JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to order dated 12.9.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh in Session Trial No. 12/24, whereby court below proceeded to frame charge against the petitioners in case FIR No. 97/23 dated 1.7.2023 under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 (in short “SCST Act”) 2. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners is that bare perusal of FIR clearly reveals that no case much less case under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the SCST Act, is made out against the petitioners. If it is so, there was otherwise no occasion for the learned court below to frame charges against the petitioners under the afore provisions of law. Mr. Sharma, while making this court peruse pleadings as well as other documents adduced on record vehemently argued that complainant, at whose instance FIR as detailed herein above, came to be lodged, was not able to prove till Hon’ble Apex Court his ownership qua the land in question. While referring to Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g), Mr. Sharma, contended that person belonging to scheduled caste community can invoke afore provision of law only in the event of his being owner or in possession of the land from which he is seeking removal of a person of higher caste. He further submitted that since complainant was unable to prove before the civil court that he is owner or in possession of the land coupled with the fact that judgments passed by the competent court of law in that regard were made available to the court below at the time of framing of charges, impugned order thereby framing charge against the petitioners needs to be interfered with. 3. To the contrary, Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, representing the respondent­State and Mr. N.K. Tomar, learned counsel representing the complainant, supported the impugned order framing charge. 3. To the contrary, Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, representing the respondent­State and Mr. N.K. Tomar, learned counsel representing the complainant, supported the impugned order framing charge. Above named counsel vehemently argued that police after having perused the sale deed qua the suit land, wherein factum of complainant’s ownership qua the land in question stands duly recorded, rightly presented challan in the competent court of law under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the Act. They further submitted that during investigation, police also collected revenue record i.e. jamabandi, suggestive of the fact that name of the complainant stands entered as owner qua the land in question. Mr. N.K. Tomar, learned counsel representing the complainant, further argued that otherwise also, present petition is not maintainable in terms of Section 14 (A) of the Act, which clearly provides that an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court. He submitted that since order framing charge is not interlocutory order, rather intermediate order, petitioners herein ought to have filed criminal appeal under Section 14 (A) of the Act instead of Criminal Revision Petition. Mr. Tomar further submitted that petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 were never party to the civil suit filed by the respondent Amar Singh, for permanent injunction and as such, they otherwise cannot take benefit of the same in the instant proceedings. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 5. Since specific question of maintainability of the present petition has been raised at the behest of the respondents, this Court, at the first instance deems, it fit to take note of Section 14 (A) of the Act, which reads as under: “14A. Appeals.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of CriminalProcedure,1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub­section (3) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub­section (3) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of ninety days: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days. (4) Every appeal preferred under sub­section (1) shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal” 6. Careful perusal of afore order clearly reveals that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, an appeal would lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order of a Special Court. Admittedly, order laid challenge in the instant proceedings has been passed by the Special Court under special act, but next question, which needs determination is “whether order framing charge can be said to be interlocutory or intermediate order.” 7. In Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. passed in Criminal Appeal No. 472 of 2021 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10157 of 2019), Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that criminal revision would lie against the order framing charge. Para No. 15 of the afore judgment reads as under: “15. The correct position of law as laid down in Madhu Limaye (supra), thus, is that orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC. That apart, this Court in the above­cited cases has unequivocally acknowledged that the High Court is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual cases. That apart, this Court in the above­cited cases has unequivocally acknowledged that the High Court is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual cases. As a caveat it may be stated that the High Court, while exercising its afore­stated jurisdiction ought to be circumspect. The discretion vested in the High Court is to be invoked carefully and judiciously for effective and timely administration of criminal justice system. This Court, nonetheless, does not recommend a complete hands off approach. Albeit, there should be interference, may be, in exceptional cases, failing which there is likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For example, when the contents of a complaint or the other purported material on record is a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes imperative upon the Court to prevent the abuse of process of law.” 8. Recently, coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr.MP(M) No. 129 of 2026, titled as Lagnesh Verma v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., has categorically held that order framing charge under SCST Act is not appealable order on account of its being intermediate order and as such, same can be laid challenge, if required by way criminal revision petition, but definitely not under Section 14 (A) of SCST Act. Relevant paras of the afore judgment read as under: “15. The other judgments, which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant have only interpreted that the “framing of charge”, if not to be construed as an “interlocutory order”, it can be said to be an “intermediate order”. None of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant had the occasion to deal with the issue to the effect that against the framing of charge, an appeal is maintainable. 