2026:JHHC:17335 1 Acq. Appeal No. 27 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Acquittal Appeal (C) No. 27 of 2025 Kameshwar Prasad, aged about 79 years, son of Sarju Prasad, resident of Main Road, Kadma, Jamshedpur P.O. & P.S. Kadma, District East Singhbhum …....... Appellant(s) Vrs. 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Sujit Kumar, son of Permanand Singh, resident of village Akbarpur, P.O. & P.S. Islampur, District Nalanda, State Bihar ........ Respondent(s) ….... CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Manindra Kr. Sinha, Advocate For the Resp. No. 2 : Mr. Vineet Sinha, Advocate 09/16.06.2026 Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment of acquittal dated 13.09.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 2024 whereby and whereunder the learned Sessions Judge, East Singhbhum at Jamshedpur, has set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence both dated 16.03.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Jamshedpur in connection with Complaint Case No. 2280 of 2023 whereby the Respondent No.2 has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and sentenced him to undergo S.I. forone year and also directed to pay compensation of Rs. 16,30,000/- out of which Rs. 16,25,000/- was directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation and Rs.5000/- was directed to be deposited in the Nazarat, Civil Courts, Jamshedpur and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo S.I. for a period of three months. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent no.2 by referring to the judgment of Yogendra Pratap Singh Vrs. Savitri Pandey & Anr. reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 has submitted that the appellant should seek his remedy before the Court below by invoking the provision of Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act. 4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra) has formulated two questions, which read as under: i. Can cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 be taken on 2026:JHHC:17335 2 Acq. Appeal No. 27 of 2025 the basis of a complaint filed before the expiry of the period of 15 days stipulated in the notice required to be served upon the drawer of the cheque in terms of Section 138(c) of the Act aforementioned? And, ii. If answer to question no.1 is in the negative, can the complainant be permitted to present the complaint again notwithstanding the fact that the period of one month stipulated under Section 142(b) for the filing of such a complaint has expired? The said questions have been answered in para 41 of the judgment, which reads as under: 41. Section 142 of the NI Act prescribes the mode and so also the time within which a complaint for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act can be filed. A complaint made under Section 138 by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque has to be in writing and needs to be made within one month from the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. The period of one month under Section 142(b) begins from the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. However, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within the prescribed period of one month, a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period. Now, since our answer to question (i) is in the negative, we observe that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque may file a fresh complaint within one month from the date of decision in the criminal case and, in that event, delay in filing the complaint will be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the NI Act. This direction shall be deemed to be applicable to all such pending cases where the complaint does not proceed further in view of our answer to question (i). As we have already held that a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice issued under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 is not maintainable, the complainant cannot be permitted to present the very same complaint at any later stage. His remedy is only to file a fresh complaint; and if the same could not be filed within the time prescribed under Section 142(b), his recourse is to seek the benefit of the proviso. satisfying the Court of sufficient cause. Question (ii) is answered accordingly. 5. Upon which, it has been submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant may be permitted to withdraw the present acquittal appeal with a liberty to approach the Court below under 2026:JHHC:17335 3 Acq. Appeal No. 27 of 2025 proviso of Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act. 6. Considering the legal provision and the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra), the present acquittal appeal is disposed of as withdrawn with a liberty to the appellant to invoke the proviso of Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, if the facts and circumstances of the case so permit. 7. The present acquittal appeal stands disposed of. (Rajesh Kumar, J.) 16.06.2026 A. Mohanty Uploaded ____/____/2026