* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 665/2026 % 06.03.2026 # Garikamukkala Sukumar Smiles, S/O.G.M.B. Koteswara Rao Prabhavathi Resident of Balaji Nagar, South Railway Gate, Agraharam Road, Near Ramalyam, Ongole. ……Petitioner And: $ K Pricrilla Alias Kiranmai, D/o K.Putta Wilson and Merina, R/o 3rd Floor, Resurection Ministries Building Baker Gardents, Opp. Silon Penthcost Church, Kabadipalem, Ongole. ….Respondent. !Counsel for the petitioner : Smt.Neelamanjari J S ^Counsel for the respondent : <Gist: >Head Note: ? Cases referred: 1. II(1992) DMC 37, (1992) IIMLJ11 2.AIR 1979 Delhi78, 14(1978)DLT22B, (1978)ILR 2 Delhi 775 3.AIR 2021AP55, 2021(1)ALT630, 2020:APHC:23912 2 HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI * * * * CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 665/2026 DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 06.03.2026 SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL: THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA 1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgments? Yes/No 2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked to Law Reporters/Journals Yes/No 3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No _________________________________ VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA, J 3 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO:665/2026 ORDER: The Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India aggrieved by the orders of the court below in returning the divorce petition filed vide (CFR No.375/2026) DOP.No.—of 2026 (un-numbered) on the file of the Hon’ble District and Sessions Judge, Prakasam District. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The present revision petition is filed challenging the rejection of D.O.P.No.—of 2026 (un-numbered) filed under Section 18 of the Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1869’) on the file of the Hon’ble District and Sessions Judge, Prakasam District on the ground that both the parties are belonging to the Hindu SC Mala community and as per their own pleadings both parties are Hindus. Therefore, the petition under Section 18 is not maintainable as per Section 2 of the Act, 1869. For which, the petitioner herein resubmitted by stating that the marriage was performed under the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1872’) and accordingly a marriage certificate was issued by the competent authority to that effect as per the provisions of the Act, 1872 which is a conclusive proof 4 that marriage was performed under the Act, 1872. It is further stated that respondent profess Christianity in the church run by the brother of the petitioner, as such, the marriage was performed under the Act, 1872 at the subject church only. In view of the same, the petition is maintainable under Section 2 of the Act, 1869. It is further reiterated by the trial Court on 03.02.2026 by way of docket order stating the there is no pleading in entire affidavit of the petitioner that the respondent is professing Christianity, as such, the endorsement to the docket order is contrary to the pleadings of the affidavit. The said docket order of the trial Court was assailed in the present revision petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent professes Christianity in a church run by the brother of the petitioner. By way of such acquaintance, the respondent got married the petitioner as per the Christian rituals as contemplated under the Act, 1872. The certificate issued by the competent authority under the provisions of the Act, 1872 stating that the marriage between the petitioner and respondent was performed as per the terms of the Act, 1872. As such, the same cannot be disbelieved stating that there are no pleadings that the respondent has been professing Christianity ignoring the valid certificate issued under the Act, 1872 by the competent authority. Therefore, the rejection without assigning the number to the petition filed by the petitioner seeking decree of nullity of marriage dated 29.04.2024 5 between the petitioner and the respondent under section 18 of the Act, 1869 is contrary to law and liable to be set aside. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Perused the material placed on record. It is appropriate for this Court to extract Section 18 and Section 2 of the Divorce Act, 1869. “Section 18: Petition for decree of nullity:Any husband or wife may present a petition to the District Court 1 [***], praying that his or her marriage may be declared null and void. Section 2: Extent of Act: This Act extends to the whole of India except the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Extent of power to grant relief generally: Nothing hereinafter contained shall authorise any Court to grant any relief under this Act except where the petitioner or respondent professes the Christian religion, and to make decrees of dissolution: or to make decrees of dissolution of marriage except where the parties to the marriage are domiciled in India at the time when the petition is presented, or of nullity: or to make decrees of nullity of marriage except where the marriage has been solemnized in India and the petitioner is resident in India at the time of presenting the petition, or to grant any relief under this Act, other than a decree of dissolution of marriage or of nullity of marriage, except where the petitioner resides in India at the time of presenting the petition.” 6 6. On perusal of the Section 18 of the Act, 1869, the petitioner being the husband is entitled to present petition before the trial Court praying for declaration of annulment of his marriage. Accordingly, the petitioner filed the present petition under Section 18 of the Act, 1869. On perusal of the Section 2 of the Act, 1869, it is clear and categorical that the subject petition is maintainable if one of the party is professing the Christianity religion. In the instant case the presumption can be drawn once the marriage was performed between the petitioner and the respondent under the provisions of the Act, 1872, unless one of the party professes Christianity the subject marriage would not have been performed under the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 at church. Therefore, there must not be action and a reason for getting the annulment of the marriage under the provisions of the Act, 1869. While resubmitting the petition, it is submitted by the petitioner that the respondent professes Christianity while attending to the church regularly running by the brother of the petitioner as pastor. It is further observed that the marriage certificate issued under the Act, 1872 was filed along with the petition which is said to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1869. Since the marriage was performed under the Act, 1872, the parties to the marriage should have been professing Christianity otherwise they would have got marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act. Therefore, considering the request of the petitioner for adjudicating the petition under the provisions of the Divorce 7 Act, 1869, no prejudice will be caused to the respondent herein, since the petition would be dealt with on merits in accordance with law. 7. On the other hand, it is an admitted fact that the marriage was not performed either under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 or under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, such parties are not entitled to file any divorce petition under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 8. On perusal of the record, wedding card and the marriage certificate issued by the authority concerned, it reveals that the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent was held at Juvet Memorial Baptist Church, Ongole conducted by Dr. DJ.Agastin and Reva T.Punnaiah, pastor. The invitation was published by the Father and mother of the respondent i.e., Putta Wilson and Merina. The name of the respondent is mentioned as Priscilla. All these reveals that the respondent family professes Christianity. Therefore, the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 18 of the Act, 1869 is maintainable. The said finding was upheld by the High Court of Madras in R.Anita Marginic vs. R.Annadurai1, High Court of Delhi in Pramilla Khosla V. Rajinish Kumar Khosla2 and High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Alokam Sudhakar Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh3. 1 II(1992) DMC 37, (1992) IIMLJ11 2 AIR 1979 Delhi78, 14(1978)DLT22B, (1978)ILR 2 Delhi 775 3 AIR 2021AP55, 2021(1)ALT630, 2020:APHC:23912 8 9. In Pramilla Khosla V. Rajinish Kumar Khosla, the High Court of Delhi, held as follows: “The Preamble to the Indian Divorce Act explains that its purpose is 'to amend the law relating to the divorce of persons professing the Christian religion'. Section 2 lays down certain conditions for the grant of various kinds of relief under the Act. The second paragraph of that section says : 'NOTHING hereinafter contained shall authorise any court to grant any relief under this Act except where the petitioner or respondent professes the Christian religion.' Nowhere in the Act is it required that the marriage, in respect of which relief is sought, should have been solemnized in any particular form. It is sufficient that one of the parties is a Christian when the petition is filed: see Sasivaram v. S. Gnanasundari Kamalam, MANU/TN/0435/1954: AIR 1954Mad1018; Nina Dalal v. Mervanji Pherozshaw Dalal AIR 1930 Bombay 385 (2) and Mrs. Chandramani Dubey and another v. Rama Shankar Dubey and others, MANU/UP/0383/1950: AIR 1951AII529. Consequently, it was held in Gobardhan Dass v. Jasadamoni Dassi 18 Cal 252(4), that a marriage between Hindus, who afterwards became converts to Christianity, could be dissolved under the Indian Divorce Act as the petitioner was a Christian at the time of presenting the petition. That case expressly rules that a decree of dissolution may be passed under that Act though the marriage was not performed according to Christian rites'. Since, here, the petitioner has unequivocally alleged in her petition that she 'professes the Christian religion' this requirement of the Act is fulfillled. 9 (11) Section 7 requires the same principle to be applied by the court exercising jurisdiction under the Indian Divorce Act. For that reason, in Thapita Peter v. Thapita Lakshmi and another, 17 Mad 235, the court refused to dissolve a marriage performed according to Hindu rites. It was pointed out that in Gobardhan Dass v. Jasadamoni Dassi, ILR. 18 Cal 252, the attention of the court had not been drawn to section 7, and that case was expressly dissented from. (12) The decision of the Madras High Court in Thapita Peter's case caused South Indian Christians to make certain representations. Acceding to their demand, the effect of that decision was partially avoided by an amending Act of 1912 which added a proviso to section 7. The proviso now makes it clear that, notwithstanding section 7, the court is not to be deprived of jurisdiction 'in a case where the parties to a marriage professed the Christian religion at the time of the occurrence of the facts on which the claim to relief is founded'. But the proviso has no application to the present case as it requires that both parties should have professed the Christian religion at the time of the commission of the matrimonial offence : see Amar Nath (A. N. John) v. Mrs. Amar Nath (Mrs. Paggy John), MANU/LA/0101/1945: Air 1948 Lahore 126 (8) and the same case at page 129. Here, the husband was a Hindu throughout. Nevertheless, the proviso does show that in a case to which it applies, relief can be had under the Indian Divorce Act in respect of any kind of marriage, whether monogamous or not. (13) With regard to a marriage performed according to Arya Samaj Rites the position was not altogether clear. In Dr. Niranjan Das Mohan v. Mrs. Ena Mohan and others Air 1943 Calcutta 145(9), a decree of dissolution was granted under the Indian 10 Divorce Act in respect of such a marriage because it was found as a fact on the evidence produced in the case 'that an Arya Samaj marriage is monogamous' Therefore, it was held that section 7 did not bar relief. (15) However, the whole position has been radically altered by the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, which, by section 2(a), applies to Arya Samajists. A Hindu marriage has now been rendered monogamous by that Act, as section 5 makes it a condition that 'neither party his a spouse living at the time of the marriage'. The bar to relief emanating from English law by virtue of section 7 of the Indian Divorce Act no longer operates. Relief can now be had under that Act in respect of a Hindu marriage provided, of course, one of the parties professes the Christian religion when the petition is filed. That condition,-as I have already said, is fulfillled in this case. (16) This does mean that, in respect of a Hindu marriage, relief can be bad both under the Hindu Marriage Act and the Indian Divorce Act if one of the parties is a Christian when proceedings are commenced, though why anyone should wish to resort to the older Act when a more modern and liberal one is available I cannot divine. But that is the present legal position, as I understand it. No doubt it is fraught with numerous possibilities of conflicting proceedings where, for example, one spouse resorts to one Act and the other to the other. The remedy, however, lies in the hands of the Legislature. 