16. Once the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that framing of charge cannot be construed as final order, the appeal is not maintainable. The aggrieved party can avail the remedy of revisional jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction of this Court under the BNSS or other laws if permissible. However, the appeal filed by the appellant is not maintainable against the order of framing the charge. 18. The aggrieved party can avail the remedy of revisional jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction of this Court under the BNSS or other laws if permissible. However, the appeal filed by the appellant is not maintainable against the order of framing the charge. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye’s case (supra) as well as in Sanjay Kumar Rai ‘s case (supra) had held that the High Court can entertain the petition either filed under Sections 397 or 482 of the Cr.P.C., but it has not held that the order of framing of charge can be questioned by way of an appeal. The other judgments cited are also not applicable and none of the judgments had dealt with the preposition that the appeal is maintainable against an order of framing the charge.” 9. Though, at this stage, Mr. Tomar, while inviting attention of this Court to judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 , argued that judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another. The meaning of the two words "final" and "interlocutory" has, therefore, to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, in Sanjay Kumar Rai and Lagnesh Verma (supra) have dealt with judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhu Limaye’s case. While interpreting its earlier judgment in Madhu Limaye’s case, Hon’ble Apex Court has clarified that order framing charge or refusing to discharge is neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are, therefore, not affected by the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC. Hence for the discussion made herein above as well as law taken into consideration, this Court is convinced that present petition is maintainable. 10. Next question, which needs consideration is “whether provisions contained under Section Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) could be attracted in the given facts and circumstances or not?” Before ascertaining answer to the aforesaid question, this court deems it necessary to take note of aforesaid provision of law. 11. 10. Next question, which needs consideration is “whether provisions contained under Section Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) could be attracted in the given facts and circumstances or not?” Before ascertaining answer to the aforesaid question, this court deems it necessary to take note of aforesaid provision of law. 11. Sections 3 (1)(f) and 3 (1) (g) of the SCST Act, reads as under: “(f) Wrongfully occupies or cultivates any land, owned by, or in the possession of or allotted to, or notified by any competent authority to be allotted to, a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, or gets such land transferred; (g) Wrongfully dispossesses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe from his land or premises or interferes with the enjoyment of his rights, including forest rights, over any land or premises or water or irrigation facilities or destroys the crops or takes away the produce therefrom.” 12. Conjoint reading of both the aforesaid provisions of law clearly reveals that a person, who is not a member of SC/ST community if wrongfully occupies or cultivates any land owned by or in the possession of any member of the SCST shall be liable to be prosecuted under Section 3 and shall be punished for imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to five years with fine. 13. In nutshell, case of the complainant as came to be reported to the police is that petitioners herein, who are admittedly member of the higher caste, wrongfully interfered/dispossessed them from land comprising Khata No.97, Khatauni III, Khasra No. 16763, measuring 01 kanal, 15 marla (in short “suit land”) situate at village Jahu Khurd, Tappa Mewa, Tehsil Bhoranj, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh. 14. 14. Though police after having completed the investigation presented challan in the court of learned Special Judge, Hamirpur, stating therein that petitioners herein being members of upper caste have interfered with the possession of the complainant Amar Singh, who is member of the scheduled caste community and as such, are required to be charged under Section Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the Act, but in nutshell, case of the petitioners herein is that suit land, which is being claimed to be interfered was never in the possession of the complainant, rather it has been categorically held by civil Court that predecessor­in­ interest of the petitioners Mauji Ram was in possession of the same and thereafter, petitioners are in possession of the same. 15. Mr. Atharv Sharma, Advocate, while making this court peruse judgment dated 23.5.1997, passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge Hamirpur (Annexure P­1), titled as Amar Singh v. Geeta Devi, vehemently argued that complainant Amar Singh had filed civil suit for permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining the defendant from interfering in the suit land. He states that since predecessor­in­interest of the petitioners Mr. Mauji Ram, was one of the defendants, it is quite apparent that at the time of filing of the suit, complainant was never in possession of the suit land. He states that though afore suit was decreed for getting vacant possession of the suit land from defendant No.2 i.e. predecessor­in­interest of the petitioners, but it was specifically ordered that defendant No.2 Mauji Ram will not be ejected from the suit land except in due course of law. 16. It also emerges from the pleadings that afore order passed by the learned trial court was laid challenge in the appeal before Additional District Judge, Hamirpur, by way of Civil Appeal No. 26/1997 RBT No. 45 of 2002, which came to be upheld vide judgment dated 31.8.2017 (Annexure P­2). In the afore judgment, learned first appellate court set aside the judgment and decree dated 23.5.1997 with respect to relief of possession, as a result of which, suit of respondent No.2 was dismissed. Respondent laid challenge to afore judgment before this Court in RSA No.484 of 2017, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 27.9.2019 (Annexure P­3). In the afore judgment, learned first appellate court set aside the judgment and decree dated 23.5.1997 with respect to relief of possession, as a result of which, suit of respondent No.2 was dismissed. Respondent laid challenge to afore judgment before this Court in RSA No.484 of 2017, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 27.9.2019 (Annexure P­3). Most importantly, in