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2026 DAILYLAW 16770 (JHR)

SHIV PRATAP VERMA v. THE UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

WPC/2010/2025 · 2026-06-15

Deepak Roshan

Civil Appealbody2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

2026:JHHC:17463 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 2010 of 2025 ….….. Shiv Pratap Verma aged about 49 years, Son of Late Vinay Kumar Verma, Resident of Flat No. G/2, Saroj Apartments, Opposite Jivanlok Hospital Kilburn Colony, Hinoo, Doranda, P.O.-Hinoo, P.S. Doranda, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand). ..… Petitioner (s) Versus 1. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Education, Government of India, having office at Sastri Bhawan, New Delhi P.O., P.S & District- New Delhi-110001. 2. Indian Institute of Management, Ranchi through its Chairman, having Office at Prabandhan Nagar, Nayasarai Road, P.O.-Argora, P.S.-Nagri, District-Ranchi. 3. Chairman, BOG & Board of Governors, Indian Institute of Management, having Office at Prabandhan Nagar, Nayasarai Road, P.O.-Argora, P.S.-Nagri, District-Ranchi. 4. Director, Indian Institute of Management Ranchi, having Office at Prabandhan Nagar, Nayasarai Road, P.O.-Argora & P.S.-Nagri, District-Ranchi. ..... Respondent(s) ….….. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN ….… For the Petitioner(s) : M/s. Amritansh Vats, Shivak A. Pathak, Arpan M. Ekka, Amartya Choubey, Ashish Choudhary, Advocates For the Respondents : Mr. Ramit Satender, Advocate Ms. Neelam Kumari, Advocate Ms. Nitu Sinha, CGC C.A.V. ON: 11/05/2026 PRONOUNCED ON:15/06/2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner for setting aside the order dated 09.08.2024 in Memo No. IIMR/DIR/DISCIPLINARY/2024-25/1608 by which he has been removed from service by the Director, Indian Institute of Management, Ranchi. He also assails the appellate order dated 18.01.2025 by which the punishment of removal from service was affirmed. Compendium of Facts: 2026:JHHC:17463 2 3. The Petitioner was recruited as Senior Administrative Officer and was placed on probation for a period of two years. On successful completion of probation, his service was confirmed on 11.02.2020. 4. By an email dated 21.10.2022, the Petitioner sent a confidential complaint to the Central Vigilance Commission under the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Informers (PIDPI) disclosing information about recruitment and financial irregularities prevalent in Indian Institute of Management at Ranchi. The petitioner asserts that his complaint was considered and the Ministry of Education vide office order dated 05.07.2025 appointed Dr. Birender Kumar Paul, Professor, School of Planning and Architecture as the Inquiry officer for conducting an investigation. The investigation into alleged malpractices and corruption in recruitment as well as in the process of construction of the new building was underway. 5. However, in the course of this investigation, the Petitioner’s identity was allegedly compromised and he was abruptly, and without assigning any reasons, relieved from his post of Administrative Officer by an office order dated 31.03.2023. The Petitioner’s further case is that his request for LTC was also denied even though it was approved earlier. 6. The Petitioner claims that he again submitted a second complaint by email dated 21.07.2023 to the Secretary, Central Vigilance Commission making further disclosures regarding financial irregularities prevailing in the Indian Institute of Management, Ranchi. 7. The Petitioner’s actions obviously infuriated his immediate superiors 2026:JHHC:17463 3 and he was served with a Memorandum of Charges on 23.02.2024 alleging that he had submitted false and misleading information in his application for recruitment to the Post of Administrative Officer in IIM, Ranchi. It is also alleged that he negotiated for private employment on multiple instances while being an employee of IIM, Ranchi. The third charge against the Petitioner is of submitting complaints to the Government and openly spreading internal information on social media bypassing higher authorities. The Petitioner is also accused of bringing political and other outside influence and has threatened two officials of IIM, Ranchi. The Memorandum also includes a charge that this Petitioner and his wife had personal business interest which was not disclosed and which constitutes grave misconduct. 8. On 06.03.2024, the Petitioner denied all charges in the Memorandum and requested postponement of the disciplinary enquiry, citing PIDPI protection. He relies on the office memorandum dated 20.06.2024, which grants whistleblower security from threats and harassment under paragraphs 6 and 7 of the PIDPI resolution dated 21.04.2004, as confirmed by the Director, Central Vigilance Commission. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are reproduced below: “6. If any person is aggrieved by any action on the ground that he is being victimized due to the fact that he had filed a complaint or disclosure, he may file an application before the designated agency seeking redress in the matter, who shall take such action, as deemed fit. The designated agency may give suitable directions to the concerned public servant or the public authority as the case may be. 7.Either on the application of the complaint, or on the basis of the information gathered, if the designated agency is of the opinion that either the complaint or the witnesses need protection, the designated agency shall issue appropriate directions to the concerned government authorities.” 9. The Petitioner’s request for postponement of the enquiry was 2026:JHHC:17463 4 ignored and the enquiry proceedings were conducted in full swing in which the Petitioner participated and on conclusion of such enquiry the enquiry report was furnished, finding the Petitioner guilty of charges. The Petitioner was given a copy of the enquiry report and the Director of the Institute eventually inflicted the punishment of removal from service which was also confirmed in appeal by the Board of IIM, Ranchi. 