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2026 DAILYLAW 16870 (HP)

Kamil Mohammed v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2026-03-30

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioners have filed the present petitions for seeking pre-arrest bail in F.I.R. No. 35 of 2026, dated 25.02.2026, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302(2) and 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Sections 41 & 42 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, registered at Police Station Majra, District Sirmour, H.P. 2. Since both the bail petitions have arisen out of the same F.I.R., hence, they are being taken up together for disposal. 3. It has been asserted that the informant Surender Kumar, Forest Guard, reported the recovery of freshly cut logs of wood at Jamni Khad, Tehsil Poanta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. The police arrested Lekh Raj, who was granted regular bail by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. on 03.03.2026. The petitioners apprehend their arrest. They are innocent, and they were falsely implicated. There is no direct evidence connecting the petitioners to the commission of crime. The entire case of the prosecution is based upon the disclosure statement made by the co-accused Lekh Raj, recorded during the police custody. The petitioner cannot be kept behind bars based on the statement made by the co-accused. The offences mentioned in the F.I.R. are not grave and do not justify the pre-trial detention. F.I.R. No. 293 of 2016 was registered against petitioner, Kamil Mohammad, and no other F.I.R. was registered against the petitioner Iqbal Mohammad. Hence, it was prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on pre-arrest bail. 4. The petitions are opposed by filing a status report asserting that informant Surender Kumar, Forest Guard, was on patrolling duty in Haripur Khol Beat on 23.02.2026. He and Sandeep Saini were going towards Devwala, and they found freshly cut timber in Jamni Khad. The timber was measured on 24.02.2026, and a seizure hammer was put on them. The forest officials had found Lekh Raj near the spot, who disclosed that he had transported the timber from Johari Byala in his truck bearing registration No. HP-17B-4730. The police registered the F.I.R. and investigated the matter. The police arrested Lekhraj on 28.02.2026 at 7:15 p.m. Lekh Raj showed the place where the timber was put into the truck on 23.02.2026. He also disclosed that Iqbal was following the truck in his vehicle bearing registration No. HP-85-0149. The police registered the F.I.R. and investigated the matter. The police arrested Lekhraj on 28.02.2026 at 7:15 p.m. Lekh Raj showed the place where the timber was put into the truck on 23.02.2026. He also disclosed that Iqbal was following the truck in his vehicle bearing registration No. HP-85-0149. The police checked CCTV footage and found that the vehicles bearing registration No. HP-17B - 4730 and Alto bearing registration No. HP-85-0149 moving together. The police searched for Iqbal Mohammad but could not trace him. The police recovered the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-85-0149 from his house. Accused Kamil Mohammad threatened the witness Khalil Mohammad, on 03.03.2026 that he would kill him and his children because he had named the accused and his truck. F.I.R. No.13 of 2026 has been registered against petitioner Kamil Mohammad. The petitioners are involved in the transportation of the timber as an organised syndicate. The petitioner, Kamil Mohammad, was in touch with Lekh Raj. The police are yet to recover the mobile phone and find out the destination of the timber. The petitioners would intimidate the witnesses in case of their release on bail. Hence, it was prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. 5. I have heard Mr Desh Raj Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners in both the petitions and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State in both the petitions. 6. Mr Desh Raj Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners in both the petitions, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated based upon the statement made by the co-accused. The petitioners are stated to be involved in the commission of theft, and the offences are not heinous. The petitioners would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail. 7. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, submitted that the petitioner Khalid Mohammad, Kamil Mohammad, had threatened the witness. He would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. Petitioner Kamil Mohammad was earlier involved in the commission of a similar offence, and the chances of his committing the same offence cannot be ruled out. The investigation is continuing. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. 8. He would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. Petitioner Kamil Mohammad was earlier involved in the commission of a similar offence, and the chances of his committing the same offence cannot be ruled out. The investigation is continuing. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement , (2019) 9 SCC 24 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that arrest is a part of the investigation procedure. The power of pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be sparingly exercised. It was observed: “69. Ordinarily, an arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice, and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes with the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.” 10. This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held: “25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious, as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent, as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.” 11. It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana , (2023) 8 SCC 181 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed: “21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.” 12. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.” 12. It was held in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab , (2025) 4 SCC 493 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 that pre-arrest bail can be granted in exceptional circumstances where the Court is of the view that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the case, and the presumption of innocence cannot be a reason to grant bail. It was observed at page 501: “21. The parameters for the grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence like corruption are required to be satisfied. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has been falsely implicated in the crime or the allegations are politically motivated or are frivolous. So far as the case at hand is concerned, it cannot be said that any exceptional circumstances have been made out by the petitioner-accused for the grant of anticipatory bail, and there is no frivolity in the prosecution. 