JUDGMENT : BIPIN CHANDER NEGI, J. CMP No. 15981 of 2024 1. The present application has been filed on 2nd August, 2024. The same has been filed for enhancement of the use and occupation charges in the case at hand. Admittedly, eviction by the Rent Controller in the case at hand had taken place on 15.12.2017. Subsequent thereto, the landlord/tenant relationship inter se the parties stood cancelled. The landlord was entitled to use and occupation charges as operation, execution of the judgment passed by the Rent Controller had been stayed during the pendency of the appeal preferred before the 1st Appellate Court by the tenant/present petitioner. 2. Use and occupation charges by the 1st Appellate Court, during the pendency of the appeal preferred before the Appellate Authority by the tenant, had been determined on the 4th day of July, 2018. For the purpose of determination of use and occupation charges by the 1st Appellate Court, a lease deed qua shop bearing No. 6 on the Mall Road level, measuring 502 sq. feet (48.33 sq. meters), owned by the wife of the present petitioner/tenant/non-applicant, executed on 18.1.2017, was used as the basis for determining the use and occupation charges. The same was fixed at Rs. 597.60 per sq. foot. The area of the tenanted premises in the case at hand occupied by the non-applicant/tenant was taken as 275 sq. feet, and hence a sum of Rs. 1,64,340 per month (275 × 597.60) was fixed as use and occupation charges. The same was admittedly assailed before a Coordinate Bench of this Court by both the parties. The landlord sought enhancement, whereas the tenant, to the contrary, sought a decrease in the use and occupation charges. Both the revision petitions, vide a common order dated 2.1.2019, were dismissed, and the order passed by the first appellate Court dated 4.7.2018 fixing the use and occupation charges was upheld. 3. Post dismissal of the appeal filed before the first appellate Court on 29.12.2023, the present revision petition was preferred before this Court on 3.4.2024. Vide order dated 14.5.2024, the execution proceedings in the case at hand filed by the landlord were kept in abeyance. 3. Post dismissal of the appeal filed before the first appellate Court on 29.12.2023, the present revision petition was preferred before this Court on 3.4.2024. Vide order dated 14.5.2024, the execution proceedings in the case at hand filed by the landlord were kept in abeyance. As has already been stated supra, use and occupation charges in the case at hand was determined on 4.7.2018, taking into account a lease deed entered into by the wife of the non-applicant qua property owned by her on the Mall Road, which was executed on 18.1.2017. 4. By virtue of the present application, the applicants/landlords submit that rentals in the vicinity of the demised premises have increased. In order to demonstrate the same, the applicants/landlords have placed on record a leave and licence agreement dated 14.3.2023 entered into with respect to a shop situated on the Mall Road in the vicinity of the demised premises. The area of the shop qua which the leave and licence agreement pertains is 300 sq. feet. Licence fee payable with respect to the same is Rs. 3 lacs per month plus GST. Hence, according to the applicants/landlords, the per square foot rate in terms of the leave and licence agreement dated 14.3.2023 placed on record is Rs. 1000/-. To show that the licence fee determined is being paid, relevant bank record has been placed on record. 5. Per contra, the tenant/non-applicant has placed on record supplementary agreements entered into between the tenant and his wife qua shop No. 6 on the Mall Road, which is owned by the wife of the tenant in the case at hand. According to the supplementary agreements placed on record, the rental of the shop has reduced over a period of time. Other than the aforesaid, order dated 27.5.2024 passed by a co-ordinate bench of this court has been placed on record, which pertains to another shop on the Mall Road (in the same building wherein the premises in question exist), which has been let out by the present applicants/landlords and which is contiguous to the demised premises let out to the present non-applicant/tenant. 6. 6. The applicants/landlords, in the rejoinder filed, have stated that the supplementary agreements placed on record by the non-applicant/tenant cannot be given credence, as the same appear to have been entered into by the tenant therein and his wife with the intent of reducing the use and occupation charges fixed by the first appellate Court in the case at hand and up-held by a co-ordinate bench of this court. It is submitted that the order dated 27.5.2024 on which reliance has been placed by the non-applicant is based on the use and occupation charges fixed in the case at hand on 4th July, 2018 by the 1st Appellate Court, hence, it is of no avail to the non-applicant/tenant. 7. Interim orders passed staying the operation and execution of judgments passed by the Rent Controller and first appellate Court staying eviction in the case at hand are passed in an equitable jurisdiction. One who claims equity must do equity. After an eviction order has been passed by the Rent Controller, the landlord/tenant relationship comes to an end. The erstwhile tenant thereafter is a trespasser who, on account of his occupation of the demised premises, is liable to pay use and occupation charges to the owner of the demised premises. 