10. The Respondents in this case have filed their Counter Affidavit and have justified Petitioner’s removal from service on the ground that a comprehensive departmental proceeding was initiated against the nine specific charges. After affording full opportunity of defence, the Petitioner was removed from service which does not call for interference by the Writ Court exercising powers of judicial review. 11. It has been vehemently argued that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with natural justice principles and in the absence of any jurisdictional error or patent illegality, this Writ Petition is devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed. Whistleblower Protection: 12. It is considered expedient to first examine the PIDPI framework which was established by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). The foundational pillar of PIDPI resolution is the absolute preservation of the whistleblower’s anonymity which is necessary to prevent retaliation. Towards this end, the CVC has established stringent procedural guidelines. When a complaint alleging corruption is made; an employee can’t be expected to follow the normal channel of communication. In 2026:JHHC:17463 5 such situation, an employee is bound to bypass the normal functioning and can make a confidential complaint to the CVC and seek protection. Clause 6 of PIDPI resolution which has been mentioned above stipulates a redressal mechanism if a person is victimized for filing a complaint with CVC. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has mandated in catena of decisions that disciplinary enquiry should strictly adhere to the principles of natural justice. Procedural fairness is deemed as much an essence of right as the substantive law itself. The Constitutional bedrock of natural justice is enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India protecting citizens against arbitrary State action. Natural justice itself is anchored by the following two pillars :- (i) audi alteram partem. (ii) nemo judex in causa sua. 14. While the first principal is a right to fair hearing, the second mandates that a decision maker cannot have a personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings he is adjudicating. This is the rule against bias. Bias in law does not necessarily require the explicit, undeniable proof of malicious intent; rather a “reasonable apprehension of bias” or “real likelihood of bias”. The test is whether a reasonable person fully aware of the facts would harbour an apprehension that the adjudicating officer or the Inquiry officer would not act impartially. When an employee invokes the PIDPI resolution to blow the whistle on a superior official, an immediate adversarial relationship is established. If that superior official assumes the role of disciplinary authority or passes an 2026:JHHC:17463 6 order of penalty, the disciplinary proceeding is fundamentally and irrevocably visited by personal and institutional bias. 15. It is also necessary to add a note of caution that once an employee has acted as a whistleblower, he does not enjoy absolute freedom and can continue to make complaints or violate service rules with impunity. When the regular disciplinary authority is incompetent to act due to being the subject of a whistleblower complaint, an ad hoc disciplinary authority has to be appointed to cure the defect of bias. The ad hoc authority must take charge and conduct a free and fair enquiry in order to ensure that there is no bias against the whistleblower who is subjected to a disciplinary proceeding. Such ad hoc authority will also independently judge whether the delinquent is a victim of harassment. However, before reaching any conclusions, it is necessary to examine the rival contentions of the parties. Respondents’ Arguments: 16. The Respondents have assiduously referred to the ratio of the decision in Ranjit Thakur vs Union of India reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611 relying on paragraph no. 25 in which it has been asserted that judicial review is not against a decision but is directed against the decision- making process. The relevant paragraph no. 25 is reproduced below:- “25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision-making process”. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court- martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial 2026:JHHC:17463 7 review. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL) : (1984) 3 All ER 935, 950] Lord Diplock said: “Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community;. . .” 17. A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India vs. B.C. Chaturvedi reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749. The ratio in paragraph no. 18 is exposition on the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters and reads as under:- 18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 18. The Respondents has next relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Modi vs Board of Control Cricket in India reported in (2011) 10 SCC 106 and have addressed the critical issue of institutional bias. In this decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court examined the facts and concluded that mere apprehension of bias should not be a ground of interference. A higher degree of proof is required, which is that there must exist a real danger of bias. In Lalit Kumar Modi (supra) case the Petitioner had objected to the enquiry by a three members committee of the Governing Council. This objection was overruled as such objection was selectively made against three individual members only. It was categorically held that domestic enquiries are 2026:JHHC:17463 8 undoubtedly to be fair but the principle of fairness cannot be extended to the extent of demanding a tribunal consisting of outsiders on allegation that the society members are biased. The law has been summarized in the following paragraphs of this decision: “29. On the issue of bias however, Shri Sundaram pointed out that as far as the law in India is concerned, a Constitution Bench of this Court has already clarified the legal position, and held that the test of “real danger” of bias is the valid test and not the one of reasonable apprehension. In M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of M.P. [(2004) 8 SCC 788 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1] , the Constitution Bench was concerned with the question of bias in the context of sanction to prosecute the ministers. In para 14, the Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 800) “14. … The question in such cases would not be whether they would be biased. The question would be whether there is reasonable ground for believing that there is likelihood of apparent bias. Actual bias only would lead to automatic disqualification where the decision-maker is shown to have an interest in the outcome of the case. The principle of real likelihood of bias has now taken a tilt to ‘real danger of bias’ and ‘suspicion of bias’.” 