JUDGMENT : G. S. Sandhawalia, C.J. The present set of appeals are directed against the common order of the learned Single Judge whereby 10 writ petitions lead case whereof was CWP No. 85 of 2008, titled as Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) & Anr. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., filed by the present appellants, were dismissed on 22.09.2016. 2. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions by placing reliance upon Section 24 of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, which came into force on 01.01.2014, by holding that since the award had been passed on 08.07.1966 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but the possession had not been taken, therefore, by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 2013 the proceedings as such had lapsed by application of law as one of the conditions in the said proviso had not been fulfilled. 3. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Velaxan Kumar vs. Union of India & Ors., (2015) 4 SCC 325 ; The Working Friends Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. vs. The State of Punjab & Ors. JT 2015 (9) SC 357; Pawan Kumar Aggarwal vs. State of Punjab & Ors. JT 2016 (4) SC 178; DDA vs. Raman Grover & Ors. JT 2016(5) SC 196; Shashi Gupta & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. JT 2016 (5) SC 196 and Delhi Development Authority vs. Reena Suri & Ors. JT 2016 (5) SC 291, and it was accordingly held that once the Apex Court as such had decided the legal issue and the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was replaced with Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act came to the rescue of the private respondents and resultantly interference was not done in the orders passed by the Collector on 28.05.2007, 18.06.2007 and 16.11.2010. 4. 4. Counsel for the appellants has argued on the strength of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority vs. Manohar Lal & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129 , that subsequently the judgment in Velaxan Kumar’s case (supra) was specifically over-ruled and it has been held that compensation if has been deposited, then there is no lapse of proceedings and both the conditions have to be satisfied and the word ‘or’ has to be read as ‘and’ and not ‘or’ and the twin requirements are cumulative and conjunctive in nature. 5. Reliance can be placed upon paragraph 366.3, wherein it has been specifically held that if compensation has been paid and the possession has not been taken, then there is no lapse. The said paragraph reads as under:- “366.3 The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.” 6. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge as such is not liable to be sustained since the law declared by the Apex Court is to the contrary now and the judgment in Indore Development Authority (supra) was passed subsequent to the passing of the judgment by the learned Single Judge. 7. The issue now remains as to whether the orders passed by the Collector on 28.05.2007, 18.06.2007 and 16.11.2010, are liable to be sustained, which was subject matter of challenge in the civil writ petitions filed. 8. 7. The issue now remains as to whether the orders passed by the Collector on 28.05.2007, 18.06.2007 and 16.11.2010, are liable to be sustained, which was subject matter of challenge in the civil writ petitions filed. 8. Keeping in view the background as such of the litigation, we are of the considered opinion that the land owners-respondents had perfected their title by way of adverse possession and the present appellants had failed to institute the proceedings within the prescribed period to take possession in accordance with law despite knowing the fact that having the benefit of acquisition of land in their favour and the award dated 08.07.1966, which was on the basis of the notification issued on 04.01.1966. Once they had not taken possession as per the terms of the award, which was to be within six weeks from the date of the award and took steps after 30 years, the respondents had acquired the right to the title on the basis of adverse possession. The relevant portion of the award reads as under:- “The ownership of some buildings occupied by the tenants is disputed by the land owners and the tenants. Necessary apportionment in this respect has been made by me after necessary enquiries at the spot. The compensation due to tenants and interested persons will be paid out of the allocation of the land owners who contest the ownership. Compensation for fruit trees, standing crops and change of residence as well as loss of business will be paid to the tenants out of the allocation of the land owners under whom the tenants work. There are 18 buildings occupied by the land owners and 70 buildings occupied by the tenants for which compensation is to be paid to the interested persons. The possession of these buildings will be given after 6 weeks of the announcement of the award. It can be a possibility that the owners or occupiers remove material of the building within this gap of six weeks. In order to ensure that the buildings are intact, till the taking over of their possession, compensation of the buildings will be paid to the interested persons on the date when the acquiring department is quite in a position to look after these acquired buildings and this date will be within six weeks of the announcing of the award. In order to ensure that the buildings are intact, till the taking over of their possession, compensation of the buildings will be paid to the interested persons on the date when the acquiring department is quite in a position to look after these acquired buildings and this date will be within six weeks of the announcing of the award. If it is found by the acquiring department that the material of any building is removed before taking over possession, the value of this building will be re- assessed by the P.W.D. and the deficiency found in the value of the buildings already assessed will be made good out of the allocation of the person interested who is paid compensation of that building and he will be paid less amount after deducting the value of the material. Date of possession The possession of waste, arable and land under tea bushes will be given immediately after making payment of compensation. Building will be got vacated after six weeks of the announcement of the award. The land owners are allowed 4 months to pull out the tea factory machine from the date of announcement of award whereafter the possession of factory premises will vest with the acquiring department.” 