JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, J. Applicant Sant Prakash Sharma has filed the present application, under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BNSS’) for releasing him, on bail, during the pendency of the trial, arising out of FIR No. 313 of 2023, dated 12.12.2023, registered under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’) and Section 25 of the Arms Act, registered with Police Station, Haroli, District Una, H.P. 2. According to the applicant, he is innocent and has falsely been implicated, in this case, as no legal evidence could be collected by the prosecution to connect him, with the alleged offence. 3. Apart from this, he has also put forward his ill health, as, one of the grounds, to release him on bail, by pleading that he is suffering from spinal injury and the Doctor has advised him to take home remedies, painkillers and physio- therapy. The Doctor is also stated to have advised that in case, the proper precaution is not taken, the problem may aggravate. Due to said problem, he allegedly could not follow daily pursuits. 4. According to the applicant, thereafter, he was referred to PGI, Chandigarh, on 27.2.2024, and the Doctor gave a comprehensive opinion. The applicant had also remained hospitalized, in Regional Hospital, Una, w.e.f. 20.9.2024 to 3.10.2024. Thereafter, the Doctor has advised the applicant the physio-therapy, for about 25 days, at PGI, Chandigarh. The applicant has also given the chronology of his medical treatment at various stages, in order to support his case. 5. The applicant has relied upon the advise of the Doctors at PGI, Chandigarh, according to which, he should avoid travelling and difficult postures. 6. According to the further stand of the applicant, investigation, in the present case, is complete and the matter is now pending before the learned trial Court. All these facts have been highlighted to show that custodial interrogation of the applicant, is no longer required by the Police. Alongwith the application,he has also annexed the medical record. 7. 6. According to the further stand of the applicant, investigation, in the present case, is complete and the matter is now pending before the learned trial Court. All these facts have been highlighted to show that custodial interrogation of the applicant, is no longer required by the Police. Alongwith the application,he has also annexed the medical record. 7. The delay in the trial has also been made a ground for seeking the relief of bail by pleading that the chances of conclusion of the trial against him, in near future, are not so bright, as, there are as many as 47 witnesses and till date only three PWs have been examined. 8. The applicant, through his counsel, has given certain undertakings, for which he is ready to abide by, in case, ordered to be released on bail. 9. On all these submissions, Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Swati Sharma, has prayed that the bail application may kindly be allowed, as prayed for. 10. When, put to notice, Police filed status report, disclosing therein that on 12.12.2023, at about 1:20 a.m., a telephonic message was received in Police Station, Tahliwal that Sant Prakash (applicant) had shot down labourer Ghoora, upon which, Inspector Ashok Kumar, Incharge Police Post, Tahliwal, alongwith other police officials, reached at the spot, i.e. Sant Rice Mill, where they noticed the blood stains near Sheller. 10.1. In order to preserve the spot, HHC Paramjeet was deputed there. When, Inspector Ashok Kumar alongwith police officials was present, in the factory, then, Raj Kumar disclosed that the injured had been taken for treatment at Naya Nangal, upon which, the I.O. reached at RK Hospital, Naya Nangal, where the Doctor had declared the injured as ‘brought dead’. His dead body was stated to be lying in vehicle No. HP-10B-8896, on the side of the road. The dead body was taken into possession and the same was sent to RH, Una. 10.2 On the spot, Santosh Kumar, S/o Lala Sahu has made statement under Section 154 Cr. P.C., disclosing therein that he is working in the Sant Rice Mill J.K. Food, for the last 7-8 years. The dead body was taken into possession and the same was sent to RH, Una. 10.2 On the spot, Santosh Kumar, S/o Lala Sahu has made statement under Section 154 Cr. P.C., disclosing therein that he is working in the Sant Rice Mill J.K. Food, for the last 7-8 years. As per him, at about 12:30 a.m., in midnight, when, he was present in the factory, then, he heard noise towards Sheller and when, he reached at the spot, he noticed that owner of the Sant Rice Mill and the deceased were quarreling with each other and Sant Prakash (applicant) was beating Ghoora with the fist and kick blows, alleging that he is not working properly. At that time, Ritesh Kumar, Heera Ram and Munshi Rakesh Kumar were also present. All the aforesaid persons, alongwith the complainant, were trying to save Ghoora from Sant Prakash (applicant), and, in their presence, Sant Prakash (applicant) had shot down Ghoora. In the meanwhile, labourer Raj Kumar allegedly reached at the spot. Thereafter, Sant Prakash (applicant) had gone to his room in the factory and came back alongwith keys of the vehicle. Thereafter, this witness, Rakesh Kumar and Sant Prakash (applicant) took Ghoora in the said vehicle, for treatment to the hospital. The Doctor had allegedly checked Ghoora in the car and declared him ‘brought dead’. 