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2026 DAILYLAW 16932 (HP)

Lata Kumari v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2026-03-18

Jiya Lal Bhardwaj

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JUDGMENT : JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ, J. 1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following substantive reliefs: “(a) That the impugned Annexure A-1, may kindly be quashed and set aside and the respondents be directed to re- engage the applicant retrospectively with all consequential benefits in the same capacity, pay scale and place and the judgment passed by the Hon’ble High Court of HP may kindly be directed to be implemented in its letter and spirit. (b) That in alternate the respondent may kindly be further directed to re-engage the applicant on any of the vacancies available in the schools in Distt. Bilaspur, H.P., as has already been allowed by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P.” 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the key facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Trained Graduate Teacher (TGT Science) in Government Senior Secondary School Gandhir, District Bilaspur, H.P. by respondents No.4 and 5 against a vacancy on 06.01.2006. 3. When the petitioner was not released the grant-in- aid w.e.f. 2006, the date of her appointment against vacancy, she had approached this Court by way of CWP No.8692 of 2012, titled, Lata Kumari vs. State of H.P. and others. This writ petition was disposed of on 10.04.2015, noticing in unequivocal words that the respondents have not disputed the fact that the petitioner is working since 02.09.2002 and further it is not denied that she is working against the vacant post w.e.f. 06.01.2006. The only reason for not paying the honorarium to the petitioner was that the PTA Committee had engaged her prior to the Rules i.e. PTA Grant-in-Aid Rules 2006 (for short “PTA GIA, Rules”) and at the time of appointment of the petitioner, the post of TGT (Non-Medical) was not vacant in the school. The said stand was negated by this Court, holding that once the respondents themselves have admitted that the petitioner had been appointed against a vacancy w.e.f. 06.01.2006. The petitioner had claimed the arrears of grant-in-aid w.e.f. 2006 and not from the date of her initial appointment in the year 2002. It was also recorded that the respondents do not dispute the factum that the petitioner has not been discharging her duties diligently, honestly and faithfully and in such circumstances, she is entitled to the grant-in-aid. The relevant paras of the judgment read as under:- “9. It was also recorded that the respondents do not dispute the factum that the petitioner has not been discharging her duties diligently, honestly and faithfully and in such circumstances, she is entitled to the grant-in-aid. The relevant paras of the judgment read as under:- “9. The matter can be looked from a different angle. Indisputably the petitioner had been appointed and assigned the duties to teach the students and such duties have been continuously performed by her. Then can the respondents, who are model employers, be permitted to act with total lack of sensitivity and indulge in “Begar” which is specifically prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution of India. 10. The State government is expected to function like a model employer, who is under an obligation to conduct itself with high probity and expected candour and the employer, who is duty bound to act as a model employer has social obligation to treat an employee in an appropriate manner so that an employee is not condemned to feel totally subservient to the situation. A model employer should not exploit its employee and take advantage of their helplessness and misery. In the present case the conduct of the respondents falls short of expectation of a model employer. 11. It is not the case of the respondents that petitioner has not been discharging her duties diligently, honestly and faithfully. Therefore, in such circumstances while demanding her legitimate due by way of grant in aid under the Rules, the petitioner has not asked for the moon 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is merit in the petition and the same is allowed and the respondents are directed to release the grant-in-aid to the petitioner as per the ‘Grant-in-Aid to Parent Teacher Association Rules, 2006’ from the date of promulgation of the Rules. No costs.” 4. This Court had allowed the writ petition preferred by the petitioner and directed the respondents to release the grant-in-aid to her as per the Grant-in-Aid to the Parent Teacher Association Rules, 2006, from the date of promulgation of the Rules. 5. No costs.” 4. This Court had allowed the writ petition preferred by the petitioner and directed the respondents to release the grant-in-aid to her as per the Grant-in-Aid to the Parent Teacher Association Rules, 2006, from the date of promulgation of the Rules. 