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2026 DAILYLAW 1678 (CHH)

DAULATRAM VASTRAKAR v. NIRA BAI (Died Through Lrs)

SA/235/2024 · 2026-01-07

Shri Bibhu Datta Guru

body2026

Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:1210 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 235 of 2024 Daulatram Vastrakar S/o Vishram Prasad, Aged About 69 Years Head Clerk, R/o Village- Koni, C.G. Vidyut Mandal, Village Koni, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Nira Bai (Died) Through LRs : 1.A Harish Chandra S/o Bisahu Lal Aged About 65 Years R/o Village Chote Koni Tehsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 1.B Ramchandra S/o Bisahu Lal Aged About 55 Years R/o Village Chote Koni Tehsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 1.C. Ramesh Chandra S/o Bisahu Lal Aged About 57 Years R/o Chote Koni Tehsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.) 1.D. Dinesh Chandra S/o Bisahu Lal Aged About 49 Years R/o Village Chote Koni Tehsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 1.E. Late Umesh Chandra (Died) Through LRs 1.E.i - Pushpa Mishra W/o Late Umesh Chandra Aged About 45 Years R/o Nunera Pali Tehsil Pali District- Korba 1.E.ii - Ayush Mishra S/o Late Umesh Chandra Aged About 27 Years R/o Nunera Pali Tehsil Pali District- Korba 1.F Late Smt. Shail Upadhyay Through LR Deepak Upadhyay, aged about 53 years, R/o Ranipara, Janjgir, Tahsil Janjgir, Dist. Janjgir- Champa (CG). 1.G Smt. Sheela Tiwari W/o Late Shri Bharat Lal Tiwari Aged About 75 Years R/o Village Shermi Tahsil Janjgir District - Janjgir Champa (C.G.) JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.01.09 16:25:18 +0530 2 1.H Late Smt. Durga Sharma through LR Ajeet Sharma S/o Ramnath Sharma Aged About 40 Years R/o Sadak 1, Sector 4, Quarter No. 15 Bhilai, Distt.- Durg (C.G.) 1.I - Smt. Pushpa Shukal W/o Late Anil Shukla Aged About 59 Years R/o Brahmanpara Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) 2. Harishchandra S/o Bisahu Lal Aged About 60 Years R/o Village- Chhote Koni, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 3. Ramchandra S/o Bisahu Lal, Aged About 55 Years R/o Village- Chhote Koni, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 4. Ramesh Chandra S/o Bisahu Lal, Aged About 57 Years R/o Village- Chhote Koni, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 5. Dinesh Chandra S/o Bisahu Lal, Aged About 49 Years R/o Village- Chhote Koni, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 6. Late Umesh Chandra (Through Lrs ) 6.1 - Pushpa Mishra W/o Late Umesh Chandra Aged About 45 Years R/o Nunera Pali Tehsil - Pali, District- Korba, C.G. 6.2 - Ayush Mishra S/o Late Umesh Chandra Aged About 27 Years R/o Nunera Pali Tehsil - Pali, District- Korba, C.G. ... Respondent(s) (The cause title is as per the Memo of Appeal) For Appellant (s) : Mr. Pankaj singh with Ms. Dyna Bajrang, Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Rahul Mishra, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board 08/01/2026 1. Heard on I.A. No. 2 of 2024, application for condonation of delay in filing this second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The 3 present application is filed by the appellants/defendants for condonation of delay of 4106 days in filing the appeal. 2. It would be appropriate to notice paragraphs 2 to 5 of the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, which state as under :- "APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING APPEAL” 2. That the appellants are illiterate, rustic and person belonging to rural area due to which their lack of understanding and delayed guidance of law they could not bring their cause to this Hon'ble Court on time. 3. That the appellant received all the documents and certified copy of the judgment very lately from their previous council and due to which there is delay. 4. That the appellants having a very good case on merits and there is every chance of their success in present second appeal.” 3. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submits that the appellant is an illiterate and rustic person belonging to a rural area due to which have lack of understanding and delayed guidance of law. Further he submits that the appellant was not aware of the judgment and decree dated 31.10.2012 and further was not in 4 contact with the counsel. He further submits that as soon as he came to know about the judgment and decree he received the documents and certified copy of the judgment very lately from the previous council he filled the second appeal on 28/04/2024, as such, the delay of 4106 days in filing the appeal deserves to be condoned. In support of his contention, he would place reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the matter of Inder Singh v The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant with an unexplained and inordinate delay and the appellant has failed to offer cogent and plausible explanation and hence the appeal may be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Bare perusal of the application filed by the appellant for condonation of delay in filing the appeal it appears that the appellant has taken a ground that he is illiterate and a rustic villager. Mere illiteracy, rural background, or lack of contact with counsel cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The explanation offered is vague and does not inspire confidence. Accordingly, the inordinate and unexplained delay of 4106 days in filing the appeal does not 5 deserve to be condoned. Further, no detail as to when he came to know about the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court has been mentioned in the application. When the delay is inordinate, he ought to have given full particulars as to what prevented him from filing the appeal on time and even otherwise, there is no detail regarding appellants as to why they could not take steps to file the appeal right on time. However, except for making bald and general assertions, no satisfactory explanation has been furnished accounting for each day’s delay of 4106 days. 7. True it is that sufficient cause enumerated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed liberally, but some cause much less sufficient cause has to be shown for condoning the delay particularly, when the delay is of more than two years. No such sufficient cause has been shown in the application for condonation of delay of 4106 days in filing the second appeal. Moreover, no additional affidavit has been filed by the appellants in the last ten years when the appeal was pending consideration before this Court. 8. In the absence of any sufficient cause, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be entertained as a matter of routine, particularly, when the delay in filing of the instant appeal is for a period of 60 days. 9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and anothers. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 2013 (14) SCC 6 81, has, in very categorical terms, after considering a series of judgements of Supreme Court on Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court held that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. It further held that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application of condonation of delav. Para’s 12 & 15 of the said decision read as under :- 12. It is a settled legal position that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be show period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the Court has no power to ignore the provision to 7 relieve flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A what is considers a distress resulting from it operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 15. …..In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be justified ground to condone the delay….." 10. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pathpati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. And Ors Vs. Special Deputy Collector {2024 SCC OnLine SC 513} had held as under:- 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; 8 (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; 9 (vi) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. 11. 11. Accordingly, I.A. No. 2, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is rejected and subsequently, the second appeal is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay of 4106 days in filing the appeal. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) JUDGE Jyoti