10.3 According to the complainant, death of Ghoora had occurred due to gun fire shot. As such, he has prayed that action be taken against applicant Sant Prakash, upon which, the Police registered a case under Section 302 IPC and Section 25-54-59 of Arms Act. 10.4 Thereafter, investigation started. During investigation, when, the I.O. reached at the spot, he came to know about the fact that accused had gone towards Naya Nangal. Consequently, I.O. alongwith labourer Raj Kumar had reached Naya Nangal. Thereafter, the Cyber Cell was requested to ascertain the location of the mobile phone of Sant Prakash (applicant) and Rakesh Kumar. Thereafter, Medical Officer of RK Hospital handed over slip OPD No. 7284, dated 12.12.2023 to the Police, containing the following description: “Pt. Brought by Mr. Sant Prakash alongwith two persons at 01:25 am (Approx) c C/o Fall from ht 20 mins ago, Pt examined outside the hospital in the car. O/E Pt. Thereafter, Medical Officer of RK Hospital handed over slip OPD No. 7284, dated 12.12.2023 to the Police, containing the following description: “Pt. Brought by Mr. Sant Prakash alongwith two persons at 01:25 am (Approx) c C/o Fall from ht 20 mins ago, Pt examined outside the hospital in the car. O/E Pt. Is uncounscious Gcs-Fz-1, V-I, M-I pupils-Dilated No reflection towards light HR-Nil, Perepheral pulses-Nil, BP & PR-Nil Brought dead.” 10.5 When, the I.O, inquired from the persons, who were present outside the hospital, then, one of the persons, disclosed his name as Sant Prakash (applicant) and when, he was inquired about the said injured person, he tried to evade the questions asked by the Police and got perplexed. He has disclosed that he had sent the injured persons, for further treatment to PGI, Chandigarh. When, the other person was inquired, about the said person, who has disclosed his name as Rakesh Kumar, he also tried to evade the questions asked by the police. The third person disclosed his name as Santosh Kumar and on inquiry, he disclosed that injured Ghoora has already expired and his dead body was taken somewhere by Sant Prakash (applicant) and Rakesh Kumar, upon which, Rakesh Kumar disclosed that vehicle No. HP-10B-8896 was parked, underneath the fly over, near railway line. The vehicle was, thereafter, searched and blood stains were found in the vehicle. In the said vehicle, dead body was found, which was taken into possession. 10.6 During investigation, spot map was prepared, where dead body and the vehicle were found. The vehicle in question was also taken into possession. During investigation, record from RK Hospital was obtained and as per the record, the cause of the injury on the person of the deceased was stated to be “fall from height” by the accused persons. As such, accused persons, according to the Police has misled the Medical Officer, as well as, the Police, so that they could dispose off the body. 10.7 The post-mortem examination of the dead body was conducted at RPGMC, Tanda, District Kangra, HP. Thereafter, blood was preserved from the spot. 10.8 During search of the residential house of the applicant Sant Prakash, a pistol of 0.32 calibre, alongwith the live cartridges, was found, which was also taken into possession. 10.7 The post-mortem examination of the dead body was conducted at RPGMC, Tanda, District Kangra, HP. Thereafter, blood was preserved from the spot. 10.8 During search of the residential house of the applicant Sant Prakash, a pistol of 0.32 calibre, alongwith the live cartridges, was found, which was also taken into possession. During search of his residential house, another double barrel country made pistol was found, alongwith live cartridges, which was also taken into possession. 10.9. It is further case of the Police that in the intervening night of 11-12/12/2023, a quarrel had taken place and thereafter, applicant Sant Prakash had called his Clerk/Munshi at the spot. Thereafter, he got his licensed pistol, from his residence and shot him with two gunshots, which were also found, during post-mortem examination of the dead body. 10.10 Thereafter, on the request of other labourers, applicant Sant Prakash and Rakesh Kumar, took the injured to RK Hospital, where he was declared “brought dead”. Thereafter, they took the dead body, in their vehicle, and parked the vehicle, at a distance of about 2 kms., at a secluded place. They had also misled the Police by disclosing that the injured was sent to PGI, Chandigarh, for treatment. As per the post-mortem examination, deceased was found to have consumed liquor, prior to his death. The cause of death has been mentioned as under: “The cause of death in this case in our opinion is the hemorrhagic shock due to injury to abdominal and thoracic contents as a consequence of ftrearm injury which is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature.” 10.11 Investigation is stated to be complete and charge-sheet has been filed in the Court of CJM, Una. Thereafter, the same has been committed to the Court of Sessions and the case is now stated to be pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Una, H.P., and fixed for consideration on charge, on 8.1.2025. 11. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 12. Bail application of the applicant has earlier been dismissed by this Court on 10.1.2025. As per the status report, there are total 47 witnesses, out of which, three have been examined, till date. 13. 11. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 12. Bail application of the applicant has earlier been dismissed by this Court on 10.1.2025. As per the status report, there are total 47 witnesses, out of which, three have been examined, till date. 13. The case is now fixed for recording evidence of PWs 6 to 8 on 6.5.2026, PWs 9 to 11 on 7.5.2026, PWs 12 to 14 on 8.5.2026, PWs 15, 17, 19 and 20 on 15.5.2026 and PWs 16, 18 and 21 on 16.5.2026. 14. The applicant is seeking the relief of bail on the ground of undue delay in the trial by highlighting the snail pace of trial, as discussed above. Right to speedy trial has been held to be fundamental right by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case titled as Abdul Rehman Antulay and others versus R.S. Nayak and another , reported in (1992) 1 Supreme Court Cases 225. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the accused has right to speedy trial, which flows from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraph 86 of the said judgment, is reproduced, as under: “86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are: (1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are: (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. (4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, “delay is a known defence tactic”. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is — who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation. (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on — what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. (6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] “it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate”. The same idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell [15 L Ed 2d 627] in the following words: ‘… the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances.’ However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. (7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. (7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] and other succeeding cases. (8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors — ‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’ — and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order — including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded — as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. (10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial. (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.” (self emphasis supplied) 15. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in another case, titled as Raj Deo Sharma versus State of Bihar , reported in (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 507, has supplemented the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay’s case (supra), by issuing the additional directions. Relevant paragraph 13 of the judgment in Raj Deo Sharma’s case (supra), is reproduced as under: “17. After deep consideration of the matter, we proceed to supplement the propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench in Antulay case [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] with the following directions: (i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case. (ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than one-half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, the trial court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than one-half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, the trial court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice the court considers it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time-limit. (iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution within the aforesaid period is attributable to the conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by clauses (i) to (iii). (v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of the court or by operation of law, such time during which the stay was in force shall be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing the prosecution evidence. The above directions will be in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by this Court in “Common Cause” A Registered Society v. Union of India [ (1996) 4 SCC 33 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 589] as modified by the same Bench through the order reported in “Common Cause” A Registered Society v. Union of India [ (1996) 6 SCC 775 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 42] .” 16. In a case, titled as Dharmendra Kirthal versus State of Uttar Pradesh and another , reported in (2013) 8 Supreme Court Cases 368, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the right to speedy and fair trial to be an integral part of very soul of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraphs 30 to 33 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “30. Relevant paragraphs 30 to 33 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “30. Keeping the aforesaid enunciation in view, we shall presently proceed to deal with the stand and stance of both the sides. The first submission which pertains to the denial of speedy trial has been interpreted to be a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Kartar Singh [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , the majority, speaking through Pandian, J., has expressed thus: (SCC p. 638, paras 85-86) “85. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend himself but also there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated in the recent past and the courts have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for quashing of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the invocation of this right even need not await formal indictment or charge. 86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 31. Be it noted, the Court also referred to the pronouncements in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn. Be it noted, the Court also referred to the pronouncements in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn. [ (1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155] , Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 98 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40] , Hussainara Khatoon (6) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 115 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 57] , Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [ (1983) 2 SCC 104 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 361] , T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of T.N. (1983) 2 SCC 68 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 342] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] . 