8. Had the premises, post passing of the eviction order by the Rent Controller, been vacated by the erstwhile tenant, then the owner would have been free to let out the same to a willing tenant at Mall Road at the market rate. Hence, once the eviction orders passed by the Rent Controller and the 1st Appellate Court are stayed, the erstwhile tenant is under obligation to pay use and occupation charges to the owner at market rate. 9. Use and occupation charges in the case at hand were fixed on 4th July, 2018 by the 1st Appellate Court. The same were based on a lease deed dated 18.1.2017. The 1st Appellate Court had affirmed the eviction on 29.12.2023. Thereafter, the present revision was preferred on 3rdApril, 2024. Since the passing of the order dated 4.7.2018 fixing use and occupation charges in the case at hand, which was affirmed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court on 2.1.2019, more than seven and a half years have elapsed. 10. The mall road where the demised premises are located is a commercial area. The mall road has to extreme ends. Since the passing of the order dated 4.7.2018 fixing use and occupation charges in the case at hand, which was affirmed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court on 2.1.2019, more than seven and a half years have elapsed. 10. The mall road where the demised premises are located is a commercial area. The mall road has to extreme ends. One is towards the lift and another towards the office of the Deputy Commissioner. The premises in the case at hand are closer to the end of the Mall Road which is towards the lift. The premises qua which leave and licence agreement has been placed on record by the applicants/landlords is also located towards the end closer to the lift. Both the demised premises and the shop qua which the leave and licence agreement has been placed on record are in the immediate vicinity of each other. 11. The shop owned by the landlord, i.e., the wife of the non-applicant/tenant, is located towards the other end closer to the Deputy Commissioner’s office. The same is not in the immediate vicinity of the demised premises. The supplementary agreements placed on record by the non-applicant/tenant showing reduction in rent of the premises let out by the wife of the non-applicant/tenant cannot be given credence. The contention of the landlords/applicants qua the same having been entered into with the sole purpose of reduction of use and occupation charges in the case at hand carries weight. 12. The shop area in the case at hand let out to the non-applicant/tenant is being disputed. The landlords/applicants claim that the area is 315 sq. feet, whereas the tenant states that the area is 275 sq. feet. In order to determine the total area under the occupation of the tenant in the case at hand, reliance can be placed on Exhibit RW-2/D, i.e., the map placed on record by the non-applicant/tenant, along with the technical report Exhibit RW-2/A filed by the tenant/non-applicant. Based on the same, the total area in terms of square meters comes to 29.308 square meters, which, when converted into square feet, comes to a little more than 315 square feet. Based on the same, the total area in terms of square meters comes to 29.308 square meters, which, when converted into square feet, comes to a little more than 315 square feet. Hence, in this respect, by placing reliance on the documents filed by the tenant/non-applicant, it is evident that the total area under the occupation of the tenant/non-applicant is 315 square feet and not 275 square feet, as has been wrongly contended by the non-applicant/tenant. 13. Hence, from the date of filing of the present application for use and occupation, i.e., from 2nd August, 2024, Rs. 1000 per square foot is determined as the use and occupation with respect to the shop area under the occupation of the non-applicant/tenant, area whereof is 315 square feet. For the three years prior to 2nd August, 2024, since use and occupation charges have been paid for 275 square feet, the applicants/landlords are held entitled to recover use and occupation charges for the balance 40 square feet at the rate of Rs. 597.60 per square foot. The amount in this respect is to be paid within 30 days of the passing of the present order. 14. In view thereof, the application stands disposed of. Civil Revision No. 55 of 2024 1. The petitioner, by filing this petition under section 24(5) of HP Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, has assailed the judgment and decree dated 29.12.2023, passed by the learned Appellate Authority-II, Shimla, District Shimla, HP in Rent Appeal No.4-S/13(b) of 2018, affirming the eviction order dated 15.12.2017, passed by the learned Rent Controller, Shimla, HP in Rent Petition No.11/2 of 2016/12. 2. The scope of interference in a petition seeking revision of an order passed by the Rent Controller or Appellate Authority is now no longer res integra. For the purpose of convenience and ready reference sub-section (5) of Section 24 of the Act is extracted as under :- “Vesting of Appellate Authority on officers by the State Government. 2. The scope of interference in a petition seeking revision of an order passed by the Rent Controller or Appellate Authority is now no longer res integra. For the purpose of convenience and ready reference sub-section (5) of Section 24 of the Act is extracted as under :- “Vesting of Appellate Authority on officers by the State Government. Section 24 … … … … (5) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of the aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit.” [Emphasis supplied] 3. In this regard a reference to the authoritative pronouncement of a five-Judges Bench of the apex Court reported in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 would be appropriate and relevant. The findings can be summarized as under: (i) The term ‘propriety’ would imply something which is legal and proper. (ii) The power of the High Court even though wider than the one provided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not wide enough to that of the appellate Authority. (iii) Such power cannot be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. (iv) Issues raised in the original proceedings cannot be permitted to be reheard as an appellate Authority. (v) The expression “revision” is meant to convey the idea of much narrower expression than the one expressed by the expression “appeal”. The revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the CPC but certainly it is not wide enough to make the HighCourt a second court of first appeal. While holding so the Court reiterated the view taken in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate vs. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagawal, (1975) 2 SCC 246 . (vi) The meaning of the expression “legality and propriety” so explained in Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131 was only to the extent that exercise of the power is not confined to jurisdictional error alone and has to be “according to law”. (vi) The meaning of the expression “legality and propriety” so explained in Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131 was only to the extent that exercise of the power is not confined to jurisdictional error alone and has to be “according to law”. (vii) Whether or not the finding of fact is according to law or not is required to be seen on the touch stone, as to whether such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any illegality like misreading of the evidence; overlooking; ignoring the material evidence all together; suffers from perversity; illegality; or such finding has resulted into gross miscarriage of justice. Court clarified that the ratio of Ram Dass (supra) does not exposit that the revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a finding contrary to the findings returned by the authority below. (viii) In exercise of its revisional jurisdiction High Court shall not reverse findings of fact merely because on reappreciation of the evidence it may have a different view thereupon. (ix) The exercise of such power to examine record and facts must be understood in the context of the purpose that such findings are based on firm legal basis and not on a wrong premise of law. (x) Pure findings of fact are not to be interfered with. Reconsideration of all questions of fact is impermissible as Court cannot function as a Court of appeal. (xi) Even while considering the propriety and legality, high Court cannot reappreciate the evidence only for the purposes of arriving at a different conclusion. Consideration of the evidence is confined only to adjudge the legality, regularity and propriety of the order. (xii) Incorrect finding of fact must be understood in the context of such findings being perverse, based on no evidence; and misreading of evidence. 4. The first and foremost contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/tenant is that the eviction petition in the case at hand has been filed under Section 14, Sub-section (3), Clause (a), sub-clause (i) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act (hereinafter for purpose of brevity referred to as the Act) thereof. 4. The first and foremost contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/tenant is that the eviction petition in the case at hand has been filed under Section 14, Sub-section (3), Clause (a), sub-clause (i) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act (hereinafter for purpose of brevity referred to as the Act) thereof. In this respect, it is specifically contended that insofar as the first proviso to the aforesaid provision is concerned, the landlords/respondents are debarred from filing a petition for eviction if they are occupying another non-residential building in the urban area concerned. 5. The petitioner/tenant contends in the case at hand that the landlords/respondents are occupying non-residential premises owned by them in the urban area, amounting to 3,906 sq.ft.. The same exists in the building wherein the suit premises are located. 6. In the aforesaid backdrop, learned counsel further submits that in the building wherein the demised premises exist, the shop area owned by the landlords/respondents on the Mall Road level is 594 sq. ft., below the Mall Road level, they have an area of 1,656 sq. ft., which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant, has been converted from residential to non-residential premises under Section 12 of the Act. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant has drawn the attention of this Court to Exhibit PW-2/A, i.e., a copy of the order dated 11.10.2001, permitting the landlord/respondent to convert the first floor of the building existing below the Mall Road level, wherein the suit premises is located from a residential to a non-residential premises. 8. Besides the aforesaid, it is submitted that there is a basement area in the building which is being used for commercial purposes, which is an area of 1,495 sq. ft. It is further submitted that there is a shed area in the basement measuring 161 sq. ft., which is also non-residential. 9. Based on the aforesaid it is contended that the eviction petition filed by the respondent/landlord in the case at hand is itself not maintainable. The aforesaid contention is sought to be supported by the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court reported as 1994 Supp (1) SCC 729 titled D. DevaJi vs. K. Sudarashana Rao (94 (1) RCR 185). 