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2026 DAILYLAW 16880 (HP)

Jagdish Thakur v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2026-03-30

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 146 of 2024, dated 08.10.2024, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the NDPS Act’) at Police Station Kala Amb, District Sirmour, H.P. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested in F.I.R. No.146 of 2024, dated 08.10.2024. He has nothing to do with the commission of crime. No recovery was made from his possession. The investigation is complete, and the charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition bearing Cr.MP(M) No. 1051 of 2025, which was dismissed by this Court on 04.08.2025. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 08.10.2024 when they received secret information at about 1:15 a.m. that the petitioner would be transporting a huge quantity of charas in his vehicle bearing registration No. HP-16A-3706. The information was written down, and the police waited for the vehicle, with Forest Guard Vishal, at some distance from the check post. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-16A-3706 came to the spot at around 1:50 a.m. The police signalled the driver to stop the vehicle. The driver tried to speed away from the spot; however, the police apprehended him. He revealed his name as Jagdish Thakur (the present petitioner). The police searched the vehicle and found a carry bag containing 2 kilograms of charas, concealed beneath the front seat, adjacent to the driver’s seat. The police completed the formalities and seized the charas. The police arrested the petitioner. The Charas was sent to SFSL Junga, and as per the report, it was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. The police filed the charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court. Out of seventeen witnesses statements of eight witnesses have already been recorded. The matter was listed on 10.03.2026 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. Hence, the status report. 4. The police filed the charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court. Out of seventeen witnesses statements of eight witnesses have already been recorded. The matter was listed on 10.03.2026 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Ms Reena Thakur, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner and Mr Parshant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Ms Reena Thakur, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The police have filed the charge-sheet before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of 2 kilograms of charas, which is a commercial quantity. The rigours of Section 37 apply to the present case. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was dismissed by this Court. A subsequent bail petition lies only when there is a change in the circumstances. The petitioner has not pleaded any change in the circumstances, and he is not entitled to bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1051 of 2025, which was dismissed by this Court on 04.08.2025. It was held in State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja , (2005) 8 SCC 380 , wherein it was observed: 9. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja , (2005) 8 SCC 380 , wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents. 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed: 30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra , 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: 7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered based on the change in the circumstances, and it is impermissible to review the order passed by the Court. 14. The Court had earlier held that there was sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of crime. He was driving the vehicle from which the recovery was effected. It is impermissible to review these findings while deciding the subsequent bail petition. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad , (2001) 7 SCC 673 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1520 : 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070, that it is impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the change in circumstances. It was observed at page 676: 8. It was observed at page 676: 8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [ (2001) 1 SCC 169 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments. 15. Therefore, the present petition can only be considered based on the change in the circumstances and not on any other ground. 16. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the violation of his right to a speedy trial. This submission cannot be accepted. The status report shows that statements of 8 witnesses have been recorded, and the matter was listed before the learned Special Judge Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P., 10.03.2026. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the ground of prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: - “17. The High Court then, on the strength of those premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion of this nature, if returned without addressing the prosecution’s assertions of operative control and antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of the trial court at first instance. 18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing. 18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing. Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated 22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the present complaint, nor do they engage with the prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the consignments. The omission to consider these factors bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by Section 37(1)(b).” 17. A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025, wherein it was observed: “11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four months, and charges have not been framed, yet the allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband. 12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is made out in the present matter.” 18. Therefore, it is impermissible to grant bail on the ground of delay alone when the petitioner has not satisfied the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. 19. No other point was urged. 20. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 21. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits.