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2026 DAILYLAW 16897 (HP)

Harsh Dhiman v. State of H. P.

2026-03-31

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 112 of 2023, dated 17.12.2023, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 341, 323, 324 and 325 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Bangana, District Una, H.P. 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the petitioner Harsh had inflicted an injury on the head of the informant’s father on 17.12.2023 at about 10-11 am with an iron rod. The informant intervened, and the petitioner inflicted an injury on him as well. The victim died on 03.03.2024, and Section 302 of the IPC was added. The petitioner is innocent and has no concern with the commission of crime. The incident occurred in the courtyard of the petitioner’s house in Khasra No. 597, which belongs to the petitioner’s father. The informant party attacked the petitioner and her mother in their house. The petitioner was arrested on 19.01.2024. The investigation is complete, and no recovery is to be effected from the petitioner. The petitioner’s father suffered a brain haemorrhage leading to paralysis on 17.02.2024. The petitioner wants to continue his ITI Course in Mechanical from the Government Industrial Institute, Mehatpur, Una, District Una, HP. The statements of four witnesses have been recorded, who have not named the petitioner. There is a delay in the progress of the trial. The co- accused was granted bail on 27.08.2025 in Cr.MP(M) No. 1137 of 2025. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that Rakesh Kumar Pardhan Gram Panchayat, Kharyalata, made a call to the police post-Zol on 17.12.2023 that the family members of Narender Kumar and Dharam Singh were quarrelling with each other. The police went to the spot for verification of the information and found that the parties had been taken to the hospital. The police reached the hospital and found that Manjeet Singh and his father were admitted to the hospital. Manjeet Singh had sustained an injury by a sharp- edged weapon, whereas Dharam Singh had sustained an injury by a blunt-edged weapon. The police reached the hospital and found that Manjeet Singh and his father were admitted to the hospital. Manjeet Singh had sustained an injury by a sharp- edged weapon, whereas Dharam Singh had sustained an injury by a blunt-edged weapon. Manjeet Singh made a statement on 17.12.2023 that he and his father, Dharam Singh, were returning from their fields. Nisha Devi and petitioner-Harsh Dhiman had thrown wooden sticks in their fields. When the informant Manjeet Singh tried to remove the wooden sticks, the petitioner stopped Dharam Singh and enquired as to why he was removing the sticks. Petitioner was armed with an iron rod, and Nisha Devi was armed with a Darat. Harsh inflicted an injury by means of an iron rod on the head of Dharam Singh. Manjeet Singh tried to save his father, but the petitioner inflicted a blow by means of an iron rod upon his head. Nisha also started quarrelling with the informant and his father. The informant and his father sustained injuries. The police conducted the investigation and recovered the iron rod from Harsh. Dharam Singh was referred to PGIMER, Chandigarh, for further treatment. As per the opinion of the Medical Officer, he had sustained grievous injuries, which were dangerous to life. The police arrested Nisha and the petitioner. The clothes were sent for analysis, and it was found that the blood of group ‘O was found on the clothes of Dharam Singh and the iron rod. Dharam Singh died in the hospital. The cause of death was septic shock as a consequence of head injury, as per the report of the Medical Officer. The police added Section 302 of the IPC. The police filed the charge sheet on 18.04.2024. The matter is pending before the Court of learned Sessions Judge-II, Una, District Una, H.P. Statements of 9 witnesses have been recorded, and the matter is now listed on 2nd, 4th, 5th, 18th, and 29th May, 2006. The co-accused, Nisha has been released on bail on 27.08.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. His right to a speedy trial is being violated, and he is entitled to bail on this consideration. 5. Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. His right to a speedy trial is being violated, and he is entitled to bail on this consideration. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that there is no delay in the progress of the trial. The prosecution has examined 9 witnesses out of 34 witnesses cited by it. The matter is now listed in the month of May, 2026 the recording of the statements prosecution witnesses; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. , (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594 : 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. A perusal of the order passed by this Court in Cr.MP(M) No. 1137 of 2025, decided on 27.08.2025, shows that the bail was granted to her because she was armed with a Darat and no injury was caused by means of the Darat; therefore, the roles of the petitioner and Nisha were different. 11. A perusal of the order passed by this Court in Cr.MP(M) No. 1137 of 2025, decided on 27.08.2025, shows that the bail was granted to her because she was armed with a Darat and no injury was caused by means of the Darat; therefore, the roles of the petitioner and Nisha were different. She had not caused fatal injury, whereas the petitioner had caused the fatal injury; therefore, the petitioner cannot claim parity with the co- accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sagar v. State of U.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2584, that a person cannot be released on bail after applying the principle of parity without examining his position vis-à-vis other accused. It was observed: “14. What flows from the above judgments, which have been referred to, only to the limited extent indicated above, is that the High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted. That, undoubtedly, is the correct position in law. The word ‘parity’ is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as “equality, especially of pay or position.” When weighing an application on parity, it is the ‘position’ that is the clincher. The requirement of ‘position’ is not met only by involvement in the same offence. Position means what the person whose application is being weighed, his position in crime, i.e., his role, etc. There can be different roles played - someone part of a large group, intending to intimidate; an instigator of violence; someone who throws hands at the other side, instigated by such words spoken by another, someone who fired a weapon or swung a machete - parity of these people will be with those who have performed similar acts, and not with someone who was part of the group to intimidate the other by the sheer size of the gathering, with another who attempted to hack away at the opposer's limbs with a weapon.” 12. This Court had noticed while deciding Cr.MP.M. No.1137 of 2025 that adjournments were sought on behalf of the petitioner, and charges could be framed on 28.12.2024. The status quo reports show that statements of nine witnesses have been recorded, and the matter is now listed on 2nd, 4th, 5th, 18th, and 29th May 2006, for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. The status quo reports show that statements of nine witnesses have been recorded, and the matter is now listed on 2nd, 4th, 5th, 18th, and 29th May 2006, for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. The fact that matter has been listed on five consecutive dates shows the concern of the learned Trial Court to expeditiously dispose of the matter. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim bail because of the violation of his right of speedy trial. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime like murder. It was observed at page 141: “24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688” 13. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail because of the delay in the progress of the trial. 14. No other point was urged. 15. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 16. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.