9. Based on the aforesaid it is contended that the eviction petition filed by the respondent/landlord in the case at hand is itself not maintainable. The aforesaid contention is sought to be supported by the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court reported as 1994 Supp (1) SCC 729 titled D. DevaJi vs. K. Sudarashana Rao (94 (1) RCR 185). Per contra learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord has submitted that the judgement being referred to in D. DevaJi (supra) by the tenant/petitioner has no applicability to the facts of the case at hand. The same deals with a provision of the Andhra Rent Control Act, which is not pari materia to the provision being considered herein. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord has placed reliance on Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, (2005) 5 SCC 375 wherein the apex court had an occasion to deal with the first proviso to Section 14, Sub-section (3), Clause (a), sub-clause (i) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act which is the basis of the contention of the petitioner/tenant before this court. In view of the law laid therein it is asserted that the petition filed for eviction in the case at hand by the landlord/respondent before the rent controller is maintainable. 10. The relevant part of sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act reads as under: “14. (3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession— (a) in the case of a residential building and non-residential building, if— (i) he requires it for his own occupation: Provided that he is not occupying another residential and non-residential building owned by him, in the urban area concerned. 11. The scope of the first proviso came up for consideration in Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, (2005) 5 SCC 375 . Therein it was held that the first proviso is not to be read in isolation. It has to be read along with the principal provision to which it is appended. The occupation of another non-residential building, to act in denial of the landlord’s right to evict the tenant to satisfy his requirement, must have correlation with the requirement of the landlord. It has to be read along with the principal provision to which it is appended. The occupation of another non-residential building, to act in denial of the landlord’s right to evict the tenant to satisfy his requirement, must have correlation with the requirement of the landlord. The first proviso would come into play only if the landlord is occupying another non-residential building of his own in the same urban area and such building is considered by the court as reasonably enough and suitable to satisfy the proven requirement of the landlord. 12. With respect to the first proviso to Section 14, Sub-section (3), Clause (a), sub-clause (i) of the Act in Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, (2005) 5 SCC 375 the following was held; “What is the scope of the first proviso? Whether the occupation by the landlord of any other residential accommodation of whatever nature, in abstract and without consideration of any other relevant factor would be enough to attract the applicability of the first proviso and to deny the landlord his right to seek an order of eviction against the tenant? In our opinion, the first proviso is not to be read in isolation. It has to be read along with the principal provision to which it is appended. The ground for eviction in the case of a residential building is “he requires it for his own occupation”. If the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the landlord do not make out a case of requirement, there would be no question of the tenant being directed to put the landlord in possession. Even on the requirement having been proved, the landlord would be denied the order for possession from the tenant because of his being in occupation of “another residential building owned by him in the same urban area”. The occupation of another residential building, to act in denial of the landlord’s right to evict the tenant to satisfy his requirement, must have correlation with the requirement of the landlord. To illustrate, another residential building in occupation of the landlord may be crumbling, or may be in a dilapidated condition or may consist of very little residential space, say one small room alone, which it would be a misnomer to call availability of a residential building in occupation of the landlord by any stretch of imagination. To illustrate, another residential building in occupation of the landlord may be crumbling, or may be in a dilapidated condition or may consist of very little residential space, say one small room alone, which it would be a misnomer to call availability of a residential building in occupation of the landlord by any stretch of imagination. The legislature could not have intended such an absurd and unreasonable consequence to follow. In our opinion, the first proviso would come into play only if the landlord is occupying another residential building of his own in the same urban area and such building is considered by the court as reasonably enough and suitable to satisfy the proven requirement of the landlord. 