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2026 DAILYLAW 16847 (HP)

State of H. P. v. Rajneesh Kumar

2026-03-02

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31.10.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, (1), Kangra, District Kangra (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 279, 337 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police filed a charge sheet against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 201 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Praveen Kumar (PW6) and Bablesh Kumar were riding a motorcycle bearing registration No. HP- 40A-4238 on 12.05.2008. An auto bearing registration No. HP40A-4037 was moving ahead of the motorcycle. An applied for a truck came from behind at a high speed and hit the auto. The informant also lost control of the motorcycle, and the motorcycle fell. The injured were taken to the hospital. The truck driver stopped the truck at some distance and ran away from the spot. The incident occurred due to the high speed and the negligence of the truck driver. The matter was reported to the police. Pritam Chand (PW10) went to the spot for verification. He recorded the statement of Praveen Kumar (Ext.PW6/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (PA) was registered. He filed an application (Ext.PW10/B) for the medical examination of the injured. Dr Shailja (PW7) examined Dhani Ram @ Anku and found that he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. She issued the MLC (Ext.PW7/A). The injured was admitted to the surgical ward, and a treatment summary (Ext.PW9/A) was issued by Dr R. Bharti (PW9). HC Pritam Chand went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW10/C). He seized the truck vide memo (Ext.PW2/C) and the auto vide memo (Ext.PW2/A). Ashok Kumar (PW5) took the photographs (Ext.PW5/A to Ext.PW5/F). Rajinder Kumar (PW8) examined the truck and auto. He found that there was no mechanical defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW8/A and Ext.PW8/B). He seized the truck vide memo (Ext.PW2/C) and the auto vide memo (Ext.PW2/A). Ashok Kumar (PW5) took the photographs (Ext.PW5/A to Ext.PW5/F). Rajinder Kumar (PW8) examined the truck and auto. He found that there was no mechanical defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW8/A and Ext.PW8/B). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to frame the charges for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 201 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses to prove its case. Raju Loderia (PW1) was driving the auto. Om Parkash (PW2) and Bhagwan Dass (PW4) witnessed various recoveries. Dhani Ram (PW3) was travelling as a passenger in the auto and sustained injuries. Ashok Kumar (PW5) took the photographs. Praveen Kumar (PW6) is the informant. Dr Shailja (PW7) examined the injured. Rajinder Kumar (PW8) examined the vehicles. Dr R. Bharti (PW9) treated the injured in the surgical ward and issued the treatment summary. Pritam Chand (PW10) investigated the matter. Shiv Kumar (PW11) is the owner of the vehicle. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that a false case was made against him, and the witnesses deposed falsely against him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of the prosecution witnesses materially contradicted each other, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. The prosecution witnesses stated that the truck was being driven at a high speed. However, the approximate speed of the vehicle was not mentioned. The identity of the driver was not established. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offences. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the prosecution’s evidence from its proper perspective. The statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded for untenable reasons. The accused was duly identified by the eyewitnesses as well as the owner of the vehicle. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the prosecution’s evidence from its proper perspective. The statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded for untenable reasons. The accused was duly identified by the eyewitnesses as well as the owner of the vehicle. Learned Trial Court had taken a view which could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Shashwat Dadwal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The learned Trial Court ignored the statements of eyewitnesses and the owner of the vehicle without any cogent reason and had taken a view which could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Shashwat Dadwal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution witnesses had contradicted themselves on material aspects. They asserted that the incident occurred because of the high speed of the truck. However, the approximate speed of the truck was not mentioned by any of the witnesses. The mere use of the term ‘high speed’ is not sufficient to infer the negligence of the driver. This Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible, while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed: “12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104 , Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258 , Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320 , and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114 .” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Informant Praveen Kumar (PW6) stated that a Canter overtook the motorcycle being driven by him and attempted to overtake the auto. He heard the noise of the auto falling into a gorge. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the canter. He stated in his cross-examination that the place of the incident was quite wide, and it was possible to overtake another vehicle. He could not say whether any accident had occurred. He could not say that the auto driver had negligently fallen into the gorge. 16. The statement of this witness does not support the prosecution’s version because he did not state that the truck had hit the auto, due to which the auto fell into the gorge. He showed his ignorance regarding the hitting of the auto by the truck. Thus, his testimony does not prove that the truck had hit the auto. 17. Raju (PW1) was driving the auto. He stated that a truck being driven by the accused hit the auto at a high speed, and the auto fell into the gorge. Dhani Ram @ Anku sustained injuries in the accident. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the truck. He stated in his cross-examination that there was a deep curve and steep gradient at the place of the incident. He denied that the truck was already parked on the spot. 18. The mechanical report (Ext.PW8/A) does not mention any damage to the rear of the auto. Rajinder Kumar (PW8) did not state on oath that there was any damage to the rear side of the auto. The photographs (Ext. PW5/A to Ext.PW5/C) also do not show any damage to the rear of the auto. Similarly, no damage to the front side of the truck is visible in the photographs (Ext.PW5/D to Ext. PW5/F). The report (Ext.PW8/A) does not mention any damage to the truck. Therefore, the statement of Raju (PW1) that the truck had hit the auto from the rear is not corroborated by the mechanical report. 19. Dhani Ram (PW3) stated that a truck hit the auto at Sunehed at a high speed. The auto turned turtle, and he sustained injuries. PW5/F). The report (Ext.PW8/A) does not mention any damage to the truck. Therefore, the statement of Raju (PW1) that the truck had hit the auto from the rear is not corroborated by the mechanical report. 19. Dhani Ram (PW3) stated that a truck hit the auto at Sunehed at a high speed. The auto turned turtle, and he sustained injuries. He was permitted to be cross-examined by the learned APP, and he denied that he had identified the driver on the spot. He denied in his cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that the motorcycle had hit the auto, due to which the motorcyclists had sustained injuries. 20. The statement of this witness is not in accordance with the statement of Raju (PW1), who stated that the auto fell into the gorge after the accident. This witness stated that the auto had turned turtle after the accident. Further, he also claimed that the truck had hit the rear side of the auto. However, it is not corroborated by the photographs and the mechanical report. Hence, his testimony cannot be relied upon. 21. Pritam Chand (PW10) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW10/C). He mentioned in note-2 that the front tyres of the truck were punctured on the spot. This site plan was prepared on 12.05.2008, the date of the incident. There is no explanation regarding the puncturing of the front tyres. The punctured tyres of the truck make the prosecution’s version doubtful that the truck was moving and caused the accident. 22. Raju (PW1) and Dhani Ram (PW3) stated that the accident occurred due to the high speed of the truck. They have not mentioned the approximate speed of the truck. Learned Trial Court had rightly noticed that the mere use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness is not sufficient unless the approximate speed of the vehicle is mentioned. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 23. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493 , wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 24. This Court also held in the State of H.P. Vs. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 24. This Court also held in the State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 25. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 26. Therefore, the driver cannot be held liable simply because of the use of the term ‘high speed’. 27. It was submitted that the witnesses stated that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused and this proved the prosecution’s case. This submission will not help the prosecution. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 28. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.” 29. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the statement made by the witnesses that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. 30. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 31. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of 32. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure  (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/ learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court 33. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.