10. In Alokam Sudhakar Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, held as follows: 11 “In this context, this Court has to examine what is “professing a religion” and who is a “Hindu”. A way back in the year 1965 in the case of Punjabrao vs. Dr. D.P.Meshram and others, the Hon’ble Apex Court had discussed about “professes a religion”. The relevant portion is extracted as hereunder: “The meanings of the word "profess" have been given thus in Webster's New World Dictionary: "to avow publicly; to make an open declaration of......to declare one's belief in : as, to profess Christ. To accept into a religious order." The meanings given in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary are more or less the same. It seems to us that the meaning "to declare one's belief in : as to profess Christ" is one which we have to bear in mind while construing the aforesaid order because it is this which bears upon religious belief and consequently also upon a change in religious belief. It would thus follow that a declaration of one's belief must necessarily mean a declaration in such a way that it would be known to those whom it may interest. Therefore, if a public declaration is made by a person that he has ceased to belong to his old religion and has accepted another religion he will be taken as professing the other religion.” The same view was considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S. Rajagopal vs. C.M. Armugam and others while considering the issue of “professing a religion”. In Sastri Yagnapurushadji and others v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya and others, Gajendragadkar, C.J. examined the broad 12 features of Hindu religion, after tracing the historical and etymological genesis of the word 'Hindu' to river Sindhu otherwise known Indus, his Lordship observed at para Nos.29 and 39 as extracted hereunder: 29. "When we think of the Hindu religion, we find it difficult, if not impossible, to define Hindu religion or even adequately describe it. Unlike other religions in the world, the Hindu religion does not claim any one prophet; it does not worship any one God; it does not subscribe to any one dogma; it does not believe in any one philosophic concept; it does not follow any one set of religious rites or performances; in fact, it does not appear to satisfy the narrow traditional feature of any religion or creed. It may broadly be described as a way of life and nothing more.” 39. “There are some remarkable features of the teachings of these saints and religious reformers. All of them revolted against the dominance of rituals and the power of the priestly class with which it came to be associated; and all of them proclaimed their teachings not in Sanskrit which was the monopoly of the priestly class, but in the languages spoken by the ordinary mass of people in their respective regions.” Now we will consider who is a “Christian” and how to consider one that he is “professing Christian religion”. It will be noticed that definition of the expressions “Christians” and “Native Christians” as given in Section 3 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, reproduced below: 13 “Christians” means, persons professing the Christian religion. “Native Christians” includes the Christian descendants of Natives of India converted to Christianity, as well as such converts”. In Halsbury Second Edition, Vol.11 p.80G, para 14G9 and note (b) described as under: “Baptism is the sacrament by which a person is admitted into the Church of Christ. It is not only a sign and distinguishing mark of the Christian profession, but also a sign of regeneration of new birth”. From the above, it is clear that any person professing the Christian religion is a Christian for the purpose of the said Act and Christian residence of Natives of India converted to Christianity as well as such converts are classified as Native Christians. Baptism is the sacrament by which a person is admitted into the Church of Christ and it is not only a sign and distinguished mark of the Christian profession. 11. On perusal of the judgment referred supra, it is clear that any person professing the Christian religion is a Christian under the purpose of the said Act, Baptism is the sacrament by which a person is admitted into Church of Christ and it is regarded as the distinguishing mark of the Christian profession. Therefore, in the instant case, the respondent was admitted into the Church through baptism, and the marriage was solemnized in that church. It is only assailed and distinguished mark of the Christian profession on part of the respondent. Therefore, the respondent professing Christian religion by 14 adopting baptism. Hence, the orders passed by the trial court rejecting/ returning the petition of the petitioner is contrary to law and liable to be set aside. 12. Accordingly, Civil Revision Petition is allowed by setting aside the rejection order dated 03.02.2026 passed by the trial Court. Further the trial Court is directed to proceed further after numbering the petition, on merits, in accordance with the provisions of the Divorce Act, 1869. No costs. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. _________________________________ VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA, J Dated: 06.03.2026 NOTE: L.R. Copy to be marked (B/o) BSP 15 153 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 665/2026 Dated: 06.03.2026 NOTE: L.R. Copy to be marked (B/o) BSP