25. Provisions like Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Act should be so interpreted as to advance the cause of justice instructed by the realities of life and practical wisdom. While the tenant needs to be protected, the courts would not ordinarily deny the relief to the landlord, who genuinely and bona fide requires the premises in occupation of the tenant for occupation by himself or for the members of his family, unless they feel convinced that the so-called requirement of the landlord was a ruse for getting rid of an inconvenient tenant or was otherwise mala fide and did not fall within the four corners of the ground for eviction provided by the law. 13. The judgment D. Devaji relied upon by the petitioner is not relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. The same pertains to an interpretation of a provision under the Andra Pradesh Rent Control Act. The provision whereupon reliance has been placed by the present petitioner insofar as the HP Urban Rent Control Act is concerned is not pari materia to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act which has been considered D. Devaji’s case. 14. Even otherwise in Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons v. Pushpa Trading Co., (1998) 5 SCC 572 , D. Devaji was considered. The relevant extract whereof reads as follow: “………………… 14. It, thus, becomes evident that there is no conflict as such between the said decisions and they have gone on in the context of their own facts and the provisions of law. The relevant extract whereof reads as follow: “………………… 14. It, thus, becomes evident that there is no conflict as such between the said decisions and they have gone on in the context of their own facts and the provisions of law. Even so, the argument of the appellant’s learned counsel carries weight that the intention of the legislature in D. Devaji case has been scuttled by putting an extremely narrow and literal construction on the provision. It has been observed therein as under: (SCC p. 732, Para 4) “The landlord should not be in possession of another non-residential building or of which he is entitled to be in possession in the city, town or village concerned. The intendment of the legislature thereby is clear that a landlord who is in occupation of a non-residential building which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled to under the Act or any other law should not be permitted to recover possession of another non-residential building belonging to him by evicting the tenants therefrom.” 15. The aspects of quality, size and suitability of the building have been totally put out of consideration. We think this would frustrate the purposes of the Act. Here was a claim set up by the landlord that the non-residential premises he owned did not serve the purpose of his need of setting up a textile and cloth business and that the need could only be met in seeking eviction of the tenant from the premises sought. As we view it there is no difficulty in D. Devaji case standing in the way of the landlord-appellant to have the issue examined from the point of view which would carry out the purposes of the Act. We refrain from mentioning any facts on the basis of which the landlord’s claim is based lest the manner they are recounted cause prejudice to either of the parties. …………” 15. Besides the aforesaid in Gulab Chand Pukhraj v. R.B. Jinender Raj, (2009) 9 SCC 752 after referring to Boorgu the following was stated: “………… 16. In Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons this Court was clearly of the opinion that the aspects of quality, size and suitability of the building cannot be put out of consideration and doing so would be to frustrate the purposes of the Act …………” 16. In Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons this Court was clearly of the opinion that the aspects of quality, size and suitability of the building cannot be put out of consideration and doing so would be to frustrate the purposes of the Act …………” 16. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the apex court in Kailash Chand’s case there is no merit in the contention of the petitioner/tenant that merely on account of the fact that the landlord is occupying another non-residential building of his own in the same urban area that the eviction petition filed in the case at hand is not maintainable. Once bona fide requirement is proved, the first proviso would come into play only if the landlord is occupying another non-residential building of his own in the same urban area and such building is considered by the court as reasonably enough and suitable to satisfy the proven requirement of the landlord. 17. The expression “bona fide requirement” means the genuine need of the landlord as opposed to a mere wish or desire of the landlord. The need in the facts substantiated by the landlord should be natural, real, sincere and honest. The expression “bona fide requirement” came up for consideration in Pratap Rai Tanwani and Anr. Vs. Uttam Chand and Another, 2004 (2) RCR (Rent) 436 : (2004) 8 SCC 490 . The same was explained in the following manner:- “12. One of the grounds for eviction contemplated by all the rent control legislations, which otherwise generally lean heavily in favour of the tenants, is the need of the owner landlord to have his own premises, residential or non-residential, for his own use or his own occupation. The expressions employed by different legislations may vary such as "bona fide requirement", "genuine need", "requires reasonably and in good faith", and so on. Whatever be the expression employed, the underlying legislative intent is one and that has been demonstrated in several judicial pronouncements of which we would like to refer to only three. 14. In Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra reiterating the view taken in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan it was held that the words "reasonable requirement" undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. 14. In Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra reiterating the view taken in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan it was held that the words "reasonable requirement" undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. 