JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to judgment dated 18.12.2023, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Solan, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh (Camp at Arki), in Criminal Appeal No. 10-AK/10 of 2022, affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 6.5.2022, in Criminal Case No. 96/3 of 2017, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Arki, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner- accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month and pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,50,000/- to the complainant. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that respondent/complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the Act before the competent court of law, stating therein that accused, who is doing business of transportation, approached him for an amount of Rs. 2.00 lakh, to purchase a vehicle. Complainant alleged that on the afore request of the accused, he had withdrawn sum of Rs. 2,40,000/- from his JCC Bank Account, Arki Branch and out of the said withdrawal, sum of Rs. 2.00 lakh was given to the accused in cash on 21.9.2013, who assured to return the same within a short span, however, since despite many requests accused failed to pay the amount. Subsequently with a view to discharge his liability, accused issued cheque bearing No.473325 dated 12.4.2017 amounting to Rs. 2,00,000/- in favour of the complainant, however fact remains that aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned, was dishonoured on account of “insufficient funds”. Since accused failed to make the payment good within the time period stipulated in legal notice issued to him, complainant had no option but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent court of law. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 6.5.2022, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 6.5.2022, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the court below, petitioner-accused preferred an appeal before the learned first appellate Court, but the same was dismissed vide judgment dated 18.12.2023. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set-aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the court below. 5. Vide order dated 22.3.2024, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the court below, subject to deposit of 30% of the cheque amount with the trial court. Though in terms of aforesaid order, accused deposited 30% of the compensation amount, but thereafter, matter was repeatedly adjourned on his request, enabling him to deposit the remaining amount, but fact remains that despite repeated opportunities, petitioner has not deposited the entire amount of compensation. In the afore backdrop, learned counsel representing petitioner-accused fairly stated that since petitioner has not deposited full amount of compensation, this Court may proceed to decide the petition on its own merits. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the judgment impugned in the instant proceedings, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and there is no scope of interference. 7. Interestingly, in the case at hand, there is no denial, if any, on the part of the petitioner-accused with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon. If it is so, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the court below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which clearly provide that there shall be presumption available in favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in discharge of the lawful liability. If it is so, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the court below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which clearly provide that there shall be presumption available in favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in discharge of the lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise probable defence. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However, in the case at hand, accused, despite ample opportunities, failed to raise the probable defence. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat , 2013 (1) RCR(Criminal) 260, has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein: “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 9. If the entire evidence led on record by the complainant is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that he successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act. With a view to rebut the presumption, accused tried to set up a case that cheque in question was issued as security but such defense of him never came to be probablized. 10. Complainant successfully proved his case while deposing as CW-1. He tendered his evidence by way of affidavit (Ext. CW1/B), whereby he reiterated all the averments contained in the complainant. If the cross- examination conducted upon these witnesses is perused in its entirety, it cannot be said that accused was able to extract anything contrary to what this witness stated in their examinations-in- chief. He specifically stated that he is working as Transporter in STDO union and advanced 2,00,000/- to the accused. He deposed that on 21.09.2013, sum of Rs.2,40,000/- was in his account. While admitting that he did not annex the account statement, he specifically denied that cheque Ext. CW1/B was given to him by Jai Ram. He specifically stated that that cheque in question was given by accused. He specifically denied suggestion put to him that Sohan Lal had issued one notice to Jai Ram which was received by him and he also replied to the same. He specifically denied that he has no transaction with the accused and has made out false case against him. Interestingly, by putting suggestion with regard to issuance of cheque to Sohan Lal, which allegedly came to be mis-used by the petitioner, accused virtually accepted the factum of issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon. He specifically denied that he has no transaction with the accused and has made out false case against him. Interestingly, by putting suggestion with regard to issuance of cheque to Sohan Lal, which allegedly came to be mis-used by the petitioner, accused virtually accepted the factum of issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon. Though he attempted to raise defence that cheque issued in favour of Sohan Lal was mis-used, but he was unable to probablise aforesaid defence by leading cogent and convincing evidence. 