5. It is admitted fact that the ibid judgment was not assailed and the respondents in sequel to the directions given by this Court, partly released the benefit of grant-in-aid in favour of the petitioner, but in arbitrary manner and without any show cause notice cancelled her appointment vide communication dated 09.09.2016 (Annexure A-3), mentioning that her appointment was maladjustment, where she is working without any post. 6. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by her disengagement had approached the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 4606 of 2016, titled, Smt. Lata Kumari vs. State of H.P. and others. The learned Tribunal vide order dated 18.12.2017 (Annexure A-4) had disposed of the original application, directing the respondents to pay Grant-in- Aid to the petitioner for rest of the period within two months from the date of production of certified copy of the order and so far the relief with respect to re-engagement against the post of TGT (Non-Medical) in GHS Malangan U/C GSSS Gandhir, GSSS Dahad, Tehsil Jhandutta or GMS Silvi u/c GSSS Jejwin, Tehsil Jhandutta Distt. Bilaspur, is concerned, she may file a comprehensive representation within one month. 7. After the disposal of the original application, the petitioner has made a representation, which came to be rejected vide order dated 30.07.2018 (Annexure A-1), assigning the reason that as per the record and provisions of PTA GIA, Rules 2006, the petitioner was not fit to be engaged against the post of TGT (Medical) as per R&P Rules of TGTs, as she has the qualification for the post of TGT (Non-Medical). The regular teacher, who had gone to extra-ordinary leave, (hereinafter referred as EOL), had joined in the school and the PTA of GSSS Gandhir, District Bilaspur, allowed the petitioner to continue work as TGT (Non-Medical) in the school without any sanctioned post. Therefore, no Grant-in-Aid was released in favour of the petitioner. It was further observed that the Court had directed to initiate disciplinary action against the erring officer/official/concerned Head of Institution, who allowed the petitioner to continue to work as TGT (Non-Medical), without any sanctioned post. Therefore, no Grant-in-Aid was released in favour of the petitioner. It was further observed that the Court had directed to initiate disciplinary action against the erring officer/official/concerned Head of Institution, who allowed the petitioner to continue to work as TGT (Non-Medical), without any sanctioned post. As per the approval of the Government, Grant-in-Aid has been released to the petitioner for whole period i.e. till the date of her termination and further process of disciplinary action against the erring officer/official is also under process. Since the petitioner was working in the school without any sanctioned post/clear-cut vacancy, the request of the petitioner to re-engage her on PTA GIA basis cannot be considered and representation made by her was rejected. 8. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the said order of rejection has approached this Court by way of present petition. It has been averred in the petition that the petitioner had rendered 14 years services with the respondents and this Court had not passed the order to terminate her services as has been mentioned by the respondents and further terming her appointment as maladjustment is not only illegal and objectionable rather unlawful. It has further been averred that as per the communication dated 22.5.2014 (Annexure A-5), on the recommendations of the High Powered Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of Worthy Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, the Government had decided to re-engage all the PTA provided Teachers, who were earlier engaged before 31.12.2007 and whose services were discontinued due to the reasons, other than Inquiry Committee. The impugned order has been passed in violation of the directions given by this Court and the petitioner has been made to suffer for no fault on her part inasmuch as it is a glaring example of disciplinary conduct on the part of the respondents. 9. Respondent Nos.1 to 4 filed reply to the petition and averred that the petitioner was engaged by the then PTA of the concerned School under PTA GIA vide Resolution on 1.7.2006 (before the promulgation of PTA to GIA Rules 2006) against leave vacancy caused due to E.O.L of the regular incumbent of the post of TGT (Medical), who re-joined on the post in June, 2008 after availing E.O.L., but the petitioner still continued to work as such without any vacancy. Moreover, as per the PTA GIA Rules, 2006 issued on 29.6.2006, the petitioner was not eligible for such appointment, as she did not have the requisite qualification for the said post i.e. TGT (Medical) as per R&P Rules. The Grant-in-Aid Rules to a PTA shall not be admissible in respect of a teacher made available by it, who does not fulfill the educational qualifications fixed by the Govt. in respect of posts under it for teaching the same subjects/classes. Further the services of the petitioner have been terminated on 09.09.2016, as she was working in the school, without any sanctioned post. 10. Respondent No.5 filed separate reply to the petition and admitted that the petitioner was appointed in the respondent school as TGT (Science) and continued to work in the respondent school with effect from 2.9.2002 to 9.9.2016. It has also been averred that the post which was lying vacant on account of the incumbent having gone on extra-ordinary leave was later filled up by transfer in the school on 20.6.2008. But the services of the petitioner were continued by the subsequent resolution passed by the PTA of the school, as it was found necessary in view of the increased strength of the students in the school. 