JUDGMENT : Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, J. By way of present petition filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the petitioner is seeking regular bail in case FIR No.302 of 2025 dated 26.12.2025 under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short “NDPS Act”). 2. As per the prosecution story, on 26.12.2025 at around 12:00 noon, when the police team was checking the vehicles at Rampur Mor near Bandla, District Chamba, H.P., the petitioner who was coming from Tissa side was stopped for checking while she was driving a Red Scooty without a number plate. When the petitioner was asked why the number plate had not been installed on the Scooty, she replied that she was going to Chamba to get it installed. Thereafter, the petitioner was asked to open the dicky of the Scooty for search. She disclosed that the dicky is not in order for the last 10-12 days and that its lock is not in working condition. On suspicion and due to the unsatisfactory response given by the petitioner, the police party deputed C. Rakesh Kumar to call a mechanic, who brought Ashik Ali from Kandla. The said mechanic was apprised of the situation and the lock of the dicky was opened, from which a black-coloured plastic bag tied with a knot was recovered. Upon opening the knot of the said bag, a black, green and white coloured substance was recovered, which, on smell and experience, was found to be charas. The recovered charas was weighed on an electronic weighing machine and was found to be 1 kilogram and 402 grams. The recovered charas was repacked in the same manner and sealed in a cloth parcel with six seals of seal ‘E’. NCB forms in triplicate were filled up, and the impression of seal ‘E’ was taken on the NCB forms as well as on a piece of cloth. The seal, after use, was handed over to C. Rakesh Kumar. The proceedings at the spot were photographed and video graphed. The parcel containing the charas was taken into possession along with the Scooty. Thereafter, a rukka was prepared and sent to Police Station Sadar, Chamba, H.P. on the basis of which an FIR was registered against the petitioner. 3. The petitioner was arrested at around 10.15 p.m. in the night and her arrest was informed to her father. The parcel containing the charas was taken into possession along with the Scooty. Thereafter, a rukka was prepared and sent to Police Station Sadar, Chamba, H.P. on the basis of which an FIR was registered against the petitioner. 3. The petitioner was arrested at around 10.15 p.m. in the night and her arrest was informed to her father. The medical of the petitioner was also got conducted at Chamba Hospital. The petitioner had filed the application on 19.01.2026 for her release on bail before the learned Special Judge, Chamba, Division Chamba, H.P. The said application came to be rejected on 23.01.2026. 4. The petitioner has filed the present bail application stating therein that she had already approached the learned Court of Sessions for the grant of bail, however, the same was rejected primarily on the ground of the alleged recovery of a commercial quantity and the applicability of Section 37 of the Act, without appreciating the material contradictions and the absence of conscious possession on the part of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the allegations against the petitioner are false and the prosecution has not collected any evidence to connect her with the commission of the alleged offence. It is also pleaded in the petition that the petitioner has been made a scapegoat in a pre-planned conspiracy orchestrated by her husband and in-laws, in connivance with certain interested persons, in order to settle personal scores arising out of matrimonial disputes. 5. It has further been averred in the petition that the petitioner was not conveyed the grounds of arrest and, therefore, she is entitled to be enlarged on regular bail. It is also pleaded in the petition that the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is likely to be filed soon, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. It has also been pleaded that the petitioner is ready to abide by all the conditions that may be imposed upon her by this Court, while enlarging on bail. Hence, the petition be allowed and the petitioner be enlarged on regular bail. 6. The petition has been opposed by the respondent–State by filing a status report, wherein it has been averred that a commercial quantity of contraband was recovered from the conscious possession of the petitioner. Hence, the petition be allowed and the petitioner be enlarged on regular bail. 6. The petition has been opposed by the respondent–State by filing a status report, wherein it has been averred that a commercial quantity of contraband was recovered from the conscious possession of the petitioner. Further the police has taken into possession two mobile phones of the petitioner from her mother and one phone of her mother, and the same have been sent for scientific investigation. As per the investigation, it has been found that the petitioner was involved in the commission of the alleged offence. It has also been stated that the challan has been prepared and is under scrutiny with the District Attorney. The bail application earlier filed by the petitioner before the learned Special Judge was dismissed on 23.01.2026. It has also been averred that in case the petitioner is enlarged on bail, she may again involve in the commission of similar offence. 7. I have heard Mr. Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sumit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. and another , (2025) 7 SCC 314 has laid down the parameters for grant of bail and relevant paras are reproduced as under: “(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order,-but, however, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though may be considered but that by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should and ought always to be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) Xxxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)”. 9. The present petition is to be decided as per the ibid parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was driving the Scooty, on the relevant date, when the contraband was recovered from it. The pleas taken by the petitioner that she has been falsely implicated and further the contraband was not recovered from her conspicuous and exclusive possession, cannot be believed for the reasons that on the relevant date, when the vehicle was stopped for checking, the petitioner herself had disclosed that dickey is not in order. Not only this, she was driving the vehicle without number plate and on asking, she had admitted that she is going for installing the same. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the petitioner is not owner of the Scooty and her husband had told her that lock of the dicky is not in working condition, thus she did not know that the dickey was containing contraband. This submission, at the first blush seems to be attractive, but the same is negated for the reason that Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in case the contraband is recovered from any vehicle, all occupants of the vehicle, would be in conscious possession of the contraband. This submission, at the first blush seems to be attractive, but the same is negated for the reason that Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in case the contraband is recovered from any vehicle, all occupants of the vehicle, would be in conscious possession of the contraband. At this juncture, it would be profitable to refer to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madan Lal and another versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664 , wherein the conscious possession has been discussed. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read as under:- “19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle. 20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession. 21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted. 22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term that assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [ (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52 ] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. 24. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. 24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [ (1972) 2 SCC 194 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756 ], possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control. 25. The word “possession” means the legal right to possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498 : (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966: (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)].) 26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it, because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.” 12. In the present case, the petitioner has admitted that the contraband has been recovered from the Scooty, being driven by her on the relevant date, but the plea taken is that she was not in conscious possession of the charas is negated as per the law of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Once the contraband is recovered from the petitioner, as per the mandate of law, burden shifts upon her to show that her possession was not conscious as per Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act. 13. It is admitted fact that the contraband recovered from the petitioner is weighing 1.402 Kilograms, which is a commercial quantity. Since it is a commercial quantity, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act applies to the present case. 13. It is admitted fact that the contraband recovered from the petitioner is weighing 1.402 Kilograms, which is a commercial quantity. Since it is a commercial quantity, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act applies to the present case. Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence. The revenant provision reads as under:- “37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable. (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for [offences, under section 19, section 24, or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity], shall be released on bail or his own bond unless– (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.” 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has interpreted the ibid provisions of law in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin S.K. and another , (2018) 13 SCC 738 , and held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail, cannot be released on bail. The relevant paragraphs of the ibid judgment read as under:- “6. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain offences enumerated under the said Section. They are: (1) In the case of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 19, (2) Under Section 24, (3) Under Section 27A and (4) Of offences involving a commercial quantity. 7. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. They are: (1) In the case of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 19, (2) Under Section 24, (3) Under Section 27A and (4) Of offences involving a commercial quantity. 7. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment. (1) The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such offence; (2) That person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 15. The above judgment has again been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala and others Versus Rajesh and others , AIR 2020 SC 721 also reported in (2020) 12 SCC 122 , wherein it was held as under:- “19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the application for bail moved by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429 , it has been elaborated as under: - "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused commits the murder of one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs Chief Secy. The reason may be the large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs Chief Secy. Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95 ) as under: 24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and a deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine. 8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely, (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socioeconomic consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended." 20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the commission of an offence under the Act unless the two conditions are satisfied. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the commission of an offence under the Act unless the two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application, and the second is that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail operates. 21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case at hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that, in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” 16. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan , (2021) 10 SCC 100 , the relevant paragraphs read as under: “21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are: (i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and (ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of such an offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11) “7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11) “7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief contemplated, in turn, points to the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. 7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.’ [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497 ], SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. (1989) 1 SCC 532 ] ] *** 10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not, which depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315 ] 11. The court, while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.” (emphasis supplied) 23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug-trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.” 17. It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. The relevant observations read as under:- “5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus:— “37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing the said enactment after repealing the then existing laws relating to Narcotic drugs. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing the said enactment after repealing the then existing laws relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in the acts themselves read thus:— “An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected therewith.” In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549 , the three-judge bench of this Court considered the provisions under Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used therein. This Court held that it means something more than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates substantial and probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the provision would require the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail it was held therein that they are cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the ‘reasonable grounds’, as referred to above. 7. Satisfaction of the existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the ‘reasonable grounds’, as referred to above. 7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC 122 , after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by this Court to be followed while considering an application for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act. Further, it was held that in case one of the two conditions thereunder is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would operate. 8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the consistent view of this Court that while considering the application for bail made by an accused involved in an offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is a sine qua non for granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act, cannot be avoided while passing orders on such applications.” 18. The plea taken by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not supplied with the grounds of arrest cannot be accepted, as in the present case, the contraband was recovered from the Scooty being driven by the petitioner on the said date, and, therefore, she was apprised of the fact that she was being arrested for the commission of the alleged offence under NDPS Act. Later on her father has been informed about her arrest under the NDPS Act and thus, it cannot be said that the mandate contained in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra , (2026) 1 SCC 500 has not been complied with. 19. Learned counsel further vehemently argued that the petitioner has two daughters aged 17 months and six years, and keeping the same in view, the petitioner deserves to be enlarged on bail. There cannot be any sympathy, where the person is involved for commission of the heinous offence. 19. Learned counsel further vehemently argued that the petitioner has two daughters aged 17 months and six years, and keeping the same in view, the petitioner deserves to be enlarged on bail. There cannot be any sympathy, where the person is involved for commission of the heinous offence. This Court could have ordered to release, the petitioner, if it was found that there is no recovery from the conscious possession of the petitioner. At this juncture, keeping in view the material come forth in the investigation, this Court is of the view considered view that once the contraband has been recovered from the conscious possession of the petitioner, from the vehicle being driven by her, she is not entitled for bail. However, after putting the challan and the material collected during investigation, she can approach the Special Judge, Chamba, H.P. seeking bail. 20. The plea that the petitioner was falsely been implicated cannot be believed. Though, there may be some dispute with the husband, but no family member can take such step to falsely implicate the family member. Hence, the petitioner has failed to satisfy the conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act and is not entitled to bail. 21. The investigation is underway and challan in the present case has not yet been presented before the competent Court of law. No doubt, it is settled law that the bail is rule and jail is an exception, but the said rule is not applicable while deciding the bail applications under the NDPS Act as held in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif , (2024) 11 SCC 372 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3848. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:- “Compliance with the mandate under Section 37 9. There has been a consistent and persistent view of this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence is punishable with minimum sentence of ten years, the accused shall generally not be released on bail. Negation of bail is the rule, and its grant is an exception. While considering the application for bail, the court has to bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are mandatory in nature. The recording of findings as mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the said Act.” 22. While considering the application for bail, the court has to bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are mandatory in nature. The recording of findings as mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the said Act.” 22. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and same is dismissed. 23. The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined only to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.