1 2026:CGHC:7784 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 316 of 2017 Smt. Gouri Bai Patel W/o Lekhram Patel, Aged About 48 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Kandadongar, Police Station Jharband, Tahsil Paikamal, Civil And Revenue District Bargadh Odissa ........Plaintiff ... Appellant versus 1 - Indar Choudhary (Deleted) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 02/02/2026 2 - Smt. Dashmoti W/o Tikaram Choudhary, Aged About 53 Years R/o Village Tilanjanpur, P.O. Bhagatdevri, Police Station Saankra, Tahsil Pithoura, Civil And Revenue District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 3 - The State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Mahasamund, Civil And Revenue District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ......Defendants …. Respondent(s) (Cause title is taken from CIS) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Punit Ruparel, Advocate For Respondent/ State : Mr. Malay Jain, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board SOURABH BHILWAR Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2026.02.12 17:20:26 +0530 2 12/02/2026 1. The present Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiff/ appellant under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 31.03.2017 passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. H- 19-A/2016 (Smt. Gouri Bai vs. Indar Choudhary & Ors.), affirming the judgment and decree dated 30.07.2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class-II, Pithora, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 8-A/2014, whereby the civil appeal filed by the appellant/plaintiff was dismissed. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 2. The appellant/ plaintiff instituted the suit seeking declaration of title, recovery of possession, permanent injunction and, in alternative, partition and separate possession pleading inter alia that the suit land, being part of Khasra No. 54/1, admeasuring 10.425 acres, is ancestral coparcenary property of the plaintiff and defendant No.1, in which the plaintiff has a right by birth. Under a family arrangement, defendant No.1 retained certain land and allotted the suit land as the plaintiff’s share, while the remaining land was recorded in the names of his sons, who have since alienated their portions. It was agreed that the son who would take care of defendant No.1 would remain in possession of the suit land during his lifetime, and thereafter the property would 3 devolve upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff further pleaded that defendant No.1 fraudulently executed a nominal sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 without consideration, though defendant No.2 has no independent source of income. The said sale deed is alleged to be not binding upon the plaintiff. Hence, the suit has been filed seeking declaration, permanent injunction, and in the alternative, partition to the extent of half share and separate possession. 3. Per contra, defendants No.1 and 2 jointly filed their written statement and contended therein that the suit property is not ancestral coparcenary property of the plaintiff. The alleged partition of the property between defendant No.1 and his sons was made with the plaintiff’s knowledge and consent, who did not claim any share at that time. Defendant No.1, due to personal expenses on medical treatment and funeral of his spouse, sold his share of the property to defendant No.2 for consideration, which has been duly recorded in the revenue records in favour of the son of defendant No.2, Chandra Shekhar, with delivery of possession. Defendant No.2 has her own assets and paid the full consideration; hence the sale deed and subsequent mutation are valid and binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not paid the requisite court fee to challenge the registered sale deed, and the suit is thus not maintainable. In view of the above, the defendants pray that the suit be dismissed. 4. After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as 4 well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff has failed to establish her claim against the defendants. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 30/07/2016, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgments and decrees of the learned Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court are perverse and liable to be set aside. He submits that the appellant, being a married daughter, is legally entitled to her share in the ancestral property situated at village Tilanjanpur, P.H. No. 41, R.N.M. Saakra, Tahsil Pithoura, District Mahasamund (C.G.) bearing Khasra Nos. 255, 294/01, and 347 (1.20, 0.27, and 0.42 hactares). The defendant No.1, despite prior assurance, executed a sale deed dated 10.12.2012 in favour of defendant No.2 without consideration, infringing the appellant’s rights. He further submits that necessary parties, namely Parmanand, Jairam, and Tikaram, were not impleaded, rendering the proceedings incomplete. The appellant adduced evidence through revenue records, Khasra Panchshala, sale deeds, and 5 witnesses to establish her claim. He also submits that the sale deed executed by an aged and incapacitated defendant No.1 is null and void. Hence, the appellant is entitled to a declaration of title, possession, permanent injunction, and her rightful share in the ancestral property. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 7. In the present case, both the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court, after due appreciation of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, have concurrently held that the appellant/plaintiff has failed to establish her claim for declaration of title, recovery of possession, permanent injunction, or alternative claim for partition and separate possession over the disputed property. It has been specifically found that the disputed property was self-acquired by defendant No.1 (Indar Choudhary), the appellant/plaintiff did not prove any entitlement under the alleged family arrangement, and no share was legally vested in her during the lifetime of defendant No.1. Both the learned Courts further recorded that the appellant’s contentions regarding lack of consideration or alleged incapacity of defendant No.1 to execute the sale were unsubstantiated, and necessary parties were not impleaded. No perversity, misreading of evidence, or illegality is apparent in the concurrent findings, and no ground exists to 6 warrant interference with the judgments and decrees of both the Courts under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 9. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/ plaintiff failed to establish her case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 10. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 12. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal 7 and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 13. 13. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and 8 decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 15. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge $. Bhilwar/ Shoaib