2026:JHHC:17456-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI First Appeal No. 234 of 2023 ----- Binay Kumar Maurya, Age about 37 years, S/o Sri Ram Kalp Maurya, R/o Kalu Bagan, New Baridih, PO + PS-Sidhgora, Town-Jamshedpur, Dist.- Singhbhum East, Jharkhand. .......…Plaintiff/Appellant Versus Alika Kumari, W/o Binay Kumar Maurya, D/o Suresh Prasad, R/o Zone No.2 B, Birsanagar, Near Water Tanky, PO +PS-Birsanagar, Town- Jamshedpur, Dist.-East Singhbhum, Jharkhand ......... Defendant/ Respondent ------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA ------- For the Appellant : Mr. Sanjay Kumar Thakur, Advocate For the Resp. No.1 : Mr. Bhola Nath Rajak, Advocate ------ C.A.V on 08.06.2026 Pronounced on 15/06/2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant appeal under section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated 11.07.2023 and the decree signed on 18.07.2023 passed in Original Suit No.26 of 2018 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur, (in short, learned Family Judge) whereby and whereunder the petition filed under section 13 (1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by the appellant-husband against the respondent-wife, has been dismissed. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case as pleaded in the plaint having been recorded by the learned Family Judge, needs to be referred herein as: (i) The appellant-husband and respondent-wife got married with each other on 21.04.2015 as per Hindu rites and custom at the parental house of the respondent. 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 2 (ii) Thereafter, both the parties started living as husband and wife at the parental house of the appellant. (iii) It is pleaded that within 10 days of marriage it was noticed by the appellant that the respondent-wife frequently quarreled with him and his mother compelling him to reside separately from his family. (iv) To save their marital status, the appellant changed residence to a rented house at Birsanangar since 17.01.2016 and stayed there. But the behavior of the respondent did not mend and she started torturing him both mentally and physically due to which the appellant was compelled to come back to his parental house. (v) It is pleaded that several attempts were made to reconcile the matter but the respondent remained unshaken threatening him to implicate in false criminal case. (vi) Under the compelling circumstance, the appellant was forced to file an informatory petition being Case No.419 of 2016 under section 39 Cr.P.C in the Court of the learned CJM, Jamshedpur. (vii) It is pleaded that several attempts were made by the well- wishers and relatives to reconcile the matter but went in vain and ultimately the appellant was forced to file a suit for divorce in the Court of learned Family Judge. (viii) Further, the appellant-husband has filed a suit being Original Suit No. 26 of 2018 praying therein to pass a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty, and on contest, 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 3 the learned Family Court dismissed the aforesaid original suit, against which the instant appeal has been preferred. 3. In pursuance to issuance of notice, the respondent-wife appeared in the original suit and filed written statement stating therein that the suit filed under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act is not maintainable in law and is fit to be dismissed. The factum of marriage has been admitted. It has been stated that the uncle of the appellant-husband abused her with a motive to kill her for demand of dowry while the appellant being a drunkard used to habitually beat her. The factum of living separately from in-laws in a rented house is admitted by the respondent-wife but it is alleged that within 10 days thereafter the appellant fled away from there after beating her. It is stated that the appellant returned back to her after 20 days on compromise but again left her on 15.09.2016. The respondent has pleaded that on 17.09.2016 she returned at the instance of her brother- in-law but on an attempt to strangulate her. Thereafter she lodged a criminal case being Mahila PS Case No.20/2016 corresponding to GR Case No.2776/2016 under sections 498A, 323 IPC & 3/4 DP Act against the petitioner-appellant. The appellant came to her resident on 31.12.2017 and again assaulted her on the pretext of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. 4. On the aforesaid ground, the respondent-wife has prayed that the original suit being Original Suit No.26 of 2018 is fit to be dismissed. 5. Learned Family Judge, after institution of the said case taking into consideration of the pleadings of the parties, after scrutinizing the evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties, oral as well as documentary, has dismissed the suit for dissolution of marriage. 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 4 6. The impugned judgment by which the suit for dissolution of marriage has been dismissed is under challenge by the appellant-husband by filing the instant appeal. Submission of behalf of the appellant-husband: 7. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Thakur, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband has taken the following grounds: (i) There is an error in the impugned judgment, since, each and every aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration based upon the evidences produced by the appellant-husband. (ii) The element of cruelty has been found to be there if the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant- husband will be taken into consideration but without appreciating the same properly the learned Family Judge has come to the finding by holding that no element of cruelty is there and on that ground dismissed the suit and, as such, the impugned judgment and decree suffer from an error. (iii) It has been contended that the appellant-husband has been meted out with cruelty as also he has been compelled to leave the rented house due to cruel behaviour of his wife, but the same has not been taken into consideration by the learned Family Judge. (iv) It has been contended that the learned Family Judge has failed to appreciate the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant-husband as in the trial, the evidence has come that it was the respondent-wife who has treated the 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 5 appellant-husband with cruelty, but this fact has not been considered by the learned Family Judge. (v) The learned Family Judge has not appreciated the fact that the appellant-husband wanted to lead a happy conjugal life with the respondent-wife and due to that reason, he has arranged a rented house to reside separately from the parental house but it was the respondent-wife who herself has treated the appellant- husband with cruelty and thus, compelled him to live separately with her. (vi) The learned counsel for the appellant-husband has further submitted that while passing the judgment for divorce the learned Family Judge has not taken into consideration that the appellant-husband has tried his level best to lead a happy conjugal life with the respondent-wife but she has filed a false criminal case against him under the dowry prohibition Act and thus, committed cruelty upon him. 8. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that the impugned judgment and decree, therefore, needs interference said to be perverse. Submission of behalf of the respondent-wife: 9. Per contra, Mr. Bhola Nath Rajak, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-wife has taken the following grounds: (i) There is no error in the impugned judgement as the learned Family Judge has considered the entire issue 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 6 and on the basis of evidence laid by the respondent herself has passed the order impugned. (ii) The appellant has sought divorce on the ground that the behaviour of the respondent-wife is cruel, and she has deserted the appellant without any valid ground but the learned Family Court, after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence, has held that the entire allegations levelled in are absolutely illegal, uncalled for and has rightly dismissed the suit. (iii) It has also been submitted that the learned Family Court after taking into consideration the material available on record has found that the conduct of the appellant-husband has never been towards salvaging the institution of marriage as it is the appellant-husband himself who has come for the dissolution of the marriage, therefore on the pretext of the aforesaid categorical finding of the Family Court, the impugned order requires no interference. 10. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that if on that pretext, the factum of cruelty has not been found to be established, hence, the impugned judgment cannot be said to suffer from an error. Analysis: 11. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, gone through the impugned judgment, as also the testimony of the witnesses, the materials available on record and the documents exhibited therein. 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 7 12. The learned Family Judge has formulated altogether five issues, for ready reference the same are being quoted hereinbelow: I. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? II. Whether the petitioner has any valid cause of action for the suit? III. Whether the respondent since the marriage has treated the petitioner with cruelty? IV. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree for dissolution of marriage under section 13(1) (i-a) of Hindu Marriage Act? V. To what other relief or reliefs the petitioner is entitled? 13. This Court is now adverting to the impugned order/judgment by which prayer for dissolution of marriage has been dismissed by the learned Family Court. 14. In support of his case, two witnesses have been examined on behalf of the appellant-husband including himself as P.W1. In addition to that the following documentary evidences have been adduced on behalf of the appellant-husband: (i) Ext. 1-Letter from the Principal, Vidya Bharti Chinmaya Vidyalaya. (ii) Ext.2-2/1-Print out copies of social media chat. (iii) Ext.3- Application dated 22.5.2016 address to SP, East Singhbhum. (iv) Ext.4-Photocopy of interlocutory petition 419/2016. (v) Ext.5-Affidavit dated 25.4.2016 of Ramkalp Maurya, father of petitioner. (vi) Ext.6- Newspaper Chamka Aaina dated 12.5.2016. (vii) Ext.7-Charge-sheet dated 19.11.2016 filed in GR Case No.2776/16. (viii) Ext.8- Certified copy of deposition of Suresh Prasad in GR Case- 2776/16. 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 8 (ix) Ext.9-Photocopy of Curriculum Vitae of respondent Alika Kumari. 15. On the other hand, the appellant-wife has examined herself as DW1 as sole witness in support of her contention and she has also adduced the following documentary evidence: (i) Ext. A-Original passbook of State Bank of India of Suresh Prasad. (ii) Ext.B-B/3-Retail invoice of Chhaganlal Dayaljee Sons Pvt. Ltd., Jamshedpur. (iii) Ext.C-Invoice issued by Vishwakarma Solar Light Pvt. Ltd. 16. But first of all, the learned Family Judge has taken into consideration the issue nos. (III) & (IV) i.e., whether the respondent since the marriage has treated the petitioner with cruelty and whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree for dissolution of marriage under section 13(1) (i-a) of Hindu Marriage Act as these are the crux of the litigation. 