11. It is further averred that the termination of the petitioner was not issued by respondent No.5 and further it is denied that the services of the petitioner were dispensed with on 09.09.2016. 12. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to take note of the order dated 19.8.2023, passed by this Court in this petition, wherein it was prima facie concluded that communication dated 9.9.2016, in terms whereof, the engagement of the petitioner was cancelled, is arbitrary and is a result of legal malafide, as is apparent from the terms of the communication itself. 13. Learned Additional Advocate General had got the matter deferred by two weeks to enable him to have appropriate instructions in the matter. Thereafter, the respondents have placed on record the instructions dated 4.10.2023, reiterating the same stand, which was earlier taken in the reply. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record carefully. 15. Thereafter, the respondents have placed on record the instructions dated 4.10.2023, reiterating the same stand, which was earlier taken in the reply. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record carefully. 15. It is most unfortunate that the respondents, without caring to comply with the earlier directions given by this Court, had cancelled her engagement without issuing any show cause notice, initially on 9.9.2016 and thereafter on 30.7.2018 (Annexure A-1), when the representation made by the petitioner was rejected by taking into consideration the material, which does not germane from the judgment earlier passed by this Court on 10.04.2015 (Annexure A-2). 16. This Court in the earlier round of litigation had categorically noticed in unequivocal words that the petitioner had been working since 02.09.2002 and thereafter worked against the vacant post w.e.f 06.01.2006. The plea taken was that the petitioner had been engaged by the PTA Committee much prior to the Rules i.e. PTA Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2006, which came into force later, and further at the time of appointment of the petitioner, the post of TGT (Non-Medical), was not vacant. 17. The stand taken by the respondents that the petitioner had been engaged by the PTA prior to promulgation of the Rules was rejected by this Court for the reason that the same cannot be considered to be a relevant factor to refuse the relief to the petitioner, once the petitioner at the relevant time was appointed against the vacancy w.e.f. 06.01.2006. 18. This Court while disposing of the writ petition on 10.4.2015 had never asked the respondents to cancel her appointment and once the petitioner had been discharging her duties w.e.f. 06.01.2006, ignoring the earlier services w.e.f. 02.09.2002, the respondents instead of throwing her out ought to have released the entire benefits in sequel to the directions given by this Court, but instead of granting her benefits, her appointment was cancelled and even the entire amount of GIA was not released to her. 19. 19. The petitioner after cancelling her appointment vide order dated 09.09.2016 had raked up the issue before the learned Tribunal by preferring an original application and the learned Tribunal vide order dated 18.12.2017 had directed the respondents to pay the Grant-in-Aid to the petitioner for rest of the period within two months from the date of production of certified copy of the order and so far the relief regarding her re- engagement against the post of TGT (Non-Medical) was concerned, the petitioner was allowed to make a fresh comprehensive representation. 20. The respondents instead of re-engaging the petitioner either in the same school where she was working or any other schools which she had mentioned in the original application and noticed in the order while disposing of the original application, had rejected the claim vide order dated 30.07.2018 (Annexure A-1), taking note of the facts, which do not germane from the order passed by this Court. 21. It is not known that where from it has been noticed in the impugned order dated 30.07.2018 that this Court had directed to initiate disciplinary action against the erring officer/official/concerned Head of the Institution. Not only this, this Court had never given the permission to the respondents to cancel the appointment of the petitioner and the issue which was raised before the Court was only with respect to release of Grant-in-Aid and once this Court had given direction to release the Grant-in-aid after noticing the fact that it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner had not been discharging her duties diligently, honestly and faithfully and further she had not asked for the moon and only for release of Grant-in-Aid. 22. The respondents have tried to overreach the directions passed by this Court when they have firstly cancelled the appointment of the petitioner and thereafter the representation of the petitioner, which was directed to be filed by the learned Tribunal has been rejected noticing facts which do not germane from record. 23. The respondents have not placed on record any material to suggest that before termination of her services vide dated 09.09.2016, the petitioner was issued with a show cause notice that why her services be not terminated. 24. It is settled law that in the case of any order, having civil/evil consequences, the least which is expected of the employer, is to issue show cause notice to the employee. 24. It is settled law that in the case of any order, having civil/evil consequences, the least which is expected of the employer, is to issue show cause notice to the employee. However, in the present case, the respondents have acted in flagrant violation of principles of natural justice, which also offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 25. The respondents at the time of requirement of services of the petitioner utilized the same and thereafter also even if the vacancy was not there, why the services of the petitioner had been utilized even after rejoining the person in the month of June, 2008 till 09.09.2016. Further, once this Court had directed the respondents to release the Grant-in-Aid, it was incumbent upon the respondents to transfer the person who had joined, at the place of petitioner so as to retain her or to transfer to other place in case the vacancy was not in existence. Furthermore, the person who was posted at her place even on the course of TGT (Medical), the petitioner could have been retained on the said post when at the time of absence of teacher, her services were utilized. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in CWP No. 384 of 2017, titled, Renuka Devi vs. State of H.P. and others, decided on 26.05.2018, wherein this Court had even taken note of the judgment passed in the case of the petitioner in the earlier round of litigation and had directed the respondents to release the grant-in-aid to the petitioners. 27. It is strange that though the earlier judgment passed by this Court had been considered by the Coordinate Bench but the petitioner has been left high and dry and she is litigating in the Court since 2012, for getting her dues. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment in CWP No. 617 of 2020, titled, Darshana Kumari vs. State of H.P. and others, decided on 24.03.2025, wherein too, the services of the employee who was appointed on PTA basis, were terminated. This Court had held that even in case of temporary employee, disciplinary proceedings are required to be initiated before passing stigmatic order. This Court had held that even in case of temporary employee, disciplinary proceedings are required to be initiated before passing stigmatic order. In the present case too, no enquiry was initiated against the petitioner though she had been discharging her duties w.e.f. 06.01.2006 and thus the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment is applicable in all four in the facts of the present case. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed heavy reliance upon the judgment passed in CWP No. 379 of 2018, titled, Vinod Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 17.07.2018, wherein the plea was taken that the employee was not qualified at the time of his engagement. However, this Court had taken note of the fact that as per the own policy of the Government, such PTA employees, who were not qualified at the time of their engagement, were given opportunity to improve their qualification and directed to be re-engaged. Further, the regular incumbent working in the school may be transferred to any other school, so as to give way to the PTA employee to be offered appointment. In the present case, the petitioner was duly qualified to hold the post of TGT(Science) and the respondents took the work from her, when they were in dire need of her services and later on terminated her services without issuing a show cause notice and without following the due process of law. Hence, the action on the part of the respondents is wholly illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, unjustified and untenable in law. 30. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the impugned orders dated 09.09.2016 and 30.07.2018 passed by the respondents are quashed and set aside and further the respondents are directed to re-engage the petitioner from the date of disengagement with all consequential benefits. Needless to say that the petitioner shall be granted all the benefits arising from her appointment w.e.f. 06.01.2006, such as seniority, regularization and other financial benefits. In case, the petitioner is not granted the benefits within a period of three months from today, the arrears shall be paid to her along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date the same fell due till its realization. 31. The petition is accordingly disposed of. However, no order as to costs. 32. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.