Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:17518-DB p. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 6046 of 2025 In / And L.P.A. No. 400 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. The Secretary, Home Affairs, Government of Jharkhand at Project Bhawan, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. 3. The D.I.G. (Jail), Ranchi at Hotwar, P.O. Hotwar, P.S. Khelgaon, District Ranchi. 4. The Jail Superintendent, Birsa Munda Central Jail, at Hotwar, P.O. Khelgaon, P.S. Khelgaon, District Ranchi. ... Appellants/Respondents Versus Anirudha Tiwari, aged about 61 years, son of Late Kanhaiya Tiwari, resident of Village- Fasar, P.O. & P.S. Fasar, District Aurangabad (Bihar), at present residing at Birsa Munda Central Jail, at Hotwar, P.O. & P.S. Khelgaon, District Ranchi. ... Respondent/Petitioner --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellants: Mr Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, A.C. to S.C.-IV For the Respondent: Ms Ganga Kumari Kachhap, Advocate Mr Samrat Sinha, Advocate --------- Reserved on: 15.06.2026 Pronounced on: 17/06/2026 Per M. S. Sonak, C.J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 356 days in filing the appeal against the judgment and order dated 09.10.2023 made by the learned Single Judge, disposing of W.P.(S) No. 07 of 2023. 3. From a perusal of the averments in the I.A., no case whatsoever has been made out to explain this inordinate delay. All that the application refers to is the routine movement of files to and from Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:17518-DB p. 2 different authorities and departments of the Government. The delay is further sought to be excused on the ground of seeking legal opinion, followed by another routine round of administrative vetting and departmental approval. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that government functionaries operate within multi-layered decision-making processes requiring approvals at successive stages. However, this submission is ex facie untenable as the prolonged delay in filing the appeal is plainly indicative of a casual approach, entirely unsupported by any material demonstrating diligent steps to expedite the matter. This administrative inertia fails to explain, let alone justify, the inordinate 356-day delay. 5. Furthermore, it was argued by the ld. Advocate of the respondent that, although the impugned judgment was passed on 09.10.2023, the appellants did not take any steps towards filing the appeal for more than three months, and it was only on 24.01.2024 that the matter was first forwarded to the Home, Jail and Disaster Management Department, Government of Jharkhand, for obtaining the opinion of the Finance Department. We find merit in the respondent’s submission that the appellants could not have remained passive and awaited a representation from the petitioner before the Inspector General, Prison, before taking steps towards filing an appeal. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:17518-DB p. 3 6. Moreover, we have noted that certain periods of delay remain inadequately explained. One such instance is reflected in para 8 of the I.A., wherein the appellants state that it took approximately 2 months to prepare and receive the draft memo of appeal. No cogent explanation has been offered for the same. 7. It is well settled that applications filed with utmost casualness and based on routine bureaucratic delays cannot be accepted as showing any sufficient cause. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the State has a good case on the merits. However, nothing has been shown to prima facie support such a submission and, in any event, the merits of the case alone cannot justify condonation of a delay of 356 days in the absence of sufficient cause. 8. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563. In the said case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government departments staffed with legally conversant personnel cannot claim any special or extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of dates of file movement, without explaining the reason for each interval, does not constitute sufficient cause. The Court categorically rejected the excuse of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology, particularly in the age of modern technology, and held that delay cannot be condoned mechanically solely because the applicant is the Government or a wing thereof. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:17518-DB p. 4 9. Moreover, in the recent past, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that the status of a litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when condoning gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed non-deliberate, and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial justice cannot override the bar of limitation. The Hon’ble Court further held that before adverting to the merits, the court must first assess the bona fides of the explanation offered; merits may be taken into aid only where the explanation and the opposition are evenly balanced. Reiterating that limitation is grounded in public policy and equity, the Hon’ble Court held that delay cannot be excused as a matter of generosity. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:17518-DB p. 5 impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. 12. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.” 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:17518-DB p. 6 cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never-ending paraphernalia. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:17518-DB p. 7 obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 17. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown and, consequently, we dismiss this I.A., which seeks condonation of the delay of 356 days in filing the accompanying appeal. 18. As a consequence, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein do not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 17, 2026 N.A.F.R. Manoj/Cp.2 Uploaded on 17.06.2026