JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 204 of 2025 , dated 22.09. , registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the NDPS Act’) at Police Station Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a law student aged 20 years. He is a permanent resident of Shimla, having roots in the society. The petitioner was arrested in F.I.R. No. 204 of 2025 and was unable to appear in his examination because of his incarceration. The petitioner was arrayed as an accused because of his presence in the vehicle from which 1 kg 174 grams of charas was recovered. Co-accused Kashin Kashyap, Ayansh and Srivastav were the financiers of the purchase. Kashin Kashyap transferred Rs. 50,000/- through Google Pay, and Ayansh transferred Rs. 14,200/-through UPI to Rewat Ram, who was subsequently arrested on 04.11. . The police have also filed the charge sheet. The petitioner has remained in prison for more than five months. No recovery is to be effected from the petitioner. Money transactions do not connect the petitioner to any of the co-accused. The mobile phone of Kashin Kashyap was also found in the laptop bag, which connects him to the commission of the crime. As per the prosecution’s case, the petitioner had not visited Kullu, H.P. He was not seen in CCTV footage and had not purchased the charas. He was the only occupant of the vehicle and was not connected to the charas. The co-accused Kashin Kashyap has been released on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police had set up a nakka at Pungh four-lane and were checking the vehicles on 22.09. 2025 . They intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. UP-16AX-2143. The driver and occupants of the vehicle got frightened after seeing the police. The police associated Kuldeep Kumar and Mukesh Kumar as independent witnesses. The police inquired about the names of the occupants of the vehicle. 2025 . They intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. UP-16AX-2143. The driver and occupants of the vehicle got frightened after seeing the police. The police associated Kuldeep Kumar and Mukesh Kumar as independent witnesses. The police inquired about the names of the occupants of the vehicle. The driver identified himself as Devayas Patel, the person sitting beside him identified himself as Nakul Mittal, and the persons sitting in the rear seat identified themselves as Arnav Chauhan (present petitioner), Saksham Bharti and Rohit Kumar. The police searched the vehicle and recovered a carry bag containing 1.174 kilograms of charas. The police seized the charas and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The charas was sent to SFSL, Junga, and as per the report of analysis, it was confirmed to be a sample of charas. The occupants revealed during interrogation that they had handed over Rs. 5000/-each to Kashin Kashyap, who had also accompanied the accused on his motorcycle. They identified the room where they had stayed in Kullu. The petitioner had gone to Kullu from Solan to purchase Charas on 21.09. , but had stayed in a hotel at 9 miles Pandoh, with his friends Nakul Mittal, Rohit Kumar and Aditya Kumar. Divyansh Patel, Nakul Mittal, petitioner, Saksham Bharti and Rohit Kumar revealed during the investigation that they handed over Rs. 5000/- each to Kashin Kashyap to purchase the charas. Petitioner waited for his friends at Pandoh. He boarded a vehicle bearing registration no. UP-16AX-2143. The police completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court of learned Special Judge, Mandi, on 17.01.2026. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. As per the status report, the petitioner had stayed at 9 Mile Pandoh. He was not seen in the CCTV footage. The statement made by the co-accused regarding the contribution of Rs. 5000/- for the purchase of charas is inadmissible in evidence. Mere possession in the vehicle is not sufficient to connect the petitioner to the commission of crime. The petitioner is a student, and his studies are suffering from his continuous incarceration. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 5000/- for the purchase of charas is inadmissible in evidence. Mere possession in the vehicle is not sufficient to connect the petitioner to the commission of crime. The petitioner is a student, and his studies are suffering from his continuous incarceration. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: - Avatar Singh and others vs. State of Punjab (2002) 7 SCC 419 ; - Sorabkhan Gandhkhan Pathan and another vs. State of Gujrat (2004) 13 SCC 608 ; - Gurprabh Singh @ Prince vs State of Punjab 2025 : PHHC : 027809 ; - Vinay Sharma vs State Govt. of NCt of Delhi : DHC:6358; - Ravi Sahrma vs. State of H.P. 2024 : HHC 12720; - Vanshika vs State of H.P. a/w connected matter Cr.MP(M) No.2341 and 2334 of decided on 08.10. and - Amar Nath vs. State of H.P. : : 22851 . 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the petitioner was found present in the vehicle from which the recovery was made. The presumption under Sections 34 and 54 of the NDPS Act applies to the present case, and the burden is upon the petitioner to rebut the presumption. He has not produced any material to rebut the presumption at this stage. The quantity of charas stated to have been recovered by the police is commercial, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. , ( 2025 ) 7 SCC 314: SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594 : 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. Perusal of the status report shows that the petitioner was present in the vehicle from which the recovery of 1 Kg 174 grams of charas was effected. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. Perusal of the status report shows that the petitioner was present in the vehicle from which the recovery of 1 Kg 174 grams of charas was effected. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664 : 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed: “19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle. 20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession. 21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted. 22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term that assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [ (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. 24. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. 24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [ (1972) 2 SCC 194 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756 ], possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control. 25. The word “possession” means the legal right to possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498 : (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966: (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)].) 26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles. 27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been established. It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.” 12. It was submitted that mere presence in the vehicle does not amount to possessing the article lying in it. Reliance was placed upon judgment Avtar Singh (supra), Sorabkhan (supra) and Amar Nath (supra). In all these cases, the vehicles were commercial, which can be hired by any person, and the driver and hirer may possess different things. In the present case, the vehicle was a private vehicle in which persons known to each other were travelling, and the situation is squarely covered by the judgment of Madan Lal (supra), and no advantage can be derived from the cited judgment. In the present case, the vehicle was a private vehicle in which persons known to each other were travelling, and the situation is squarely covered by the judgment of Madan Lal (supra), and no advantage can be derived from the cited judgment. In Vanshika (supra) and Ravi Sharma (supra), the quantity of contraband was intermediate, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act did not apply. In the present case, the quantity of charas recovered from the vehicle was 1 kg 174 grams, which is a commercial quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 apply to the present case; hence, the cited judgments will not assist the petitioner. 13. In Gurprabh Singh @ Prince (supra) and Vinay Sharma (supra), it was held that the recovery of contraband marginally in excess of the prescribed quantity will not attract Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It is difficult to agree with this reasoning. Once the Central Government has specified a commercial quantity of the charas, it is impermissible for the Court to hold that the variation is marginal. The Court is bound to apply the law as it stands, except when it is declared to be unconstitutional; therefore, these judgments cannot be followed with utmost respect to the Hon’ble Judges deciding those cases. 14. The quantity of charas stated to be in possession of the petitioner was more than the commercial quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. 15. Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It reads as follows: “37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable. It reads as follows: “37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable. (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19, section 24, or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond unless– (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.” 16. It was submitted that, as per the prosecution, the petitioner had stayed at 9 Mile Pandoh. The actual purchase was not made by the petitioner, and the petitioner was not connected to the purchase. This submission will not help the petitioner as it is based upon the statement made by the co-accused, which is inadmissible in evidence. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat , (2019) 16 SCC 547 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 588 that a statement made by a co-accused during the investigation is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. and cannot be used as a piece of evidence. It was also held that the confession made by an accused is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed at page 568: - 44. Such a person, viz., the person who is named in the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eye of the law, can indeed be questioned, and the statement is taken by the police officer. A confession that is made to a police officer would be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act, would also be inadmissible. A confession that is made to a police officer would be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act, would also be inadmissible. A confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala Narayana Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47 ] and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a statement contains an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 CrPC.” 17. Similarly, it was held in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2018 (8) SCC 271 that a confession made by an accused cannot be taken as a substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and can only be utilised to lend assurance to the other evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently held in Tofan Singh Versus State of Tamil Nadu 2021 (4) SCC 1 that a confession made to a police officer during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and is not saved by the provisions of Section 67 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by the petitioner from the confessional statement made by the co-accused. 18. No other point was urged. 19. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 20. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the case's merits.