30. The Constitution Bench in M.P. Special Police Establishment case [(2004) 8 SCC 788 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1] referred with approval an earlier judgment in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant [(2001) 1 SCC 182 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 189] . In that case the question was whether the Managing Director had a bias against the respondent therein. This Court had held that mere apprehension of bias was not sufficient but that there must be real danger of bias. 40. We have noted the submissions of the petitioner with respect to his apprehensions. However, as far as the propositions of law are concerned, we cannot take a different view in the present case from the law laid down in the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in M.P. Special Police Establishment [(2004) 8 SCC 788 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1] , and the judgment of four Judges in T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria [AIR 1963 SC 1144] . As held in M.P. Special Police Establishment [(2004) 8 SCC 788 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1] , a mere apprehension of bias cannot be a ground for interference. There must exist a real danger of bias. And, following T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria [AIR 1963 SC 1144] , though such domestic inquiries have undoubtedly to be fair, a member of a society cannot stretch the principle of fairness to the extent of demanding a tribunal consisting of outsiders, on the basis that the society members are biased against him.” Legal Discussion & Findings; 19. The above-mentioned propositions of law relied on by the Respondents would indeed apply with full rigour if the Petitioner in this case had only raised casual allegations of bias against his superior authorities for some adverse complaint by him. This is not a case of mere generalized allegations of institutional bias. The Petitioner is a protected whistleblower which is evident from the office memorandum dated 2026:JHHC:17463 9 20.06.2024 (Annexure-24 of Writ Petition). Relying on paragraphs no. 6 and 7 of the PIDPI resolution, the Petitioner was to be provided full security. It is significant that memorandum of charges was issued on 23.02.2024 and this protection as a whistleblower was extended four months thereafter, in the midst of enquiry proceedings. The enquiry was conducted without due regard to the Petitioner’s special status as a whistleblower protected under the PIDPI resolution against retaliatory action. The employee with reasonable belief that he is being directed to act unlawfully must be vested with the right to refuse to follow such direction and should also be protected from adverse consequences for this refusal. When he makes a complaint to CVC, he enjoys special protection as a recognised whistleblower. A leading decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court on public accountability and vigilance is the case of Indirect Tax Practitioners Association vs R.K. Jain (2010) 8 SCC 281. The following pertinent observations and directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court are germane for the purpose of a decision in this case:- “40. At this juncture, it will be apposite to notice the growing acceptance of the phenomenon of whistleblower. A whistleblower is a person who raises a concern about the wrongdoing occurring in an organisation or body of people. Usually this person would be from that same organisation. The revealed misconduct may be classified in many ways; for example, a violation of a law, rule, regulation and/or a direct threat to public interest, such as fraud, health/safety violations and corruption. Whistleblowers may make their allegations internally (for example, to other people within the accused organisation) or externally (to regulators, law enforcement agencies, to the media or to groups concerned with the issues). Most whistleblowers are internal whistleblowers, who report misconduct on a fellow employee or a superior within their company. 41. One of the most interesting questions with respect to internal whistleblowers is why and under what circumstances people will either act on the spot to stop illegal and otherwise unacceptable behaviour or report it. There is some reason to believe that people are more likely to take action with respect to unacceptable behaviour, within an organisation, if there are complaint systems that offer not just options dictated by the planning and controlling organisation, but a choice of options for individuals, including an option that offers near absolute confidentiality. However, external whistleblowers report misconduct on outside persons or entities. In these cases, depending on the information's severity and nature, whistleblowers may report the misconduct to lawyers, the media, law enforcement or 2026:JHHC:17463 10 watchdog agencies, or other local, State, or federal agencies. 42. In our view, a person like the respondent can appropriately be described as a whistleblower for the system who has tried to highlight the malfunctioning of an important institution established for dealing with cases involving revenue of the State and there is no reason to silence such a person by invoking Articles 129 or 215 of the Constitution or the provisions of the Act.” 20. An important aspect of the case in hand is the Petitioner’s insinuation of retaliation by the top management for his acts of disclosure to the Central Vigilance Commission and other high Constitutional authorities. The primary challenge of whistleblowing is the real risk of retribution that follows. Protecting the identity of the whistleblower significantly mitigates the probability of retribution. However, in real practice, the identity is often compromised or becomes too apparent in the course of any enquiry based on the information provided by the whistleblower. In such cases, retaliation has chilling effects on whistleblower and requires a protection mechanism. 