2026:JHHC:17488 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (C) No. 7231 of 2006 ------ Kedar Prasad Sinha, son of Late Ram Sundar Choudhary, resident of Qr. No. CD-769/11, H.E.C. Sector- II, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagannatahpur, District Ranchi .... .... …. Petitioners Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, P.O., P.S. and District Ranchi 3. The Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation, Ranchi, P.O., P.S. and District Ranchi 4. Mostt. Budi Mundain, widow of Late Bhadwa Munda, resident of Village Kamre, P.O. Kamre, P.S. Ratu, District Ranchi .... .... .... Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI For the Petitioner : Mr. Ayush Aditya, Advocate Mr. Avanish Prakhar, Advocate Ms. Mitali, Advocate For the State : Mr. Anuj Burman, A.C. to G.A. IV. For the Res. No.4 : Mr. Gopal Krishna Sinha, Advocate ------ 18/15.06.2026 Heard Mr. Ayush Aditya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Anuj Burman, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-State and Mr. Gopal Krishna Sinha, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.4. 2. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the entire proceeding of S.A.R. Case No.805/2005-06 and the notice dated 27.01.2006 issued by respondent no.3 whereby the proceeding under Section 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred ‘Act’) has been initiated against the petitioner. 3. Mr. Ayush Aditya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that by order dated 18.12.2006, proceeding under Section 71-A of the Act of S.A.R. Case No.805/2005-06 has been stayed by this court and the matter is still pending before this court and no development has taken place in the light of the stay before the S.A.R. court. 4. He submits that Jitbahan Munda and Sukra Munda, sons of Late 2026:JHHC:17488 2 Chamru Munda, being the heirs of the recorded raiyat of lands comprised within Plot No.479 under Khata No.72 of Mouza Kamre, measuring an area of 01 acre, made an application under Section 49 of the Act being Permission Case No.117R8/1963-64 praying for grant of permission to sell the said land in favour of one Harendra Kumar Tiwari and Shyameshwar Dayal Singh. He next submits that on the said application, Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi registered Permission Case No.117R8/1963-64 and being satisfied that there was sufficient and reasonable purpose for grant of permission, passed an order dated 21.11.1963 granting permission to the said applicants namely Jitbahan Munda and Sukra Munda for sale of 01 acre out of 1.70 acres of lands of Plot No.479 under Khata No.72, Khewat No.7/3 of Village Kamre. Accordingly, by terms of a registered Sale Deed dated 02.01.1965, 01 acre of lands of Plot No.479 from eastern sides out of 1.70 acres of land comprised within Khata No.72, Khewat No.7/3 of Mouza Kamre, said Jitbahan Munda and Sukra Munda sold and transferred the said lands in favour of Harendra Kumar Tiwari and Shyameshwar Dayal Singh on the consent of respondent no.2 in terms of the provisions of Section 49 of the Act. 5. He next submits that by registered sale deed dated 21.02.1980, Indra Kumar Tiwari as the only surviving legal heir of Harendra Kumar Tiwari and Shyameshwar Dayal Singh, sold and transferred 20 Kathas of lands purchased by them as aforesaid in favour of Smt. Prabhawati Devi (wife of the petitioner) and Raju Sinha (son of the petitioner) for valid consideration and thereafter, petitioner’s wife and son became the owners with respect to 20 Kathas of lands from the eastern side of Plot No.479 under Khata No.72 and Khewat No.7/3 of Mouza Kamre and continued in possession in their own right, title and interest. He submits that copy of registered sale deed has been annexed in this writ petition as Annexure- 2. He further submits that during the survey and settlement operation, the name of the petitioner’s wife Prabhawati Devi and son Raju Sinha has also been entered in the Khatiyan with respect to the purchased lands which has been numbered as Plot No.417/479 2026:JHHC:17488 3 and 418/479 and the nature of the Plot No.417/479 has been mentioned as ‘Sahan’ and Plot No.418/479 as ‘Makan’. He submits that in view of that the petitioner’s wife and son are recorded raiyats of their purchased land which has been re-numbered as aforesaid and the Khatiyan has been published contained in Annexure- 4 of this writ petition. 6. He further submits that one Bhadwa Munda, son of Jitbahan Munda appears to have filed an application for restoration under Section 71A of the Act being S.A.R. Case No.26/2000 praying for restoration of various plots of lands including the lands belonging to the petitioner’s wife and son which had been purchased upon permission from the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi in terms of Section 49 of the Act. He submits that the said case was heard by the Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation, Ranchi and by terms of order dated 09.07.2001, the restoration applications were rejected. 7. He next submits that prior to S.A.R. Case No.26/2000 there was another S.A.R. Case No.36/1985 which was also rejected by order dated 18.06.1985 and that has been noted by the S.A.R. officer in the order dated 09.07.2001 in S.A.R. Case No.26/2000, however, against the order of S.A.R. Case No.36/1985, no appeal was been preferred. He submits that appeal has been preferred against the order dated 09.07.2001 in S.A.R. Case No.26/2000 which was numbered as S.A.R. Appeal No.109R15/2001-02 and the said appeal was also dismissed by the order dated 30.06.2005. He submits that against the appeal, no revision has been preferred and in view of that the said proceeding has attained finality. 8. He submits that third proceeding being S.A.R. Case No.805/2005-06, has been registered in which the petitioner has been noticed and aggrieved with that the petitioner has moved before this court in the present writ petition and the entire proceeding has been stayed by the co-ordinate Bench of this court. 9. He submits that the present S.A.R. case has been filed none other than by the wife of Bhadwa Munda, who was applicant in S.A.R. Case No.26/2000. In the aforesaid back grounds, Mr. Ayush Aditya, 2026:JHHC:17488 4 learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that third proceeding is an abuse of process of law and the earlier proceeding has attained finality. He submits that in view of that the proceeding is barred by res judicata and further Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 is not attracted as permission under Section 49 of the Act has been taken by the competent authority. He submits that even entire proceeding is barred by limitation and limitation in Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 is prescribed to be 30 years and initial transfer was made in the year 1965, wherein the present S.A.R. case was filed in 2005-06. He submits that res judicata arising out of Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 has been considered by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Gopal Oraon and Others Vs. State of Jharkhand & Others reported in L.P.A. No.288 of 2022 and he refers to para 45-48 of the judgment which are quoted herein below: 45. Once one of the raiyat has made an application and any adjudication has been made under the statutory provision, then the same will also bind the other members of family and cannot file subsequent application on the garb that they are not party to the proceeding. 46. The principle of res-judicata as well as constructive resjudicata in the matter of restoration is well settled by Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Satyabati Devi Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1996(2) PLJR 719 wherein in a similar issue arising out of C.N.T. Act and it was held that the principles of res-judicata was applicable in view of the admitted position that the earlier application for restoration was filed by one of the members of the family which was rejected. 47. Further, this Court in series of judgment has observed that if on earlier occasions the application for restoration has been rejected and it has become final then subsequent application for restoration for the same would be hit by principles of resjudicata. Reference in this regard may be made to the decisions in the case of Gadia Oraon v. State of Jharkhand. reported in 2004 (1) JCR 237 (Jhr.) and Bibi Makho v. State of Bihar, reported 2004 (1) JLJR 515. 48. In the instant case also, we find that since the point in issue has already been decided in earlier proceeding under Section 71 A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act initiated at the instance of predecessor of the respondent no. 5 to 9 (appellants herein) and, therefore, in the light of aforementioned settled position of law, the subsequent application filed by the Appellants is being barred by res- judicata. 2026:JHHC:17488 5 10. Relying on the above judgments, he submits that identical situation, the ratio laid down by the Division Bench is applicable and in view of that this writ petition may kindly be allowed. 11. On the point of 30 years limitation, he relied the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Situ Sahu & Ors. Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in (2004) 8 SCC 340 wherein it has been held as under: 7. Against the background of these legal provisions, the learned counsel for the appellants raised the following contentions: 1. Section 71-A has no application whatsoever to the case of the appellants. Even if the surrender of tenancy by the tenants on 7-2-1938 followed by settlement of property on the present appellants on 25-2-1938 could be considered as “transfer” within the meaning of Section 71-A, there was no provision of law which existed in the year 1938 under which such a transfer was prohibited. There is no retrospective effect given to Section 71-A so as to cover transactions which took place in the remote past. Hence, the power to restore possession could not have been exercised under Section 71-A. 2. In any event, the period of limitation of 30 years was long past when the application for restoration of possession was sought to be entered by the Special Officer in the year 1978. 11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words “at any time” in Section 71-A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under Section 71-A it would be futile to contend that the period of limitation under the Limitation Act has expired. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable property. But, where, for socio-economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by making an officer of the State responsible for doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third-party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is not whether the period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but whether the power under Section 71-A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay. 2026:JHHC:17488 6 14. We shall now examine the last argument of ShriNarasimha that the transfer was fraudulent. Even on this, we are afraid that the appellants are entitled to succeed. We need not go into the details of the transaction for we may even assume that the transfer was fraudulent. Even then, as held in Ibrahimpatnam (supra), the power under Section 71A could have been exercised only within a reasonable time. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the present appeal, we are not satisfied that the Special officer exercised his powers under Section 71A within a reasonable period of time. The lapse of 40 years is certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. We derive support to our view from the observations made by this Court in Jai MangalOraon case (supra) which was also a case which arose under the very same provision of law. There this Court took the view that Section 46(4)(a), which envisaged a prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner before effecting the transfer in any of the modes stated therein, was introduced only in the year 1947 (with effect from 5.1.1948) and no such provision existed during the relevant point of time when the surrender was made in that case (15.1.1942). Obviously, therefore, no such provision existed in 1938, and the same reasoning applies.” 12. Relying on the aforesaid two judgments in the facts and circumstance of the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that so far the petitioner is concerned, entire proceeding including the notice may kindly be quashed. On these grounds, he submits that the writ petition may kindly be allowed. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the State submits that the stay has been granted by this court and in view of that the learned S.A.R. court has not proceeded further. He fairly submits that when the earlier proceeding has attained finality, the third case for the same cause of action, is bad in law. 14. Mr. Gopal Krishna Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the private respondent no.4 opposes the prayer and submits that the there are provisions in the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 for restoration of the case of the tribal and in view of that the said case has been filed and the learned court has issued notice and in view of that entire S.A.R. case may not be quashed. 15. In view of above submission of learned counsel for the parties, the court has gone through the materials on record including the 2026:JHHC:17488 7 judgments annexed with the writ petition. Annexure- 1 is the order dated 21.11.1963 passed by the Deputy Collector, Ranchi whereby permission has been granted to transfer the said land by Jitbahan Munda and Sukra Munda to Harendra Kumar Tiwari and Shyameshwar Dayal Singh in the light of the provisions Section 49 of the Act and thereafter, registered Sale Deed dated 21.02.1980 was executed in favour of wife and son of this petitioner by one Indra Kumar Tiwari, who is surviving legal heir of Harendra Kumar Tiwari and Shyameshwar Dayal Singh contained in Annexure 2 and thereafter, the settlement operation in the name of the petitioner’s son and wife has been included and the Khatiyan was also published contained in Annexure 3 and 4 of this writ petition. In the order dated 09.07.2001 in S.A.R. Case No.26/2000, it has been noted by the learned S.A.R. court that one S.A.R. case was instituted being S.A.R. Case No.36/1985 which was also rejected by the order dated 18.06.1985. It has been pointed out that against the said order, no appeal has been preferred. Thereafter, the second S.A.R. case being S.A.R. Case No.26/2000 has been dismissed by the order dated 09.07.2001. Against the said order, appeal has been preferred being S.A.R. Appeal No.109R15/2001-02 and the said appeal was also dismissed by the order dated 30.06.2005. It has been pointed out that against the said order of appeal, no revision has been preferred and in view of that the said proceeding has attained finality. Thereafter, the present S.A.R. Case No.805/2005-06 has been instituted in the year 2005-06 in which the notice dated 27.01.2006 has been issued upon the petitioner which clearly suggests that the third proceeding was the abuse of process of law and when the two earlier proceedings have attained finality and this aspect of the matter has been set at rest in the judgment of Division Bench of this court in the case of Gopal Oraon & Others (supra) and the said judgment was passed relying on other judgments of this court. Thus, on the point of res judicata, the court finds force in the argument of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. 16. It is well settled that S.A.R. proceeding is required to be 2026:JHHC:17488 8 instituted within 30 years of dispossession, wherein permission was granted for transfer in the year 1963 and the present proceeding has been instituted in the year 2005-06. In that view of the matter, the court further finds force in the argument of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as it is also barred by limitation. 17. In view of above facts, reasons and analysis, the entire proceeding arising out of S.A.R. Case No.805/2005-06 and the notice dated 27.01.2006 so far this petitioner is concerned, are hereby, quashed. This writ petition is allowed and disposed of. Pending I.A. if any, stands disposed of. (Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Anit A.F.R. Uploaded 18.06.2026