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2026 DAILYLAW 16753 (HP)

Rattani Devi v. Sita Devi

2026-03-06

Romesh Verma

body2026
Judgment : Romesh Verma, J. The present petition arises out of the order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. dated 22.07.2025, whereby application filed by the respondents/defendants under Section 151 of CPC for police assistance and for implementing the order dated 02.04.2025, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. was allowed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the present petitioners Rattani Devi and Manoj Kumar filed a suit under Sections 36, 37 and 38 of Specific Relief Act for declaration to the effect that the exchange deed executed between plaintiff No.2 and defendant No.1 on 04.09.2020 registered in the office of Sub-Registrar Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. dated 04.09.2020 with respect to the land measuring 11-7 bighas situated in Village Bakroa, P.O.Bhager, Pargana Tiun, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur , H.P. is a result of fraud and misrepresentation exercised by respondents/defendants upon petitioner No.2/plaintiff No.2. Therefore, it was prayed that the exchange deed is null and void and be declared as no-nest which does not have any effect on the right, title and interest of the parties. 3. It was further prayed that decree for declaration that mutation No. 538 attested on 17.10.2020 may also be declared as illegal and void  which  has been attested by A.C. IInd Grade Ghumarwin at the back of the petitioners/ plaintiffs. Further a decree in alternative to the effect that if petitioners/ plaintiffs fail to prove themselves to be exclusive owners  of  the  suit  land  or  the  exchange  deed  dated 04.09.2020 is held to be valid, even then the respondent No.1/defendant No.1 with the help of respondents/ defendants No. 2 to 8 have got no right, title and interest to raise construction of house or road over any specific and valuable portion of the suit land, until the suit land is finally partitioned. 4. Alongwith the suit, the present petitioners filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC read with Section 151 of CPC for restraining the respondents from digging the land, raising construction or constructing road over any specific and valuable portion of the land measuring 9-9 Bighas comprised in Khasra No. 284/129/34 and land measuring 1-18 bighas comprised in Khasra No. 55, Khata/Khatoni No. 61/74 situated in Village Bakroa, Hadbast No. 464, P.O. Bhager, Pargna Tiun, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. until the suit land is finally partitioned. 5. 5. On 30.12.2021, in the application, which was filed under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC, the learned Civil Judge, Court No.3, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. passed the orders restraining the respondent from digging or raising construction or constructing road or causing any type of interference over the suit land till further orders. 6. The respondents/defendants contested the suit filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs by filing written statement, whereby all the allegations levelled in the plaint have been refuted and it has been averred that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is false, frivolous and vexatious and is liable to be dismissed. All the allegations as levelled in the plaint were refuted and the defendants sought for dismissal of the suit. 7. Learned Civil Judge, Court No.3, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. allowed the  application under Order 39 rule 1 & 2 CPC which was filed by the plaintiffs/petitioners and the respondents were restrained from, causing interference, changing the nature, raising construction or alienating the suit land till the final disposal of the main suit. 8. The present respondents/defendants filed an appeal before learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P.  on 14.09.2022 under Order 43 Rule (1) (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The learned First Appellate Court vide its order dated 02.04.2025 partly allowed the appeal filed by the present respondents/ defendants and the parties were directed to maintain status quo qua the nature, character and possession of the road existing over the suit land measuring 9.9 bighas, comprised in Khasra No. 284/129/34, and land measuring 1-18 Bishwas, Khasra No. 55, Khata/Khatoni No. 61/74 measuring 0-6 bighas, situated in Village Bakroa, Hadbast No. 464, Pargna Tiun, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. till the final disposal of the suit. 9. After passing of the order by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, the defendants/ respondents Sita Devi and Ved Prakash filed an application under Section 151 of CPC for the grant of Police Assistance and seeking implementation of the order dated 2.4.2025 as passed by the learned First Appellate Court, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. It was averred in the application that the present respondents are senior citizens and both are old persons. The respondent No.1/defendant No.1 is bed ridden who has recently been discharged from IGMC, Shimla. The respondent No.1/defendant