32. The present provision is to be tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid constitutional principle. The provision clearly mandates that the trial under this Act of any offence by the Special Court shall have precedence and shall be concluded in preference to the trial in such other courts to achieve the said purpose. The legislature thought it appropriate to provide that the trial of such other case shall remain in abeyance. It is apt to note here that “any other case” against the accused in “any other court” does not include the Special Court. The emphasis is on speedy trial and not denial of it. The legislature has incorporated such a provision so that an accused does not face trial in two cases simultaneously and a case before the Special Court does not linger owing to clash of dates in trial. It is also worthy to note that the Special Court has been conferred jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act to try any other offences with which the accused may, under any other law for the time being in force, have been charged and proceeded at the same trial. 33. As far as fair trial is concerned, needless to emphasise, it is an integral part of the very soul of Article 21 of the Constitution. Fair trial is the quintessentiality of apposite dispensation of criminal justice. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [ (2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999] , it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 183, para 33) “33. Fair trial is the quintessentiality of apposite dispensation of criminal justice. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [ (2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999] , it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 183, para 33) “33. The principle of fair trial now informs and energises many areas of the law. It is reflected in numerous rules and practices. It is a constant, ongoing development process continually adapted to new and changing circumstances, and exigencies of the situation—peculiar at times and related to the nature of crime, persons involved— directly or operating behind, social impact and societal needs and even so many powerful balancing factors which may come in the way of administration of criminal justice system.” (self emphasis supplied) 17. Similar view has been taken by a two Judges’ Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as Hussain and another versus Union of India , reported in (2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 702. Relevant paragraphs 9 to 12 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “9. As already noticed, speedy trial is a part of reasonable, fair and just procedure guaranteed under Article 21. This constitutional right cannot be denied even on the plea of non-availability of financial resources. The court is entitled to issue directions to augment and strengthen the investigating machinery, setting up of new courts, building new court houses, providing more staff and equipment to the courts, appointment of additional Judges and other measures as are necessary for speedy trial [Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98 , para 10 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40]. 10. Directions given by this Court in Hussainara Khatoon (7) v. State of Bihar, (1995) 5 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 913, to this effect which were left to be implemented by the High Courts are as follows: (SCC p. 328, para 2) “2. Since this Court has already laid down the guidelines by orders passed from time to time in this writ petition and in subsequent orders passed in different cases since then, we do not consider it necessary to restate the guidelines periodically because the enforcement of the guidelines by the subordinate courts functioning in different States should now be the responsibility of the different High Courts to which they are subordinate. General orders for release of undertrials without reference to specific fact situations in different cases may prove to be hazardous. While there can be no doubt that undertrial prisoners should not languish in jails on account of refusal to enlarge them on bail for want of their capacity to furnish bail with monetary obligations, these are matters which have to be dealt with on case-to-case basis keeping in mind the guidelines laid down by this Court in the orders passed in this writ petition and in subsequent cases from time to time. Sympathy for the undertrials who are in jail for long terms on account of the pendency of cases has to be balanced having regard to the impact of crime, more particularly, serious crime, on society and these considerations have to be weighed having regard to the fact situations in pending cases. While there can be no doubt that trials of those accused of crimes should be disposed of as early as possible, general orders in regard to Judge-strength of subordinate judiciary in each State must be attended to, and its functioning overseen, by the High Court of the State concerned. We share the sympathetic concern of the learned counsel for the petitioners that undertrials should not languish in jails for long spells merely on account of their inability to meet monetary obligations. We are, however, of the view that such monitoring can be done more effectively by the High Courts since it would be easy for those Courts to collect and collate the statistical information in that behalf, apply the broad guidelines already issued and deal with the situation as it emerges from the status reports presented to it. The role of the High Court is to ensure that the guidelines issued by this Court are implemented in letter and spirit. We think it would suffice if we request the Chief Justices of the High Courts to undertake a review of such cases in their States and give appropriate directions where needed to ensure proper and effective implementation of the guidelines. Instead of repeating the general directions already issued, it would be sufficient to remind the High Courts to ensure expeditious disposal of cases.” 11. Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21. Instead of repeating the general directions already issued, it would be sufficient to remind the High Courts to ensure expeditious disposal of cases.” 11. Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21. While deprivation of personal liberty for some period may not be avoidable, period of deprivation pending trial/appeal cannot be unduly long. This Court has held that while a person in custody for a grave offence may not be released if trial is delayed, trial has to be expedited or bail has to be granted in such cases [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731 , para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39]. 12. Timely delivery of justice is a part of human rights. Denial of speedy justice is a threat to public confidence in the administration of justice. Directions of this Court in Noor Mohammed v. Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202 , are as follows: (SCC p. 217, para 34) “34. … Therefore, we request the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well as the other learned Chief Justices to conceive and adopt a mechanism, regard being had to the priority of cases, to avoid such inordinate delays in matters which can really be dealt with in an expeditious manner. Putting a step forward is a step towards the destination. A sensible individual inspiration and a committed collective endeavour would indubitably help in this regard. Neither less, nor more.” (self emphasis supplied) 18. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb, reported in (2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases 713, has held that when a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge accused on bail. Relevant paragraphs 11 and 15 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “11. The High Court's view draws support from a batch of decisions of this Court, including in Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 , laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 , laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote the following observations from the cited case: (SCC p. 622, para 10) “10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh case [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21.” *** *** *** 15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731 , para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39] , it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.” (self emphasis supplied) 19. In the recent decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar @ Banu versus State of Punjab , in Cr. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.” (self emphasis supplied) 19. In the recent decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar @ Banu versus State of Punjab , in Cr. Appeal No. 1341/2026 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 18775/2025, the similar view has again been reiterated. Relevant paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment are reproduced as under: “5. Prosecution proposes to examine 23 witnesses to drive home that charges against the appellant, but none has been examined. Thus, the trial is likely to take some time to conclude. 6. Almost two years have passed since the appellant was arrested without trial having commenced and conclusion thereof nowhere being in sight. Incarceration without trial amounts to punishment.” 20. In view of decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, as referred to above, now, this Court would proceed to determine the fact whether there is any undue delay in trial, as mentioned above, as out of 47 witnesses, only 3 witnesses have been examined till date and the case is now listed for remaining PWs, in the month of May, 2026 and on all these dates, all the PWs, as per provisions of Section 309 Cr. P.C. (BNSS) have not been summoned. The trial is moving in snail pace, as witnesses have been summoned in peace meal manner. 21. Considering the fact, so discussed above, this Court is of the view that the applicant was arrested on 13.12.2023 and after the lapse of two years and three months, the prosecution could examine only three witnesses and the case is now listed in the month of May, 2026, that too, for recording only 23 PWs. Meaning thereby, the chances of conclusion of the trial, against the applicant, in near future, are not so bright. From the above fact, the undue delay in the the trial is writ at large. Hence, the applicant is entitled for the relief of bail. 22. Considering all these facts this Court is of the view that the bail application of the applicant is liable to be allowed. 23. From the above fact, the undue delay in the the trial is writ at large. Hence, the applicant is entitled for the relief of bail. 22. Considering all these facts this Court is of the view that the bail application of the applicant is liable to be allowed. 23. Consequently, the bail application is allowed and the applicant is ordered to be released on bail, in case FIR No. 313 of 2023, dated 12.12.2023, registered under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, registered with Police Station, Haroli, District Una, H.P. on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/-, with one surety, in the like amount, to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. 24. This order, however, shall be subject to the following conditions:- a) Applicant shall regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing the appropriate application; b) Applicant shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever; c) Applicant shall not make any inducement, threat or promises to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer, and d) Applicant shall not leave the territory of India without the prior permission of the Court. 