Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1 2026:HHC:30105 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017 a/w FAO (MV) Nos. 227, 228, 229 of 2017 & FAO (MV) No. 376 of 2019 Reserved on : 01.07.2026
Decided on : 21.07.2026 Uploaded on : 22.07.2026 FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017 National Insurance Company Ltd. ...Appellant Versus Smt. Tikma Devi & Others ...Respondents
FAO (MV) No. 227 of 2017 National Insurance Company Ltd. ...Appellant Versus Dole Ram & Others ...Respondents
FAO (MV) No. 228 of 2017 National Insurance Company Ltd. ...Appellant Versus Smt. Gumti Devi & Others ...Respondents
2 2026:HHC:30105 FAO (MV) No. 229 of 2017 National Insurance Company Ltd. ...Appellant Versus Dhani Ram & Others ...Respondents
FAO (MV) No. 376 of 2019 National Insurance Company Ltd. ...Appellant Versus Hira Singh & Others ...Respondents
Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the appellant: Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Ms. Mamta, Advocate, in all the appeals. For the respondents: Ms. Leena Guleria, Advocate, for respondents No. 1 to 4, in FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017. Mr. Sunil Kumar, Advocate, for respondent No. 1, in FAO (MV) Nos. 227, 228 & 229 of
2017. 3 2026:HHC:30105 Respondent No. 1 exparte in FAO (MV) No. 376 of 2019. Mr. Lokesh Thakur, Advocate, vice Mr. G.R. Palsra, Advocate, for respondents No. 5 and 6 in FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017, for respondents No. 2 and 3 in FAO (MV) Nos. 227, 228, 229 of 2017 and 376 of 2019. Virender Singh, Judge The above titled appeals are being decided by a common judgment, as the appellantNational Insurance Company Ltd., has filed these appeals, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the M.V. Act’), against the awards, which have been passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims TribunalI, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. and learned Motor Accident Claims TribunalIII, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., respectively, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the MACTI’ and ‘the MACTIII’), in the claim petitions, which have arisen out of the accident, which had taken place on 21.12.2013, at place Chairakhad Nalla, involving Tata Sumo bearing No. HP01M1688 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the offending vehicle’). 4 2026:HHC:30105
2.
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2. FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017, has been preferred by the Insurance Company against the award dated 02.01.2017, passed by the learned MACTI, in Claim Petition No. 67/2014, titled as ‘Smt. Tikma Devi & Ors. Versus Neeraj Kumar & Ors.’, wherein a sum of Rs. 16,02,000/, along with interest, at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole awarded amount, has been awarded by fastening the ultimate liability to pay the amount of compensation upon the appellantInsurance Company. 3. FAO (MV) No. 227 of 2017, has been preferred by the Insurance Company against the award dated 02.01.2017, passed by the Court of learned MACTI, in Claim Petition No. 74/2014, titled as ‘Dole Ram Versus Roop Lal & Ors.’, wherein a sum of Rs. 5,91,600/, along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole awarded amount, has been awarded by fastening the ultimate liability to pay the amount of compensation upon the appellant Insurance Company. 5 2026:HHC:30105
4. FAO (MV) No. 228 of 2017, has been preferred by the Insurance Company against the award dated 02.01.2017, passed by the Court of learned MACTI, in Claim Petition No. 76/2014, titled as ‘Gumti Devi Devi Versus Roop Lal & Ors.’, wherein a sum of Rs. 40,300/, along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole awarded amount, has been awarded by fastening the ultimate liability to pay the compensation upon the appellantInsurance Company. 5. FAO (MV) No. 229 of 2017, has been preferred by the Insurance Company against the award dated 02.01.2017, passed by the Court of learned MACTI, in Claim Petition No. 90/2014, titled as ‘Dhani Ram Versus Roop Lal & Ors.’, wherein a sum of Rs. 40,000/, along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole awarded amount, has been awarded by fastening the ultimate liability to pay the compensation upon the appellantInsurance Company. 6 2026:HHC:30105
6.
FAO (MV) No. 376 of 2019, has been preferred by the Insurance Company against the award dated 22.10.2018 passed by the Court of learned MACTIII, in Claim Petition No. 44/2015, 32/2017/2015, titled as ‘Hira Singh Versus Roop Lal & Ors.’, wherein a sum of Rs. 21,173/, along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole awarded amount, has been awarded by fastening the ultimate liability to pay the compensation upon the appellantInsurance Company. 7. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present lis, are, hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned MACT. STAND OF THE PETITIONERS BEFORE LEARNED MACT:
8. Necessary facts, for adjudication of the above titled appeals are being borrowed from Claim Petition No. 67 of 2014, titled as “Smt. Tikma Devi & Ors. Versus Neeraj Kumar & Ors.”, by treating the said case as the lead case,
9. The petitioners, in Claim Petition No. 67 of 2014, have filed the claim petition, seeking compensation on
7 2026:HHC:30105 account of death of their predecessorininterest Sh. Chhabinder, whereas in Claim Petition Nos. 74/2014, 76/2014, 90/2014 and 44/2015 (32/2017/2015), the petitioners have sought compensation, on account of the injuries sustained/suffered in Claim Petition No.67 of 2014 (lead case), by them, in the aforesaid accident. 10. The petitioners, in Claim Petition No.67 of 2014 (lead case) being widow, minor sons and mother of deceased Chhabinder, have filed the claim petition under Section 166 of M.V. Act, seeking compensation on account of death of Sh. Chhabinder, in a motor vehicle accident involving the offending vehicle, against the respondents being driver, owner and insurer of the offending vehicle. 10.1 According to the petitioners, on 21.12.2013, Sh. Chhabinder, along with his nephew Jhabe Ram, son of Sh. Ganga Ram, was coming from Kullu to their native place and when, they reached at place Kandha, they hired the offending vehicle. Apart from them, other persons also boarded the offending vehicle.
When the offending vehicle reached at ChairaKhad Nala, the same fell down from the
8 2026:HHC:30105 road, due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1, due to which, Sh. Chhabinder sustained fatal injuries and died. His dead body was taken to PHC Thunag for postmortem examination, where, the postmortem examination was conducted on 22.12.2013. The information, regarding the accident, was given to police of Police Station Gohar, where, FIR No. 140 dated 22.12.2014 under Sections 279, 337, 304A of IPC was registered. 10.2 The age of Sh. Chhabinder, at the time of his death, was pleaded as 27 years. He was earning Rs. 12,000/ per month, from all sources. Elaborating the stand, it has been pleaded by the petitioners that apart from working as mason, Sh. Chhabinder was also following the agricultural pursuits. 10.3 Since, the accident in question has solely been attributed to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1, as such, petitioners have sought the compensation of Rs. 30,00,000/, from the respondents. STAND OF THE RESPONDENTS BEFORE LEARNED MACT:
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11. When put to notice, respondents have contested the claim petition, by filing their replies. 11.1 Respondents No. 1 and 2 have filed their joint reply, in which, they have pleaded that respondent No. 1 was not driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. According to them, respondent No. 1 was having a valid driving license. Other contents of the claim petition have been denied by pleading that at the site of accident, it was a hilly track and there was a blind curve also. When, the offending vehicle reached at the spot, a stray cow suddenly appeared in front of the offending vehicle, from the adjoining hill, and in order to save the said cow, vehicle rolled down from the road. 12.