9. It is not disputed that the first proactive steps as such after the passing of the award dated 08.07.1966 was only taken by filing a suit for possession of the land and the house in question and also seeking permanent injunction against the defendants on 29.04.1989, who are the private respondents herein, for restraining other from raising any construction on the suit land. 10. In the plaint itself, the plea taken was that the present appellants is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act and the owners of the land, the details of which were given, the acquisition had been of the year 1966 for establishment of National Biological Research Institute at Palampur. The compensation had been duly deposited and disbursed to the owners and other occupants including the predecessor-in-interests of the defendants and the scheme of establishing the research institute was dropped. In the year 1978, the property was handed over to the Regional Research Laboratory, Jammu, another constituent unit of CSIR for its research work etc. and the Laboratory was using only a part of the property. In the year 1978, the property was handed over to the Regional Research Laboratory, Jammu, another constituent unit of CSIR for its research work etc. and the Laboratory was using only a part of the property. It was further averred that the defendants in the year 1984 had been orally asked to vacate the suit land, but they had not done so and then the suit was filed as they had not vacated the property and were further wanting to raise constructions. The cause of action was stated to be of the year, 1984 and it was admitted that there was house also. One of the plaint reads as under:- “The plaintiff submits as under:- 1. The plaintiff is a society registered under the societies registration Act and is the owner of the land incorporated in the Jamabandi 1983-84, Khata No. 7 Min Khatoni No. 21 Khasra Nos. 225-256 & 258 qita-3 measuring 0-07-13 hectares situated in Mohal Holta, Mauza Holta, Tehsil Palampur alongwith the structure specified in site plan attached Annexure ‘A’. The National Biological Research Institute was to be a constituent of Council of Scientific & Industrial Research, Plaintiff Council. 2. That earlier this land and house mentioned above in para-I of the plaint to be further termed as suit property was a part of the Holta Tea Estate, Palampur alongwith other land and buildings. 3. That in the year 1966, the plaintiff wanted to establish National Biological Research Institute at Palampur and had asked the Punjab Government to acquire the land in Holta Tea Estate, as Distt. Kangra formed a part of State of Punjab at that time. 4. That compensation was awarded to the owners and other occupants of any part of the acquired property by Revenue Asstt. Kangra at Dharamshala, exercising the powers of Collector, Kangra under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which was duly deposited in the Treasury and all the owners and the occupants received their payments of the compensation for all the rights whatever they had in the Holta Tea Estate. 5. That regarding the suit land, the compensation was given to Smt. Waziro predecessor in interest of the present defendants. Sh. Nathu s/o Smt. Waziro whose name is recorded in the revenue papers as occupants, had already died. 6. That as the scheme of establishing the National Biological Research Institute was later dropped and later in the year 1978. 5. That regarding the suit land, the compensation was given to Smt. Waziro predecessor in interest of the present defendants. Sh. Nathu s/o Smt. Waziro whose name is recorded in the revenue papers as occupants, had already died. 6. That as the scheme of establishing the National Biological Research Institute was later dropped and later in the year 1978. The part of the property was temporarily handed over to Regional Research Laboratory, Jammu of CSIR for its work and the laboratory was using only a part of the whole property. 7. That as the plaintiff wanted to establish a Laboratory with its wider objects and research programme, it established its Complex at Palampur in 1983. the plaintiff asked the defendants in 1984 orally to vacate the suit property as all the land and property were required for the purposes of the plaintiff Council. Although the defendants orally promised to vacate the property but they wanted to be given some time as they wanted to make some alternate arrangements in the meantime. But uptill now they have failed to vacate the possession of the suit property. Hence this suit. 8. That as the plaintiff Council needs the suit property for its work and the defendants have not vacated the property rather they are planning to further raise construction for which the defendants have no right at all. The plaintiff Council is left with no other alternative but to initiate the legal proceedings against them. 9. That the cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff in 1984 and now in June, 1988 at Mohal Holta, Tehsil Palampur Distt. Kangra within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 10. That the value of the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction as as follows:- Court fee Jurisdiction Prayer(a) Rs. 7=80 Rs.23=00 Prayer (b) Rs. 2000=00 Rs. 2000=00 Prayer (c) Rs. 190=00 Rs. 190=00 The value of the house has been fixed as Rs. 2000=00 as it is a very old and in dilapidated condition. It is therefore, prayed that a decree as prayed for in the heading of the plaint may kindly be granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants with costs.” 