No.1 is bed ridden who has recently been discharged from IGMC, Shimla. The link road is being used for ingress and egress from main road to the house and the present petitioners by taking undue advantage of the aforesaid circumstances are causing interference in the use of the road and quarreling with the applicants. The applicants are apprehending that the respondents/petitioners may cause grievous injury while using the said road by the applicants, hence the interference by the present petitioners over the aforesaid link road deserves to be stopped through police of P.S. Ghumarwin and the order dated 02.04.2025 may kindly be implemented It has further been submitted in the application that respondent No.1 is unable to walk and she remains bed ridden hence ambulance/vehicle facility is required in order to lift the said respondent from the house. Further, it has been averred that the present respondents are unable to resist the illegal acts of the present petitioners. Hence, rights of the said respondents are required to be protected with the assistance of the police. 10. The present petitioners/plaintiffs filed a reply to the application for the police assistance and all the allegations as levelled in the application were refuted and they prayed for dismissal of the application. 11. Learned Senior Civil Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. vide its order dated 22.07.2025 allowed the application as filed by the respondents/defendants and SHO of Police Station Ghumarwin, was directed to visit the spot and get the order dated 02.04.2025 implemented on the spot and to remove the blockage/ obstruction caused by the respondents/petitioners on the said road. 12. Feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiffs/petitioners have approached this Court challenging the order dated 22.07.2025, passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. 13. I have heard Mr. N.K.Sharma, Advocate, for the petitioners and Mr. Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, Advocate, for the respondents. 14. The case file reveals that the petitioners/plaintiffs have instituted a suit for declaration before the learned trial Court , whereby the exchange deed has been challenged on the ground of fraud and mis-representation and further declaration has also been sought that mutation No. 538 attested on 17.10.2020 is illegal, null and void and the same has been attested by AC Iind Grade, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. at the back of the petitioner No1/plaintiff No.1. Further decree for permanent prohibitory injunction has also been sought by the plaintiffs/petitioners. Further decree for permanent prohibitory injunction has also been sought by the plaintiffs/petitioners. 15. Learned Civil Judge, Court No. 3, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P on 22.07.2022 in the application, which was filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC accepted the prayer of the plaintiffs/ petitioners, restraining the present respondents/defendants from causing interference, changing the nature, raising construction or alienating the suit land till the final disposal of the main suit. 16. The said order dated 22.07.2022 passed by learned trial Court was assailed by the present respondents/ defendants before the learned First Appellate Court, who modified the order and directed the present petitioners/ defendants to maintain status quo, qua nature, character and possession of the road existing over the suit land till final disposal of the suit. 17. The respondents/defendants has filed an application, whereby they have submitted that both the respondents are senior citizens and they are using the link road for the ingress and egress from main road to their house and the respondents/petitioners are taking undue advantage of the old age of the present respondents and they are causing interference in the use of the road. It has been categorically submitted that respondent No.1 is an old lady and she remains bed ridden . Therefore, she requires the ambulance facility in order to have lift from her house. 18. The application has been filed disclosing the violation and defiance of the order as passed by the learned First Appellate Court and it has been categorically stated that the present petitioners/ plaintiffs are causing interference in the use of the road and quarreling with the present respondents. Even the police report, which has been placed on record by the present petitioner reveals that there is an interference on the part of the present petitioners/plaintiffs with respect to the usage of the road on behalf of the present respondents/ defendants. 19. This Court primarily is of the opinion that once there is an interim protection granted by the First Appellate Court, whereby both the parties have been directed to maintain  status  quo  qua  the  nature,  character  and possession of the road existing on the suit land, in that event, the plaintiffs / petitioners have got no right to violate the said order by defying/ disobeying the same. 20. 