Insurance company of the offending vehicle has filed the separate reply by taking preliminary objections that the vehicle in question was being permitted to ply in violation of the terms and conditions of insurance policy and the driver was not holding valid and effective driving license at the time of accident. 10 2026:HHC:30105 12.1 On merits, contents of the claim petition have been denied mainly for want of knowledge. 13. Thus, a prayer has been made by the respondents to dismiss the claim petition. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LEARNED MACT:
14. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned MACT on 27.03.2015:
1. Whether the deceased Chhabinder had died in Motor Vehicle Accident on account of rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1? OPP
2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what amount the petitioners are entitled for compensation? OPP
3. Whether the respondent No. 3 Insurance Company can be held liable to indemnify the award amount? OPR 1&2
4. Whether the vehicle was driven by the respondent No. 2 in violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy? OPR3
5. Whether the respondent No. 2 was not having valid and effective driving license to drive the vehicle at the time of the accident? OPR3
6. Relief. 15. Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence. 16. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the learned MACT have allowed the petitions, as referred to above, by fastening the liability upon the
11 2026:HHC:30105 insurance company to pay the compensation, as referred above. STAND OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY BEFORE THIS COURT:
17. Feeling aggrieved from the awards, the Insurance Company of the offending vehicle has preferred the present appeals, before this Court, assailing the awards, mainly on the ground that the evidence has not been properly considered by the learned MACT. 18.
The awards have also been assailed, on the ground, that driving license Ext. RW1/A, has been proved to be fake and learned MACT has wrongly held that respondent No. 1 was having valid and effective driving license, to drive the offending vehicle, at the time of accident. 19. It is further case of the Insurance Company that the driver, Neeraj Kumar, has placed on record his driving license No. 157636/BPR (Ext. RW1/C). He has also produced on record copy of the No Objection Certificate (Ext. RW1/D) allegedly issued by DTO, Bishnupur (Manipur). 12 2026:HHC:30105
20. According to the appellant, a commission was appointed by the learned MACT, to record the statement of District Transport Officer, Bishnupur (Manipur). Accordingly, statement of Simen Keishing, the then D.T.O. Bishnupur was recorded by the Commissioner as RW2, in which, he has deposed that the driving license No. 157636/BPR was issued from his office in the name of Takhellambam Nanoacha Singh, resident of Ithai Wakokpi, P.O. and P.S. Kumbi, District Bishnupur (Manipur) on 22.01.2013 for MLV and lateron, the said person was authorized to drive Heavy Motor Vehicle on 06.01.2014. According to the appellant, RW2 has categorically stated that the driving license was not issued in the name of Neeraj Kumar son of Roop Lal, resident of Village Kondhi, however, in the crossexamination, he has admitted that document Ext. RW1/C bears his signatures. 21. All these facts have been highlighted by the Insurance Company, in the present appeals, to establish that the company has successfully proved that the driving license Ext. RW1/C, was not issued by DTO Bishnupur
13 2026:HHC:30105 (Manipur), in the name of respondent No. 1. As such, the findings have been assailed on the ground that the learned MACT has wrongly concluded that the Insurance Company could not prove the violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. 22. The findings of the learned MACT have further been assailed on the ground that the monthly income of Sh. Chhabinder has wrongly been taken as Rs.
6,000/ per month and thereafter increase at the rate of 50% has been given on account of future prospects, which according to the learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant Insurance Company, is not sustainable in the eyes of law, in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
“National Insurance Company Ltd. Versus Pranay Sethi & Others, (2017) 16 Supreme Court Cases 680”. 23. On the basis of above facts, Sh. Ashwani K. Sharma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Mamta, Advocate, has prayed that the appeals may kindly be allowed by setting aside the awards and Insurance Company may kindly be
14 2026:HHC:30105 exonerated from the liability to pay the amount of compensation to the petitioners. STAND OF THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THIS COURT:
24. Per contra, Ms. Leena Guleria, learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 1 to 4, in FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017, has supported the award passed by learned MACT and prayed that the awarded amount may kindly be enhanced, so that the same could fall within the definition of ‘just compensation’. 25. In order to buttress her contentions, Ms. Leena Guleria, learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court towards the fact that all the petitioners are entitled for compensation, under the heads ‘loss of estate’; and ‘loss of consortium’, along with 10% increase, as mandated by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra). STAND OF THE OWNER & DRIVER BEFORE THIS COURT:
26. Sh. Lokesh Thakur, Advocate vice Mr. G.R. Palsra, Advocate, appearing for respondents No. 5 and 6,
15 2026:HHC:30105 have supported the award passed by the learned MACT and prayed that the appeal sans merits and the same may kindly be dismissed.
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS:
27. This Court has to decide the contention, as raised by the Insurance Company, in the present appeals, qua violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. From the evidence, so adduced on the file, it has been argued that respondent No. 1 was not having a valid and effective driving license, as such, the insurance company is not liable to pay the amount of compensation. 28. In this regard, evidence of RW2 Simen Keishing, has been highlighted to prove that he has categorically stated that driving license No. 157636/BPR dated 28.01.2013, has never been issued by DTO Bishnupur (Manipur), in favour of respondent No. 1. As such, efforts have been made by the Insurance Company to get rid of their liability of indemnifying the owner of offending vehicle. 29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in case “Hind Samachar Ltd. Versus National Insurance
16 2026:HHC:30105 Company Ltd. & Ors., (2026) 2 Supreme Court Cases 773”, has held that it is incumbent upon the Insurance Company to plead and prove that the owner was knowing the fact that his driver was having a fake driving license, in case the Insurance Company wants to get the exoneration from the liability to indemnify the owner. Relevant paragraphs 8 to 17 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:
“8. In Swaran Singh (supra), a three Judge Bench of this Court, considered the purported conflict in Kamla (supra) and Lehru and Ors. (supra) to hold as under:
“99. So far as the purported conflict in the judgments of Kamla (2001) 4 SCC 342 and Lehru (2003) 3 SCC 338 is concerned, we may wish to point out that the defence to the effect that the licence held by the person driving the vehicle was a fake one, would be available to the insurance companies, but whether despite the same, the plea of default on the part of the owner has been established or not would be a question which will have to be determined in each case.”
