JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. Notice. Mr. Anuj Gupta, learned counsel, appears and waives service of notice on behalf of respondent. 2. The Case Learned District Collector, Solan on 20.01.2017 ordered vestment of respondent’s/petitioner’s land with the State government on the ground that the respondent failed to put the land to use within two years from the date of execution of sale deed, the respondent could not start construction of the resort over land in question within two years in accordance with the permission granted to it under Section 118 of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The operative portion of the order passed by the learned District Collector, Solan ordering vesting of respondent's land with the petitioner is as under:- “17. In this case, Respondent purchased 150 bigha land and then did not put it to use for which it was purchased even after 7 years after the Sale Deed. The record available on the case file shows clearly that the Respondent did not do anything to set up the resort within the stipulated period of two years from the date of Sale Deed. He did not even apply for further extension one year after the expiry of two years’ time limit. His plea that he could not start the construction due to economic recession is too general and vague in the absence of specific documentary evidence. There is nothing specific on record that the Respondent was prevented from starting the construction because of economic downturn. It is evident that the failure of Respondent is due to his own acts of commission and omission. As has been pointed out by the Hon’ble High Court in Judgment delivered in the case titled Som Kirti versus State of H.P. quoted above the intention of Act is prevent land grab by moneyed people. By not putting the land to use for which permission was granted the Respondent has blocked the land from being used for any other gainful purpose. Therefore this is a clear case of violation of Section 118 of the Act. I answer this point in affirmative and hold it in favour of the State. 18. On the basis of the discussion above, it is clear that the respondent has violated the provision contained in the Act. Therefore this is a clear case of violation of Section 118 of the Act. I answer this point in affirmative and hold it in favour of the State. 18. On the basis of the discussion above, it is clear that the respondent has violated the provision contained in the Act. Therefore, land measuring 150-00 bigha, located in revenue Village Rahed, Tehsil Kandaghat, District Solan and comprised in Khewat No.54 min, Khatauni No.79 and Khewat No.55, Khatauni No.81, Khasra Nos. 1030/697, 1035/696, 1036/696 purchased vide Sale Deed No.80/2008 dated 18.03.2008 shall vest with the State of Himachal Praedesh free from all encumbrances as provided in the Act. Copy of this Order be sent to the SDO (C), Kandaghat and the Tehsildar, Kandaghat for information and compliance. No order as to the cost. File after due completion be consigned to the General Record Room.” Statutory appeal preferred by the respondent against the above order was allowed by the learned Divisional Commissioner, Shimla Division, H.P. on 21.12.2017. While allowing the appeal, learned Divisional Commissioner relied upon Ravinder Chauhan and others versus State of H.P., AIR 1999 HP 43 as also Sanjay Dutt versus State through CBI, 1994 (5) SCC 410 and Tola Ram Relumal versus State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SCC 496. Learned Divisional Commissioner interpreted the provisions of Section 118(2) of the Act and returned the findings that default on the part of the respondent in raising the construction of resort over the land in question within stipulated period of two years in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be considered as “conscious default, negligence or refusal”. Operative portion from the order passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner is as under:- “17. In view of the above, by no stretch of imagination the default on the part of appellant can be considered a “conscious default negligence or refusal” on the part of a person concerned within the scope defined by the Hon’ble High Court in the matter of Ravinder Chauhan & others versus State of H.P. as cited above. It can certainly be covered within the scope of words for “reasons beyond his control” since the promoter wanted to develop a major health resort, spa with convention facilities involving a total investment of ?72 crores. He initiated the construction work also constructing 1.5 K.m road (which has also been acknowledged by the Collector in his order at page-18). It can certainly be covered within the scope of words for “reasons beyond his control” since the promoter wanted to develop a major health resort, spa with convention facilities involving a total investment of ?72 crores. He initiated the construction work also constructing 1.5 K.m road (which has also been acknowledged by the Collector in his order at page-18). The default on the part of the developer, therefor,e essentially arises due to recession in the financial markets and not due to his own fault. As such, he is covered within the scope of the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as cited above. 18. As can be seen from the discussions above, it is clear that the case of appellant does not fall within the purview of default defined by the Hon’ble High Court in Ravinder Chauhan judgment cited above as conscious default negligence or refusal on the part of a person concerned since the appellant has taken all possible steps within the period of two years but could not secure funding due to recession. The fact of recession being there in the financial markets cannot be disputed since the recession was a global phenomenon and it affected the Indian Economy also. Therefore, it also needs to be appreciated here that the appellant could not have been expected to secure finances before getting permission of land since no financial institution would agree to fund a project without land especially in H.P. where permission of the Govt. is required before purchase of land. Therefore, the inability to start construction and complete within two hears has been for reasons beyond his control and as such, the default does not fall within the scope of provision of Section 118(2) of the Act.” Petitioner carried the matter further by preferring Revision Petition before the learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals). The appeal was dismissed on 27.09.2021 as under:- “9. Record of the trial court further suggest that the proceedings for non-utilization of land were initiated against the respondent in the year 2014 i.e. after lapse of about six years of time period. In reply to the notice, issued by the Ld. Collector, the respondent could not clearly rebut the notice by stating the fact that the land in dispute has been fully utilized. In reply to the notice, issued by the Ld. Collector, the respondent could not clearly rebut the notice by stating the fact that the land in dispute has been fully utilized. However, submissions are there that due to certain litigation arisen during partition of land and financial constraints faced by the respondent as a result of severe global recession, the project could not be completed. The record further reveals that the respondent was making efforts to utilize the land and a huge investment has already been made by the respondent for leveling of the land and construction of internal road. While accepting the appeal of the present respondent, the ld. Commissioner has relied upon the law laid down by the Hon’ble High Court vide its judgment dated 18.09.1998, delivered in RSA No.254 of 1995 titled as Ravinder Chauhan & Ors. vs., State of H.P & Ors. And has rightly concluded that by no stretch of imagination the default on the part of present respondent can be considered as a conscious default, negligence or refusal in putting the land to use. The ld. Commissioner has further observed that the respondent initiated the construction work also by constructing 1.5 K.M road. The ld. Counsel for the respondent has categorically stated that the respondent has also started construction of five cottages on the spot, but due to proceedings the same could not be completed. The statements of the officials during cross- examination before the Ld. Collector also corroborate this fact. This prima -facie shows that the petitioner has taken bonafide steps to utilize the land in dispute for the purpose for which permission was granted. Thus, keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon’ble High Court, vide judgment dated 18.09.1995 in the above referred matter, it would be appropriate that the present petition be dismissed in view of the merits of the case and the orders of the ld. Divisional Commissioner are hereby upheld.” It is in the above circumstances, State has preferred the present writ petition feeling aggrieved against the order dated 21.12.2017 passed by learned Divisional Commissioner, Shimla and the order dated 27.09.2021 passed by learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Shimla, H.P. whereby vestment of respondent’s land in petitioner’s favour was held to be illegal. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the case file. 4. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the case file. 4. Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act pertains to transfer of land to non- agriculturists and is as follows:- 118. Transfer of land to non-agriculturist barred. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, contract, agreement, custom or usage for the time being in force, but save as otherwise provided in this chapter, no transfer of land (including sales in execution of a decree of a civil court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue) by way of sale, gift, will, exchange, lease, mortgage with possession, creation of a tenancy or in any other manner shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist. (Explanation. For the purpose of this sub-Section, the expression “transfer of land” shall not include- i) transfer by way of inheritance; ii) transfer by way of gift made or will executed, in favour of any or all legal heirs of the donor or the testator, as the case may be; iii) transfer by way of lease of land or building in a municipal area; but shall not include- (a) a benami transaction in which land is transferred to an agriculturist of a consideration paid or provided by a non-agriculturist; and (b) an authorization made by the owner by way of special or general power of attorney or by an agreement with the intention to put a non-agriculturist in possession of the land and allow him to deal with the land in the like manner as if he is a real owner of that land. “(2) Nothing in sub-Section (1) shall be deemed to prohibit the transfer of land by any person in favour of- (a) a landless laborer; or (b) a landless person belonging to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe; or (c) a village artisan; or (d) a landless person carrying on an allied pursuit; or (dd) a person who, on commencement of this Act, worked and a continues to work for gain in a estate situated in Himachal Pradesh; for the construction of a dwelling house, shop or commercial establishment in a municipal area, subject to the condition that the land to be transferred does not exceed- (i) in case of a dwelling house-500 square Meters; and (ii) in the case of a shop or commercial establishment- 300square meters: Provided that such person does not own any vacant land or a dwelling house in a municipal area in the state. (e) the State Government or Central Government, or a Government Company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, or a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, for which land is acquired through the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or a statutory body or a corporation or a board established by or under a statute and owned and controlled by the State of Central Government; or (f) a person who has become non-agriculturist on account of- (i) acquisition of his land for any public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; or (ii) vestment of his land in the tenants under this Act; or (g) a non-agriculturist who purchases or intends to purchases land for the construction of a house or shop, or purchases a built up house or shop, from the Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority, established under the Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority Act 2004, or from the Development Authority constituted under the Himachal Pradesh Town and Country Planning Act, 1977 or from any other statutory Corporation set up for framing and execution of house accommodation schemes in the State under any State of Central enactment; or (h) a non-agriculturist with the permission of the State Government for the purposes that may be prescribed: Provided that a person who is non-agriculturist but purchase land either under (Clause (dd) or clause (g) or with the permission granted under clause (h) of this sub-Section, shall, irrespective of such purchase of land, continue to be a non-agriculturist for the purpose of the Act. Provided further that a non-agriculturist (who purchases land under clause (dd) or) in whose case permission to purchase land is granted under clause (h) of this sub-Section, shall put the land to such use for which the permission has been granted within a period of two years or a further such period not exceeding one year, as may be allowed by the State Government for the reasons to be recorded in writing to be counted from the day on which the sale deed of land is registered and if he fails to do so or diverts, without the permission of the State Government, the said user for any other purpose or transfer by way sale, gift or otherwise, the land so purchased by him shall, in the prescribed manner, vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances.” Learned Additional Advocate General highlighted the second proviso to sub-Section 118(2) to submit that same placed an obligation upon the respondent to put to use the property/land within two years or further such period not extending one year as may be allowed by the State government for the reasons to be recorded in writing from the date on which the sale deed of the land was registered and in case the respondent failed to do so or diverted without the permission of the State government, the land so purchased by it was to vest in the State Government from all encumbrances. The order dated 20.01.2017 passed by learned District Collector wherein contentions of the State to the effect that the respondent had not started construction of resort within two years from the date of execution of sale deed, was highlighted. Appreciation of evidence as recorded therein was also emphasized. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that factual pleas taken by the respondent of being not in position to put the land in use on ground of alleged global economic recession were negated. Respondent’s failure to put the land to use for the purpose, it was granted within the time limit of two years in terms of the sanction/permission, was urged to be sufficient to attract consequent vesting provisions of Section 118(2) of the Act. Hence, prayer was made for allowing the writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondent reiterated the observations recorded in the orders passed by learned Divisional Commissioner as also the learned Financial Commissioner. 5. Consideration. Hence, prayer was made for allowing the writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondent reiterated the observations recorded in the orders passed by learned Divisional Commissioner as also the learned Financial Commissioner. 5. Consideration. 5(i) First and foremost, it needs to be noticed that impugned order was passed by the learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals) H.P. on 27.09.2021. Present writ petition assailing the same was filed on 06.01.2026. More than four years have gone by. Petitioner has not explained in the writ petition the reasons for not assailing the impugned order within a reasonable period. In case, the order conclusively determining the lis between the parties is not agitated within close proximity of the time that sets down rights and obligations of the parties, it has to be given a quietus. The respondent in the instant case during the period of more than four years from the date of passing of impugned order might have taken consequential steps based upon the said order. In fact, during hearing of the case, learned counsel for the respondent apprised that respondent has already moved application for deletion of red entry in the revenue record & for deletion of vestment orders reflected therein. The writ petition gives the impression that petitioner had earlier preferred CWP No. 8576 of 2022 assailing the order passed by learned Financial Commissioner. Though fate of said writ petition is not discernible from the record, however, during hearing of the instant petition, learned counsel for the respondent placed on record copy of judgment dated 16.10.2023 passed in CWP 8576/2022 which also acknowledges objection of delay and laches taken by the respondent. The writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 16.10.2023 with following observation:- “Faced with the query raised by the Court as to how the petition was maintainable having been filed through District Collector, when the 1st Authority, who had passed the order in the case, was the District Collector itself, learned Additional Advocate General prays for and is permitted to withdraw this petition, with liberty to file a fresh writ petition on the same cause, if so advised. 2. At this stage, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the petition is otherwise also hit by delay and laches. 2. At this stage, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the petition is otherwise also hit by delay and laches. This issue is left open in case the petitioner does choose to file a fresh petition.” It was more than two years after the disposal of CWP No. 8576/2022 that the petitioner woke up from its slumber and filed fresh writ petition on 06.01.2026 assailing the order passed on 27.09.2021. The petition is certainly hit by unexplained delay and laches. 5(ii). Be that as it may, even on merits of the case, learned Divisional Commissioner as also learned Financial Commissioner have justly interpreted Ravinder Chauhan, (supra) drawing out following three conclusion therefrom as under:- “(i) That the vestment could not be automatic and due and proper enquiry adhering to the principles of natural justice had to be carried out; (ii) The failure has been defined to be on account of “conscious default, negligence or refusal on the part of a person concerned”; (iii) The circumstances of non-compliance have also been defined as “reasons beyond his control or due to the fact that it was capable or impossible of performance due to operation of the other provisions of law in force and the authorities who accorded such permission are also equally at fault,” After going through the facts of the case, it was observed by the Divisional Commissioner as under:- “11. Coming to the facts of this case, as per record of the case maintained by the District Collector, the registry was executed on 18-03-2008. However, while the case for grant of permission was under process, the appellant started taking steps towards the construction and execution of project by signing an agreement with M/S Fourth Dimension Project Management Private Limited (Annexure R-5) wherein the work of Survey, Landscaping Architectural and services drawings of the site etc. were outsourced to M/S Fourth Dimension Project Management Private Limited. A perusal of the case record also transpires that the appellant also took initial steps to get the land partitioned since it was in the joint ownership of so many other co-sharers. This fact also came on record in the statement of Shri Anil Verma who appeared before the District Collector as a witness RW-1.In between as per the Annexure R-6, the Company also started getting some remittances from abroad towards funding the project. 12. This fact also came on record in the statement of Shri Anil Verma who appeared before the District Collector as a witness RW-1.In between as per the Annexure R-6, the Company also started getting some remittances from abroad towards funding the project. 12. The Company executed another M.O.U with M/S Shiv Shakti Steel, Sadhu Singh Building, Mashobra, Tehsil & District Shimla, whereby, the contract of construction of building and obtaining necessary permissions thereof was given to M/S Shiv Shakti Steel. This contract was valid for a period of five years. It is also a matter of fact that the Company constructed an approach road measuring 1.5 Km. approximately for initiating the construction process at the site. This fact has also been acknowledged in the order of the District Collector at page 18. With regard to the process of partition, it has been stated by Shri Anil Verma (RW-1) who was General Power of Attorney on behalf of other co-sharers and Shri Sushil Kumar Goenka (RW-2) in their statements that the process was initiated by obtaining a copy of tatima from Patwari, however, it could not be taken to the logical end as some of the co- sharers expired and their legal heirs were objecting to it. A copy of Tatima prepared for carving out the share of the appellant is also appended to the file as Ext. R-1. 15. It is a matter of fact that the world faced great recession during the period between 2008 and 2013. This also got reflected in fall of Indian Stock Market thereby affecting the cash flow to the project. It is apparent from the communications discussed above that the developers made all out efforts to source funding both from the Financial Institutions as well as from the Stock Markets but due to recession, the funding was refused to the developers which is proved from the above communications. This fact has also been taken into consideration by the Ld. Collector at page-20 and has observed: "His plea that he could not start the construction due to economic recession is too general and vague in the absence of specific documentary evidence. This fact has also been taken into consideration by the Ld. Collector at page-20 and has observed: "His plea that he could not start the construction due to economic recession is too general and vague in the absence of specific documentary evidence. There is nothing specific on record that the respondent was prevented from starting the construction because of economic downturn." It appears that at the stage of the case before the District Collector, the appellant could only produce the copies of reports of the Stock Market as well as communications on e-mail with the Stock Market to prove his point, however, he did not produce any communication from the banks refusing the grant of loan to him. He later obtained the copies of communications sent to him by the banks and submitted the same at the stage of arguments which go to prove that he not only approached the banks and Stock Market but did it well in time i.e. in the year 2009- 10 immediately after getting approval from the State and within the specified period of two years. The refusal on the part of the financing agencies has clearly been on account of recession. 16. It may also be appropriate to summarize as to what the appellant has done so far and what else he could have done. What he had done:- - Signed M.O.Us for architectural designs and construction of the project; - Approached banks and Stock Market for loans and share capital; - Constructed 1.5 km. road; What else could have been done: - Informing the Govt. and obtaining extension; - Obtaining necessary permissions under various law. (It has been pleaded that TCP permission was Annexure R-18). - Getting the land partitioned (though the process seems to have been initiated but was not taken to a logical end).” In view of the concurrent findings of facts returned by the two revenue authorities below which do not call for any interference, it was justly concluded that the default on the part of the respondent could not be held to be conscious negligence so as to order vestment of the land in the State. Reliance upon Ravinder Chauhan2 was justly placed for holding that merely because respondent could not start the actual construction of the resort within two years from the date of execution of the sale deed for which he was granted permission under Section 118 of the Act would not result in automatic vestment of the land in the State. Here it would also be pertinent to take note of M/s Springdale Resorts and Villas Pvt. Ltd. versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Others, CWP No.3363/2025, decided on 26.09.2025 wherein while relying upon Ravinder Chauhan, (supra) it was observed that the words “shall put the land to such use for which the permission has been granted” are not to be interpreted myopically. Period of two years prescribed in the Statute cannot be construed in myopic manner so as to mean that everything with regard to the project has to be completed before the expiry of the period. The intent of legislation behind Section 118(2) was to ensure that steps are taken to put the land to use for the purpose for which the permission is granted before the expiry of the period prescribed in the Statute. The Court also took judicial notice of the fact that various permissions are granted under Section 118 of the Act for big and small projects by the State Government. For coming up of these projects, many further permissions/approvals/ sanction are required from several departments/ authorities. Various other formalities are also needed to be completed. The actual construction work can start only after all the permissions are in place in favour of the proponent. Therefore, if the words “shall put the land to such use for which permission has been granted” are given strict interpretation i.e. the entire project activities shall have to be completed from A to Z within the period mentioned in the second proviso to Section 118(2) of the Act, in such scenario majority of the projects would fall in the trap paving way for vestment of the land in State. Therefore, only meaningful interpretation can be given to these words. Therefore, only meaningful interpretation can be given to these words. That beneficiary of the permission has to demonstrate taking cogent and meaningful steps for putting the land to use for the purpose for which the permission was granted and if this test is satisfied, the same has to be construed and read that the permission holder has put the land to such use for which the permission was granted. In the instant case, the respondent has taken steps for putting the land to use. It is not the case of the petitioner that respondent had diverted the land for any other use. The mechanical order passed by the District Collector ordering vesting of respondent’s land in the State on the ground of it having failed to construct resort within period of two years was rightly set-aside by the higher authorities. As observed earlier, two authorities below on the basis of facts have concurrently held that respondent cannot be held guilty of conscious default, negligence by correctly applying the principles laid down in Ravinder Chauhan, (supra). The impugned orders therefore do not call for any interference. Petition is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.