JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays challenge to judgment dated 12.09.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan, District Solan, H.P., in Criminal Appeal No.3-AK/10 of 2024, affirming the judgment of conviction dated 16.01.2024 and order of sentence dated 29.01.2024, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Arki, District Solan, H.P. in Criminal Complaint No.217/3 of 2018, whereby the learned Court below, while holding the petitioner-accused (hereinafter "accused") guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the "Act”), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.80,000/- to the respondent-complainant (hereinafter "complainant"). 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that complainant instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act before the competent Court of law, alleging therein that accused applied for loan amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- from the complainant’s bank and loan was sanctioned in the name of accused on 15.09.2015. Afore loan was to be repaid/returned by the accused as per terms and conditions of loan agreement. However, on account of default in repayment, loan account of the accused was declared as NPA and sum of Rs.2,14,272/- along with interest was shown to be outstanding in his account. With a view to discharge his lawful liability and regularization of his loan account, though accused issued cheque bearing No. 025601 dated 01.07.2018 amounting to Rs.60,000/-, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Branch Arki, Tehsil Arki, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, but aforesaid cheque on its presentation was returned back vide memo dated 06.07.2018 with the remarks “Insufficient Funds”. Since accused failed to make the payment good within the stipulated period despite his having received legal notice dated 28.07.2018, complainant had no option, but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 16/29.01.2024, held the accused guilty of his having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 16/29.01.2024, held the accused guilty of his having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Arki, District Solan, H.P., accused preferred an appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan, District Solan, H.P., but same was ismissed vide judgment dated 12.09.2024. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for setting-aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the learned Court below. 5. Vide order dated 02.01.2025, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below subject to petitioner’s depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount within a period of eight weeks, however, fact remains that aforesaid order was never complied with. Repeatedly time was granted to the accused to comply with the aforesaid order, but in vain. Vide order dated 23.02.2026, this Court, while granting last opportunity to the petitioner to do the needful, specifically observed in the order that in case needful is not done, interim protection granted vide order dated 02.01.2025 shall come to an end and respondent would be at liberty to get the judgment of learned trial Court executed in accordance with law. 6. Today, during the proceedings of the case, learned counsel for the accused submitted that since accused is not coming forward to impart instructions, this Court may proceed to decide the case on its own merits. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan, District Solan, H.P., whereby judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld, this Court is not persuaded to agree with Mr. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan, District Solan, H.P., whereby judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld, this Court is not persuaded to agree with Mr. Rajinder Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the accused, that learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and there is no scope left for this Court to interfere. Evidence led on record by the parties, especially statement of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. clearly reveals that there is no denial, if any, on the part of accused with regard to issuance of cheque as well as his signatures thereupon. Since factum of issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon never came to be refuted at the behest of accused, both the learned Courts below rightly invoked Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which talk about presumption in favour of holder of cheque that cheque in question was issued towards discharge of lawful liability. 8. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption person seeking to rebut such presumption is expected to raise probable defence. However, in the instant case, no probable defence ever came to be raised. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence, which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused, besides leading evidence in defence, can rely on the materials produced by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability,  statutory  presumption  under  Section  139  of  the  Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras of the judgment herein: “23. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability,  statutory  presumption  under  Section  139  of  the  Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras of the judgment herein: “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act speciftes the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually conftned to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 10. In the case at hand, complainant, with a view to prove its case, examined its authorized officer as CW-1 Sh. Bhupender Gupta, who tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ext. CW-1/A, wherein he reiterated the facts as averred in the complaint. He also placed on record GPA Ext. CW-1/B, cheque Ext. CW-1/C, dishonour memo Ext. CW-1/D, demand notice Ext. CW-1/E and post receipt Ext. CW-1/F. If the cross-examination conducted upon this witness is perused in its entirety, it can be safely concluded that opposite party was unable to extract anything contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination, CW-1 stated that he was posted at PNB Branch Arki in the year 2018. CW-1/E and post receipt Ext. CW-1/F. If the cross-examination conducted upon this witness is perused in its entirety, it can be safely concluded that opposite party was unable to extract anything contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination, CW-1 stated that he was posted at PNB Branch Arki in the year 2018. He further stated that accused took a C.C. Limit loan from the complainant's bank. While stating that loan was sanctioned in favour of accused in his presence, he stated that copy of account statement, though not attached with the case file, but he has brought it with him. Not even a single suggestion ever came to be put to afore witness with regard to fact that cheque in question was never issued by the accused towards discharge of lawful liability and same has been misused. 11. In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, though accused denied the case of complainant in toto, but despite sufficient opportunities, he was unable to led evidence in defence. 12. By way of leading cogent and convincing evidence, complainant successfully proved on record that it had sanctioned a loan to the tune of Rs. 2,00,000/- in favour of the accused in the present case on 15.09.2015 and the same was agreed to be repaid/returned by the accused as per the conditions and terms of loan agreement. Complainant also proved that accused did not pay regular monthly installments and loan amount was outstanding to the tune of Rs. 2,14,272/-. It also came to be proved at the behest of complainant-bank that though accused had issued a cheque bearing No.025601, on 01.07.2018, amounting to Rs. 60,000/-, drawn at P.N.B Bank, Branch Arki, Tehsil Arki, District Solan, H.P. in favour of complainant towards discharge of his lawful liability, but the same was dishonored with the remarks “Insufficient Funds” vide return Memo dated 06.07.2018. Factum with regard to issuance of legal notice prior to institution of proceedings under Section 138 of Act also came to be proved by the complainant by placing on record legal notice as well as postal receipt. Though in the case at hand, accused denied the case of the complainant in toto, while getting his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, but that may not be sufficient to discard the full proof case of the complainant. Though in the case at hand, accused denied the case of the complainant in toto, while getting his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, but that may not be sufficient to discard the full proof case of the complainant. As observed hereinabove, the testimony of CW-1, i.e., the evidence adduced on record by the complainant, could not be shattered by the accused. 13. Having scanned pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by the complainant, this court finds that complainant successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act. Similarly, factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by the accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established on record. 14. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the Courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any ftnding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 15. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has  held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal Court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the Courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the Courts below. 16. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 17. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender before the learned trial Court within 15 days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are cancelled. 18. Amount, if any, lying deposited by the accused with the learned trial Court as well as Registry of this court is ordered to be released in favour of complainant by remitting the same in its bank account, detail whereof, shall be furnished within a period of one week.