9. In PEPSU RTC (supra) it was held so on the facts arising in the said case, as under:
“11. On facts, in the instant case, the appellant employer had employed the third respondent Nirmal Singh as driver in 1994.
In the process of employment, he had been put to a driving test and he had been imparted training also. The accident took place only after six years of his service in PRTC as driver. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the insured is at fault in having employed a person whose licence has been proved to be fake by
17 2026:HHC:30105 the Insurance Company before the Tribunal. As we have already noted above, on scanning the evidence of the licensing authority before the Tribunal, it cannot also be absolutely held that the licence to the driver had not been issued by the said authority and that the licence was fake. Though the appellant had also taken a contention that the compensation is on the higher side, no serious attempt has been made and according to us justifiably, to canvas that position.”
10. In Geeta Devi (supra) this Court deprecated the practice of the insurance companies blithely claiming that the deceased vehicle owner did not conduct due diligence while employing a driver; which is not a condition prescribed either in the statute or in the insurance policy, despite the wealth of precedents. It was held so in paragraph 18, as under:
“18. Applying the aforestated edicts to the case on hand, it may be noted that the petitionerinsurance company did not even raise the plea that the owner of the vehicle allowed Ujay Pal to drive the vehicle knowing that his licence was fake. Its stand was that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the victim himself. Further, the insurance policy did not require the vehicle owner to undertake verification of the driving licence of the driver of the vehicle by getting the same confirmed with the RTO. Therefore, the claim of the petitioner insurance company that it has the right to recover the compensation from the owners of the vehicle, owing to a willful breach of the condition of the insurance policy, viz., to ensure that the vehicle was driven by a licenced driver, is without pleading and proof.”
11.
Now, coming to the facts of this case, A2 was produced by R3W1, a Clerk of the record room in Tis Hazari Court as was pointed out by the appellant. While referring to his deposition, the Tribunal had in paragraph 179 specifically stated that neither the Clerk nor the Court could have seized the driving licence at the time of accident. It is also stated in paragraph 184 that: ‘Interestingly, the police had seized the driving licence A2 from the driver of the Tempo issued from Alwar, renewed on 18.04.1990 till
18 2026:HHC:30105 17.04.1993’. We would, for the moment, assume that it is a typographical error and the statement is that A2 was seized from the driver of the truck itself. Even then, there is no evidence to substantiate the seizure having been made, nor even the seizure mahazar produced, which the police would have recorded if such seizure had been made at the accident spot or from the driver, later on. 12. We do not find any substance in the argument of the respondentinsurer that a collusion can be validly inferred since the driving licence was produced by the owner. In fact, the owner of the truck is not an individual and is a company, as we see from the cause title. Undisputedly, even if the tort feasor is the driver, the liability for any negligence of the driver rests on the owner of the vehicle, vicariously. There can be no suspicion raised merely because the owner had produced the driving licence before Court. It only indicates that the owner had been diligent enough to procure the driving licence from the driver and produce it before the Tribunal, so as to validly raise a case for indemnification by the insurer. 13.
The office of the DTO, Gurdaspur had also issued a certificate indicating that the driving licence No.5288 issued in the name of the first respondent was so issued on 05.04.1991 valid from 05.04.1991 to 04.04.1994 and, thereafter renewed from 11.08.1994 to 10.08.1997 vide entry No.2903 dated 11.08.1994, produced along with the additional documents by the appellant and marked before the Tribunal as R1. 14. The driving licence issued from the office of DTO Gurdaspur was produced as R1W1/1 and R3W3 was a Clerk from the office of DTO Gurdaspur who claimed that Exhibit R1W1/1 was not issued from their office and no amount was deposited in the name of R1 towards driving licence fees in their office on 21.08.1990. Immediately, we have to notice that the date 21.08.1990 has no nexus with the date of issuance of R1W1/1, which was first issued on 05.04.1991 and the renewal effected on 11.08.1994. 15. Further, it is to be noticed that the DL register produced from the office of DTO Gurdaspur was full of interpolations. A colour photograph of 1st respondent was found in the register but the name shown was different. In cross
19 2026:HHC:30105 examination, it has come out that there were interpolations and deletions made as against other entries too. Also on the ground of there being no possibility of a colour photograph in the year 1990, the High Court found collusion between the owner and the driver. The collusion at best can be only alleged for the production of the licence and not with respect to the entrustment of the vehicle. 16. As has been noticed in Geeta Devi (supra) there is no pleading or substantiation of due diligence having not been employed at the time of entrustment. R1W1 was the Advertising Incharge of the appellant who produced the licence before the Court as Exhibit R1W1/1.
The certificate issued by the RTO Gurdaspur was also marked as R1 which we referred to from the additional documents. In crossexamination, there was only a bland suggestion made to the witness that the Directors of R2 knew that R1 possessed only a fake driving licence. There were no questions put to the witness, who was examined on behalf of the owner, as to the actual entrustment of the vehicle or whether R1 was employed regularly or temporarily and when such employment commenced, which are crucial insofar as proving or disproving due diligence by the owner at the time of engagement of the driver and the entrustment of the vehicle. As has been rightly held by the precedents above noticed, the owner of a vehicle employing a driver can only look at the licence produced by the person seeking employment and is not expected to verify from the licence issuing authority whether the licence is fake or not. 17. The insurance company from the totality of the circumstances has to bring out the absence of due diligence in the employment of the driver or the entrustment of the vehicle, to prove breach by the insured, which is totally absent in the present case. The High Court had erred in finding that there was collusion between the employer and the employee merely for reason of the driving licence having been produced by the employer and the driver having not contested the claim. The driver, as has been noticed in a number of decisions of this Court, would have kept himself away from the box, for fear of incriminating himself; since a prosecution was pending against him. In any event, the vicarious liability to satisfy the damages caused by the negligence of the employee is on the employer, the later of whom has to contest the matter. Not only was the driving
20 2026:HHC:30105 licence, as issued to the driver produced, but, a certificate showing its further renewal was also produced.
In fact, we specifically notice that the renewal made is not an automatic renewal which has to be carried out within 30 days of the expiry of a driving licence, as per the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules made thereunder. Herein the validity period of the licence, originally issued expired on 04.04.1994 and the renewal was on 11.08.1994.” (Self emphasis supplied)
30. Being guided by the above decision, now, this Court would proceed further to determine the fact, whether the Insurance Company has proved/probablized the fact that respondent No. 2, owner of the offending vehicle (father of respondent No. 1), had the knowledge that the license Ext. RW1/C was not valid. 31. In order to determine the said fact, relevant evidence, so adduced by the parties, before the learned MACT, is required to be discussed. Onus to prove the willful violation was on respondent No. 3Insurance Company. 32. Respondents No. 1 and 2driver & owner, filed the joint reply, in which, specific stand has been taken that respondent No. 1 was having valid driving license. 33. Respondent No. 2 appeared in the witness box as RW1 and filed his duly swornin affidavit Ext. RW1/A in evidence, in which, he has asserted the factual position qua
21 2026:HHC:30105 the fact that he is owner of the offending vehicle and he has deployed his son Neeraj Kumar, as driver of his vehicle, who has good experience of driving for the last about ten years in the State of H.P. and other States of India, including Manipur, where he used to work as driver, upto January,
2013. According to him, he had verified his driving license and his driving was perfect with no antecedents of accident. 34. In the crossexamination by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company, this witness has deposed that he had verified the driving license from Manipur and obtained the copy of verification letter Ext. RW1/E. Rest, he has denied all the suggestions, including the suggestion, qua production of documentary proof to prove that his son was working at Manipur. 35.
The verification letter has not been tendered by RW1, in his examinationinchief, rather, on asking of
learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company, he has deposed about the material fact that he got verified the license of his son by obtaining the verification report Ext. RW1/E.
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36. Respondent No. 1 has not appeared in the witness box, nor he has been examined by the Insurance Company, as their witness, to probablize their defence that the driving license, copy of which is Ext. RW1/C, was not obtained by him from the office of DTO Bishnupur (Manipur).
37. In this case, evidence of DTO Bishnupur (Manipur) has been recorded by the Local Commissioner as RW2. RW2, in his examinationinchief has deposed that the driving license No. 157636/BPR, as per record, was issued in the name of Takhellambam Nanoacha Singh on 22.01.2013, which was issued for Light Motor Vehicle, lateron, he was authorized to drive Heavy Motor Vehicle on
06.01.2014. In this regard, he has issued the report Ext. RW2/A, mentioning therein that no license was issued in the name of Neeraj Kumar son of Roop Lal, resident of Village Kandhi, P.O. Saroa, Tehsil Chachiot, District Mandi, H.P.
38. Interestingly, in the crossexamination by learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2, this witness has admitted that the document Ext. RW1/C, bears his
23 2026:HHC:30105 signature. Ext. RW1/C is the copy of verification report of driving license issued in the name of respondent No. 1. The evidence of RW2 was recorded on 25.02.2016 and statement of RW1 was recorded on 20.11.2015, prior to the recording of statement of RW2. On the day, when the statement of RW2 was recorded i.e. on 25.02.2016, document Ext. RW1/E was already on record, as the same had been produced by respondent No. 2 (RW1) on 20.11.2015, in the crossexamination conducted by the
learned counsel for the Insurance Company. 39. Interestingly, this document i.e. No Objection Certificate has been issued under the seal and signature of Simon Keishing, District Transport Officer Bishnupur District, Manipur (RW2) as admitted by him, in his cross examination. In the absence of any evidence contrary to the authenticity of Ext. RW1/E, this document is sufficient to hold that the owner has taken requisite precautions before handing over the offending vehicle to a person, who was having a driving license purported to have been issued by DTO Bishnupur, Manipur. 24 2026:HHC:30105
40. The Insurance Company has miserably failed to prove that the owner has knowingly allowed the breach of terms and conditions of the Insurance Company, by handing over the offending vehicle to a person, who was not having a valid and effective driving license. 41. At the cost of repetition, RW2 has admitted that the driving license, copy of which is Ext. RW1/C, bears his signatures and the verification report has also been tendered in evidence by respondent No. 2 (owner of the offending vehicle). Thus, the learned MACT has considered the evidence in the right perspective and rightly concluded that the Insurance Company has miserably failed to prove the willful violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. 42. The Insurance Company could not prove any fault on the part of the owner of the offending vehicle. As such, it can be said that the Insurance Company has failed to prove that respondent No. 2 (owner of the offending vehicle) had handed over the offending vehicle to respondent
25 2026:HHC:30105 No. 1 (driver) to drive the same, despite knowing the fact that he was not having a valid and effective driving license. 43. Now, the next question is whether the amount of compensation awarded to the petitioners falls within the definition of ‘just compensation’, as the endavour of the Court/Tribunal is to grant ‘just compensation’. 44. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Mohd. Nasir and another, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 987 has held that the provisions of M.V. Act are beneficial piece of legislation and the endeavour of the Court/Tribunal should be to provide “just compensation”. The relevant paras 23 and 24 of the judgment are reproduced as under:
“23.
Both, the 1923 Act and 1988 Act are beneficent legislation insofar as they provide for payment of compensation to the workmen employed by the employers and/or by use of motor vehicle by the owner thereof and/or the insurer to the petitioners suffering permanent disability. The amount of compensation is to be determined in terms of the provisions
of
the respective Acts. Whereas in terms of the 1923 Act, the Commissioner who is a quasi judicial authority, is bound to apply the principles and the factors laid down in the Act for the purpose of determining the compensation, Section 168 of the 1988 Act enjoins the Tribunal to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be just. 26 2026:HHC:30105
24. Both the Acts aim at providing for expeditious relief to the victims of accident. In these cases, the accidents took place by reason of use of motor vehicles. Both the statutes are beneficial ones for the workmen as also the third parties. The benefits thereof are available only to the persons specified under the Act besides under the Contract of Insurance. The statutes, therefore, deserve liberal construction. The legislative intent contained therein is required to be interpreted with a view to give effect thereto.” (self emphasis supplied)
45. This view has again been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in Govind Yadav versus The New India Assurance Co. Ltd., reported in 2012 ACJ 28 (SC). Relevant paragraphs 12 & 13 of the judgment are reproduced as under:
12. In Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2009) 13 SCC 422, this Court reiterated that the compensation awarded under the Act should be just and also identified the factors which should be kept in mind while determining the amount of compensation. The relevant portions of the
judgment are extracted below:
"The compensation which is required to be determined must be just. While the petitioners are required to be compensated for the loss of their dependency, the same should not be considered to be a windfall. Unjust enrichment should be discouraged. This Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that in given cases, as for example death of the only son to a mother, she can never be compensated in monetary terms. The question as to the methodology required to be applied for determination of compensation as regards prospective loss of future earnings, however, as far as possible should be based on certain principles. A person may have a bright future prospect; he might have become eligible to promotion immediately; there might have
27 2026:HHC:30105 been chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in another (sic situation) the nature of employment was such that he might not have continued in service; his chance of promotion, having regard to the nature of employment may be distant or remote. It is, therefore, difficult for any court to lay down rigid tests which should be applied in all situations. There are divergent views. In some cases it has been suggested that some sort of hypotheses or guess work may be inevitable. That may be so. In the Indian context several other factors should be taken into consideration including education of the dependants and the nature of job. In the wake of changed societal conditions and global scenario, future prospects may have to be taken into consideration not only having regard to the status of the employee, his educational qualification; his past performance but also other relevant factors, namely, the higher salaries and perks which are being offered by the private companies these days. In fact while determining the m ultiplicand this Court in O riental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jas huben held that even dearness allowance and perks with regard thereto from which the family would have derived monthly benefit, must be taken into
consideration. One of the incidental issues which has also to be taken into consideration is inflation. Is the practice of taking inflation into consideration wholly incorrect? Unfortunately, unlike other developed countries in India there has been no scientific study. It is expected that with the rising inflation the rate of interest would go up. In India it does not happen. It, therefore, may be a relevant factor which may be taken into consideration for determining the actual ground reality. No hardand fast rule, however, can be laid down therefor." (emphasis supplied)
13. In Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Limited (2010) 10 SCC 254, the Court considered the plea for enhancement of compensation made by the appellant, who was a student of final year of engineering
28 2026:HHC:30105 and had suffered 70% disablement in a motor accident. After noticing factual matrix of the case, the Court observed:
"We do not intend to review in detail state of authorities in relation to assessment of all damages for personal injury. Suffice it to say that the basis of assessment of all damages for personal injury is compensation. The whole idea is to put the petitioner in the same position as he was insofar as money can. Perfect compensation is hardly possible but one has to keep in mind that the victim has done no wrong; he has suffered at the hands of the wrongdoer and the court must take care to give him full and fair compensation for that he had suffered." (emphasis supplied)
46. It would also be profitable to reproduce relevant paragraphs 29 to 34 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled as, Sidram versus Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited & anr., reported in (2023) 3 Supreme Court Cases 439, as under:
29. The process of determining the compensation by the court is essentially a very difficult task and can never be an exact science. Perfect compensation is hardly possible, more so in claims of injury and disability. As rightly pointed out in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 195865 ACJ 504 (HL, England):
“…money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered.”
30.
The principle consistently followed by this court in assessing motor vehicle compensation claims, is to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in before the accident, with other compensatory directions for loss of amenities and other payments. These general principles
29 2026:HHC:30105 have been stated and reiterated in several decisions. [Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 683.]
31. It is now a well settled position of law that even in cases of permanent disablement incurred as a result of a motor accident, the petitioner can seek, apart from compensation for future loss of income, amounts for future prospects as well. We have come across many orders of different tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different High Courts, taking the view that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation for future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries resulting in permanent disablement. That is not a correct position of law. There is no justification to exclude the possibility of compensation for future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries resulting in permanent disablement. Such a narrow reading is illogical because it
denies altogether the possibility of the living victim progressing further in life in accident cases – and admits such possibility of future prospects, in case of the victim’s death. (Self emphasis supplied)
32. This Court has emphasised time and again that “just compensation” should include all elements that would go to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in, before the occurrence of the accident. Whilst no amount of money or other material compensation can erase the trauma, pain and suffering that a victim undergoes after a serious accident, (or replace the loss of a loved one), monetary compensation is the manner known to law, whereby society assures some measure of restitution to those who survive, and the victims who have to face their lives. 33.
In Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited and Others, (2012) 6 SCC 421, this Court held that:
“14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any rationale for the observation made in paragraph 24 of the judgment in Sarla Verma case [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] that where the deceased was self employed or was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., the Courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death and a departure from this rule should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. 30 2026:HHC:30105 In our view, it will be nave to say that the wages or total emoluments/income of a person who is self employed or who is employed on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., would remain the same throughout his life. 15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone across the board. It does not make any distinction between rich and poor. As a matter of fact, the effect of rise in prices which directly impacts the cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum on those who are selfemployed or who get fixed income/emoluments. They are the worst affected people. Therefore, they put in extra efforts to generate additional income necessary for sustaining their families. 16. The salaries of those employed under the Central and State Governments and their agencies/ instrumentalities have been revised from time to time to provide a cushion against the rising prices and provisions have been made for providing security to the families of the deceased employees. The salaries of those employed in private sectors have also increased manifold. Till about two decades ago, nobody could have imagined that salary of Class IV employee of the Government would be in five figures and total emoluments of those in higher echelons of service will cross the figure of rupees one lakh. 17.
Although the wages/income of those employed in unorganised sectors has not registered a corresponding increase and has not kept pace with the increase in the salaries of the government employees and those employed in private sectors, but it cannot be denied that there has been incremental enhancement in the income of those who are self employed and even those engaged on daily basis, monthly basis or even seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of the fact that with a view to meet the challenges posed by high cost of living, the persons falling in the latter category periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this context, it may be useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by stitching cloths. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it
31 2026:HHC:30105 is but natural for him to increase the cost of his labour. So will be the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason etc. 18. Therefore, we do not think that while making the observations in the last three lines of para 24 of Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121]
judgment, the Court had intended to lay down an absolute rule that there will be no addition in the income of a person who is selfemployed or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it would be reasonable to say that a person who is selfemployed or is engaged on fixed wages will also get 30% increase in his total income over a period of time and if he/she becomes the victim of an accident then the same formula deserves to be applied for calculating the amount of compensation.”
34. In Jagdish v. Mohan and Others, (2018) 4 SCC 571, the victim, a carpenter, suffered permanent disablement, and his claim for compensation including for loss of future prospects was considered by a three Judge Bench which included, incidentally, the judges who had decided National Insurance Company (supra). This Court held that:
“13. In the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680], this Court has held that the benefit of future prospects should not be confined only to those who have a permanent job and would extend to selfemployed individuals. In the case of a self employed person, an addition of 40% of the established income should be made where the age of the victim at the time of the accident was below 40 years. Hence, in the present case, the appellant would be entitled to an enhancement of Rs. 2400 towards loss of future prospects. 14. In making the computation in the present case, the court must be mindful of the fact that the appellant has suffered a serious disability in which he has suffered a loss of the use of both his hands. For a person engaged in manual activities, it requires no stretch of imagination to understand that a loss of hands is a complete deprivation of the ability to earn. Nothing —at least in the facts of this case—can restore lost hands. But the measure of compensation must reflect a
32 2026:HHC:30105 genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not law's doles.
