JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 7.6.2007, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment and decree dated 24.6.2003, passed by learned Sub Judge, First Class, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession of the suit property described in para-2 of the plaint. An alternative relief of possession was also sought in case the plaintiffs were found to be out of possession. It was asserted that there was a dispute between the defendants and the father of the plaintiff No.1 regarding the suit land. The father of plaintiff No.1 had filed a civil suit, which was decided on 15.9.1988. The plaintiffs and defendants were declared co- owners. The defendants did not file any appeal, and the decree attained finality. The father of plaintiff No. 1 filed two applications for partition of the land, and the land was partitioned. The defendants interfered with the plaintiffs’ possession even after the partition. They have no right to do so. Hence, a civil suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding the plaintiffs being estopped to file the suit, the suit having not been properly valued for Court fees and jurisdiction, lack of cause of action and the maintainability, and the suit being bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties. The contents of the plaint were admitted to the extent that the father of the plaintiff no. 1 had applied for partition, and the land was partitioned by the revenue Court. It was asserted that there was no land comprised in Khasra No.228/1, 261, 341, 342, measuring 1-9-3 bigha in Mohal Dhalog. Khasra No.228 was in exclusive possession of the defendant and was not partitioned. This Khasra number is located in Mohal Sanana, and the defendants No.1 and 4 have raised a shed on Khasra No.228/1, measuring 0-1-3 bigha before the institution of the suit. Khasra No.228 was in exclusive possession of the defendant and was not partitioned. This Khasra number is located in Mohal Sanana, and the defendants No.1 and 4 have raised a shed on Khasra No.228/1, measuring 0-1-3 bigha before the institution of the suit. This land was wrongly allotted to the father of plaintiff No.1. No warrant of possession was issued, and the defendants remained in possession. The defendants had also filed a civil suit for declaration and injunction, and the appeal was pending in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Mandi. The suit land was in exclusive possession of the defendants. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed. 5. Learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 27.8.2002: - 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree for permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed? OPP. 2. In case plaintiffs are found out of possession during the pendency of the suit, whether the plaintiffs are also entitled for possession alternatively? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped to file the present suit by their own act, conduct, and deeds? OPD. 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPP. 5. Whether there is no cause of action? OPD. 6. Whether the present suit is not maintainable? OPD. 7. Whether the suit suffers on account of mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD. 8. Whether the plaintiffs are out of possession of suit land, therefore, suit for injunction is not maintainable? OPD. 9. Whether the defendants have raised a shed over Khasra No.228/1, measuring 0-1-3 bighas situated in Village Shanana prior to institution of the suit? OPD. 10. Relief. 6. The parties were called upon to produce evidence. The plaintiffs examined Karanveer Singh (PW1), Jia Lal (PW2), Khajan Singh (PW3) and Hans Raj (PW4). The defendants examined Chuni Lal (DW1), Lajja Ram (DW2), Padma Nand (DW3), Praveen Kumar (DW4) and Hans Raj (DW5). 7. The learned Trial Court held that it was an admitted case of the parties that they were co-sharers and the father of plaintiff No.1 had applied for partition proceedings. The defendants examined Chuni Lal (DW1), Lajja Ram (DW2), Padma Nand (DW3), Praveen Kumar (DW4) and Hans Raj (DW5). 7. The learned Trial Court held that it was an admitted case of the parties that they were co-sharers and the father of plaintiff No.1 had applied for partition proceedings. Land was partitioned, and as per Mutation No.315, the land in Mauja Sanana and Dhalog fell into the share of the father of plaintiff No.1, who sold it to plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4. The plea taken by the defendants that they had raised a dhara over the suit land before filing the suit was not acceptable. Father of plaintiff No.1 was put in possession vide Rapat No.417, dated 10.6.1999, Rapat No. 411, dated 25.5.1999 and Rapat No.452, dated 8.6.1999. The defendants ceased to have any title over the land after the partition, and their claim regarding the ownership amounted to sufficient interference. Hence, Issues No. 1 and 9 were answered in the affirmative, Issue No. 2 and 7 were answered partly in the affirmative and issues No.3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 were answered in the negative and the suit was decreed. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the defendants filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court that the possession was delivered to Dharam Dass, father of plaintiff No.1, as per the order passed by learned Assistant Collector, First Grade in File No.71/93 and File No.72/93. The entries in the revenue record were incorporated regarding the partition. Hence, plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 were to be proved to be in exclusive possession of the suit land. Plaintiffs No.1 and 2 sold the suit land to plaintiffs No.3 and 4 by means of a sale deed. The defendant Chuni Lal had constructed a wooden shed on a portion of the suit land bearing Khasra No.228/1, and the decree of vacant possession was rightly passed. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below, the defendants have filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 30.9.2010: - 1. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below, the defendants have filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 30.9.2010: - 1. Whether on account of mis-description of the suit property, the suit could not have been decreed, and two courts below have erred in decreeing the suit in such a situation? 2. Whether the suit was barred by time, and the plea having been raised to this effect, non-framing of the issue prejudiced the appellants/defendants? 10. I have heard Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants and Mr Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs. 11. Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants, submitted that the suit land was not properly described and the learned Trial Court erred in passing a decree. The learned Courts below erred in holding that the possession was delivered to the father of the plaintiff No. 1. The suit was virtually filed for taking possession, which was barred by limitation. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below be set-aside. 12. Mr Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs, submitted that both the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the possession was delivered to the father of plaintiff No.1. The defendants themselves admitted in their written statement that the land was partitioned by the Revenue Court and Khasra No.228/1, situated in Mohal Sanana was allotted to the father of plaintiff no. 1. The defendants were in unauthorized possession of the part of the suit land. No prejudice was caused to any party by the misdescription of the suit land. The evidence on record proved that the possession was delivered to the father of the plaintiff no. 1 by the revenue authorities, and the present suit was not a suit for possession. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial Question of Law No. 1: 14. The plaintiff asserted in para No. 2 of the plaint that Khasra Nos. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial Question of Law No. 1: 14. The plaintiff asserted in para No. 2 of the plaint that Khasra Nos. 228, 239, 245, 278, 287/1, 309, Kita-6, measuring 2-12-10 bighas situated in Mohal Sanana came into the share of the plaintiffs as per the order of the learned Assistant Collector, First Grade, Karsog, District Mandi, HP, in Misal No.72/93. Similarly, Khasra No.228/1, 261, 341, 342, Kita-4, measuring 1- 9-3 bigha, situated in Mohal Dhalog, fell into the share of the plaintiff exclusively vide Misal No.71/93. The defendants stated in para 2 of the written statement that it was admitted that the father of the plaintiff no. 1 had applied for partition of the suit land, and the same was partitioned by the revenue record. The land comprised in Khasra No.228/1, 261, 341, 342, measuring 1-9-3 bighas, was not located in Mohal Dhalog. Khasra No.228 is situated in Mohal Sanana, and defendants No.1 and 4 had raised a shed on Khasra No.228/1. The copy of the order in Misal No.71/93 (Ex.PW1/C) shows that the land comprised in Khata/Khatauni No.1/1, Kita-6, measuring 2-18-5 bighas, situated in Mohal Sanana, was partitioned, and Khasra No.228/1, 261, 341, 342, Kita-4, measuring 1-9-3 bigha, was allotted to Narvada, Maina, Rosi and Karanveer. It was ordered that a separate Khata be prepared for Dharam Dass in Mohal Dhalog. Thus, the plaintiff had erred in describing the Khasra No.228/1 as located in Mohal Dhalog, whereas it was located in Mohal Sanana, even as per the case of the defendants and the material on record. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that it was a clerical error which could be corrected by taking recourse to Section 152 of CPC. Further, the defendants had specifically asserted their possession over Khasra No.228/1 situated in Mohal Sanana, which was found to be unauthorised and no prejudice was caused to them by decreeing the suit qua this land. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that it was a clerical error which could be corrected by taking recourse to Section 152 of CPC. Further, the defendants had specifically asserted their possession over Khasra No.228/1 situated in Mohal Sanana, which was found to be unauthorised and no prejudice was caused to them by decreeing the suit qua this land. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136, that when an alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was admitted by the defendant and was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim of the plaintiff, the suit can be decreed on the claim so projected by the defendant. It was observed: - “12. A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively, and there is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. The question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint, it is open to the court to give him relief on that basis. The rule undoubtedly is that the court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter, and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit. 13. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit. 13. As an illustration of this principle, reference may be made to the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Babu Raja Mohan Manucha v. Babu Manzoor Ahmad Khan [Babu Raja Mohan Manucha v. Babu Manzoor Ahmad Khan, (1942-43) 70 IA 1: 1942 SCC OnLine PC 30]. This appeal arose out of a suit commenced by the appellant- plaintiff to enforce a mortgage security. The plea of the defendant was that the mortgage was void. This plea was given effect to by both the lower courts as well as by the Privy Council. But the Privy Council held that it was open in such circumstances to the plaintiff to repudiate the transaction altogether and claim a relief outside it in the form of restitution under Section 65 of the Contract Act. Although no such alternative claim was made in the plaint, the Privy Council allowed it to be advanced and gave a decree on the ground that the respondent could not be prejudiced by such a claim at all, and the matter ought not to be left to a separate suit. It may be noted that this relief was allowed to the appellant even though the appeal was heard ex parte in the absence of the respondent.” 15. Thus, learned Courts below had rightly decreed the plaintiffs’ suit, and the misdescription was not sufficient to dismiss it. Hence, the substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial Question of Law No.2: 16. It was submitted that the plaintiff had virtually filed a civil suit for seeking possession of the land. Such a suit was required to be filed within three years from the date of passing of the order of partition. The order was passed on 8.2.1996, and the suit was filed on 3.3.2001 beyond the period of limitation. This submission is only stated to be rejected. Hans Raj, Patwari (PW4), stated that he and Pratap Singh, Kanungo, had delivered the possession to Dharam Dass, father of plaintiff No. 1 in File No.71/93 and 72/93. No person had objected to the delivery of possession. An entry no. 417, dated 10.6.1999, entry no. 411, dated 25.5.1999 and entry no. 452, dated 8.6.1999, were made regarding the delivery of possession to Dharam Dass. No person had objected to the delivery of possession. An entry no. 417, dated 10.6.1999, entry no. 411, dated 25.5.1999 and entry no. 452, dated 8.6.1999, were made regarding the delivery of possession to Dharam Dass. He is a public official who was discharging his official duties, and there is no reason to disbelieve his testimony. His statement is duly corroborated by the entries made in the Rapat Rojnamcha regarding the delivery of possession. The plaintiff’s version regarding their possession is corroborated by Khajan Singh (PW3). 17. Hans Raj, Patwari (PW4), prepared the tatima on 13.7.2000 regarding Khasra No.228, which showed the possession of the defendants. This tatima was prepared after the delivery of possession in favour of the father of the plaintiff No.1 and does not falsify the plaintiffs’ version regarding the delivery of possession. The defendant also relied upon the statement of Lajja Ram (DW2), who admitted in his cross-examination that he is a professional witness and had appeared in many cases. Therefore, his testimony was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below. Padma Nand (DW3) stated in his cross- examination that he was making a statement as was explained to him. He came to the Court to depose in favour of the defendants to maintain cordial relations so that the defendants would also help him in times of need. Thus, his testimony was not acceptable. 18. Hence, the learned Courts below had rightly accepted the evidence regarding the plaintiffs’ possession, and the submission that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit land and they had filed a suit for taking possession, which is barred by limitation, is not acceptable. This substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Final Order: 19. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the judgments and decree passed by the learned Courts below. 20. Hence, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. 21. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. 22. Records of the learned Courts below be sent down forthwith.