JUDGMENT : Ranjan Sharma, J. OMP(M) No.116 of 2024 National Highway Authority of India, being the applicant, has filed the instant application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of 289 days of delay in filing the accompanying Arbitration Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (yet to be registered, with filing No. ARB. A. 19789/2024); assailing order/judgment dated 31.05.2023 [Annexure A-1], [referred to as the Impugned Order], passed by Learned District Judge, Kullu, dismissing the application, CMP No. 24 of 2023 filed in Section 34 proceedings, titled as National Highways Authority of India versus Smt. Salochna Vaidya & Ors., wherein, the belated challenge to the Award passed by the Learned Arbitrator was held as non-entertainable, being time-barred. FACTUAL MATRIX SETUP BY APPLICANT-NHAI: 2. Applicant, National Highway Authority of India, has set up a case that consequent upon the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings, Learned Divisional Commissioner Mandi, being the Arbitrator passed an Award No 1103/2017 on 30.07.2022. Feeling aggrieved, NHAI assailed the Award dated 30.07.2022 before Learned District Judge, Kullu, though belatedly, in proceedings under Section 34 on 24.03.2023 alongwith an application for condonation of delay (i.e. CMP No 24 of 2026) which was dismissed on 30.05.2023, Annexure A-1. The applicant-NHAI assailed the order dated 30.05.2023 by filing an appeal under Section 37 alongwith present application [OMP(M) No. 116 of 2024] with the prayer to condone the delay and to hear the appeal. 2(i). Perusal of application for condonation of delay states that copy of the order/judgment dated 30.05.2023 [Annexure A-1] passed by the Learned District Judge was applied for by counsel for Applicant-NHAI on 03.06.2023 and the same was attested on same day. It is averred that the Applicant–NHAI was never intimated about the disposal of the case and it was on closing of financial year 2023, that the Applicant–NHAI made inquiries about case pendency from its Counsels in Himachal Pradesh and it was on 21.03.2024, that it transpired that some other matters were decided but their outcome was never intimated to the applicant-NHAI by its counsel, namely M/s M.V. Kini & Co and due to inefficiency of the aforesaid law firm, the work was assigned to M/s Nishaank Matto & Associates vide letter dated 20.09.2023 (Annexure A-2). It is averred that in this situation, all the cases were withdrawn from the earlier law firm, M/s. M.V. Kini & Co. It is averred that in this situation, all the cases were withdrawn from the earlier law firm, M/s. M.V. Kini & Co. on 26.03.2024 (Annexure A-3). It is averred that the applicant finally procured the records on 09.04.2024 and thereafter sought legal opinion and the legal opinion was remitted to Regional Office and the thereafter, the matter was examined at various levels, when, it was decided to challenge the order dated 30.05.2023 and the Award dated 30.07.2022. It is averred that after receiving the decision to assail the order, the applicant-NHAI transmitted the papers to present counsel on 25.04.2024 and the appeal was prepared and was filed before this Court on 14.06.2024. It is averred that certified copy of the orders dated 31.05.2023 got misplaced in transit and fresh copy of orders was applied for by the Applicant–NHAI. It is further averred that this Court had entertained another Arbitration Appeal No, 30/2024, in which Award was stayed by this Court on 23.04.2024 and the case of the applicant-NHAI was similar. In this backdrop, the Applicant-NHAI submitted that the delay of 289 days in filing the accompanying appeal under Section 37, being bonafide, not intentional and beyond the control of Applicant-NHAI, may kindly be condoned and accompanying appeal, may kindly be accepted, after condoning the delay. STAND OF RESPONDENT(S)-NON-APPLICANTS: 3. Upon listing of the instant application, [OMP(M) No 116 of 2024], before this Court and based on office report that there was delay of 289 days in filing the accompanying appeal under Section 37 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act; this Court issued notice to Non-applicants-Respondents 1 to 3 on 09.04.2024, with the direction to file reply to this application. 3(i). Pursuant to issuance of notice, on this application, the Non-Applicants/Respondents filed a reply stating that delay of 289 days in filing accompanying appeal may not be condoned as the grounds spelt out by the Applicant-NHAI for seeking condonation of delay does not reveal any sufficient cause and no satisfactory cogent and convincing reasons for condoning the delay have been spelt out. It is averred that the inaction and negligence of the Applicant-NHAI, has led to belated filing of instant appeal. In this backdrop, the application was opposed, with the prayer to dismiss the same. ANALYSIS ON APPLICATION FOR DELAY: 4. It is averred that the inaction and negligence of the Applicant-NHAI, has led to belated filing of instant appeal. In this backdrop, the application was opposed, with the prayer to dismiss the same. ANALYSIS ON APPLICATION FOR DELAY: 4. Taking into account the entirety of facts and circumstances and the material on record, this Court is of the considered view, that instant application [OMP(M) No. 116 of 2024], seeking condonation of 289 days of delay in filing the accompanying appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act is devoid of any merit, for the reason; firstly, the plea in the application that though Impugned order/judgment dated 31.05.2023 (Annexure A-1) was passed by Learned District Judge, Kullu but it was only on 21.03.2024 that the Applicant-NHAI came to know that other cases were decided whereas fate of the case filed by the Respondent(s)-Non-Applicants was not intimated by its Counsel cannot be accepted, for the reason, that a litigant (NHAI) was supposed to be vigilant in tracking its cases and once applicant-NHAI had remained inactive, negligent and non-vigilant in pursuing its rights and remedies and therefore, this Court cannot come to the aid of the applicant so as to condone its lethargy, negligence, indolence and inaction in view of the settled principle of “Vigilantibus non-dormientibus jura subveniunt”; and secondly, the material on record establishes that even after receiving certified copy of orders dated 31.05.2023 on 03.06.2023, the applicant-swung into action after a lapse of about 3½ months on 20.09.2023 (Annexure A-2) by taking steps for withdrawing the cases from earlier law firm. The inaction and lethargy further precipitated as the applicant claims to have procured the records after a delay of more than 6 months on 09.04.2024 and even after procuring the records on 09.04.2024, the matter was delayed by more than 2 months by filing the instant application alongwith an appeal on 14.06.2024. The inaction and lethargy further precipitated as the applicant claims to have procured the records after a delay of more than 6 months on 09.04.2024 and even after procuring the records on 09.04.2024, the matter was delayed by more than 2 months by filing the instant application alongwith an appeal on 14.06.2024. The aforesaid facts clearly reveal palpable inaction, negligence and lethargy on the part of the applicant in pursuing its rights/remedy, and unfettered free play cannot be permitted to be made the basis for condoning delay; and thirdly, the plea of the applicant-NHAI that certified copy of the orders dated 31.05.2023 were misplaced and fresh copy was applied appears to be a “cock and bull story”, for the reason, that Annexure A-1, [at pages 14 and 25 of paper book] is the same certified copy of the orders dated 31.05.2023 which was received by applicant on 03.06.2023. Distorted, untrue and misleading facts lacking bonafides cannot be permitted to be set-up as a plea for condoning the delay; and fourthly, the plea of the applicant-NHAI that the matter was required to be examined at various levels is without any force as “bureaucratic shackles” cannot form the basis for exercising discretion for condoning delay; and fifthly, the plea that applicant acquired knowledge about passing of the orders dated 31.05.2023 only on 21.03.2024 appears to be totally concocted and fanciful, when, the Respondents-Non Applicants had filed an execution petition under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act i.e. Execution Petition No 624 of 2023, titled as Rakesh Vaidya & Anr vs National Highway Authority of India seeking execution of Award dated 30.07.2022 and orders dated 31.05.2023 and copy of execution petition was supplied to Learned Counsel for NHAI on 20.07.2023 and upon listing of the said petition, this Court issued notice to NHAI on 08.08.2023 with directions to file objections to execution and on 31.10.2023 further time was extended for filing reply and even thereafter the matter was listed on various dates on 08.12.2023 and thereafter. These facts establish that NHAI had knowledge of the passing of orders dated 31.05.2023, on filing of aforesaid execution petition on 20.07.2023 and then on listing of the matter on 08.08.2023, then on 31.10.2023 and thereafter the false plea which has been set-up in instant proceeding “as an excuse” lack bonafides coupled with negligence, inaction and lethargy of NHAI does not constitutes sufficient cause for condoning delay; and sixthly, even the rights which had crystallized in favour of the Respondent(s)-non-Applicant(s) by virtue of orders dated 31.05.2023 cannot be brushed aside, so as to give premium and leverage to the applicant-NHAI for its own inaction, inactiveness, indolence and non-vigilant ; and lastly, the plea for condoning delay cannot sustain in view of the principles mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of Salil Dutta versus MC Private Limited, that fault of an advocate cannot be recognized as giving an absolute immunity, but depending on facts of each case, things can be eased out in case of a rustic and innocent litigant, which is not the situation in this case. The plea set up asserting lack of knowledge cannot be a ground for condoning delay, when, the applicant-NHAI had knowledge of the passing of the orders dated 31.05.2023 on filing of and then on listing of Execution Petition before this Court and setting up a concocted and fanciful story, on incorrect and distorted facts cannot be condoned in view of the principles enunciated in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee versus Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors (2013) 12 SCC 649 . The inaction and negligence and bonafides, when, the delay was neither properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained cannot be a ground for condoning the delay as mandated in the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors versus State Of Haryana & Ors, (2014) 11 SCC 351 . Laxity on the part of applicant in not asserting his right and in allowing the cause to drift away by acquiescing in acts, therefore, the lapsed or dead cause cannot be permitted to be rekindled or revived in view of the principle outlined in Mrinmoy Maity versus Chandra Koley & Ors (2024) 15 SCC 215 . The applicant having lost its right due to its inaction for long, gives rise to presumption of deliberate delay. The applicant having lost its right due to its inaction for long, gives rise to presumption of deliberate delay. The bonafides of explanation offered by the applicant seeking condonation of delay has to be tested at first instance. Want of bonafides disentitle the applicant for condoning the delay, in view of the mandate of the Honble Supreme Court in H Guruswamy versus A Krishnaih since deceased through LRs, (2025) SCC Online SC 54. The plea of the applicant for condoning delay cannot be accepted merely as an act of generosity when, the pursuit of substantial justice cannot be invoked/applied at the cost of causing prejudice to Respondents-non-applicants in view of the principles enunciated in case of Thirunagalingam versus Lingeswaran & Anr (2025) SCC Online SC 1093. In view of the above discussion and based on the principles mandated by the Honble Supreme Court, this Court in fact of instant case, is not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to condone the delay of 289 days, for want of bonafides, for placing distorted facts, for having suppressed correct facts so as to give premium or leverage to the applicant-NHAI for its inaction, negligence, lethargy, indolence and acquiescence in pursuing its rights-remedies despite having knowledge of the passing of the orders dated 31.05.2023 on filing of execution petition by the Respondents-non applicants on 20.07.2023 and then on listing of the matter on 08.08.2023, then on 31.10.2023 and thereafter. Even the ‘sufficient cause, which is not based on proper, satisfactory and convincing explanation lacking bonafides is not liable to be condoned and “an excuse” set-up on wholly distorted, misleading, incorrect facts and by suppressing the true facts coupled with the grave inaction, negligence and lethargy warrants dismissing of application seeking condonation of 289 days of delay and in these circumstances, instant application for condoning delay in filing accompanying appeal is dismissed. ARBITRATION APPEAL No. OF 2024 [FILING NO. ARB. A. 19789 OF 2024, YET TO BE REGISTERED]: 5. NHAI having filed the accompanying appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, has assailing the order dated 31.05.2023 (Annexure A-1), passed by Learned District Judge, Kullu (HP), in CMP No. 24 of 2023 (NHAI vs. Smt. Salochna Vaidya & Ors.), dismissing objection(s) filed by NHAI in proceedings under Section 34 as not entertainable, being time-barred, in the following term: “7. In the case in hand, the award was passed on 30.07.2022 and as per applicant, they came to know about the award on 7.10.2022 and as per Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the prescribed period of three months to challenge the award expired on 6.1.2023. The applicant moved the present application for setting aside the award before this Court on 24.3.2023, after a time period mentioned in sub-section 3 of Section 34 of 1996 Act. 9…… In the present case the three months time period from the date of knowledge, i.e., 7.10.2022, as per the applicant, expired on 6.1.2023 and thereafter, maximum extendable period of 30 days, the time to move the application for setting aside the award was upto 6.2.2023, but the present application was moved by the applicant before this Court on 24.3.2023.” 6. Though this Court had disallowed the belatedly challenge to the judgment order dated 31.05.2023 [Annexure A-1], yet, at the insistence of Learned Counsel for NHAI, this Court proceeds to examine the validity of the impugned orders dated 31.05.2023, here-in-below. MANDATE OF LAW OF SUPREME COURT ON NON-CONDONABILITY OF 120 DAYS TIMELINE: 7. For appreciating the controversy, it is necessary to have a recap of the mandate of law, declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court as to whether the maximum period of 120 days for filing objections under Section 34 (3) read with proviso to Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 was condonable or not stands answered in the following cases: 7(i). (i). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India Versus Popular Construction Co., (2001) 7(ii). SCC 470, mandated that an application beyond 120 days as prescribed under provisio to Section 34(3) was not entertainable and was time-barred, in the following terms:- “10. This decision recognises that it is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be necessarily implied. As has been said in Hukum Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra. "If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act" 11. As has been said in Hukum Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra. "If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act" 11. Thus, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation for the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days was to be computed after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these sections meant that to that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended and the applicability of the other provisions, by necessary implication stood excluded. 12. As for as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the Award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result. 13. Apart from the language, 'express exclusion' may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law: "Even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation" 14. Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an Award is absolute and unextendable by Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need "to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process". The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need "to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process". This objective has found expression in Section 5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms : "5. Extent of judicial intervention.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matter governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part." 7(ii). The Honble Supreme Court has mandated that Section 5 of Limitation Act has no application to a petition filed under Section 34 of the Act, in Simplex Infrastructure Limited versus Union of India (2019) 2 SCC 455 , in the following terms :- “10. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides thus: “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.- Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. 18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 could be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is given to the respondent, there will still be a delay of 131 days in filing the application. That is beyond the strict timelines prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to breach a clear statutory mandate. 21. That is beyond the strict timelines prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to breach a clear statutory mandate. 21. Under the circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that in view of the period of limitation prescribed in Section 34(3), the learned Single Judge of the High Court was not justified in condoning the respondent’s delay of 514 days in filing the application. The judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta on 27-4-2016, in Union of India v. Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The petition under Section 34 stands dismissed on the ground that it is barred by limitation. There shall be no order as to costs.” 7(iii). Considering the issue of condonability beyond 120 days in filing an appeal under Section 37, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had mandated in N.V. International vs. State of Assam & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 109 , that the delay beyond 120 days was not condonable, in following terms:- “3. Having heard learned counsel for both sides, we may observe that the matter is no longer res integra. In SLP (C) No. 23155/2013 [Union of India vs. Varindera Const. Ltd., this Court, by its judgment and order dated 17.09.2018 held thus: “1. Heard the learned Counsel appearing of the parties. 2. By a judgment dated 19.04.2018 in Civil Appeal Nos. 3994-3995 of 2018 [Union of India vs. M/s Varindera Constructions Ltd. Etc.], this Court has in near identical facts and circumstances allowed the appeal of the Union of India in a proceeding arising from an Arbitral Award. 3. Ordinarily, we would have applied the said judgment to this case as well. However, we find that the impugned Division Bench judgment dated 10.04.2013 has dismissed the appeal filed by the Union of India on the ground of delay. The delay was found to be 142 days in filing the appeal and 103 days in refiling the appeal. 3. Ordinarily, we would have applied the said judgment to this case as well. However, we find that the impugned Division Bench judgment dated 10.04.2013 has dismissed the appeal filed by the Union of India on the ground of delay. The delay was found to be 142 days in filing the appeal and 103 days in refiling the appeal. One of the important points made by the Division Bench is that, apart from the fact that there is no sufficient cause made out in the grounds of delay, since a Section 34 application has to be filed within a maximum period of 120 days including the grace period of 30 days, an appeal filed from the self-same proceeding under Section 37 should be covered by the same drill. 4. Given the fact that an appellate proceeding is a continuation of the original proceeding, as has been held in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and Others vs. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and Others, AIR 1941 Federal Court 5, and repeatedly followed by our judgments, we feel that any delay beyond 120 days in the filing of an appeal under Section 37 from an application being either dismissed or allowed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 should not be allowed as it will defeat the overall statutory purpose of arbitration proceedings being decided with utmost despatch. 5. In this view of the matter, since even the original appeal was filed with a delay period of 142 days, we are not inclined to entertain these Special Leave Petitions on the facts of this particular case. The Special Leave Petitions stand disposed of accordingly. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.” 5) We may only add that what we have done in the aforesaid judgment is to add to the period of 90 days, which is provided by statute for filing of appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, a grace period of 30 days under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by following Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and Others (supra), as also having regard to the object of speedy resolution of all arbitral disputes which was uppermost in the minds of the framers of the 1996 Act, and which has been strengthened from time to time by amendments made thereto. The present delay being beyond 120 days is not liable, therefore, to be condoned.” 7(iv). The present delay being beyond 120 days is not liable, therefore, to be condoned.” 7(iv). While dealing with the scope of proviso to Section 34(3) it has been mandated that the period of 120 days [i.e. 3 months period and additional period of 30 days], is the outer period for laying a challenge to the Award in Section 34 proceedings and beyond the outer limit of 120 days, the period is neither extendable nor condonable by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Entertaining and permitting a challenge to the Award in Section 34 proceedings on the strength of application under Section 5 of Limitation Act shall defeat the legislative intent and shall defeat the object of finality by expeditious alternative disputes resolute system and shall render the legislative intent otiose and a petition filed under Section 34 beyond the period of limitation is liable to be dismissed as per the mandate of law of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Radha Bai & Others versus P. Ashok Kumar & Another (2019) 13 SCC 445 , in the following terms:- “32. Section 34(3) deserves careful scrutiny and its characteristics must be highlighted: 32.1 Section 34 is the only remedy for challenging an award passed under Part I of the Arbitration Act. Section 34(3) is a limitation provision, which is an inbuilt into the remedy provision. One does not have to look at the Limitation Act or any other provision for identifying the limitation period for challenging an Award passed under Part I of the Arbitration Act. 32.2 The time limit for commencement of limitation period is also provided in Section 34(3) i.e. the time from which a party making an application “had received the Arbitral Award” or disposal of a request under Section 33 for corrections and interpretation of the Award. 32.3 Section 34(3) prohibits the filing of an application for setting aside of an Award after three months have elapsed from the date of receipt of Award or disposal of a request under Section 33. Section 34(3) uses the phrase “an application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed”. The phrase “may not be made” is from the UNCITRAL Model Law and has been understood to mean “cannot be made”. The High Court of Singapore in ABC Co. Ltd v. XYZ Co. Section 34(3) uses the phrase “an application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed”. The phrase “may not be made” is from the UNCITRAL Model Law and has been understood to mean “cannot be made”. The High Court of Singapore in ABC Co. Ltd v. XYZ Co. Ltd, held: “The starting point of this discussion must be the Model Law itself. On the aspect of time, Article 34(3) is brief. All it says is that the application may not be made after the lapse of three months from a specified date. Although the words used are ‘may not’ these must be interpreted as ‘cannot’ as it is clear that the intention is to limit the time during which an award may be challenged. This interpretation is supported by material relating to the discussions amongst the drafters of the Model Law. It appears to me that the court would not be able to entertain any application lodged after the expiry of the three months period as Article 34 has been drafted as the all-encompassing, and only, basis for challenging an award in court. It does not provide for any extension of the time period and, as the court derives its jurisdiction to hear the application from the Article alone, the absence of such a provision means the court has not been conferred with the power to extend time” 32.4 The limitation provision in Section 34(3) also provides for condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5 of Limitation Act, the delay can only be condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient cause. The crucial phrase “but not thereafter” reveals the legislative intent to fix an outer boundary period for challenging an Award. 32.5 Once the time limit or extended time limit for challenging the arbitral award expires, the period for enforcing the award under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act commences. This is evident from the phrase “where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired”. There is an integral nexus between the period prescribed under Section 34(3) to challenge the Award and the commencement of the enforcement period under Section 36 to execute the Award. This is evident from the phrase “where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired”. There is an integral nexus between the period prescribed under Section 34(3) to challenge the Award and the commencement of the enforcement period under Section 36 to execute the Award. 33.2 The proviso to Section 34(3) enables a Court to entertain an application to challenge an Award after the three months period is expired, but only within an additional period of thirty dates, “but not thereafter”. The use of the phrase “but not thereafter” shows that the 120 days period is the outer boundary for challenging an Award. If Section 17 were to be applied, the outer boundary for challenging an Award could go beyond 120 days. The phrase “but not thereafter” would be rendered redundant and otiose. This Court has consistently taken this view that the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso of Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration Act are of a mandatory nature, and couched in negative terms, which leaves no room for doubt. (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Engineers & Anr., Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Marketing Ltd. And Anil kumar Jinabhai Patel (D) through LRs v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel & Ors. 36.1 First, the purpose of Arbitration Act was to provide for a speedy dispute resolution process. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reveal that the legislative intent of enacting the Arbitration Act was to provide parties with an efficient alternative dispute resolution system which gives litigants an expedited resolution of disputes while reducing the burden on the courts. Article 34(3) reflects this intent when it defines the commencement and concluding period for challenging an Award. This Court in Popular Construction Case highlighted the importance of the fixed periods under the Arbitration Act. We may also add that the finality is a fundamental principle enshrined under the Arbitration Act and a definitive time limit for challenging an Award is necessary for ensuring finality. If Section 17 were to be applied, an Award can be challenged even after 120 days. This would defeat the Arbitration Act’s objective of speedy resolution of disputes. The finality of award would also be in a limbo as a party can challenge an Award even after the 120 day period. If Section 17 were to be applied, an Award can be challenged even after 120 days. This would defeat the Arbitration Act’s objective of speedy resolution of disputes. The finality of award would also be in a limbo as a party can challenge an Award even after the 120 day period. 36.2 Second, extending Section 17 of Limitation Act to Section 34 would do violence to the scheme of the Arbitration Act. As discussed above, Section 36 enables a party to apply for enforcement of Award when the period for challenging an Award under S.34 has expired. However, if Section 17 were to be extended to Section 34, the determination of “time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award” in Section 36 will become uncertain and create confusion in the enforcement of Award. This runs counter to the scheme and object of the Arbitration Act. 36.3 Third, Section 34(3) reflects the principle of unbreakability. Dr. Peter Binder in International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions, 2nd Edn., observed: “An application for setting aside an award can only be made during the three months following the date on which the party making the application has received the award. Only if a party has made a request for correction or interpretation of the award under Art. 33 does the time limit of three months begin after the tribunal has disposed of the request. This exception from the three month time limit was subject to criticism in the Working group due to fears that it could be used as a delaying tactics. However, although “an unbreakable time limit for applications for setting aside” was sought as being desirable for the sake of “certainty and expediency” the prevailing view was that the words ought to be retained “since they presented the reasonable consequence of article 33”. According to this “unbreakability” of time limit and true to the “certainty and expediency” of the arbitral awards, any grounds for setting aside the award that emerge after the three month time limit has expired cannot be raised.” 42. In the context of Section 34, a party can challenge an award as soon as it receives the award. Once an award is received, a party has knowledge of the award and the limitation period commences. In the context of Section 34, a party can challenge an award as soon as it receives the award. Once an award is received, a party has knowledge of the award and the limitation period commences. The objecting party is therefore precluded from invoking Section 17(1)(b) and (d) once it has knowledge of the Award. Section 17(1)(a) and (c) of Limitation Act may not even apply, if they are extended to Section 34, since they deal with a scenario where the application is “based upon” the fraud of the respondent or if the application is for “relief from the consequences of a mistake”. Section 34 application is based on the award and not on the fraud of the respondent and does not seek the relief of consequence of a mistake. 44. In view of the above, we hold that once the party has received the Award, the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act commences. Section 17 of the Limitation Act would not come to the rescue of such objecting party.” 7(v). In the case of Chintels India Limited Versus Bhayana Builders Private Limited (2021) 4 SCC 602 , Three Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have reiterated that the timeline of three months is condonable by 30 days and beyond 120 days the period is neither extendable even by invoking Section 5 of Limitation Act. Special provisions contained in Section 34 override the general provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act. The provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act stands excluded by Section 34(3) of Act, in the following terms :- “11. A reading of section 34(1) would make it clear that an application made to set aside an award has to be in accordance with both sub-sections (2) and (3). This would mean that such application would not only have to be within the limitation period prescribed by sub-section (3), but would then have to set out grounds under sub-sections (2) and/or (2-A) for setting aside such award. This would mean that such application would not only have to be within the limitation period prescribed by sub-section (3), but would then have to set out grounds under sub-sections (2) and/or (2-A) for setting aside such award. What follows from this is that the application itself must be within time, and if not within a period of three months, must be accompanied with an application for condonation of delay, provided it is within a further period of 30 days, this Court having made it clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply and that any delay beyond 120 days cannot be condoned. (see State of Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Engineers at para 5). 18. Having so held, this Court then referred to and followed the judgment in Essar Constructions and the judgment contained in Union of India v. Jain and Associates, ultimately holding: “8. The decision in Popular Construction Co. case did not deal with specific issues in this case. In that decision it was held that in respect of “sufficient cause cases” the provisions of Section 34(3) of the Act which are special provisions relating to condonation of delay override the general provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the Limitation Act”). The position was reiterated in the Western Builders case [ (2006) 6 SCC 239 ] and also in Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. v. Custodian. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that Section 5 of the Limitation Act providing for condonation of delay is excluded by Section 34(3) of the Act.” 36. The order of this Court does not in any manner touch upon the reasoning of the Bombay High Court. On the contrary, this court refers to the judgment of this Court in Himachal Techno Engineers, which as has been held by us hereinabove, makes it clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded by section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and that no condonation of delay can take place beyond the period of 120 days. It is on this ground, citing the learned District Judge’s order, that this Court did not interfere. Consequently, it cannot be said that this Court approved of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Likewise, the reasoning contained in Radha Krishna Seth, does not commend itself to us. It is on this ground, citing the learned District Judge’s order, that this Court did not interfere. Consequently, it cannot be said that this Court approved of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Likewise, the reasoning contained in Radha Krishna Seth, does not commend itself to us. Both these judgments therefore do not state the law correctly and stand overruled.” 7(vi). In the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Limited Versus Maheshbhai Tinabhai Rathod and Others, (2022) 4 SCC 162 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that the maximum period of 120 days stipulated under Section 34(3) read with provisio to Section 34(3) for filing objections cannot be extended or condoned by invoking Section 5 of Limitation Act, in the following terms:- 9.3 The observations of this Court in different decisions relating to non-applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in condoning the delay and extending the limitation prescribed under Section 34 (3) of Act 1996 was taken note of by a bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court with approval, in Chintels (India) Ltd. v. Bhayana Biuilders (P) Ltd…. 10. In the above backdrop, a perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge indicates that as per the explanation put forth by the respondent herein, it was their case that the Arbitration Petition under Section 34 of Act 1996 filed on 4-1-2012 was on having knowledge of the award, which according to the respondent was on 15-11-2011 when notice in the execution petition was received. The affidavit in reply was noted by the learned Single Judge, as per which it was brought on record that the learned Arbitrator had dispatched the award dated 28-2-2011 on 15-03-2011 by making an inscription, ‘AWARD’, on the envelope, by regd. post acknowledgment due. The refusal to receive was endorsed by the postal authority on 23.03.2011. The postal remark in Gujarati “Lenavi Na Pade Che” (refused to accept) was noted by the learned Single Judge. In SCC OnLine Bom paras 9 and 10 of the order, the learned Single Judge has ascertained the factual position of the refusal made by the respondent and there being no denial on that front. In that light, the learned Single Judge concluded as hereunder: “17. In SCC OnLine Bom paras 9 and 10 of the order, the learned Single Judge has ascertained the factual position of the refusal made by the respondent and there being no denial on that front. In that light, the learned Single Judge concluded as hereunder: “17. The envelopes forwarded by the learned Arbitrator to the Petitioners, which are returned by the postal authorities to the Arbitrator on the ground that the Petitioners have refused to accept service of the same, are opened in Court and it is noted that the learned Arbitrator had forwarded signed copies of the award to the Petitioners. As stated hereinabove, the Petitioners have admitted the fact that they have refused to accept service of the envelopes containing copies of the Arbitral Award. Refusal of service is good service in law. In view thereof, the Petitioners are deemed to have been served with the signed copy of the award on 23-3-2011. The Petitioners have filed the Petition only on 2-1-2012 to 4-1-2012 i.e. after delay of about 197 days. The issue as to whether the provision of Section 34(3) of the Act, has the effect of excluding Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has in para 53 of its decision, categorically held that the provisions of Section 34(3) of the Act, has the effect of excluding Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.” 13. In the instant case where limitation is prescribed, the extent to which it can be condoned is circumscribed and it has been held by this Court that Section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable to condone the delay beyond the period presribed under Section 34(3) of Act 1996, the learned Division Bench was not justified in condoning the delay in a casual manner. The order dated 24-9-2012 is not sustainable, the same is therefore set aside and the order of learned Single Judge is restored.” 7(vii). The Honble Supreme Court has mandated in Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita Versus Walchandnagar Industries Limited (2023) 8 SCC 453 , that though Limitation Act may apply but so far as the provisions for assailing the Award is concerned, the timeline prescribed under provisio to Section 34(3) being a special provision has to prevail over general provisions of Limitation Act. The Honble Supreme Court has mandated in Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita Versus Walchandnagar Industries Limited (2023) 8 SCC 453 , that though Limitation Act may apply but so far as the provisions for assailing the Award is concerned, the timeline prescribed under provisio to Section 34(3) being a special provision has to prevail over general provisions of Limitation Act. Thus, an application for condoning the delay beyond 120 days i.e. prescribed period of 90 days and the extendable period of 30 days as provided under proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act, being a special provision is not condonable by applying general provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act. It has been mandated that applying Section 5 of Limitation Act, shall be contrary to the scheme and legislative intent of Arbitration Act, in the following terms :- “39. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the appellant that the judgment in Assam Urban has the effect of denying the parties to right to file their application for condonation in situation where the discretionary period expires during vacation and that such interpretation was incorrect inasmuch as it leaves parties at the mercy of “fortuitous circumstance”, it is submitted that such a submission is not tenable. It is submitted that the court vacations are notified well in advance and would not account to a fortuitous circumstance as alleged. It is submitted that on the date of receipt of award, the party would be well aware of the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act and ought to diligently secure its right. It is submitted that in the present case, having received the award on 24-8-2016, the appellant had a further period of 25 days after expiry of “prescribed period” and before commencement of the winter vacation of the trial court. However, the appellant-petitioner chose not to file its petition during this time and therefore, has to suffer for the inevitable consequences. 40. It is further submitted that right under Section 34 of the Arbitration act is a restricted right to challenge an award on extremely limited ground. The proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act further excludes the general power of the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and imposes a strict timeline for presentation of a petition under Section 34. The proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act further excludes the general power of the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and imposes a strict timeline for presentation of a petition under Section 34. In such circumstances, acceptance of the appellant’s argument will have the effect of providing an unduly enlarged time period (beyond the statutory 30-day discretionary period) for delayed presentation of a petition under Section 34, which would be contrary to the scheme and intent of the Arbitration Act.” 54. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the appellant that the Limitation Act shall not be applicable to the proceedings under the Arbitration Act is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance. Section 43(1) of the Arbitration Act specifically provides that Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceeding in Court. However, as observed and held by this Court in the case of Assam Urban, Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable to the matters of arbitration covered by 1996 Act save and except to the extent its applicability has been excluded by virtue of express provision contained in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. 56. In Hindustan Construction Co., in fact this Court has emphasized the mandatory nature of limit to the extension of period provided in proviso to Section 34(3) and has held that an application for setting aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act has to be made within time prescribed under subsection (3) of Section 34 i.e. within three months and a further period of 30 days on sufficient cause being shown and not thereafter.” 7(viii). While dealing with the applicability of Limitation Act [Section 4 and 12], the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in State of West Bengal Versus Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Limited, (2024) 7 SCC 257 , after relying on the mandate in the case of Popular Construction Co. [supra] has outlined that “prescribed period of limitation” for assailing the Award in Section 34 proceedings is three months; and the period of 30 days in proviso to Section 34 of Act “is not the prescribed period of limitation”. [supra] has outlined that “prescribed period of limitation” for assailing the Award in Section 34 proceedings is three months; and the period of 30 days in proviso to Section 34 of Act “is not the prescribed period of limitation”. It has been mandated that period of 30 days beyond three months is the “extendable period which may be extended by a Court on showing sufficient cause being shown” and such 30 days period cannot be enlarged by invoking Section 4 or Section 5 of Limitation Act; and the challenge made beyond 120 days [90 days prescribed period of limitation and the extendable period of 30 days subject to sufficient cause been established to satisfaction of Court] is not condonable, in the following terms :- “9. We may note here that Section 43 of the Arbitration Act provides that the Limitation Act shall apply to the arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in the Court. We may note here that the consistent view taken by this Court right from the decision in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. is that given the language used in the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the applicability of Service 5 of the Limitation Act to the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act has been excluded. 11. The meaning of “the prescribed period” is no longer res integra. In Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd. in paras nos. 13 and 14, the law has been laid down on the subject. The said paragraphs read thus: “13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are “prescribed period”. What is the meaning of these words? 14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines: “2. (j) ‘period of limitation’ [which] means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and ‘prescribed period’ means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act; Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside an arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in the proviso that follows subsection (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the “period of limitation” and, therefore, not the “prescribed period” for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the “period of limitation” or, in other words, the “prescribed period”, in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the present case.” Even in this case, this Court was dealing with the period of limitation for preferring a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. We may note that the decision in the case of State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers which is relied upon by the appellant, follows the aforesaid decision. 12. In the facts of the case in hand, the three months provided by way of limitation expired a day before the commencement of the pooja vacation, which commenced on 1-10-2022. Thus, the prescribed period within the meaning of Section 4 of the Limitation Act ended on 30-9-2022. Therefore, the appellants were not entitled to take benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act. As per the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34, the period of limitation could have been extended by a maximum period of 30 days. The maximum period of 30 days expired on 30-10-2022. As noted earlier, the petition was filed on 31-10-2022. 13. Thus, looking from any angle, the High Court was right in holding that the petition filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was not filed within the period specified under sub-section (3) of Section 34. Hence, we find no merit in the appeal, and it is, accordingly, dismissed.” 7(ix). While dealing with the similar issue as to whether a petition filed beyond 120 days under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act could be entertained by condoning the delay by invoking Limitation Act stands reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. While dealing with the similar issue as to whether a petition filed beyond 120 days under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act could be entertained by condoning the delay by invoking Limitation Act stands reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2025 SCC Online SC 910, mandating that based on the object of speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” in itself is not a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims beyond extendable period of 30 days, is not condonable, by way of rule, in the following term :- “29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it's judgment in Government of Maharashtra (2 supra) discussed the statement of objects and reasons behind enacting of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and held that period of limitation must always to some extent be arbitrary and may result in some hardship, but this is no reason as to why they should not be strictly followed. In para 32, it held that the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be seen in the context of the object of speedy resolution of the dispute. In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given the object sought to be achieved under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 i.e., the speedy resolution of the disputes, expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself; and that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. In other words, the Supreme Court indicated that in exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date on which the appeal could have been filed can be condoned (i.e., below 120 days from the date of pronouncement of the judgment) by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but where there is negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides, such power ought not to be exercised. It went further in para 59 by observing that merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down.(This rule would thus apply equally to instrumentalities of Government like the applicants herein). It held in para 62 that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the applicants or the appellants to have the delay condoned. It concluded in para 63 as under: “63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration An and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals pled under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(l-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days. respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bonafide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, he condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches.” 31. In the instant case, the delay in filing the appeal is 301 days, way beyond 60 days + 60 days = 120 days permitted by the judgment of the Supreme Court to be condoned in exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, such inordinate delay caused by negligence of the applicants is not liable to be condoned. 34. They also cannot take advantage of the negligence of the counsel engaged by them in not informing the applicants about the judgment of the Commercial Court. Therefore, such inordinate delay caused by negligence of the applicants is not liable to be condoned. 34. They also cannot take advantage of the negligence of the counsel engaged by them in not informing the applicants about the judgment of the Commercial Court. This is because the applicants have a Legal Department and employees engaged by the applicants in that department have a duty to monitor what is happening in the cases to which the applicants are parties, keep track of the progress of the said cases and the decisions therein, and ensure that applications for issuance of certified copy are made to the concerned court so that the appeals, if required, can be preferred within the period of limitation prescribed by law.” 7(x). The question as to whether the period of 90 days prescribed under Section 34(3), which is extendable by further 30 days on sufficient cause being shown, can be condoned beyond 120 days, stands answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a recent judgement in the case of My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Private Ltd. & Anr. vs. Faridabad Implements Private Ltd. (2025) 6 SCC 481 , in the following terms: “40. From the reasoning and decisions in the above cases, the following conclusions evidently follow: 40.1 First, Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3) of the ACA. 40.2 Second, Section 4 of the Limitation Act benefits a party only when the “prescribed period”, i.e. the 3-month limitation period under Section 34(3) expires on a court holiday. In such a situation, the application under Section 34 will be considered as having been filed within the limitation period if it is filed on the next working day of the court. 40.3 Third, Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not come to the aid of the party when the 3-month limitation period expires on a day when the court was working. The 30-day condonable period expiring during the court holidays will not survive and neither Section 4, nor any other provision of the Limitation Act, will inure to the benefit of the party to enable filing of the Section 34 application immediately after reopening. 42. For the reasons set forth above, the application preferred by the appellant under Section 34 of the ACA stands dismissed as it was filed beyond the condonable period of 30 days, which conclusively and absolutely expired on 28.06.2022. 62. 42. For the reasons set forth above, the application preferred by the appellant under Section 34 of the ACA stands dismissed as it was filed beyond the condonable period of 30 days, which conclusively and absolutely expired on 28.06.2022. 62. Admittedly, as the period of limitation prescribed for filing a petition under Section 34 of the A & C Act expired on 29.05.2022 whereas the petition was preferred on 04.07.2022 much beyond the period of limitation prescribed and the condonable period of 30 days stipulated under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A & C Act, the petition under Section 34 of the A & C Act was beyond time and the delay could not have been condoned. Accordingly, there is no error or illegality on part of the High Court in dismissing the petition under Section 34 of the A & C Act as barred by limitation.” MANDATE OF LAW OF THIS COURT ON NON-CONDONABILITY OF 120 DAYS TIMELINE: 7(xi). A Coordinate Bench of this Court, in OMP(M) No. 89 of 2023, titled State of H.P. & Anr. vs. M/s Jagson International Ltd., decided on 30.04.2024, held that the delay beyond 120 days under provisio to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act is not condonable and non-filing of application within aforesaid period warrants dismissal. 7(xii). Another Coordinate Bench of this Court, while deciding Arbitration Appeal No. 25 of 2024, titled National Highway Authority of India vs. Sansaru Devi & Ors., decided on 01.09.2024 has held that expression “but not thereafter in proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 34 mandates that the maximum 120 days period can neither be enlarged or extended by involving Section 5 of Limitation Act, in the following terms:- “4. It is well settled that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to an application challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act. Under Section 34(3) of the Act, an application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act can be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso to Section 34 makes it clear that extension cannot be beyond thirty days (Ref. Simplex Infrastructure Limited Versus Union of India). The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso to Section 34 makes it clear that extension cannot be beyond thirty days (Ref. Simplex Infrastructure Limited Versus Union of India). In the instant case, three months’ period from the date of receipt of award expired on 07.12.2022. Further period of 30 days lapsed on 06.01.2023. The petition under Section 34 of the Act was instituted on 20.02.2023. There was a delay of about 44 days in moving the application under Section 34 of the Act by the present applicant. Learned District Judge, therefore, did not err in holding that a delay beyond 120 days in moving the application under Section 34 of the Act could not be condoned. 5. In view of above, there is no merit in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed along with pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.” 7(xiii). Negating the claim regarding condonability of delay, this Court dismissed the appeal, on the ground that Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot invoked so as to condone the period beyond 120 days, so as to defeat the objective of expeditious resolution of disputes through alternative dispute resolution mechanism, in the case of Arbitration Appeal No. 30 of 2024, titled National Highway Authority of India versus Vishashwar decided on 21.11.2024, in the following terms:- “7. In backdrop of the settled law, this Court is of the view that provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has no application to an application to a petition, challenging an arbitration Award under Section 34(3) of the Act. Section 5 of Limitation Act being a general provision has to succumb to the special provision prescribing time-line for assailing Award in Section 34(3) and proviso thereto. An application for setting aside the Award, on grounds mentioned in Section 34 of the Act made within three months and the further period of thirty days thereafter, on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso to Section 34 makes it clear that extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Invoking Section 5 of Limitation Act beyond 120 days shall certainly defeat and frustrate the legislative intent and object of ensuring efficient and expeditious resolution to disputes by alternative disputes mechanism. The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso to Section 34 makes it clear that extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Invoking Section 5 of Limitation Act beyond 120 days shall certainly defeat and frustrate the legislative intent and object of ensuring efficient and expeditious resolution to disputes by alternative disputes mechanism. Condoning delay beyond 120 days shall frustrate the finality of Awards, by defeating its execution under Section 36, which accrues to a party on expiry of time-line in Section 34(3) and proviso thereof. Permitting invocation of Section 5 of Limitation Act would be contrary to mandate of law declared by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Popular Construction Co.; Simplex Infrastructure; P. Radha Bai; Chintel(s) India Pvt. Ltd; Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd.; Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita and Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd. and therefore, the challenge to Impugned Order is devoid of any merit. 7(iv). On facts of instant case, the Award dated 09.02.2022, was received by the appellant- NHAI on 08.09.2022 and the prescribed three months period expired on 07.12.2022. Even 30 days period lapsed on 06.01.2023. However, the appellant-NHAI filed the petition under Section 34 on 19.01.2023 along with an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay of 14 days in filing Section 34 petition. Once, as per the mandate of law, as discussed hereinabove, Section 5 of Limitation Act was not applicable then, the delay of 14 days was not condonable and the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act was rightly dismissed by the Learned District Judge.” CONCLUSION: 8. Taking into account the entirety of the facts and circumstances and the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and of this Court and in facts of instant case, the application filed by NHAI under Section 34 of the Act, after a delay of 46 days, beyond the maximum period of 120 days under proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act was validly dismissed by Learned District Judge, Kullu on 31.05.2023 to be time-barred and not maintainable. Even otherwise, Learned Arbitrator passed an Award on 30.07.2022 and the appellant NHAI having acquired knowledge of the Award on 07.10.2022 was bound to prefer objection(s) under Section 34(3) within a period of 90 days from the date of acquiring knowledge on or before 06.01.2023. Even otherwise, Learned Arbitrator passed an Award on 30.07.2022 and the appellant NHAI having acquired knowledge of the Award on 07.10.2022 was bound to prefer objection(s) under Section 34(3) within a period of 90 days from the date of acquiring knowledge on or before 06.01.2023. Even by virtue of the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34, the extendable period of 30 days, on showing sufficient cause also elapsed on 06.02.2023. However, the appellant NHAI filed the objection(s) under Section 34 on 24.03.2023, after a delay of 46 days, beyond the maximum 120 days period stipulated under Section 34 (3) and the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act. In these circumstances, the objections filed beyond 120 days, were validly held to be not entertainable and the application seeking condonation of delay of 46 days, beyond the maximum period of 120 days, was validly dismissed as time-barred by Learned District Judge, vide Impugned Order dated 31.05.2023, (Annexure A-1), inconsonance with the principles mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case(s) of Popular Construction Co.; Simplex Infrastructure; N.V. International; P. Radha Bai; Chintels India Pvt. Ltd.; Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd.; Bhima shankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita; Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd.; Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr; and the recent judgement in My Preferred Transformation and Hospitality Private Ltd. & Anr (supra) and the judgments passed by this Court in cases of M/s Jagson International Ltd.; Sansaru Devi and Vishashwar (supra). Once the objection(s) filed under Section 34 were dismissed as time-barred on 31.05.2023, therefore, the challenge to the Impugned Order dated 31.05.2023 [Annexure A-1] in present proceedings, along with an application seeking condonation of 289 days of delay in filing appeal under Section 37 proceedings, does not warrant any interference by this Court, when, the material on record, clearly indicates inaction, negligence, lethargy, inactiveness, slackness and indolence and placing distorted facts, on the part of NHAI, by not pursuing its right/remedies, within the timelines stipulated under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, disentitling the applicant-NHAI for any relief, in instant proceedings. 9. No other point was argued/raised. DIRECTIONS: 10. 9. No other point was argued/raised. DIRECTIONS: 10. In view of above discussion and for reasons recorded hereinabove, the application and accompanying appeal, is dismissed, in the following terms:- (i) OMP(M) No.116 of 2024 seeking condonation of 289 days of delay in filing the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, stands dismissed; (ii) Impugned order dated 31.05.2023 (Annexure A-1) passed by Learned District Judge in CMP No. 24 of 2023, dismissing the objections filed under Section 34 to be time-barred is upheld ; (iii) Arbitration appeal filed under Section 37 of Act (Filing No. ARB. A. No. 19789 of 2024, yet to be registered) stands dismissed; (iv) Parties to bear respective cost(s). In the aforesaid terms, the appeal and the application(s), shall accordingly stand disposed of.