25. Any of the observations, made herein above, shall not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as these observations are confined, only to the disposal of the present bail application. 26. It is made clear that the respondent-State is at liberty to move an appropriate application, in case, any of the bail conditions is found to be violated by the applicant. 27. The Registry is directed to forward a soft copy of the bail order to the Superintendent of District Jail, Una, through e-mail, with a direction to enter the date of grant of bail in the e-prison software. 28. In case, the applicant is not released within a period of seven days from the date of grant of bail, the Superintendent of District Jail, Una is directed to inform this fact to the Secretary, DLSA, Una. 28. In case, the applicant is not released within a period of seven days from the date of grant of bail, the Superintendent of District Jail, Una is directed to inform this fact to the Secretary, DLSA, Una. The Superintendent of the District Jail, Una is further directed that if the applicant fails to furnish the bail bonds, as per the order passed by this Court within a period of one month from today, then, the said fact be submitted to this Court. 29. The applicant has also given the details of his ailment in para-9 of the application, which is re-produced as under: “i. 27.02.2024: The petitioner was examined at PGI Chandigarh and was advised continuous physiotherapy for 10 days from 04.03.2024 to12.03.2024, with MWD 7/10 till 16.04.2024 and review on 16.04.2024. ii. 06.03.2024: PGI Chandigarh advised the petitioner to avoid travelling, lifting heavy weights, and forward bending. iii. 03.04.2024: PGI Chandigarh advised continuation of physiotherapy for another six weeks and to avoid Indian-style toilets and travelling. iv. 26.06.2024: Regional Hospital (RH), Una advised regular physiotherapy. v. 02.07.2024: RH Una again advised regular physiotherapy. vi. 12.07.2024: PGI Chandigarh reiterated advice to avoid Indian-style toilets and travelling and prescribed physiotherapy for six weeks. vii. 19.07.2024: PGI Chandigarh physiotherapy for 10 days. Advised RH Una advised viii. 07.09.2024: regular physiotherapy sessions as recommended by PGI Chandigarh. viii. 7.9.2024: RH Una advised regular physiotherapy sessions as recommended by PGI Chandigarh. ix. 17.09.2024: RH Una reiterated advice for regular physiotherapy as per PGI Chandigarh. x. 03.10.2024: advised Una RH regular physiotherapy sessions for 25 days as per PGI Chandigarh. xi 17.10.2024: CT scan revealed depression of the superior end plates of L3 and L5 vertebral bodies. xii. 07.11.2024: PGI Chandigarh advised the petitioner to avoid travelling, lifting, forward bending, and climbing stairs, and recommended continued treatment at a local hospital with regular physiotherapy. xiii. 11.11.2024: RH Una advised avoidance of forward bending and climbing. xiv. 10.01.2025: The Hon'ble High Court, while dismissing the bail application, directed the jail authorities to provide proper medical treatment to the petitioner. XV. 14.01.2025: RH Una referred the petitioner to a spine surgeon/neurosurgeon. xvi. 30.01.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised that the petitioner required admission at a local hospital for continued and regular physiotherapy and lumbar traction. xvii. 10.02.2025: A Medical Board at Dr. XV. 14.01.2025: RH Una referred the petitioner to a spine surgeon/neurosurgeon. xvi. 30.01.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised that the petitioner required admission at a local hospital for continued and regular physiotherapy and lumbar traction. xvii. 10.02.2025: A Medical Board at Dr. Rajendra Prasad Government Medical College, Tanda, opined that the petitioner was suffering from chronic low backache with intermittent left radicular pain and advised continuation of treatment as prescribed by PGI Chandigarh. xviii. 22.04.2025: RH Una noted lapse in follow-up in the medical case file. xix. 21.06.2025: The petitioner filed Application No. Cr.M.A/464/2025 for medical treatment before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Vide order dated 04.07.2025, jail authorities were directed to take necessary steps; however, no regular treatment was ensured. xx. 07.07.2025: PGI Orthopaedics Department XX. advised rheumatology consultation and physiotherapy for 10 consecutive days. The petitioner was referred to the Rheumatology Department on 22.08.2025. Physiotherapy, though advised from 07.07.2025, commenced belatedly on 17.07.2025. xxi. 29.07.2025: It was recorded that over a span of 26 days, physiotherapy was conducted only 8 times and remained incomplete. Jail authorities, vide Letter No. 2639-40 dated 29.07.2025, stated that treatment could not be provided regularly due to non-availability of police escort and further disclosed that no Medical Officer was posted at District Jail Una, Bangarh, compelling inmates to rely on old prescriptions or generic painkillers available in the jail pharmacy. xxii 11.08.2025: The petitioner was admitted at RH Una but was discharged on the same day due to non-availability of police guard, with advice to get Registrar admitted again once escort was available: however, thereafter. re-admission no was arranged thereafter. xxiii. 22.08.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised blood tests, for which fees were deposited the same day, but the petitioner was asked to report again on 24.10.2025. Reports have not been collected till date. xxiv. 15.10.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised certain blood tests; the petitioner was taken to RH Una, but the tests were unavailable there and hence not conducted. xxv. 24.10.