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2026 DAILYLAW 16891 (HP)

Himanshu v. State of H. P.

2026-03-19

Rakesh Kainthla

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JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 207 of 2023 dated 18.12.2023, registered at Police Station Jawali, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 325, 504, 506 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant, Baryam Singh, was returning with the grass on 11.12.2023 at about 11:00/11:15 a.m. He saw that the accused, Swaroop Singh, was cutting the branches of the Teeu tree from his (informant’s) land. The informant told the accused that the tree belonged to him (the informant). Accused Swaroop Singh threatened to kill the informant with Darati. He also abused the informant. The informant started walking towards his house, and Swaroop Singh inflicted the blow by means of a stick on the informant’s head, left shoulder, right arm and right hand. Parveen Kumari and Himanshu (present petitioner) also came to the spot and started beating the informant. Mukhtiar Singh and other persons came to the spot after hearing the noise. Mukhtiar Singh snatched the stick from Swroop Singh. The matter was reported to the police. The medical examination of the informant was conducted, and the medical officer found grievous injuries which could have been caused by means of a blunt weapon. An F.I.R. was registered in the Police Station, and the investigation was conducted. Swaroop Singh had burnt the stick used in the incident. The police recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their version and filed the charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 325, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 3. Being aggrieved by the filing of chargesheet, the petitioner/accused, Himanshu, has filed the present petition asserting that he had nothing to do with the commission of the crime. He is specially abled, which is evident from the certificate issued by the competent authority. The Investigating Agency had not considered this aspect. The civil suits are pending between the informant and the petitioner’s father, and a false case was registered to wreak vengeance upon the petitioner. He is specially abled, which is evident from the certificate issued by the competent authority. The Investigating Agency had not considered this aspect. The civil suits are pending between the informant and the petitioner’s father, and a false case was registered to wreak vengeance upon the petitioner. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. 4. I have heard Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State. 5. Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the petitioner is a specially abled person, which is evident from disability certificate (Annexure P-3) issued by the Chief Medical Officer, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. The petitioner is unable to commit the crime, and a false case was registered against him. Hence, prayed that the present petition be allowed and F.I.R. and consequential proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. 6. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings cannot go into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. The F.I.R. clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence. The police investigated the matter and found truth in those allegations and filed the charge sheet before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction at this stage. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (Emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The F.I.R. specifically mentioned that initially, Swaroop Singh had given beatings to the informant. Parveen Kumari and her son Himanshu (present petitioner) subsequently came to the spot and gave beatings to the informant with a stick. These allegations, prima facie, show the commission of cognizable offences, and the FIR cannot be quashed. 12. It was submitted that the allegations made against the petitioner are false. The petitioner is a specially abled person, and he is unable to cause hurt to any person. Reliance was placed upon the certificate issued by the Chief Medical Officer, Kangra, at Dharamshala (Annexure P-3) in which permanent disability of 65% was diagnosed. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 13. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed:- “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home, (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand , (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 15. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed:- 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 16. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 17. The disability certificate (Annexure P-3) does not show that the petitioner is unable to cause any hurt to any person. It merely shows that the petitioner has a locomotor disability of 65%. Whether the locomotor disability would prevent the petitioner from causing hurt to any person is not a matter of trial and cannot be determined by looking into the certificate at this stage; therefore, the proceedings cannot be quashed based on the disability certificate (Annexure P-3). 18. It was submitted that the civil suits are pending between the parties, and a false complaint was filed before the police to wreak vengeance. This submission will not help the petitioner. 18. It was submitted that the civil suits are pending between the parties, and a false complaint was filed before the police to wreak vengeance. This submission will not help the petitioner. It is trite to say that enmity is a double-edged weapon: while it furnishes a motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of a crime. It is a matter of trial whether the offence was committed or the petitioner was falsely implicated and it is impermissible to determine this question at this stage. 19. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 20. No other point was urged. 21. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any. 22. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.