15. Recently, in Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta this Court in a detailed judgment, dealing with this aspect, analysed the concept of bona fide requirement and said that the requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant refers to a state of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way of peeping into the mind of the landlord is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by placing himself in the armchair of the landlord and then posing a question to himself- whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. We do not think that we can usefully add anything to the exposition of law of requirement for self-occupation than what has been already stated in the three precedents.” 18. The demised premises in the case at hand exist on the second floor of the building. The second floor is located at the Mall Road level. The same has been divided into three portions. In one portion the landlord is running his business in the name and style of M/s. Nathu Ram. The second part is possessed by the present tenant and the 3rd part is possessed by another tenant against whom also a separate petition for eviction has been filed. All three are divided by wooden partitions. By removing of the same, one single unit can be created by the landlord at the mall road level. 19. The building wherein the landlord is running his business and portions whereof have been let out to the present tenant were purchased by the landlord in the year 1972. The business is being carried out ever since. By removing of the same, one single unit can be created by the landlord at the mall road level. 19. The building wherein the landlord is running his business and portions whereof have been let out to the present tenant were purchased by the landlord in the year 1972. The business is being carried out ever since. In the year 2001 portion of the property existing below the Mall Road level i.e. first floor of the building was got converted from a residential into a non-residential premise in terms of order dated 11.10.2001 i.e. Ex.PW-2/A. In the said portion so got converted, business is being conducted by the landlord in the name and style of M/s John Raymond Bright (a partnership firm). The aforesaid conversion of the first floor of the building into a non-residential premise clearly reflects that the same was done to accommodate the expansion of the business. 20. After 2001 need on account of expansion arose in 2012. It is on account of expansion of the existing business carried out in the name of M/s Nathu Ram and M/s John Raymond Bright that the present petition for eviction was filed on 18.05.2012. Additional requirement was necessitated for better display and to serve customers better. The income tax returns filed depict increase in business. 21. Both the Courts after considering the pleadings and evidence placed on record have concurrently held that the bona fide requirement of the landlord in the case at hand is genuine bona fide and made in good faith. No infirmity calling for interference by this court in this respect has been pointed out. I see no reason to differ with the view taken by both the Courts below. 22. The bona fide personal need is a question of fact. Once the bona fide requirement is established then neither the Court nor the tenant can dictate the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilized by him for the purpose of his business. The landlord is the best judge of his own requirement. Even otherwise as concurrently held the occupation of the other part of the building in the case at hand is not reasonably enough and suitable to satisfy the proven requirement of the landlord. In this respect, suffice it to state that the demised premises are located in the best commercial area of Shimla, i.e., the Mall Road. Even otherwise as concurrently held the occupation of the other part of the building in the case at hand is not reasonably enough and suitable to satisfy the proven requirement of the landlord. In this respect, suffice it to state that the demised premises are located in the best commercial area of Shimla, i.e., the Mall Road. One of the purposes of expansion of business is to display the goods being sold, other than stacking/storing of the same. The demised premises, being on the Mall Road, have high visibility. No other part of the building, in the case at hand, exists on the Mall Road level. As has already been stated supra, by removal of the wooden partition, the shop size and frontage of the shop occupied by the landlord, post eviction of the tenant in the case at hand, would be increased. 23. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner/tenant is that insofar as the present suit premises are concerned, they were taken over from a previous tenant, as is evident from the cross-examination of the respondents/landlords on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. In view thereof, it is submitted that the second proviso to Section 14, Sub-section (3), Clause (d) of the Act is applicable. The same reads as under:- “Provided further that where the landlord has obtained possession of any building or rented land under the provisions of clause (a) or clause (b), he shall not be entitled to apply again under the said clause for the possession of any other building of the same class or rented land.” 24. Per contra learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord has placed reliance on Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, (2005) 5 SCC 375 wherein it is contended that the aforesaid proviso came up for consideration. 