the afore judgment, this Court came to the conclusion that sale deed, on the basis of which, respondent Amar Singh was claiming possession, was never proved in accordance with law. Interestingly, respondent/complainant laid challenge against the judgment dated 27.9.2019, in the Hon’ble Apex Court by way of SLP (c) No. 1152 of 2020, but same was withdrawn with liberty to file review before the High Court. Though respondent/complainant filed review petition praying therein to review judgment dated 27.9.2019 passed in RSA No. 484 of 2017, but same was also dismissed. Though Mr. Tomar, learned counsel appearing for the complainant fairly admitted factum with regard to finality attached to the judgment dated 27.9.2019 passed by this Court in RSA No. 484 of 2017, wherein admittedly, it came to be ruled that complainant never proved sale deed in accordance with law, thereby showing him to have purchased the suit land from Sh. Hem Raj, but he states that during investigation of FIR, which is subject matter of the present case, complainant produced sale deed as well as jamabandi, showing him to be owner of the suit land and as such, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the court below while charging the petitioners under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the SCST Act. He states that since at the time of registration of case, complainant was found to be owner of the land in question and he was also able to establish factum with regard to interference by the accused named in the FIR i.e. petitioners therein, court below rightly passed the impugned order. 17. He states that since at the time of registration of case, complainant was found to be owner of the land in question and he was also able to establish factum with regard to interference by the accused named in the FIR i.e. petitioners therein, court below rightly passed the impugned order. 17. Having scanned the material adduced on record, especially charge sheet under Section 173 of CrPC, presented by investigating agency, this court finds that though factum with regard to filing of the civil suit by the respondent/complainant as well as judgments passed thereupon uptill Hon’ble Apex Court was brought to the notice of learned Special Court at the time of framing of charge, but yet court below ignored the same and proceeded to frame the charge under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the SCST Act. 18. Though Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General representing the respondent­State attempted to argue that since investigating agency was able to find out during investigation that suit land was in the possession of the complainant and same was being interfered by the petitioners who are members of upper caste, there is no scope of interference in the impugned order, but this court is not persuaded to agree with aforesaid submission of learned Additional Advocate General as well as learned counsel appearing for the complainant for the reason that to invoke Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g), it is incumbent to prove ownership or possession of the person belonging to Scheduled Caste. Though in the case at hand, complainant belongs to Scheduled Caste, but as has been taken note herein above, complainant has been neither held to be owner nor in possession of the land in question by the competent court of law. Though learned trial Court had decreed the suit of the complainant, but learned first appellate court set aside the judgment of learned trial Court especially with regard to relief of possession. Subsequently, this Court in Regular Second Appeal having been filed by the complainant returned a categorical finding that respondent/complainant was not able to prove sale deed, on the basis of which, he was claiming himself to be owner of the suit land. Subsequently, this Court in Regular Second Appeal having been filed by the complainant returned a categorical finding that respondent/complainant was not able to prove sale deed, on the basis of which, he was claiming himself to be owner of the suit land. Since aforesaid finding returned by the learned first appellate court as well as this Court in proceedings as detailed herein above, has attained finality, on account of withdrawal of SLP filed by the petitioners, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioners that Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) could not have been attracted in the case at hand. Since respondent/complainant was unable to prove his ownership or possession qua the suit land in the competent court of law, mere production of sale deed or jamabandi during investigation by the police cannot be sufficient to conclude guilt, if any, of the petitioners under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g). Though Investigating Agency was aware of factum of passing of the judgments by the competent court of law as detailed herein above, but yet proceeded to present the challan under the afore provisions of law for petitioners’ having committed offence under Section Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) on the basis of sale deed and jamabandi, thereby showing the petitioners to be owner in possession of the suit land, however for the discussion made herein above, no case much less case under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) could have been registered against the petitioners. 19. This Court having taken note of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case is compelled to draw a conclusion that respondent, who admittedly belongs to Scheduled Caste community after his having failed to get relief in civil proceedings, has attempted to get similar relief by lodging criminal proceedings under SCST Act, which for the reasons stated herein above are not maintainable. Civil dispute, which otherwise stands concluded on account of dismissal of SLP filed at the by the respondent/complainant has been attempted to be re­opened by the complainant by filing criminal proceedings under the Act, which are not otherwise maintainable. 20. Civil dispute, which otherwise stands concluded on account of dismissal of SLP filed at the by the respondent/complainant has been attempted to be re­opened by the complainant by filing criminal proceedings under the Act, which are not otherwise maintainable. 20. In view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law taken into consideration, this Court, while holding present petition to be maintainable, is persuaded to conclude that court below has fallen in grave error while proceeding to frame charge against the petitioners under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the Act and as such, same needs to be interfered with. 21. Consequently, in view of the above, present petition is allowed and Order dated 12.9.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh in Session Trial No. 12/24 is quashed and set­aside. Present petition is disposed of along with pending applications, if any.