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised ECG and TFT tests at PGI laboratory; however, the same have not been conducted till date.” 30. Although, it is the duty of the jail authorities to take the applicant to the hospital, as advised by the Doctor, however, alongwith the bail application, copy of information, under Right to Information Act, has also been annexed, as Annexure P-3. Although, it is the duty of the jail authorities to take the applicant to the hospital, as advised by the Doctor, however, alongwith the bail application, copy of information, under Right to Information Act, has also been annexed, as Annexure P-3. This Court deems it appropriate to reproduce paras-3 and 4 of the said information to demonstrate the sorry state of affairs, as prevailing in the jail, in which, the applicant has been confined. Accordingly, paras-3 and 4 of Annexure P-3, are reproduced, as under: “3) As far as possible, the treatment recommended by the PGI and TMC Kangra was provided but sometimes due to non-availability of Police escort inspite of repeated requests for guard deployment, the unavoidable delay occurred as vide letter No. 3168-3267 dated 21.01.2025 the non-availability of Police escort as large Police Personnel were deployed to impart the rehearsal and other multifarious duties from 21.01.2025 to 26.01.2025, vide letter No. 5702-5801 dated 07.02.2025 the non-availability of Police escort as large Police Personnel were engaged in constable recruitment process duty from 10.02.2025 to 18.02.2025, vide letter No. 9485-88 dated 03.03.202.5 the non-availability of Police escort as large Police Personnel were deployed for the cremation ceremony of Sant Dera baba Rudra Nand Ji Maharaj at Basal from 02.03.2025 t? 03.03.2025, vide letter No. 10111 dated 05.03.2025 the non-availability of Police escort as large Police Personnel were deployed in Baba Badbhag Singh Ji at Mari Tehsil Amb from 07.03.2025 to 17.03.2025 and vide letter No. 17156-256 dated 26.04.2025 the non-availability of Police escort as large Police Personnel were deployed in Haroli Mahotsav from 27.04.2025 to 29.04.2025 (Annexure-B.). 4) Currently, no permanent Medical Officer has been posted in this jail. However, deputed Medical officers from R.H, Una on weekly visit Jail for checking up of ailing inmates while one whole time jail dispenser, Sh.Raj Kumar has been posted for looking after the ailing inmates.” 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported in Dr. Upendra Baxi (I) versus State of Uttar Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 308 , has stressed upon the rights of inmates to live in human and good conditions. Relevant para-1 of the judgment is reproduced as under: "1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported in Dr. Upendra Baxi (I) versus State of Uttar Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 308 , has stressed upon the rights of inmates to live in human and good conditions. Relevant para-1 of the judgment is reproduced as under: "1. When this writ petition came up for hearing before us on May 8, 1981 we made an order giving various directions in order to ensure that the inmates of the Protective Home at Agra do not continue to live inhuman and degrading conditions and that the right to live with dignity enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution is made real and meaningful for them. We gave to the State Government which is running the Home, the entire period of vacation for carrying out these directions. Miss Srivastava, Superintendent of the Home, has filed an affidavit before us setting out the action taken by the State Government with a view to complying with these directions." 32. The similar view has also been taken by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parmanand Katara versus Union of India , (1989) 4 SCC 286 . Relevant paragraph of the judgment is reproduced as under: "7. There can be no second opinion that preservation of human life is of paramount importance. That is so on account of the fact that once life is lost, the status quo ante cannot be restored as resurrection is beyond the capacity of man. The patient whether he be an innocent person or be a criminal liable to punishment under the laws of the society, it is the obligation of those who are in-charge of the health of the community to preserve life so that the innocent may be protected and the guilty may be punished. Social laws do not contemplate death by negligence to tantamount to legal punishment." (self-emphasis supplied) 33. Failure of the authorities to provide timely medical treatment is also held to be violative of right to life, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case titled as Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity versus State of W.B. , reported in (1996) 4 SCC 37 . Relevant paragraph-9, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: "9. The Constitution envisages the establishment of a welfare State at the federal level as well as at the State Level. Relevant paragraph-9, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: "9. The Constitution envisages the establishment of a welfare State at the federal level as well as at the State Level. In a welfare State the primary duty of the Government is to secure the welfare of the people. Providing adequate medical facilities for the people is an essential part of the obligations undertaken by the Government in a welfare State. The Government discharges this obligation by running hospitals and health centres which provide medical care to the person seeking to avail of those facilities. Article 21 imposes an obligation on the State to safeguard the right to life of every person. Preservation of human life is thus of paramount importance. The government hospitals run by the State and the medical officers employed therein are duty-bound to extend medical assistance foi preserving human life. Failure on the part of a government hospital to provide timely medical treatment to a person in need of such treatment results in violation of his right to life guaranteed under Article 21. In the present case there was breach of the said right of Hakim Seikh guaranteed under Article 21 when he was denied treatment at the various government hospitals which were approached even though his condition was very serious at that time and he was in need of immediate medical attention. Since the said denial of the right of Hakim Seikh guaranteed under Article 21 was by officers of the State, in hospitals run by the State, the State cannot avoid its responsibility for such denial of the constitutional right of Hakim Seikh. In respect of deprivation of the constitutional rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution the position is well settled that adequate compensation can be awarded by the court for such violation by way of redress in proceedings under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. Hakim Seikh should, therefore, be suitably compensated for the breach of his right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we fix the amount of such compensation at Rs 25,000. A sum of Rs 15,000 was directed to be paid to Hakim Seikh as interim compensation under the orders of this Court dated 22-4-1994. The balance amount should be paid by Respondent 1 to Hakim Seikh within one month.” 34. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we fix the amount of such compensation at Rs 25,000. A sum of Rs 15,000 was directed to be paid to Hakim Seikh as interim compensation under the orders of this Court dated 22-4-1994. The balance amount should be paid by Respondent 1 to Hakim Seikh within one month.” 34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case titled as State of A.P. versus Challa Ramkrishna Reddy , reported in (2000) 5 SCC 712 has held that even the prisoners do have fundamental rights, human rights and human dignity, which cannot be permitted to be shrinked or taken away. Relevant paragraphs 22, 24 and 28, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “22. Right to life is one of the basic human rights. It is guaranteed to every person by Article 21 of the Constitution and not even the State has the authority to violate that right. A prisoner, be be a convict or undertrial or a detenu, does not cease to be a human being. Even when lodged in the jail, he continues to enjoy all his fundamental rights including the right to life quaranteed to him under the Constitution. On being convicted of crime and deprived of their liberty in accordance with the procedure established by law, prisoners still retain the residue of constitutional rights. 24. Thus, according to the definition under the Prisoners Act, there is a convict, there is an undertrial and there is a civil prisoner who may be a detenu under preventive detention law. None of the three categories of prisoners lose their fundamental rights on being placed inside a prison. The restriction placed on their right to movement is the result of their conviction or involvement in crime. Thus, a person (prisoner) is deprived of his personal liberty in accordance with the procedure established by law which, as pointed out in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India must be reasonable, fair and just. 28. Thus, fundamental rights, which also include basic human rights, continue to be available to a prisoner and those rights cannot be defeated by pleading the old and archaic defence of immunity in respect of sovereign acts which has been rejected several times by this Court." 35. 28. Thus, fundamental rights, which also include basic human rights, continue to be available to a prisoner and those rights cannot be defeated by pleading the old and archaic defence of immunity in respect of sovereign acts which has been rejected several times by this Court." 35. If the grievances, so put forth by the applicant, in the present case, as highlighted above, are seen in the light of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as referred to above, then the violation of fundamental right, under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is writ at large. 36. The poor prisoner has been denied proper medical aid, on various occasions, only on account of the fact that no permanent Medical Officer has been posted in the jail, and on many occasions, he has not been taken to hospital, on account of non-availability of the police escort. In such situation, it is high time for this Court to direct the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh to look into the matter and submit the detailed report, on or before the next date of hearing. 37. In addition to this, the Director General of Prisons & Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh is directed to submit the details of the jails, including availability of the police escort to take the inmates to hospital, in case, need so arises. 38. The Director General of Prisons & Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh is also directed to submit the detailed report, with regard to posts of Medical Officers/para-medical staff, in the jails, and alternate arrangements, if any, made in the absence of Medical Officer, on account of any unforeseen circumstances. 39. The Director General of Prisons & Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh is also directed to submit the detailed report regarding the availability of the medical facilities, including specialized treatment to the inmates, in the vicinity of the jail(s), including distance of the nearby hospital(s), including super-specialty hospital(s). This also includes the mode of transport, adopted by the jail authorities to take the inmates, in case of medical emergency, as well as, availability of the police escort. This information be submitted to this Court, on or before the next date of hearing. 40. List on 27.4.2026.