In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations about law must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the individual to an assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsic to human dignity. 15. The Tribunal has noted that the appellant is unable to even eat or to attend to a visit to the toilet without the assistance of an attendant. In this background, it would be a denial of justice to compute the disability at 90%. The disability is indeed total. Having regard to the age of the appellant, the Tribunal applied a multiplier of 18. In the circumstances, the compensation payable to the appellant on account of the loss of income, including future prospects, would be Rs 18,14,400. In addition to this amount, the appellant should be granted an amount of Rs 2 lakhs on account of pain, suffering and loss of amenities. The amount awarded by the Tribunal towards medical expenses (Rs 98,908); for extra nourishment (Rs 25,000) and for attendant's expenses (Rs 1 lakh) is maintained. The Tribunal has declined to award any amount towards future treatment. The appellant should be allowed an amount of Rs 3 lakhs towards future medical expenses. The appellant is thus awarded a total sum of Rs 25,38,308 by way of compensation. The appellant would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the compensation from the date of the filing of the claim petition. The liability to pay compensation has been fastened by the Tribunal and by the High Court on the insurer, owner and driver jointly and severally which is affirmed. The amount shall be deposited before the Tribunal within a period of 6 weeks from today and shall be paid over to the appellant upon proper identification.”
33 2026:HHC:30105
47.
Being guided by the above decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, now this Court would proceed further to determine the fact whether the learned MACT has rightly assessed the amount of compensation or not. FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017 arising out of Claim Petition No. 67 of 2014
48. As per the stand taken by the petitioners, Sh. Chhabinder, at the time of accident was 27 years of age and earning Rs. 12,000/ per month, by working as mason and also pursuing agricultural pursuits. By examining PW3 Jhabe Ram, who is nephew of Sh. Chhabinder, an attempt has been made by the petitioners to prove that Sh. Chhabinder was earning Rs. 12,000/ per month, during his lifetime. 49. Petitioner No. 1 Tikma Devi, while appearing in the witness box as PW4, has deposed almost on the same lines. In the crossexamination, she has admitted that her husband was not getting regular employment and he used to get work occasionally. He was earning Rs. 400/ Rs. 500/ per day. Learned MACT has taken the income of Sh. 34 2026:HHC:30105 Chhabinder, during his life time as Rs. 6,000/ per month. The accident in question had taken place in the year 2013. Even in that year, the minimum wages of a skilled worker were Rs. 122/ per day, or to say Rs. 3660/ per month. However, the principle of minimum wages is to be applied, where there is no evidence, whereas, in the present case, the wife of Sh. Chhabinder categorically deposed about the income of her husband, in her statement, on oath. In such situation, this Court is of the view that the learned MACT has rightly taken the monthly earning of Sh. Chhabinder as Rs. 6,000/ per month. 50. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Sarla Verma Vs Delhi Transport Corportation, 2009 (6) SCC 121”, and as approved in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), keeping in view the age of Sh.
Chhabinder, at the time of his death, increase has rightly been given by the learned MACT, but the said increase should be 40%, not 50% as awarded by the learned MACT, as Sh. Chhabinder was working in unorganized sector. Thus, his contribution towards his family comes to Rs. 35 2026:HHC:30105 6,000/ + 40% of Rs. 6,000/ = Rs. 6,000/ + Rs. 2,400/ = Rs. 8,400/ per month. 51. Keeping in view the number of dependents, 1/4th amount, out of the total contribution of Sh. Chhabinder is liable to be deducted, on account of personal expenses, had he been alive, which comes to Rs. 6,300/ per month (Rs. 8,400/ minus Rs. 2,100/). His monthly contribution, thus comes to Rs. 6,300/ per month. 52. The learned MACT has applied the multiplier of 17, which according to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Verma’s case (supra), is the appropriate multiplier, to be applied in the present case. Thus, the loss of contribution comes to Rs. 6,300/ x 12 x 17 = Rs. 12,85,200/. 53. In view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Limited versus Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, reported in (2018) 18 Supreme Court Cases 130, all the petitioners are held entitled for the amount of loss of consortium. The
36 2026:HHC:30105 relevant paras 21 to 24 of the judgment are reproduced, as under:
“21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, "consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses `spousal consortium', `parental consortium', and `filial consortium'. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family.
With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse:
21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husbandwife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of "company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation”. 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training."
21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. 22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of
37 2026:HHC:30105 actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions worldover have recognized that the value of a child's consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. 23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In case where a parent has lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Act. A few High Courts have awarded compensation on this count.
However, there was no clarity with respect to the principles on which compensation could be awarded on loss of filial consortium. 24. The amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under `loss of consortium' as laid down in Pranay Sethi (supra). In the present case, we deem it appropriate to award the father and the sister of the deceased, an amount of Rs. 40,000 each for loss of Filial Consortium.”
54. Before assessing the entitlement of the petitioners for compensation under conventional heads, it is
38 2026:HHC:30105 apt for this Court to reproduce relevant paragraph 59.8 of Pranay Sethi case (supra), which is reproduced as under:
“59.8 Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/, Rs. 40,000/ and Rs. 15,000/ respectively. The aforesaid amount should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.”
55. In view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), the petitioners are also held entitled for compensation under the heads: ‘loss of estate’, ‘funeral expenses’, and ‘loss of consortium’. 56. Thus, the entitlement of the claimants, is adjudicated, as under:
1. Loss of income = Rs. 12,85,200/
2. Loss of consortium = Rs.1,60,000/
3. Loss of estate = Rs. 15,000/
4. Funeral Expenses = Rs. 15,000 / _________________________________________________________ Total = Rs. 14,75,200/. ________________________________________________________
57. The entitlement of the petitioners with a view to grant just compensation, thus, comes to Rs. 14,75,200/. 39 2026:HHC:30105
58. So far as the rate of interest is concerned, the learned MACT has rightly awarded the rate of interest at the rate of 7.5% and the same does not require any interference. 59. The learned MACT has rightly fastened the ultimate liability to pay the amount of compensation, along with uptodate interest, on the Insurance Company (respondent No.3), with whom, the offending vehicle was, admittedly, insured, at the time of accident. 60.