11. While examining himself as DW1, accused deposed that complainant is not known to him and he did not receive Rs. 2.00 lakh from the complainant. He deposed that Jai Ram, son of Kirpa Ram, is known to him with whom, he is having good relation. He deposed that he took Rs.50,000/- from Jai Ram for domestic necessity for two months and at that time, Jai Ram obtained one blank cheque of UCO Bank Branch Dhundan. He deposed that after two months, he returned the money to Jai Ram and at that time he was disclosed that his cheque has been misplaced. He deposed that factum with regard to mis-use of cheque by the complainant came to his knowledge when he received summons from the court. He deposed that he got issued one notice through his Advocate to Jai Ram which was replied by him, wherein he admitted that he had given 50,000/- to him and had obtained blank cheque as security. He stated that the Rakesh Kumar has made out false case against him. 12. Interestingly, in his cross-examination, he stated that Rakesh is not known to him and he has no knowledge when he received the notice and denied his signatures on notice Ext. D-1. He stated that the process server has given wrong report on Ext. D-1 and no service was effected on him. He denied that the process server delivered one notice to him on 01- 08-2017 and also intimated about the case. He deposed that he borrowed 50,000/- from Jai Ram in March, 2018 and at that time, blank cheque of UCO Bank Branch, Dhundhan, was given to him. He admitted that he did not report to the police that his cheque has been lost. He admitted that before year 2018, he did not visit the Court, but surety given by Jagat Ram Ext. D-2 is correct. He admitted that he did not report to the police that his cheque has been lost. He admitted that before year 2018, he did not visit the Court, but surety given by Jagat Ram Ext. D-2 is correct. He admitted that he presented one application Ext. D-3 before the Court. He also admitted that in the Court file, he has seen cheque Ext. CW1/B. He denied that he got issued the notice through his Advocate in order to save himself from this case. He denied that he issued cheque amounting to Rs. 2,00,000/- in favour of Rakesh Kumar for discharge of his liability. 13. If the version put forth by the accused is examined in its entirety, there is no specific denial with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon, rather an attempt has been made by him to set up a case that cheque was actually issued to Jai Ram, but same was mis-used by the complainant. Though by way of issuing one notice upon Sh. Jai Ram, accused attempted to prove that sum of Rs.50,000/- taken by from Jai Ram was returned, but cheque obtained by afore person at the time of lending money was misplaced and same was ultimately misused by the complainant. He nowhere stated that after his having learnt factum of misuse of cheque, he ever lodged complaint against the complainant. Interestingly, in the case at hand, persons namely Jai Ram and Rakesh, who could be material witnesses in support of the defence of the accused, were never examined. Jai Ram never entered into witness box to state that cheque obtained by him as security was subsequently misused by the complainant. In the case at hand, Jai Ram stated that he had taken cheque in March 2018, but fact remains that cheque in question was presented before the bank concerned for clearance on 12.4.2017. If it is so, entire version put forth by the accused rightly came to be rejected by the court below being totally fallacious. 14. Complainant successfully proved on record that before instituting proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, he had served legal notice upon the accused, thereby calling upon him to make the payment good. Neither he replied to the legal notice, nor paid the money. Similarly factum with regard to issuance of cheque and signature thereupon towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established on record. Neither he replied to the legal notice, nor paid the money. Similarly factum with regard to issuance of cheque and signature thereupon towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established on record. Defence, set up by the accused that cheque in question was issued as security, never came to be proved on record in accordance with law. 15. By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand , Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on 28.10.2021, has held as under: “16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow. 16. Needless to say, expression “Security Cheque” is not a statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a “security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138 of the Act in case of its dishonour. 17. 17. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “ State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri ” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 18. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 19. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another , (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 20. 20. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 21. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court with fifteen days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate application by the complainant. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Needless to say, complainant shall always be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings for recovery of amount of compensation.