21. Even though retaliation itself is not defined, it is to be understood as any broad discrimination or conduct, actual and threatened, which has an adverse impact on such employee. Experience has shown that it is extremely difficult for whistleblower to prove retaliation if the entire burden of proof is placed on them. 22. The reverse burden of proof was first adopted by United States of America (USA) in its Whistleblower Protection Act, 1998. This reverse burden requires that (i) at the outset the whistleblower must make out a prima facie case of retaliation and (ii) once, the initial onus is discharged, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct in question is not attributable to the 2026:JHHC:17463 11 whistleblower’s disclosure. The Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 itself incorporates the reverse burden principle in Section 11 which reads as follows: “11. Safeguards against victimisation.- (1) The Central Government shall ensure that no person or a public servant who has made a disclosure under this Act is victimised by initiation of any proceedings or otherwise merely on the ground that such person or a public servant had made a disclosure or rendered assistance in inquiry under this Act. (2) If any person is being victimised or likely to be victimised on the ground that he had filed a complaint or made disclosure or rendered assistance in inquiry under this Act, he may file an application before the Competent Authority seeking redress in the matter, and such authority shall take such action, as deemed fit and may give suitable directions to the concerned public servant or the public authority, as the case may be, to protect such person from being victimised or avoid his victimisation: Provided that the Competent Authority shall, before giving any such direction to the public authority or public servant, give an opportunity of hearing to the complainant and the public authority or public servant, as the case may be: Provided further that in any such hearing, the burden of proof that the alleged action on the part of the public authority is not victimisation, shall lie on the public authority. (3) Every direction given under sub-section (2) by the Competent Authority shall be binding upon the public servant or the public authority against whom the allegation of victimisation has been proved. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the power to give directions under sub-section (2), in relation to a public servant, shall include the power to direct the restoration of the public servant making the disclosure, to the status quo ante. (5) Any person who wilfully does not comply with the direction of the Competent Authority under sub-section (2), shall be liable to a penalty which may extend up to thirty thousand rupees.” (Emphasis supplied) 23. In the present case also, the Petitioner had sent his complaint prior to initiation of disciplinary action. The bulk of the charges against him relate to his communication with high-ranking officials and other Constitutional Authorities. The nature of allegations as well as request for withholding enquiry suspecting that the initiation and continuation of the enquiry itself was a result of Petitioner’s whistleblowing act has been completely ignored. Even though there was specific direction that Petitioner is protected and must be provided security as a whistleblower; the disciplinary proceeding continued as if he was an ordinary 2026:JHHC:17463 12 delinquent. The Petitioner’s participation in the enquiry was neither voluntary; nor was he given any other option by his employer. 24. The allegations of corruption in recruitment reach the doorstep of the Director who has inflicted the punishment of removal from service. The Inquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority have shown no regard to the special protection the Petitioner enjoyed as a whistleblower. There is no record that his complaints to the CVC were found to be frivolous, mischievous and lacked any basis. 25. In such circumstances, the only appropriate course of action would be to set aside the punishment order and to quash the disciplinary proceedings. 26. As a consequence of the above findings, the punishment order dated 09.08.2024 and the appellate order dated 18.01.2025 affirming the punishment of removal from service, is hereby, quashed and set aside. The Petitioner shall be reinstated in service for the purposes of completion of any enquiry. 27. As has been explained above, if the Petitioner committed acts of misconduct, he cannot escape its consequences. Therefore, the charges framed against him have to be enquired by an independent external body or an ad hoc disciplinary committee. Ordinarily, no such right of independent enquiry exists. However, in the special facts and circumstances of the case and for ensuring that the Petitioner is not subjected to harassment for his whistleblowing acts; it is necessary to hand over the enquiry to an impartial and independent body. Not only 2026:JHHC:17463 13 will the charges be enquired into independently and free from bias, before undertaking any enquiry, the competent authority under Section 11 of the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 must, after hearing the complainant and the public authority, take appropriate decision and issue necessary directions. 28. If it is found that the disciplinary proceedings are not the result of retribution, the ad hoc disciplinary authority shall itself conduct and enquire into the charges against the Petitioner. The Petitioner is directed to extend full cooperation, and the enquiry, if any, should be conducted and completed expeditiously. 29. Accordingly, the instant writ application stands allowed. Pending I.A, if any, also stands disposed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) Dated15 /06/2026 Amardeep/ A.F.R Uploaded on 17.06.2026