Having glance of the above discussion, the appeal of the Insurance Company is partly allowed; the amount of compensation is reduced from Rs. 16,02,000/ to Rs. 14,75,200/, along with interest @ 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till the deposit of award amount. FAO (MV) No. 227 of 2017 arising out of Claim Petition No. 74/2014
61. In the case of petitioner Dole Ram, who has filed the Claim Petition No. 74/2014, the learned MACTI has awarded a sum of Rs. 5,91,600/, along with interest @ 7.5% per annum. 40 2026:HHC:30105
62. According to the petitioner Dole Ram, in the said accident, he has sustained grievous injuries and suffered fracture. After the accident, he was firstly taken to PHC Thunag and thereafter, referred to Zonal Hospital Mandi, where, he remained admit as indoor patient on 21.12.2013 and 22.12.2013 and thereafter, he was referred to PGI Chandigarh and remained admit from 22.12.2013 to
12.01.2014. Thereafter, he was again brought back to Zonal Hospital Mandi and remained admit w.e.f. 12.01.2014 to
19.01.2014. Thereafter, he was again taken to PGI Chandigarh, where he remained admit from 20.01.2014 to
28.01.2014. He was again admitted with Zonal Hospital Mandi from 29.01.2014 to 31.01.2014, and again admitted at PGI Chandigarh w.e.f. 01.02.2014 to 17.02.2014. Thereafter, he was advised to visit twice, per month, at PGI Chandigarh, by the Doctor. According to him, he was forced to spend a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/ for his treatment. 63. By examining PW1 Dr. Sandeep Vaidya, the petitioner has proved the temporary disability certificate as Ext. PW1/A, in which, the disability has been mentioned as
41 2026:HHC:30105 32% in relation to right lower limb. No doubt, the Doctor has deposed that there are chances of permanent disability, in this type of injuries, but, till date the permanent disability certificate has not been placed on record. 64.
Moreover, PW1, who has been examined as expert, has categorically admitted in crossexamination that petitioner may recover and there are chances of decrease of the disability, suffered by the petitioner. 65. In addition to this, the petitioner has also examined PW3 Diwan Chand, who allegedly, took the petitioner for treatment to Shimla, Chandigarh and Mandi, in his vehicle bearing No. HP01M1610 and proved receipts Ext. PW3/A1 to Ext. PW3/A20. 66. By examining PW5, the petitioner has made efforts to prove the fact that the driver of HP01M0964 took him to Chandigarh on fivesix occasions for treatment, vide bills Ext. P86 to Ext. P92. 67. Petitioner Dole Ram, while appearing as PW4, has deposed on the similar lines, as pleaded, in the claim
42 2026:HHC:30105 petition and he has also proved the bills Ext. P1 to Ext. P
85. 68. By examining PW6 Dr. M.A. Bassit, the petitioner has proved the discharge slip Ext. P93, treatment chart Ext. P94 to Ext. P98, discharge slip Ext. P99 and medical bills Ext. P100 to Ext. P113. 69. Learned MACTI has taken the income of the petitioner, at the time of his accident, as Rs. 6,000/ per month. The said findings do not require any interference, as petitioner has pleaded that he was agriculturist and also doing business. He has made the deposition on oath that he was earning Rs. 8000/ per month. He has admitted that he is not having any document to prove that he was earning Rs. 8,000/ per month, but, this does not mean that the petitioner was not earning anything. As such, the learned MACTI has rightly taken his income as Rs. 6,000/ per month. 70. In the present case, the learned MACTI, has given the 50% increase in the monthly income of petitioner and thus held his notional income as Rs. 9,000/ per
43 2026:HHC:30105 month. The disability is proved to be temporary and till date, no certificate demonstrating the permanent disability has been placed on record.
As such, the increase is not liable to be given, while assessing the monthly income of the petitioner, as there is no permanent disability. 71. The increase, on account of future prospects, is to be given only in case of permanent disablement, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Sidram Versus Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr., (2023) 3 Supreme Court Cases 439”. Relevant paragraph 31 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:
“31. It is now a wellsettled position of law that even in cases of permanent disablement incurred as a result of a motor accident, the claimant can seek, apart from compensation for future loss of income, amounts for future prospects as well. We have come across many orders of different tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different High Courts, taking the view that the claimant is not entitled to compensation for future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries resulting in permanent disablement. That is not a correct position of law. There is no justification to exclude the possibility of compensation for future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries resulting in permanent disablement. Such a narrow reading is illogical because it denies altogether the possibility of the living victim progressing further in life in accident cases – and admits such possibility of future prospects, in case of the victim’s death.”
44 2026:HHC:30105
72. The learned MACTI, while giving the addition of 50%, has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Rajesh and others Versus Rajbir Singh and others, reported in (2013) 9 Supreme Court Cases 54”, but the same is held to be not a binding precedent, in view of the Pranay Sethi’s case (supra). Relevant paragraph 59.2 of the
judgment, is reproduced, as under:
“59.2 As Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54, has not taken note of the decision of Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65, which was delivered at earlier point of time, the decision of Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54, is not a binding precedent.”
73. Moreover, in Rajesh’s case (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has given increase, on account of future prospects, in a case involving death, and not in a case, where the petitioner had sought compensation on account of the injuries sustained by him. 74. Thus, the income of Sh. Dole Ram, is liable to be taken as Rs. 6,000/ per month. 75. Learned MACTI, in the present case, has awarded a sum of Rs. 40,000/ under the head ‘pain and sufferings’. As per the documents produced by the
45 2026:HHC:30105 petitioner especially Ext. P36, Ext. P37, the period of hospitalization in PGI Chandigarh, from 22.12.2013 to 31.12.2013 is 10 days, from 01.02.2014 to 17.02.2014 is 17 days, and as per document Ext. P93, period of hospitalization from 29.08.2014 to 03.09.2014 is six days. Similarly, from the document Ext. P99, it has been proved by the petitioner that he was admitted in the hospital on 23.05.2016 and was discharged on 25.05.2016 i.e. three days, as he was admitted for bone grafting. Thus, the total period of hospitalization comes to 36 days. The said period of 36 days, must be traumatic and painful for the petitioner, for which, he is entitled, atleast, for a sum of Rs. 72,000/ (36 x 2000), as such, the amount of compensation, which has been awarded as Rs. 40,000/, under the head ‘pain and sufferings’ is liable to be enhanced to Rs. 72,000/. Ordered accordingly. 76. The period of hospitalization is held to be 36 days, as apparent from the documents, referred to above, in the preceding paragraph. The period of treatment has been proved to be spanning from 22.12.2013 to 25.05.2016, when
46 2026:HHC:30105 he was discharged from Mannat Hospital. The said period is held to be spanning over two and half years. During that period, he could not enjoy the life of a normal human being. As such, the amount of compensation, which has only been awarded by learned MACTI as Rs. 40,000/ is liable to be enhanced, as the petitioner has also suffered 32% temporary disability.
