[2026:RJ-JP:6273] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2530/2026 Chief Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Nagaur. ----Petitioner Versus Jagdish Prasad Sain S/o Shri Indramal, Post-Conductor, R/o Narsinghpura Road, Pancholi Chauraha, Ramnagar, Alwar. ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Prateek Mathur with Mr. Utkarsh Dubey For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Order 10/02/2026 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner against the judgment dated 09.09.2025 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (for short, 'Tribunal'), whereby application under Section 33(2)(b) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act of 1947'), filed by the Chief Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Nagaur, has been dismissed. 2. It is stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that as the respondent-workman was wilfully absent from 20.10.1999 to 30.11.1999, charge-sheet under Clause 18 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers & Workshop Employees Standing Orders, 1965, was issued to him on 18.11.1999. Due opportunity of hearing was given to the workman and after conducting enquiry the order of dismissal from service was passed on 29.03.2000. Thereafter, petitioner-Corporation filed application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 after making necessary compliance of serving the order to the workman along with one month's notice pay as well as of filing the application on the same day before the [2026:RJ-JP:6273] (2 of 4) [CW-2530/2026] Tribunal. However, vide order dated 20.02.2024, the enquiry held by the petitioner-Corporation was declared to be unfair and improper. Thereafter, opportunity was granted to the petitioner- Corporation to prove the charges before the Tribunal. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner-Corporation produced sufficient evidence before the Tribunal to prove that the respondent-workman was wilfully absent from 20.10.1999 to 30.11.1999 and was also habitual absentee in the past also, as he was charged with the similar allegations. He also submits that the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 are summary proceedings and the Labour Court cannot meticulously examine the evidence treating it to be reference proceedings under the Act of 1947. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that even otherwise it is a settled proposition of law that in departmental proceedings, decision is taken by the employer on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and not by proving the charges beyond reasonable doubts. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that merely on account of the fact that the enquiry was held to be improper and unfair by the Tribunal, the decision earlier taken by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be substituted by giving perverse and irrational findings by not giving cogent reasons for disbelieving the evidence laid by the petitioner-Corporation. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of John D'Souza vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation reported in 2019 (18) SCC 47 in support of his contention that [2026:RJ-JP:6273] (3 of 4) [CW-2530/2026] the scope of proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 is quite limited and learned Tribunal has transgressed his powers while passing the judgment dated 09.09.2025. 7. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 8. It has not been disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner that while question of fairness, order dated 20.02.2024 was passed by the Tribunal, whereby the enquiry earlier conducted by the petitioner-Corporation was held to be improper and unfair, it has also not been disputed that the order dated 20.02.2024 was not challenged by the petitioner-Corporation. 9. Thereafter as per the liberty granted by the Tribunal, both the parties led evidence which has been meticulously considered by the Tribunal. 10. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Labour Court could not have taken independent evidence by ignoring the evidence earlier collected by Disciplinary Authority of petitioner-Corporation, is totally misconceived and against the Scheme of the Act. It is a settled proposition of law that as and when, on examining the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947, learned Labour Court and Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the enquiry conducted by the employer was not proper, the learned Labour Court is bound to give opportunity to both the parties to lead the evidence. As such, no error or mistake have been committed by the Tribunal in permitting the parties to the petition to lead evidence in support of their respective cases. 11. This Court has also examined that order dated 09.09.2025, wherein, there is a reference of two medical [2026:RJ-JP:6273] (4 of 4) [CW-2530/2026] certificates (W1 & W2) produced by the respondent-workman in order to show that only on account of his illness, the respondent- workman could not attend his duties from 18.11.1999 to 30.11.1999. Merely, absence of an employee is not sufficient to penalize him and the misconduct comes into picture only where his absence was wilful in nature. In the facts and circumstances of the case, where medical certificate was produced and duly proved by the respondent-workman, there was no legal basis for treating such absence to be wilful in nature. The witness produced by the petitioner-Corporation also could not prove the charges by placing the supporting material on record. Hence, under these circumstances, sound and rationale finding has been given by the Tribunal to hold that since the petitioner-Corporation has failed to prove the charges, therefore, inflicting penalty of dismissal upon the respondent-workman was not valid and proper. 12. In the case of John D'Souza (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that the Labour Court or Tribunal while exercising their jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 are empowered to permit the parties to lead evidence in respect of the legality and propriety of the domestic enquiry held into the misconduct of a workman. Thus, the judgment relied upon by the petitioner is of no help to the petitioner-Corporation. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, there is no scope for interference in the order dated 09.09.2025 passed by the Tribunal and the writ petition filed by the petitioner is hereby dismissed. 14. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. (ANAND SHARMA),J DAKSH/22