17. Thereafter, the learned Family Judge has considered the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties for deciding the issues involved in Original Suit No.26 of 2018. 18. This Court in order to appreciate the aforesaid rival submission before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment needs to discuss herein the relevant part of the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife wherein the element of cruelty has been shown by the petitioner-husband (appellant herein). 19. During the trial, the respondent-husband himself has been examined as PW1 before learned Family Court. 20. In his examination on oath as PW1, the appellant-husband has narrated entire things as pleaded in the plaint about his marriage with the respondent-wife. He has stated on oath that his marriage was solemnized 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 9 with the respondent on 21.04.2015 in accordance with Hindu rites and customs at Jamshedpur and after marriage they were living as husband and wife at his parental house. He has stated that within few days of marriage the respondent quarreled with him and his family members and, as such, he under pressure separated the household with respondent on 17.01.2016 and shifted to a rented house at Birsanangar. But the behaviour of the respondent did not change there and she continued to quarrel with him. Finally, she ousted him from the house and since then he is residing with his parents without any conjugal relationship with her. Thereafter, the petitioner tried his level best to reconcile the matter with the help of his well-wishers and relatives but all went in vain. The respondent threatened him to implicate him and his family members in false criminal cases which compelled the petitioner to file an informatory petition before the Court of learned CJM, Jamshedpur being Informatory Petition No.429/2016. During cross examination, PW1 has denied having mineral water plant at Adityapur but admitted having a water supply shop at Baridih. He has stated that his wife has lodged a case under section 498A against him in the year 2016 and since September, 2016 she is residing separately. At para-6, he has admitted that he never went to bring back his wife. He has further stated that since his wife used to quarrel with his parents and, as such, he was residing in a rented house with her. He has stated that he has reported the matter to the office of the S.P. and the documents thereof has been filed. He has further stated that there was a compromise arrived at between him and his wife at Sakchi police station. At para-8 of his cross-examination, he has stated that his wife is a teacher and she is getting Rs.28,000/- as salary and he has produced the certificate relating to the salary which has been marked as Ext.1. At para- 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 10 9, he has admitted that he does not want to keep his wife with him as she used to quarrel with him. His wife has driven out him out of the house in the month of September, 2016 and since then they were living separately. He has admitted that he did not inform anyone in this regard rather he only informed his in-laws. He has denied that due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry he has assaulted his wife and tortured her. 21. PW2-Bijay Kumar Maurya is the younger brother of the petitioner who has corroborated the statement of the petitioner with regard to marriage and cruelty meted out to the petitioner at the hands of the respondent. 22. PW2 has stated that the respondent with an intention to burn down their house had set it on fire resulting in scorched curtain. Due to her pressure his brother shifted with her to Moharda since 17.1.2016 but his brother was compelled to leave the place on 15.09.2016 due to her cruel behaviour. He has stated that despite an undertaking given before Sakchi PS not to repeat her behaviour, the respondent had uploaded scurrilous photographs and post of his mother and sister on social media on 28.05.2018. He has denied the suggestion that despite her willingness his brother was not ready to keep the respondent with him. 23. Per contra, the respondent while examining herself as DW 1 has stated that her marriage was solemnized with the respondent as per Hindu rites and custom on 21.04.2015 and after the marriage they were living together as husband and wife at her inlaws’ house. She has stated that the marriage is love-cum-arranged marriage. She has alleged that the petitioner and his family members started torturing her due to non- fulfillment of demand of dowry and when the matter became intolerable, she lodged Mahila P.S Case No.20 of 2016 against the petitioner and his 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 11 parents under section 498-A/323 IPC read with section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and the petitioner is on bail in that case. She has stated that the petitioner is in habit of consuming liquor and he used to assault her due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. She has stated that if the petitioner mends his ways and undertakes not to torture her again, she is ready to live with him as wife. During cross-examination, she has admitted that she has completed M.Sc. in mathematics and now she is teaching in Vidyabharti Chinmaya School, Telco since April, 2018. She has stated that prior to that, she was teaching in Beldih Church School from June 2012 to May 2013. She admitted that she lodged a case being Mahia PS Case No.20/2016 on 18.09.2016 against the petitioner and his parents. She has admitted that she had filed an application before the S.D.O Court as her husband used to leave her and go away repeatedly. She has admitted that when her husband and in-laws tried to kill her she has made a call to the police who rescued her and save her life. She has further admitted that she has lodged a criminal case against her husband and in-laws and in the F.I.R she had made a complaint that her father-in-law and mother-in-law had tried to kill her by strangulating her, but she somehow managed to escape with her life; she dialed 100 number, but was told to call the police station instead. DW1 has denied the suggestion that she quarreled with her mother-in- law on 13.01.2016 and tried to kill her. She has further denied the suggestion that because of her ill behavior her mother-in-law threatened to call her parents due to which she became anger and set the house on fire due to which curtain of the house was burnt. 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 12 At para-13, DW1 has stated that they were living separately from 17.01.2016 and when she left her matrimonial house, she gave tuition. At para-15, DW1 has stated that his husband had left her on 18.05.2016 for the first time. She has further stated that on 08.06.2016 a compromise was arrived at Sakchi Mahila police station. She has again stated that there was no compromise at the police station, rather her husband had given an undertaking in writing that he himself had left the house and returned back again on his own will. She has further denied that she does not have any information that her husband had given an application to S.P, East Singhbhum alleging that since her wife used to pay rent of the house and, as such, she told him to get out of her house. At para-16 of her cross examination, she has admitted that from 08.06.2016 they were living as husband and wife at Moharda. She has further admitted that she does not live separately from her husband who used to come to her house to meet her time to time. At para-18, she has stated that it is true that she gave her fard beyan in the FIR alleging that her husband did not pay any penny for maintenance. She has further denied the suggestion that her in-laws had treated her well. 24. Thus, from scrutiny of the evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner, it is evident that the respondent-wife had filed a criminal case under sections 498A/323 IPC and 3/4 D.P Act against her husband and in-laws. It is also evident from the evidence of the respondent that it was the petitioner who had left the rented house on his own will and again returned back there and in this regard, he had given an undertaking in the police station. It is also evident from the evidence of the parties that on the one hand, the appellant-husband has alleged that due to cruel 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 13 behaviour of his wife he was compelled to leave his parents’ house and after shifting in a rented house he was again compelled to leave the said rented house due to cruel and quarrelsome behaviour of the respondent. 25. On the other hand, the respondent-wife has denied the allegation and has stated that due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry she was driven out from the matrimonial house. She has further stated at para-16 of her cross examination that her husband (the appellant herein) used to come to her house to meet with her time to time. 26. It needs to refer herein that the “desertion” is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, ‘the home’. The desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. 27. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 14 matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. In such a situation, the party who is filing 28. This Court, on the premise of the interpretation of the word “desertion” has considered the evidence of the petitioner and the respondent as has been incorporated by the learned Family Court in the impugned judgment dated 11.07.2023. The appellant has claimed that her wife (respondent herein) has deserted him and living separately since September, 2016 at the time when he was driven out of the rented house by the respondent whereas the respondent has specifically stated that it was the petitioner and his parents who had driven her out of the matrimonial house due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. She has further stated that her husband (the appellant herein) used to visit her in her rented house time to time. 29. Herein, as per the facts of the case it is evident that the appellant and the respondent were living separately in a rented house from the parental house of the appellant and later on the appellant returned back to his parental house again and left her and started living in his parental house. 30. It has also come in the evidence of the appellant-husband himself that the respondent-wife had lodged a criminal case against him under the provision of Dowry Prohibition Act which is still pending. 31. The learned Family Judge has appreciated the entire facts and evidence and has come to the conclusion that the appellant-husband has failed to make the ground either of cruelty or desertion and, as such, has dismissed the suit which is under challenge in the instant appeal. 32. It needs to refer herein that the fact about filing of suit on the ground of cruelty is admitted one as per the evidences adduced on behalf 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 15 of the appellant. The appellant-husband has tried to establish the element of cruelty upon him at the hands of the respondent-wife and in order to establish the same the evidences has been laid as has been referred hereinabove. 