Thus, the ends of justice would meet, if a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/ is awarded to the petitioner, under the head ‘Loss of enjoyment of life’. Ordered accordingly. 77. In the absence of any evidence on the record to demonstrate that on account of the injuries/disability, sustained/ suffered by the petitioner, the life span of the petitioner has been shortened, no amount of compensation is being awarded, under the head ‘shorten expectancy of life’. 78. So far as the ‘Loss of earning and earning capacity’, is concerned, in the present case, the petitioner could not prove the fact that the temporary disability, as shown in the certificate Ext. PW1/A, has resulted into permanent disability. The learned MACTI has granted a sum of Rs. 1,72,800/, to the petitioner, under the head
47 2026:HHC:30105 ‘Loss of earning and earning capacity’, by assuming that 32% disability would result into permanent disability into 10%. Although, the proceedings under M.V. Act are summary in nature, but, this does not mean to grant the compensation merely on the basis of assumptions. Had there been any permanent disability, then, there would have been no legal hesitation to the petitioner to get himself examined from the Board of Doctors to assess the permanent disability. The temporary disability has already been taken into consideration, while awarding the compensation under the head ‘Loss of enjoyment of life’, as such, learned MACTI has fallen into an error by assuming the loss of earning capacity as 10%. Said findings are liable to be interfered with. Ordered accordingly, by holding that petitioner is not entitled for any compensation under the head ‘Loss of earning and earning capacity’. 79. The period of treatment is held to be two and half years and he might have taken, at least, four months for convalescence, after getting discharged from Mannat Hospital, after bone grafting on 25.05.2016, as per
48 2026:HHC:30105 document Ext. P99.
Thus, for a period of about 33 months, the petitioner could not contribute anything for his family, as such, he is held entitled for a sum of Rs. 1,98,000/ (Rs. 6000/ x 33). 80. Under the head ‘Medical expenses’, the learned MACTI has granted a sum of Rs. 2,93,800/, for medical expenses and taxi charges. The said amount is not liable to be interfered with, as the same is based on the documents Ext. P1 to Ext. P113 and Ext. PW3/A1 to Ext. PW3/A20. 81. So far as the special diet is concerned, learned MACTI, has awarded a sum of Rs. 25,000/, on account of special diet and attendant charges, which is liable to be enhanced, keeping in view the span of treatment. As such, the petitioner is held entitled to a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/, under the head “Special Diet and attendant charges’, as, the petitioner might have taken ‘special diet’ and might have taken help of an attendant. Even, for the pro bono services rendered by his family members, to help the petitioner to follow his daily pursuits, this amount is required to be awarded to him. Ordered accordingly. 49 2026:HHC:30105
82. In view of the above, the total amount of compensation, which was awarded by the learned MACT, as Rs. 5,91,600/, is liable to be enhanced, to Rs. 72,000/ + Rs. 2,00,000/ + Rs. 1,98,000/ + Rs. 2,93,800/ + Rs. 2,00,000/ = Rs. 9,63,800/. Ordered accordingly. 83. So far as the rate of interest is concerned, the learned MACT has rightly awarded the rate of interest at the rate of 7.5% and the same does not require any interference. 84. With these observations, the appeal is dismissed by modifying the award passed by the learned MACTI and the amount of compensation is enhanced from Rs. 5,91,600/ to Rs. 9,63,800/, along with interest @ 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole amount, with upto date interest.
FAO (MV) No. 228 of 2017 arising out of
Claim Petition No. 76/2014
85. By way of above titled claim petition, petitioner Gumti Devi, has sought the compensation on account of the injuries suffered by her, in the accident, in question. 50 2026:HHC:30105
86. As per the stand taken by the petitioner Gumti Devi, at the time of accident, she was 31 years of age and agriculturist by profession and earning Rs. 6,000/ per month. According to her, after the accident, in which, she has sustained injuries, she was taken to Regional Hospital Bagsaid and thereafter, to Zonal Hospital Mandi, where, she remained admitt as indoor patient from 21.12.2013 to 30.01.2014 and she was forced to spend a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/ for her treatment. She has proved the bills Ext. PW2/C1 to Ext. PW2/C29. 87. The learned MACTI in the present case, has awarded a sum of Rs. 40,300/ along with interest, at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing the petition, till the payment. The petitioner has not examined any Doctor from Zonal Hospital Mandi, nor, any document has been exhibited and from the MLC Ext. PW2/B, it can be said that she was referred to Zonal Hospital Mandi, but, the document is totally silent about the period of hospitalization. Although, the photocopy of the discharge slip has been produced, but said document has not been exhibited. 51 2026:HHC:30105
88. Considering the amount, which has been awarded to the petitioner under various heads, this Court is of the view that the same does not require any interference by this Court. 89. As such, the findings recorded by the learned MACTI need no interference. The appeal preferred by the appellantInsurance Company is dismissed. FAO (MV) No. 229 of 2017 arising out of
Claim Petition No. 90/2014
90.
This claim petition has been filed by petitioner Dhani Ram, alleging therein that after sustaining injuries in the accident in question, he was taken to Regional Hospital Bagsaid, from where, he was taken to Zonal Hospital Mandi, where, he remained admit from 21.12.2013 to 27.01.2014 and spent about Rs. 1,00,000/ on his treatment. At the time of accident, the petitioner was 32 years of age and agriculturist by profession and earning Rs. 7,000/ per month. 91. The petitioner has placed on record the copy of MLC Ext. PW2/B and medical bills Ext. PW2/C1 to Ext. PW2/C17. The learned MACTI has awarded a sum of Rs. 40,000/, along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of
52 2026:HHC:30105 filing the petition, which does not require any interference, as no document, qua the admission, has been proved by the petitioner, by examining any Doctor/employee of Zonal Hospital Mandi. 92. As such, the findings recorded by the learned MACTI need no interference. Consequently, the appeal of the Insurance Company is dismissed. FAO (MV) No. 376 of 2019 arising out of
Claim Petition No. 44/2015 (32/2017/2015)
93. This claim petition has been filed by Hira Singh, alleging that after the accident, he was taken to Regional Hospital Bagsaid, from where, he was referred to Zonal Hospital Mandi, where, he remained admit from 22.12.2013 to 09.01.2014 and again admitted on 16.01.2014 and discharged on 18.01.2014. According to him, he was forced to spent Rs. 1,00,000/ on his treatment. Learned MACTIII, in the present case, has awarded a sum of Rs. 21,173/, along with interest, at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till payment. 53 2026:HHC:30105
94. The petitioner, when appeared in the witness box, as PW1, produced the medical bills Ext. PW1/A1 to Ext.
PW1/A32 and discharge slips Mark X and Mark Y. In this case, the petitioner has not proved any document to demonstrate that after the accident, he was taken to Zonal Hospital Mandi, where, he remained admit, as asserted by him. In the absence of any evidence, mere bald assertions of the petitioner, cannot be accepted as gospel truth. 95. Hence, the findings of learned MACTIII, do not require any interference. Consequently, the appeal of the Insurance Company is dismissed. 96. Parties are left to bear their own costs. 97. Memo of costs be prepared accordingly. 98. Record be sent back. 99. Copy of the judgment be placed on record, in the connected appeals. (Virender Singh) 21st July, 2026 Judge (Pramod Kumar)