Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2026:CGHC:9007-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR CRA No. 1119 of 2024 Jaiprakash @ Bau Yadav S/o Veer Singh Yadav Aged About 19 Years R/o Bajrang Chowk, Near Former Parshad House, Rawanbhata, Police Station - Khamtarai, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
--- Appellant Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
---- Respondent ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant : Mr. Shivendu Pandya, Advocate For Respondent-State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge
Judgment on Board Per
Arvind Kumar Verma, J.
20.02.2026
1. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant-accused under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of VASANT KUMAR Digitally signed by VASANT KUMAR Date: 2026.02.24 14:34:45 +0530
2 conviction and order of sentence dated 10.04.2024, passed by the learned 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) in Sessions Case No.125/2022, whereby the appellant- accused has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC, 1860 and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further undergo additional simple imprisonment for one month. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the Complainant- Lekhram Dhruv lodged the report in the Police Station – Khamtarai, District Raipur (C.G.) to the effect that the incident, i.e. on 11/02/2022 at about 09:50 P.M., the present accused/appellant came in the house of the deceased namely Devraj Dhruv and called from inside of the house, thereafter, the deceased and appellant went towards some distance near the same place and assaulted the deceased by way of knife. The present accused/appellant committed the murder of the deceased by way of knife because the deceased used obscene language against the sister of the appellant. Further, it is alleged by the complainant that the appellant assaulted the deceased by way of knife in the neck of the deceased, in result of this incident, the deceased was sustained multiple injury by assault of the accused person. 3. After the incident, the deceased was brought the hospital and
3 treatment was going on, thereafter, the deceased died on 15/02/2022. 4. On the basis of merg intimation, the police of Police Station Khamtarai, District - Raipur (C.G.) registered the FIR against the present accused/appellant for punishable under Sections 307 & 302 of IPC and 25/27 of Arms Act. 5. The complainant namely Lekhram Dhruv (PW-1) father of the deceased lodged the F.I.R. in the Police Station - Khamtarai, District - Raipur (C.G.) where the offence punishable under Sections 307 & 302 of IPC and 25/27 of Arms Act was registered against the present accused/appellant at Crime No. 83/2022. 6. During the course of investigation, the panchnama of dead body was prepared by the police. Further, police seized the property which was relating the offence and spot map was prepared, thereafter, the police sent the body for postmortem.
The statements of witnesses were recorded and on completion of the investigation, police filed the challan under Sections 307 & 302 of IPC and 25/27 of Arms Act before the competent Court against the present accused/appellant. 7. During the course of trial, the charges under Sections 307 & 302 of IPC and 25/27 of Arms Act was framed against the present accused/appellant, but he denied the charge. 4
8. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 35 documents. The appellant- accused examined none in his defence nor any document has been exhibited. 9. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 10.04.2024, convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been filed. 10. Mr. Shivendu Pandya, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial court is bad; illegal, perverse and contrary to law applicable to the facts and circumstances and evidence available on record. The judgment of the learned trial court is based on surmises and conjunctures. He would further submit that the evidence of main witness i.e. Shubham Meshram (PW-01), Manoj Meshram (PW- 05), Ashok Kumar (PW-06) and Nikhil Ramteke (PW-08) as well as the other witnesses have as a hostile witnesses along with other witness are not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. The aforesaid witnesses are not supported the prosecution case and most of the witnesses are turned hostile along with the eye witness also. Tthe present case mainly depends upon the eye witness i.e.
5 Lekhram (PW-01), Chamman (PW-02), Dropati (PW- 03), Shivkumari Dhruv (PW-04), Chhturam Dhruv (PW-05) and Budharu Ram Nishad (PW-06) evidence and prosecution has not proved regarding the incident or the circumstances revealed that the present accused/appellant has not been connected the aforesaid offence. He would further contend that the evidence produced by the prosecution was that memorandum and seizure relating to the present accused/appellant which do not stand duly proved in the present case.
In this light, the prosecution has not been successfully connecting the present accused/appellant with the offence/charged, more so for offence under Section 302 of IPC. In absence of duly proved of memorandum and seizure memos as well as the eye witness, the aforesaid offence are not made out against the present accused/appellant. It shows that false and fabricated case registered by the police against the present accused/appellant which has not duly proved in the Court. The learned trial court erred in not appreciating the evidence of PW's in the right prospects. The prosecution has examined the doctor who were not supported the prosecution case, therefore it can say that the present accused/appellant has not committed the offence of murder in the light of evidence of the doctor. The learned trial court has committed gross error in appreciating evidence of Doctor. He would next submit that the FSL report
6 which has been produced before the trial Court, is not supported the prosecution case because the human blood of the deceased, blood group of the article and blood of the cloths of accused/appellant are not same due to which the FSL report it self rejected. The learned trial Court committed error of law by convicting the accused/appellant in spite of failure of prosecution to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. It is, therefore, prayed that this Court may kindly be pleased to allow the present appeal and the impugned judgment dated 10/04/2024 of conviction and sentence may kindly be set-aside; further the Court may kindly be acquitted the present accused/appellant from the alleged charges. 11. On the other hand, Mr. Priyank Rathi, Government Advocate appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned
judgment and would submit that the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court is based on proper appreciation of material and evidence available on record and the same requires no interference. 12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 13. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of
7 deceased Devraj Dhruv was homicidal in nature ? 14. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record particularly relying upon the postmortem report of Dr. Swapnil Akhade (PW-09) has come to the conclusion that cause of death was ‘Haemorrhagic Shock’ in case of Internal Carotid artery injury following penetrating injury on left side of neck. However tissues preserved and sent for Histopathological examination and Toxicological analysis. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Devraj Dhruv was unnatural which was occurred due to injury sustained by the deceased from the assault made by the appellant by way of a knife and the said finding is based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 15. Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question as during the commission of the crime ? 16. In the present case, Lekhram Dhruv (PW-1) (father of the deceased/complainant of the case) who lodged the report in the Police Station – Khamtarai, District Raipur (C.G.) has stated in examination-in-chief that the accused is his neighbor. The
8 accused-Jaiprakash, called his son/deceased-Devraj from house and stabbed him in the neck. Blood oozed from his throat as a result of the attack, and the deceased fell to the ground. The accused fled after striking him in the neck. He further stated that about six people took the deceased to AIIMS Hospital, Raipur for treatment. Deceased- Devraj’s treatment continued for about four days and he passed away during treatment. After his death, he reported his son's death to the Khamtarai Police Station. 17. Chamman (PW-2) stated in examination-in-chief that he and his brother-Lekhram returned home on our motorcycles from Silatra after working as laborers.
Thet were opening the door and parking our motorcycles when the accused- Jaiprakash, arrived and asked where Devraj was. he replied, he just coming back from work, and he must be at home. At that very moment, his nephew/deceased Devraj, came out of the house. He must have walked two steps when the accused-Jaiprakash, attacked his nephew with a weapon on his neck. He went and saw that he was staggering and falling due to the injury on his neck. 18. Dropadi (PW-3) has stated in statement that the accused is her neighbor. She know the deceased- Devraj, who is her brother-in- law's son. She was inside the house. Her sister- Shivkumari, called out to me and told her there was a lot of commotion in front of the
9 house. She then came out of the house and saw the accused, Jaiprakash alias Bau, run away after hitting the deceased-Devraj. 19. Investigating Officer Assistant Sub-Inspector Mukesh Yadu (PW- 08) has stated in examination-in-chief that during the investigation, notice under Section 160 was given to the main witnesses Umendrag and Budharuram. The notice is Ex.P. 6, The memorandum statement was taken by taking the accused into custody in front of the said witnesses. The memorandum statement is Ex.P. 7. On 12.02.2022, a bundle of cotton and a cotton ball stained with blood were seized from the spot of the incident in the presence of witness Umendra and other witnesses. The seizure memo is Ex.P-8 and after receiving it from accused Jaiprakash, a buttoned knife and a T-shirt were seized in the presence of witnesses. The seizure memo is Ex.P. 9 and 10.
On 12.02.2022, received from the father of deceased, a red checkered flower shirt worn by the injured at the time of the incident which was stained with blood and a black flower pant worn by the injured at the time of the incident which had blood stains on it and a piece of saffron colored gamcha which was tied to stop the bleeding after the injury to the injured and which was completely stained with blood were seized. The seizure memo is Ex.P. 11. 20. On perusal of the FSL report (Ex.P-34), dated 10.09.2022, shows
10 that the cotton seized from the scene of the incident, Exhibits A and B, the deceased Devraj Dhruv's full-shirt and pants, the deceased Devraj Dhruv's towel, Exhibits C, D, and E, the knife seized from the accused, Exhibit F, and the accused's T-shirt, Exhibit G, contained human blood. The cotton seized from the scene of the incident, Exhibits A and B, the deceased Devraj Dhruv's full-shirt and pants, Exhibits C and D, and the deceased Devraj Dhruv's full-shirt and pants, Exhibits C and D, contained blood of type A blood. Blood was found on the knife seized by the Investigating Officer and on the accused's T-shirt, Exhibit G.
