SC 63] it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been 2026:HHC:30212 14 outraged, is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman.” 29. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will be essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman. 30. The term “filthy language”, when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509IPC. Had there been references to specific words used, contextual details, or any gestures—whether preceding, succeeding, or accompanying these words—that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants. 31. In considering the term “filthy language” objectively, in the overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the appellants' actions do not demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that would reasonably lead to the conclusion that their conduct could provoke such a severe emotional response as to constitute an insult to a woman's modesty. 32. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that each case must be assessed having regard to the specific facts and circumstances, not only of the case itself, but also of the individuals involved in the alleged incident. It is undisputed that the complainant and the appellants were positioned as an employee and senior officials, respectively. Moreover, it is evident from the case presented by both parties that a dispute existed between them with regard to the employment in question. 33. To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate that the appellants used language towards the complainant that would warrant an offence under Section 509IPC. However, the charge-sheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant using “filthy language”. Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR. 34. In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants and the complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the employment; the absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures —whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any “filthy language” in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in 2026:HHC:30212 15 the charge-sheet : there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants. Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509IPC have not been disclosed. 35. This brings us to the offence under Section 506IPC, which the High Court has found to be prima facie disclosed against the appellants. Section 506IPC prescribes the punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation, while Section 503 defines the offence of criminal intimidation. 36. This Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506IPC in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132] , wherein it was observed as follows : (SCC p. 428, para 11) “11. … A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.” 37. In the present case, the complaint does not specifically attribute any threats or intimidation to the second accused. Therefore, ingredients of Section 506IPC, prima facie, are not made out against him. The argument that the first accused acted at the behest of the second accused is untenable, as Section 34IPC, which imposes vicarious liability in criminal matters, has not been applied in this case. 38. However, the complainant has stated in her complaint that she was threatened by the first accused, as detailed below: “Then on 25-10-2013 at about 2.00 p.m. and 3.00 p.m. one Madhushiree Dutta (HR) asked me to forcefully resign or otherwise I will be sent out immediately. Further she abruptly asked me not to come for my work henceforth.” 39. Before an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out against the first accused, it must be established that she had the intention to cause alarm to the complainant. A review of the alleged threat reveals that the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination, which constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation. It is also the appellants' case, which has not been disputed by the complainant, that the complainant has filed a reference before the Labour Court challenging her termination and 2026:HHC:30212 16 seeking reinstatement along with back wages. Given these circumstances and the materials on record, the ingredients of Section 506IPC, prima facie, are not disclosed against the first accused too”. 19. In afore case, Hon’ble Apex Court, while relying upon its earlier judgments, reiterated that before offence of criminal intimidation is made out against the perpetrator, it must be established that she/he intentionally caused alarm to the complainant. 20. In the instant case, there is nothing to suggest that there was an intentional insult or that the petitioner had the intent or knowledge to provoke disturbance of public peace or commission of any other offence. Similarly, the complaint, on the basis of which FIR came to be lodged, nowhere reveals that accused/petitioner had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant, rather, as has been observed hereinabove, the message, which is the subject matter of the present case, appears to have been sent to the husband of 21. the complainant to express anguish and to warn him for sending uncalled-for messages, which allegedly were being received on the mobile phone of the accused. 22. Having scanned the entire material adduced on record, vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court, while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., may proceed to quash the FIR as well as 2026:HHC:30212 17 consequent proceedings, because continuance thereof would be sheer abuse of process of law, since, for the reasons stated herein above, case of prosecution is bound to fail against the petitioner in all probabilities. Otherwise also, in case prayer made on behalf of the petitioner is not accepted, he would be subjected to unnecessary ordeal of facing protracted trial, which otherwise is bound to fail. 23. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein- above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, present petition is allowed and FIR No. 178 of 2017, dated 25.11.2017, under Sections 506 and 507 of IPC, registered at Police Station, Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh alongwith consequential proceedings pending adjudication in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, are quashed and set-aside. Petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed against him in the aforesaid FIR. Accordingly, present petition is disposed of, so also pending applications, if any. July 22, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma), (shankar) Judge