25. A pari materia provision of the Haryana Urban Rent Control Act came up for consideration in Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd., (2000) 4 SCC 285 wherein the expression “entitled to apply again” found in the proviso came up for consideration therein. The apex court held that Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 like any other similar Act in other States in India is an enactment which controls the fixation of rent and eviction of the tenants from rented premises to which the Act is applicable. The apex court held that Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 like any other similar Act in other States in India is an enactment which controls the fixation of rent and eviction of the tenants from rented premises to which the Act is applicable. This Act controls the right of a landlord to seek eviction of tenanted premises, it restricts the right of a landlord to seek eviction on those grounds mentioned in the Act. Section 13 enumerates various grounds on which a landlord can seek possession. This right is further restricted if the landlord has obtained possession of similar premises under the same provisions of law by the proviso. Following examples were cited therein by the apex court, if the landlord is seeking eviction of a tenant on the ground that the same is required for the use of his son then, in view of the proviso applicable to that sub-section, he can seek eviction of the premises only once. Similarly, if the landlord is seeking eviction for his own occupation under Section 13(3)(b) of the Act then by virtue of the proviso applicable to that sub-section, the landlord can seek such eviction only once in regard to the premises of the same nature. Based on the aforesaid in the opinion of the apex court in Molar Mal, the bar imposed by the proviso is in fact a bar on the right of the landlord to seek actual eviction and not confined to the filing of the application for eviction. Further the apex court held in Molar Mal that the proviso does not make any such distinction between a landlord seeking possession of the premises held by more than one tenant occupying the same building or the tenants occupying different independent buildings under the same landlord. For the reason, the object of the proviso like any other provisions of the Act, is to further restrict the right of the landlord to seek eviction; if that be so, no justification was found in reading into the proviso something as conferring a larger right on the landlord to evict more than one tenant if those tenants are occupying different parts of the same premises. 26. A Bench of three Judges in Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, (2005) 5 SCC 375 did not accept the aforesaid construction placed on the said proviso. 26. A Bench of three Judges in Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, (2005) 5 SCC 375 did not accept the aforesaid construction placed on the said proviso. The apex court held that a landlord by virtue of the said proviso would not be denied relief under sub-section 14(3)(a)(i) if the requirement has undergone a change or a new requirement unrelated to the previous one has come into existence. The said proviso would only kick into operation if the requirement is mala fide. The relevant extract reads as follow; 13…………………………………………The third proviso cannot be so interpreted as to restrict the right conferred by sub-section (3)(a)(i) on the landlord to be exercisable only “once in a lifetime”. The proviso has to be read as providing a statutory expression of a situation which would otherwise have been held to be mala fides of a requirement. A landlord, having obtained possession of any building to satisfy a requirement, cannot again and again plead the same set of circumstances or similar circumstances for evicting tenants one after the other. That is what the third proviso aims at providing. The proviso cannot be interpreted to mean that in spite of the requirement having undergone a change or a new requirement unrelated to the previous one having come into existence, the landlord would yet be denied relief under sub-section (3)(a)(i) merely because at some point of time in the past he had resorted to this provision for seeking an eviction. Such an interpretation is too rigid an interpretation and would cause such hardship to the landlord as the legislature cannot be said to have intended.” 27. In the case at hand the new requirement which has arisen in 2012 is unrelated to the previous one. Hence the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner/tenant that insofar as the present suit premises are concerned, they were taken over from a previous tenant, on the ground of bona fide personal requirement in view of the second proviso to Section 14, Sub-section (3), Clause (d) of the Act the present eviction petition is not maintainable is rejected. 28. The lease deed entered into between the parties to the lis is an un-registered document. A lease deed for more than a period of eleven months is compulsorily registerable. In the absence of registration the same can only be looked into for a collateral purpose. 28. The lease deed entered into between the parties to the lis is an un-registered document. A lease deed for more than a period of eleven months is compulsorily registerable. In the absence of registration the same can only be looked into for a collateral purpose. There is no provision in the Urban Rent Control Act applicable in the case at hand whereby a fixed term commercial tenancy can be created. Even otherwise post entering into a lease agreement, the present respondents/landlords are not debarred from filing an eviction petition on grounds available therein. In view of the aforesaid, there is no force in the contention of the petitioner/tenant that by virtue of the lease agreement entered into between the parties to the lis a lease for an in-definite time had been created. 29. In view of the aforesaid, the present revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, stand disposed of.