Learned counsel for the defense argued that the classification of the blood found in the seized material could not be ascertained. The FSL report dated 10.09.2022 states that after examination of seven sealed packets received in Crime No. 83/2022 of Khamtarai police station, blood was found on Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and human blood was found on Exhibits A, B, C, and D.
21. On perusal of the statement of the relevant witnesses, it reveals that the accused/appellant came in the house of the deceased namely Devraj Dhruv and called from inside of the house, thereafter, the deceased and appellant went at a certain distance where the appellant assaulted the deceased by way of knife. The present accused/appellant committed the murder of the deceased
11 by way of knife because the deceased used to use obscene words for his sister while talking to his friends. Further, it is alleged by the complainant that the appellant assaulted the deceased by way of knife in the neck of the deceased, in result of this incident, the deceased sustained multiple injury which resulted into his death. As such, the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant-accused who has caused injuries over the body of the deceased and caused his death.
22. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for
consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ? 23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana1 has observed as under:-
“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 1 (2002) 3 SCC 327
12 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.”
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana2 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :-
“23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective.
The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; 2 (2009) 15 SCC 635
13 (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view,
14 proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.”
25. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda3, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both.
It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 26. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh4 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-
“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) 3 (2012) 8 SCC 450 4 (2017) 3 SCC 247
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“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.”
21.
Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9)
“9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the
“fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any
16 general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved
facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression
“undue advantage” as used in the provisions means
“unfair advantage”. 27. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 28. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)5 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under:
“16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 5 (2019) 6 SCC 122
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29. The case of the prosecution is based on theory of last seen together. Now, the question is whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant relying upon the theory of last seen together to be duly established ? 30. Admittedly, the present case is based on circumstantial evidence. The five golden principles to constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been narrated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
6 , in which it was observed in paragraph 153 as under :
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1)the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra7 where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047] Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2)the facts so established should be consistent 6 (1984) 4 SCC 116 7 (1973) 2 SCC 793
18 hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3)the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4)they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5)there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”
31. From the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, it is crystal clear that the appellant and deceased went together outside the house where the appellant assaulted the deceased by way of knife and the said fact has been found proved by the learned trial Court and the said fact cannot be disbelieved in absence of any rebuttal in the evidence of the witnesses and thus, it is found that at the relevant point, the appellant was last seen with deceased. 32.
32. Applying the aforesaid the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the facts of the present case and considering the statements of the witnesses, it is quite vivid that as per statement of Complainant- Lekhram Dhruv (PW-1) who stated that on the date of incident, the accused/appellant came in the house of the deceased namely Devraj Dhruv and called outside and took the deceased to a certain distance and assaulted him by way of knife. The present accused/appellant committed the murder of the deceased by way of knife because the deceased used to use obscene language against his sister. 19 Further, it is alleged by the complainant that the appellant assaulted the deceased by way of knife in the neck of the deceased, in result of this incident, the deceased sustained multiple injury. After the incident, the deceased was brought to the hospital and treatment was going on, thereafter, the injured-Devraj died on 15/02/2022. There was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause death of deceased – Devraj and only because of the fact that he used to pass obscene comments on his sister, dispute took place between the appellant and the deceased. The appellant did not have any intention to cause death of deceased, but by causing such injuries, he must have had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by him would likely to cause death of Devraj, as such, his case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of the appellant herein completely satisfied the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 33. Considering the above-stated facts, further considering the statement of Lekhram Dhruv (PW-1), taking into consideration the age of the appellant at present, the fact that he is in jail since
20 12.02.2022, also considering the postmortem report of the deceased (Ex.P-25) and the material available on record, it would meet the end of justice that if the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is altered/converted to Section 304 Part-I of the IPC. 34.
Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and the fine amount imposed by the trial Court shall remain intact. 35. The appellant is stated to be in jail, he shall serve out the sentence as modified by this Court. 36. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein- above. 37. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Vasant