22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a pronouncement in CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy[CBIv.V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 563], wherein this Court expressed thus: (SCC p. 465, para 34) “34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis in original and supplied) 23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for the grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations that the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of public justice. Over-solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice. 13. The present petitions have to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. It was submitted that the police are relying upon the statement made by co-accused Lekh Raj to connect the petitioners to the commission of the crime. The statement made by him is inadmissible; therefore, the petitioners are entitled to bail. This submission cannot be accepted. The police are relying upon the CCTV footage in which Alto was seen moving with the truck from which the recovery was effected, and the statement made by the co-accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs Khaliludeen 2022 Supreme SC 1247 that bail can be denied to the accused, who was named by the co-accused. It was observed: “8. The answer to said question could be the statement recorded by Md. Nizam Uddin. The statement of Md. Jakir Hussain, recorded under Section 67 of the act, has also named his owner Abdul Hai. We are conscious of the fact that the validity and scope of such statements under Section 67 have been pronounced upon by this Court in Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1 . Nizam Uddin. The statement of Md. Jakir Hussain, recorded under Section 67 of the act, has also named his owner Abdul Hai. We are conscious of the fact that the validity and scope of such statements under Section 67 have been pronounced upon by this Court in Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1 . In State by (NCB) Bengaluru vs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta and Another, 2022 Live Law (SC) 69, the rigour of law laid down by this Court in Tofan Singh was held to be applicable even at the stage of grant of bail. 9. However, going by the circumstances on record, at this stage, on the strength of the statement of Md. Nizam Uddin, though allegedly retracted later, the matter stands on a different footing. In our considered view, in the face of the mandate of Section 37 of the Act, the High Court could not and ought not to have released the accused on bail. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the view taken by the High Court and direct that both the appellants be taken in custody forthwith”. 15. This position was reiterated in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346, wherein it was held: “11. The information revealed by the above two accused persons indicated that both of them knew the respondent-accused and that they had connived with him to transport the illicit ganja, and that they were in direct contact with the respondent-accused all through his mobile number. The facts as unfurled from the complaint/FIR and the statements of the above two accused persons recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act reveal that the respondent-accused is the kingpin and the organiser of the illicit trade in ganja. Xxxx 17. The quantity of “ganja” recovered is admittedly of commercial quantity. The High Court has not recorded any finding that the respondent-accused is not prima facie guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit the same offence when enlarged on bail; rather, his antecedents are indicative that he is a regular offender. In the absence of a recording of such satisfaction by the court, we are of the opinion that the High Court manifestly erred in enlarging the respondent-accused on bail. 16. In the absence of a recording of such satisfaction by the court, we are of the opinion that the High Court manifestly erred in enlarging the respondent-accused on bail. 16. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Samarth Kumar , 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2087, that the accused cannot be released on pre-arrest bail relying upon the judgment in Tofan Singh (supra). It was observed: “4. The High Court decided to grant pre-arrest bail to the respondents on the only ground that no recovery was effected from the respondents and that they had been implicated only on the basis of the disclosure statement of the main accused, Dinesh Kumar. Therefore, reliance was placed by the High Court in the majority judgment of this Court in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1 . xxxxx 8. In cases of this nature, the respondents may be able to take advantage of the decision in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), perhaps at the time of arguing the regular bail application or at the time of final hearing after the conclusion of the trial. 9. To grant anticipatory bail in a case of this nature is not really warranted. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court fell into an error in granting anticipatory bail to the respondents.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. These judgments were followed by this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. State of H.P. , Cr.MP(M) No. 458 of 2025, decided on 25.3.2025, and it was held that the pre-arrest bail can be denied to a person named by the co-accused to enable the police to interrogate the petitioner. An SLP No. 55547 of 2025 titled Rajesh Kumar Vs. State of H.P. against this order was withdrawn on 21.4.2025. It was held by this Court in Jatinder Pal Singh vs. State of HP 2025:HHC:20446 that a person named by the co-accused is not entitled to pre-arrest bail. This order was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jatinder Pal Singh vs. State of HP , Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 9629/2025 decided on 10.07.2025. 18. Thus, the submission that the statement made by the co-accused is inadmissible and the petitioner are entitled to pre-arrest bail cannot be accepted. 19. The allegations made against the petitioners are serious. 18. Thus, the submission that the statement made by the co-accused is inadmissible and the petitioner are entitled to pre-arrest bail cannot be accepted. 19. The allegations made against the petitioners are serious. The petitioners had cut a huge quantity of the timber. Learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour District at Nahan had rightly held that the offence was against the environment and cannot be said to be minor. 20. The police asserted that the petitioners are to be interrogated to determine the destination of the timber. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Versus Anil Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187 that where custodial interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted. It was observed: “6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who is well-ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring much useful information and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often, interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible Police Officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offender” 21. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Mukesh Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1032, wherein it was observed: - “13. One of the significant factors in determining this question would be the need for custodial interrogation. Without a doubt, custodial interrogation is more effective to question a suspect. The cocoon of protection afforded by a bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals. One of the significant factors in determining this question would be the need for custodial interrogation. Without a doubt, custodial interrogation is more effective to question a suspect. The cocoon of protection afforded by a bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals. But it must also be kept in mind that while interrogation of a suspect is one of the basic and effective methods of crime solving, the liberty of an individual also needs to be balanced out.” 22. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that the grant of pre-arrest bail may hamper the investigations. It was observed: “83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting useful information, and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences, would definitely hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the materials said to have been collected by the respondent Enforcement Directorate and considering the stage of the investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.” 23. It was submitted that the co-accused has been released on regular bail, and the petitioners are entitled to bail because of the parity. This submission will not help the petitioners. There is a distinction between regular bail and pre-arrest bail, and the grant of regular bail to a co-accused will not entitle the petitioners to pre-arrest bail. 24. No other point was urged. 25. In view of the above, the present petitions fail, and they are dismissed. 26. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of these petitions and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits.