Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2026 DAILYLAW 16806 (HP)

Gurmeet Singh @ Meeta v. State of H. P.

2026-01-01

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 11.4.2014, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour District at Nahan, (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 21.2.2013 and order of sentence dated 25.2.2013, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmour District at Nahan (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 353, 332 and 290 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant HHC Pradeep Kumar (PW6), Constable Jagat Singh (PW9), HHG Balak Ram (PW2) and HHG Mohan Singh (not examined) were on a patrolling duty on 22.1.2008. They reached near the shop of Kulveer Singh (PW5) located in Mohalla Govindgarh, at about 6.30 PM. Gurmeet Singh (accused) and another person were consuming liquor outside the shop. Pradeep Kumar (PW6) advised the accused not to consume liquor at a public place. Gurmeet Singh became infuriated, caught hold of the informant’s uniform, and slapped the informant. The informant sustained injuries to his neck. The button of his shirt was torn. Another person ran away from the spot. Surinder Kumar (PW1) rescued the informant from the accused. The matter was reported to the police. An entry No. 10 (Ex.PW3/B) was registered in the Police Station. ASI Ram Lal (PW8) went to the spot to verify the correctness of the information. The informant made a statement (Ex.PW6/A) which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW8/A) was registered. ASI Ram Nath (PW8) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW8/C). He seized the liquor bottle (Ex. P3) bearing Mark ‘Lal Kila’, one broken button (Ex. P2) of the uniform, and two empty glasses (Ex. P4) vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). He sealed the bottle with seal ‘M’. He put the broken button into a cloth parcel and sealed the parcel with seal ‘T’. He seized the shirt (Ex. P1) vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). He put the shirt in a cloth parcel and sealed the parcel with a seal impression ‘T’. P4) vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). He sealed the bottle with seal ‘M’. He put the broken button into a cloth parcel and sealed the parcel with seal ‘T’. He seized the shirt (Ex. P1) vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). He put the shirt in a cloth parcel and sealed the parcel with a seal impression ‘T’. He obtained the seal impression ‘M’ (Ex.PW8/F) and seal impression ‘T’ (Ex.PW8/E) on separate pieces of cloth and handed over the seals to Balak Ram. He filed an application (Ex.PW8/M) for conducting the medical examination of the informant. Dr S.M. Ali (PW4) medically examined the victim and found that he had sustained multiple injuries which could have been caused by beating. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW4/A). ASI Ram Nath seized the informant’s posting and transfer orders (Ex.PW7/A and Ex.PW7/B). He recorded the statements of the remaining witnesses as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 353, 332 and 290 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove its case. Surinder Kumar (PW1) and Kulveer Singh (PW5) did not support the prosecution’s case. HHG Balak Ram (PW2) and Jagat Singh (PW9) are the official witnesses to the incident. Constable Jagjeet Singh (PW3) proved the entry in the daily diary. Dr S.M. Ali (PW4) medically examined the informant. Pradeep Kumar (PW6) is the informant/victim. Sudhir Chauhan (PW7) produced the appointment and posting orders. ASI Ram Nath (PW8) investigated the matter. ASI Kuldeep Singh (PW10) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They stated that they were innocent and were falsely implicated. They did not present any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was corroborated by other official witnesses. The mere fact that independent witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case was not sufficient to discard it. It was suggested to the official witnesses that the accused were falsely implicated because no case of consuming liquor could be made out under the Excise Act. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was corroborated by other official witnesses. The mere fact that independent witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case was not sufficient to discard it. It was suggested to the official witnesses that the accused were falsely implicated because no case of consuming liquor could be made out under the Excise Act. This suggestion proved the prosecution’s case that the accused were consuming liquor, and they were asked not to do so by the police. The recovery of bottles, glasses and a broken button from the spot supported the prosecution’s version that the accused were consuming liquor outside the shop of Kulveer and had beaten the informant. The statement of Dr S.M. Ali corroborated the informant’s version regarding the infliction of injuries. Minor contradictions in the statements were not sufficient to doubt the prosecution’s case. The informant was proved to be a public servant who was discharging his official duties. The identity of the other accused was not proved. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused Gurmeet Singh of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 332 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and, in case of default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for the commission of the aforesaid offence. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour District at Nahan, HP (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the informant’s testimony was corroborated by the official witnesses and the medical evidence. The fact that the witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case was not sufficient to doubt it. Minor contradictions in the statements could not be used to discard the prosecution’s case. Learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the evidence on record. The independent witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case. The testimonies of official witnesses contradicted each other in material particulars. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the evidence on record. The independent witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case. The testimonies of official witnesses contradicted each other in material particulars. Learned Trial Court had imposed a harsh sentence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 10. Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed on record. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars. The possibility of the self-infliction of injuries could not be ruled out. Learned Trial Court had imposed a harsh sentence, and the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was wrongly denied to the petitioner/accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set-aside. 11. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the accused suggested to the prosecution witnesses that no case under the Excise Act could be made against the accused, and a false case was made against him. This suggestion corroborated the prosecution’s version that the accused were consuming liquor, and they were prevented by the police officials from doing so. The learned Courts below have concurrently held that the prosecution’s case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10. It was observed at page 207:- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, Para 5) “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. The informant Pradeep Kumar (PW6) stated that he was on patrolling duty and he saw the accused Gurmeet Singh and Harbhajan Singh consuming liquor outside the shop of Kulveer Singh. He asked them as to why they were consuming liquor in the open. He tried to seize the bottle and the glasses. The accused caught hold of his neck and pushed him. The accused also slapped him. He sustained injuries on his neck, and the button of his shirt was torn. He stated in his cross-examination that he started from the Police Post at 5.00 PM. He reached Mohalla Govindgarh at 6.30 PM. He did not have the mobile at the time of the incident. Many people usually stand outside the meat shop. The shop of Kulveer was shut, and no inquiry was made from him. Gurmeet Singh was sitting outside the shop. The movement of the traffic was not obstructed. No inquiry was made in his presence. He knew Gurmeet before the incident. He denied that he wanted to file a case under the Excise Act, but no case was made out for one bottle; hence, he falsely implicated the accused. 19. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the suggestion made to this witness in the cross-examination that the informant Pradeep wanted to register a case under the Excise Act, but no case for the possession of one bottle could be made, established the presence of the accused and informant on the spot and the fact that the accused was consuming liquor in a public place. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness can be taken into consideration while determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed at page 382:- “34. According to the learned counsel, such suggestions could be a part of the defence strategy to impeach the credibility of the witness. The proof of guilt required of the prosecution does not depend on the satisfaction made to a witness. 35. In Tarun Bora v. State of Assam [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568], a three-judge Bench of this Court was dealing with an appeal against the order passed by the Designated Court, Guwahati, in TADA Sessions case wherein the appellant was convicted under Section 365IPC read with Sections 3(1) and 3(5) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. 36. In Tarun Bora case [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568], this Court, while considering the evidence on record, took note of a suggestion which was put to one of the witnesses and considering the reply given by the witness to the suggestion put by the accused, concluded that the presence of the accused was admitted. We quote with profit the following observations made by this Court in paras 15, 16 and 17, respectively, as under: (Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568, SCC pp. 43-44) “15. The witness further stated that during the assault, the assailant accused him of giving information to the army about the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). He further stated that on the third night, he was carried away blindfolded on a bicycle to a different place, and when his eyes were opened, he could see his younger brother Kumud Kakati (PW 2) and his wife Smt Prema Kakati (PW 3). The place was Duliapather, which is about 6-7 km away from his Village, Sakrahi. The witness identified the appellant, Tarun Bora, and stated that it was he who took him in an Ambassador car from the residence of Nandeswar Bora on the date of the incident. 16. The place was Duliapather, which is about 6-7 km away from his Village, Sakrahi. The witness identified the appellant, Tarun Bora, and stated that it was he who took him in an Ambassador car from the residence of Nandeswar Bora on the date of the incident. 16. In cross-examination, the witness stated as follows: ‘Accused Tarun Bora did not blind my eyes, nor did he assault me.’ 17. This part of the cross-examination is suggestive of the presence of the accused, Tarun Bora, in the whole episode. This will suggest the presence of the accused, Tarun Bora, as admitted. The only denial is that the accused did not participate in blindfolding the eyes of the witness, nor did he assault him.” 37. In Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1987) 2 SCC 34 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 256, this Court was dealing with an appeal against the judgment of the High Court affirming the order of the Sessions Judge whereby the appellant and three other persons were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34IPC. While reappreciating the evidence on record, this Court noticed that in the cross- examination of PW 4 Sube Singh, a suggestion was made with regard to the colour of the shirt worn by one of the accused persons at the time of the incident. This Court, taking into consideration the nature of the suggestion put by the defence and the reply, arrived at the conclusion that the presence of the accused, namely, Dharam Vir, was established on the spot at the time of the occurrence. We quote the following observations made by this Court in paras 8 and 9, respectively, as under (SCC p. 36) “8. PW 3, Bhagat Singh, stated in his examination-in- chief that he had identified the accused at the time of the occurrence. But curiously enough, he was not cross- examined as to how and in what manner he could identify the accused, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge. No suggestion was also given to him that the place was dark and that it was not possible to identify the assailants of the deceased. 9. In his cross-examination, PW 4 Sube Singh stated that the accused, Dharam Vir, was wearing a white shirt. It was suggested to him on behalf of the accused that Dharam Vir was wearing a cream-coloured shirt. 9. In his cross-examination, PW 4 Sube Singh stated that the accused, Dharam Vir, was wearing a white shirt. It was suggested to him on behalf of the accused that Dharam Vir was wearing a cream-coloured shirt. In answer to that suggestion, PW 4 said it is not correct that Dharam Vir, the accused, was wearing a shirt of a cream colour and not a white colour at that time.’ The learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed that the above suggestion at least proves the presence of the accused Dharam Vir on the spot at the time of occurrence.” 38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross- examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client. 39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except for the concession on a point of law. As a legal proposition, we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner.” 20. Therefore, the suggestion made to the witness can be taken into consideration while evaluating the evidence, and there is no infirmity in considering the suggestion made to the witnesses. 21. The informant’s testimony is duly corroborated by the statement (Ex.PW6/A), which was recorded at 7.25 PM within an hour of the incident. The statement contains the details of the incident in the same manner as they have been deposed by the informant on oath, and the statement provides valuable corroboration to the informant’s testimony. 22. His testimony is also corroborated by the statement of Dr S.M. Ali (PW4), who medically examined him on the date of the incident at 9.10 pm and found multiple injuries on his person. He noticed the injury on the lower, interior and middle part of the neck, which could have been caused by beating. 22. His testimony is also corroborated by the statement of Dr S.M. Ali (PW4), who medically examined him on the date of the incident at 9.10 pm and found multiple injuries on his person. He noticed the injury on the lower, interior and middle part of the neck, which could have been caused by beating. He admitted in his cross-examination that the injury could be caused by a fall; however, that is an alternative hypothesis and will not make the prosecution’s case suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395 : 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404: “22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 23. Further, the learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that a person falling on a hard surface would sustain injuries on his face and other parts of the body and not on the neck because the neck is protected by the face and the chest. Hence, the absence of injuries on the face and chest would make it difficult to rely upon the cross-examination of this witness that the injury could have been caused by a fall on a hard surface. 24. HHG Balak Ram (PW2) also corroborated the informant’s testimony. Hence, the absence of injuries on the face and chest would make it difficult to rely upon the cross-examination of this witness that the injury could have been caused by a fall on a hard surface. 24. HHG Balak Ram (PW2) also corroborated the informant’s testimony. He stated that the police party went to Mohalla Govindgarh and found that two persons were consuming liquor outside the shop of Kulveer Singh. Pradeep objected, and Gurmeet Singh became infuriated. He caught hold of the collar of the informant's shirt and slapped him. The button of the shirt was torn in the incident. The accused ran away from the spot. He stated in his cross-examination that he did not know the accused Gurmeet personally. The accused was sitting on the roadside, and the traffic was not blocked. Pradeep Kumar told the accused not to consume liquor in an open place. He denied that the accused had obstructed the informant in the discharge of his duty. 25. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. He is a police official, and the presumption regarding the correctness of the official acts applies to him. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly accepted his testimony. 26. Jagat Singh (PW9) stated that the police party reached Mohalla Govindgarh and found that Gurmeet Singh and another person were consuming liquor outside the shop of Kulveer. Pradeep told them not to do so. The accused quarrelled with Pradeep. The shirt and the scarf worn by the informant were torn in the incident. He stated in his cross-examination that he had told the police about the tearing of the scarf. He did not remember the places visited by the police party during the patrolling. He admitted that the people keep standing on the road at Mohalla Govindgarh. 27. The testimony of this witness corroborated the prosecution’s version. His statement that the scarf of the informant was torn is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case because it is a minor discrepancy, which is bound to come with time. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation difler from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 Cri LJ 1096: ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525 : AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP ( AIR 1959 SC 1012 )” 28. Testimonies of these witnesses are corroborated by the recovery of the bottle, glasses and a broken button from the spot. The police also recovered the informant’s shirt, from which the button was found missing. These circumstances corroborate the statements of the prosecution witnesses that the accused were consuming liquor and had assaulted the informant, breaking the button of his shirt. 29. Surinder Kumar (PW1) did not support the prosecution’s case. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that two persons were consuming liquor in Mohalla Govindgarh. The police objected and gave beatings to the informant. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 30. Kulveer Singh (PW5) also did not support the prosecution’s case. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that he saw the accused consuming liquor outside the shop. He denied that he objected, and the accused picked up a quarrel with him. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 30. Kulveer Singh (PW5) also did not support the prosecution’s case. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that he saw the accused consuming liquor outside the shop. He denied that he objected, and the accused picked up a quarrel with him. He denied that the police came to the spot and the accused gave beatings to the informant. He denied his previous statement recorded by the police. 31. ASI Ram Nath (PW8) investigated the matter. He specifically stated that he had recorded the statements of Surinder Kumar (Ex.PW8/G) and Kulveer Singh (Ex.PW8/H) as per their version. This was not challenged in the cross- examination and is deemed to be accepted as correct. Thus, the witnesses are shown to have made two inconsistent statements: one before the police and another before the Court. Both these statements cannot stand together. Hence, their credit has been impeached under Section 153(3) of the Indian Evidence Act, and no reliance can be placed upon their statements in the Court. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed: “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” 32. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman vs. State, 2002 (2) Shim LC 16 wherein it was observed: “12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross- examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Court observed: "It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony. 33. Thus, the testimonies of the independent witnesses cannot be used for discarding the prosecution’s case. 34. It was not disputed that the informant was a public servant. He was discharging his duties at the time of the incident. The accused Gurmeet Singh gave beatings to him while he was discharging his duties, and he sustained simple injuries. Therefore, he was rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 332 of the IPC. 35. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in not extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Siyasaran v. State of M.P., 1994 SCC OnLine SC 4 : 1995 Cri. L.J. 2126 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person for using force on a government servant. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and there is no error in not extending the benefit of the Act to the accused. 36. Learned Trial court imposed a sentence of six months and a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and there is no error in not extending the benefit of the Act to the accused. 36. Learned Trial court imposed a sentence of six months and a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. This cannot be said to be excessive, considering that a public servant was beaten at a public place while discharging his duties. Any leniency in such matters would encourage the people to take the law into their own hands, and it is impermissible to take a lenient view. Hence, no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court. 37. No other point urged. 38. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 39. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.