11. 2000=00 Prayer (c) Rs. 190=00 Rs. 190=00 The value of the house has been fixed as Rs. 2000=00 as it is a very old and in dilapidated condition. It is therefore, prayed that a decree as prayed for in the heading of the plaint may kindly be granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants with costs.” 11. Thus, in the plaint itself, the present appellants had admitted the factum that the possession had continued from the year 1966 onwards and they had not taken any proactive steps and they were aware that defendants and predecessor-in-interest now represented by as respondents continued to be in a possession which was apparently adverse and hostile as contention was being raised and there was categorical admission by the present appellants. 12. The suit, however, was dismissed on 30.04.1996 by the Sub Judge First Class, Palampur, Kangra after framing the issue whether the defendants had become owners of the suit property by way of adverse possession on the ground of maintainability keeping in view the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the judgment of the Apex Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay versus M/s Godrej and Boyce AIR 1987 SC 2421 , that the land shall be deemed to be vested in the government in view of Section 16 and therefore the Land Acquisition Act was a complete code in itself. 13. No appeal as such was filed against the said decision and belatedly after three years, the application under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act was preferred before the Collector. The Collector while passing its first order dated 28.05.2007 (Annexure P-1) came to the conclusion that person in possession can validly claim possessory title as against the title of the present appellants and since they had failed to take possession at the time when the award had been passed, the application was not maintainable at the belated stage and dismissed the same. The relevant portion of the order reads as under:- “From the above discussion and perusal of the arguments put forth by the Counsel for the parties and record so placed on the file, the Court has come to the conclusion that the application has been moved by the party/applicant for taking over the possession after long for more than 30 years. The applicant was asked to produce evidence with regard to the actual possession by the defendant at the time of handing over the said possession of the ground as per letter and spirit of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, but in spite of giving of many opportunities to do so, the applicant failed to do so. No credible evidence whatsoever or written has been placed on record which can support their claim. It is therefore, clear that until and unless the defendant takes possession of the land after the acquisition, no title possess to it. In such a case, the person in possession can validly claim possessory title as against the title. It was for the applicant to take over the actual possession at the time of handing over the possession by the acquiring authority and in case had their been some resistance to do, it would have been appropriate for the applicant party to move under Section 16 of Land Acquisition Act to obtain the actual possession on the ground at that point of time. Since that remedy has not been availed by the party at that point of time, therefore, this application is not maintainable under Section 16 of Land Acquisition Act, now and hence dismissed. File be consigned to the General Record Room after the completion. Announced in the open court on today 28th May, 2007.” 14. Similar order came to be passed on 18.06.2007 that the matter was of civil nature and had already been decided by the Trial Court. The relevant portion of the said order reads as under:- “Case called. Counsel for both the parties present. The arguments in this case have already been heard. From the perusal of arguments and record so placed on the file, it reveals that a case between the parties have already been decided in the Court of Sub Judge Ist Class Palampur on 3.4.1981 vide civil suit No. 214/1976 titled as Smt. Chirago Devi versus Union of India etc. wherein the respondents (petitioners in the present petition) have been restrained to make any interference in the land in question. In such circumstances, this Court has nothing to do in this case in view of the being of civil nature. Hence the petition is dismissed and the parties are directed to seek remedy in the competent court of law. wherein the respondents (petitioners in the present petition) have been restrained to make any interference in the land in question. In such circumstances, this Court has nothing to do in this case in view of the being of civil nature. Hence the petition is dismissed and the parties are directed to seek remedy in the competent court of law. The file be consigned to the GRR after due formalities.” 15. Another order was passed by the Collector on 16.11.2010, the relevant portion whereof reads as under:- “I have heard the Ld. Counsels for the parties and perused the material on record very carefully and it is obvious that the instant application has been filed by the applicant on 21.06.2003 after a lapse of more than 36 years. It is well settled law that the law of limitation cannot be extended on equitable grounds. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. K. Ramachandaran vs. State of Kerala has held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds ( AIR 1998 SC 2276 ). The proposition of law is that if a case is barred by limitation it must be dismissed by the court not withstanding that no such plea was taken by the either of the parties ( AIR 1964 SC 1336 ). It is obvious from the perusal of the case file and the discussion held here in above that it was for the applicant to take possession at the time of handing over of the possession by the acquiring authority and the appropriate action u/s 16 and other provisions of the Land Acquisition Act could have been taken by the said acquiring authority at that point of time. Moreover there is colossal delay in filing the application and the application is badly barred by limitation and the same is dismissed.” 16. Resultantly, the present writ petitions came to be filed, which as noticed, were dismissed on account of lapsing of proceedings on account of possession not having been taken, which view cannot be sustained as noticed above in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority’s case (supra). 17. Resultantly, the present writ petitions came to be filed, which as noticed, were dismissed on account of lapsing of proceedings on account of possession not having been taken, which view cannot be sustained as noticed above in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority’s case (supra). 17. The right as such to claim the possession of the immovable property or any interest would become time barred in view of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which is 12 years when the possession of the defendants become adverse to the plaintiffs. 18. As noticed, in the plaint itself, there was an admission that the possession of the present respondents was apparently open and hostile in as much as even construction was being raised in front of the eyes of the present appellants and, therefore, they were constrained to file the civil suit for possession. The delay at the hands as such of the appellants of a period of over 30 years from 1966 to 29.04.1989, thus, cannot be countenanced. 19. In such circumstances, once the factual matrix is clear, it would be a travesty of justice as such at this point of time to enforce the award by way of writ of mandamus on the ground that the appellants as such had deposited the compensation and, therefore, having become owners of the land by virtue of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act and are entitled for possession. The specific plea had been taken by the respondents in the civil suit, had the same been not adjudicated upon solely on the ground that the suit was not maintainable. 20. Having not acted promptly at that point of time and letting the private respondents to continue the possession for a long period of over 30 years before even filing the suit, we would grant the benefit as such of adverse possession to the respondents. 21. The earlier view of the Apex Court was that the principle of adverse possession can be only used as shield to protect the settled possession. Now the view has veered around to the extent that on the basis of long possession, person is also entitled to suit for declaration that they are owners by virtue of adverse possession. 22. Reliance can be placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. vs. Manjit Kaur & Ors. Now the view has veered around to the extent that on the basis of long possession, person is also entitled to suit for declaration that they are owners by virtue of adverse possession. 22. Reliance can be placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. vs. Manjit Kaur & Ors. (2019) 8 SCC 729 , wherein it has been held as under:- “62. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years' period of adverse possession is over, even owner's right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession. In case of dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a possessory suit can be maintained under Article 64, even before the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. By perfection of title on extinguishment of the owner’s title, a person cannot be remediless. In case he has been dispossessed by the owner after having lost the right by adverse possession, he can be evicted by the plaintiff by taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly, any other person who might have dispossessed the plaintiff having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be evicted until and unless such other person has perfected title against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly, under other Articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and maintain a suit.” 23. Though the Apex Court in B. Leelavathi vs. Honnamma & Anr. Similarly, under other Articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and maintain a suit.” 23. Though the Apex Court in B. Leelavathi vs. Honnamma & Anr. 2005 (2) CCC 663 has held that plea of adverse possession is a question of fact and has to be specifically pleaded but in this case, as noticed, it is the case of the appellants themselves by way of admission on their part of long adverse possession and therefore once the fact as such is admitted by them, we deem it appropriate to adjudicate on the issue rather than relegating the parties to another round of litigation to prove that their title has got perfected on the basis of long possession. 24. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the present appeals are not liable to be allowed by setting aside the orders of the Collector though the reasoning of the learned Single Judge for different reasons cannot as such sustain. Resultantly, the view cannot be sustained and to that extent the appeals are disposed off but the writ petitions continue to remain dismissed. 25. Accordingly, we dismiss the present set of appeals.