33. This Court while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant on the issue of perversity needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. 34. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under: “24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 16 a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. 27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. “Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.” 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.” 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 17 35. In the instant case, the ground for divorce has been taken on the pretext of cruelty. 36. The “cruelty” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastana, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has been laid down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the conduct charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. 37. This Court deems it fit and proper to take into consideration the meaning of ‘cruelty’ as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the appellant-husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition. 38. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct and in respect of matrimonial obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, “intentional” or “unintentional”. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a question of fact and degree.” 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty it is important for the Court to not search for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered to include is the kind of life the 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 18 parties are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and human values” to which they attach importance. 40. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement filed before the Court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty. 41. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337, the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of “lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family while he was conducting a cross-examination. The Hon’ble Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to constitute “cruelty”. 42. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself. 43. It needs to refer herein that it is settled position that a proceeding under Hindu Marriage act is not criminal proceeding where proof beyond reasonable doubt is required rather preponderance of probability" is enough. The accepted rule, therefore, is that circumstantial evidence is all that can normally be expected in proof of charge; However, the circumstances must be such as to lead to fair inference, as a necessary conclusion. 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 19 44. Further, it requires to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has observed that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce. 45. It is evident from the interpretation of the word cruelty that the same is to be considered on different parameters depending upon the material, if available on record. 46. Now re-adverting to the factual aspect, it is evident from the impugned order that the allegations specific to the ground of alleged cruelty has been made by petitioner-husband vide paras- 6 and 9 of his examination-in-chief. 47. However, it is evident from the testimony of the appellant- husband that nothing substantial has come in his testimony in order to substantiate the cruelty meted to him at the hands of the respondent-wife. Further, no cogent evidence has been produced on behalf of the appellant- husband that there were any grave and weighty circumstances arose which compelled him to pullout himself from matrimonial obligation, rather it is evident from the testimony of witnesses that the substances which have been stated is only related to normal wear and tear of life. It is further evident from the evidence of the appellant-husband that though there was allegation of torture and quarrelsome behaviour of the respondent-wife 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 20 but it has nowhere come in the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant-husband that the torture meted out by the respondent-wife is so grave and weighty that there was no chance of reunion of the parties, rather it was normal wear and tear of the matrimonial life. 48. It is also evident from the evidence of the respondent-wife, particularly, at para-16 of her cross examination wherein she has admitted that she is not residing separately with her husband (the appellant herein), rather the appellant used to come to meet with her time to time. She has also stated in her examination-in-chief at para-8 that if the petitioner mends his habit, gives up demand of dowry and undertakes to keep her as his wife with necessary comforts and dignity, she is willing to live with the petitioner as his sincere and devoted wife. 49. Further, it is evident from the impugned order that the learned Family Court has examined each and every aspect of the instant case and found that the appellant-husband has miserably failed to establish the element of cruelty. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under: “9. From the sifting of evidence brought on record it is manifest that the parties were married on 21.1.2015 but are separate since 15.9.2016. The allegation and counter allegation is of cruelty. However from the perusal of the evidence brought on record it is manifest that the occurrences complained of are trivial being quarrels and lack of adjustment or harmony between the parties leading to disturbances in day to day life. Moreover, the petitioner himself is found to have left the respondent in the rented accommodation returning on his own sweet will. While the petitioner had filed informatory petition the respondent on the other hand had initiated proceedings against him for demand of dowry. The respondent appears to have taken conciliatory approaches by returning to her matrimonial home leaving her own residence only to find herself caught between Scylla and Charybdis. Even then the dispute between the parties do not appear to be more than normal wear and tear of married life. The events narrated by the parties appear more 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 21 to be in the nature of family drama than of cruelty as envisaged in 13(1a) Hindu Marriage Act. 1955. Furthermore from the perusal of the deposition of the respondent at para 16 she has stated to be not separate from her husband who keeps on visiting her from time to time. Thus from the discussion made as above it transpires that no specific instances of cruelty to him has been made out against the respondent. Except of a single instance of humiliation no other instance has been brought out by the petitioner to establish cruelty within the meaning of Section 13 1(ia) Hindu Mariage Act, 1955. Even that instance is not specific nor has been established by corroborative evidence. Thus the allegations made by the petitioner are omnibus and general in nature without any specific instances. In the considered opinion of this Court the evidence and facts stated by the petitioner does not entitle him for a relief on the ground of cruelty by the respondent. it would therefore not de proper to put an end to the matrimonial life on such allegations without any proof. The respondent must be shown to have indulged in such willful and unjustifiable conduct so as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental of the petitioner. The respondent must be proved to have Indulged in unprovoked and abusive conduct towards the petitioner causing ensnaring humiliation, distress and miseries to the detriment of his mental and physical health as well as making it impossible for him to maintain the marital status. Needless to say the evidence on record does not point to that extend and as such it can be stated without any doubt that the petitioner has failed to establish cruelty by the respondent upon him so as to entitle him for a decree of divorce. On the contrary, the petitioner having abandoned the respondent as well as having assaulted her for dowry appears to be taking advantage of his own wrong for obtaining the relief as prayed for in the plaint to the suit. Stil further the petitioner by revisiting the respondent has condoned the acts of the petitioner complained of. The petitioner had filed informatory petition on 22.5.2016 while he has resided with the respondent as per his own deposition, till September 2016. Given the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above as well as sifting of evidence, no detailed or specific discussion and appreciation of documents filed by the parties is required any further. In view of the discussions as made above the petitioner is held not entitled to a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion. Accordingly, the petitioner is held to have failed to prove the allegations of cruelty and desertion made against the respondent beyond preponderance of all probabilities. These issues are decided accordingly against the petitioner.” 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 22 50. Thus, it is evident that the appellant-husband although has taken the ground of cruelty meted to him by his wife but in course of trial, he has failed to establish the element of cruelty meted out to him at the hands of the respondent-wife as discussed hereinabove. 51. This Court after discussing the aforesaid factual aspect along with the legal position and adverting to the consideration made by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment has found therefrom that the issue of element of cruelty has well been considered by the learned Family Judge. 52. On consideration of the evidence, the learned Family Judge has come to conclusion that the appellant-husband has miserably failed to establish the ground of cruelty against the respondent-wife, rather it is the appellant-husband, who himself has committed cruelty upon the respondent by demanding dowry. It has also come on evidence that the respondent-wife desires that she is still willing to live with her husband if he keeps her with necessary comforts and dignity as wife. 53. The aforesaid reason has led the learned Family Judge to dismiss the suit. 54. This Court, on consideration of the finding arrived at by the learned Family Judge and based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Family Judge is not coming under the fold of the perversity, since, the conscious consideration has been made of the evidences, both ocular and documentary, as would be evident from the impugned judgment. 55. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the judgment dated 11.07.2023 and the decree signed on 18.07.2023 passed in Original Suit 2026:JHHC:17456-DB 23 No. 26 of 2018 by the learned Family Judge need no interference and, accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed. 56. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) I Agree. (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) Sudhir Dated:15/06/2026 Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi AFR Uploaded on 17/06/2026.