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that an interim protection order passed by the competent Court has to be implemented in its letter and spirit and no one can be permitted to violate the same. The majesty of the Court orders has to be upheld. The present respondents/ defendants, who are senior citizens, cannot be harassed and the petitioners/ plaintiffs cannot be permitted to create nuisance that too in the light of the interim order passed by learned First Appellate Court. On account of the defiance as made by the petitioners/plaintiffs, the respondents/ defendants were compelled to approach the Court for the interim protection of the order and for the grant of the police Assistance. 21. Mr. Naresh K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no obstruction has been caused in the case in hand and all the allegations as levelled are incorrect. Since no obstruction has been caused by the petitioner there cannot be any occasion for them to oppose the prayer made by the respondent for providing police assistance for the enforcement of the order of status quo which is only to visit the spot to ensure compliance of the court order. 22. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CMPMO No. 166 of 2021, titled Sanjay Kumar vs. Vijay Kumar & others, decided on 13.07.2023, has held as under:- “7. This Court in Jaishi Ram and others Vs. Salig Ram, 1981 Sim. L.C. 156 has held that if the circumstances of a case are such that assistance of police for the enforcement of an order is necessary, an order to this effect can be passed. The learned Single Judge has held as under: “3. I have perused the order passed by the Sub-Judge. He has based his judgment on a decision in Ravapati Audemma V. Pothineni Narasimham, AIR 1971 A.P. 53 . This is a Division Bench judgment of that High Court. In the said judgment the point involved was the same as in the presence case. The learned Judges have discussed the case-law on the point. They have not agreed with certain prior decisions. The relevant observations may be reproduced: “The observations in the aforesaid decision no doubt support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the said judgment the point involved was the same as in the presence case. The learned Judges have discussed the case-law on the point. They have not agreed with certain prior decisions. The relevant observations may be reproduced: “The observations in the aforesaid decision no doubt support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned Judge Bhima Sankaram, J., referred to Section 151, C.P.C. but took the view that because an order of injunction is capable of enforcement by punishing its disobedience in the manner provided by Order 39 Rule 2(3), C.P.C., it is not open to the Civil Courts to enforce the same with the aid of the police. With great respect we are unable to agree with this reasoning. It has to be noticed that Order 30, Rule 2(3), CPC., provides only for punishment by attachment of the property or by detention in civil prison of the person who committed breach. But it does not further provide for implementation of the order of injunction itself. Order 39, Rule 2(3) cannot be said to be an express provision with respect to implementation of the order of injunction, but is only a provision which provides penalty for disobedience of the order. In such a case there being no other express provisions in the Code for enforcement of the order, it is not only proper but also necessary that the courts should render all aid to the aggrieved party to derive full benefits of the order. Though the order  of  injunction  under  Order  39, C.P.C. is only interim in nature, still it clothes the person who obtained the order with certain rights and he is entitled to enforce the aforesaid right against the party who is bound by the order. No doubt in such a case, the aggrieved party himself could approach the police authorities to prevent obstruction to the enforcement of the order or to the exercise of the right which he derives under the order or to the exercise of such right which he derives under the order of Court. No doubt in such a case, the aggrieved party himself could approach the police authorities to prevent obstruction to the enforcement of the order or to the exercise of the right which he derives under the order or to the exercise of such right which he derives under the order of Court. But we do not see why when the same person brings to the notice of the Court that enforcement of the order is sought to be prevented or obstructed, the Court should not exercise its inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C. and direct the police authorities to render all aid to the aggrieved party in the implementation of the Court’s order. In our opinion the exercise of such power is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process and the civil court has ample jurisdiction to pass such order under Section 151, C.P.C. The learned Judge’s observation “that the police are not bound to obey and directions of the court in the absence of any statutory obligation to do so and a civil court would be stultifying itself by giving directions which may not be complied with”, with great respect, cannot be said to be correct. Inasmuch as we are of the opinion that such a direction to be police authorities could be given under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151, C.P.C. the police are bound to obey such directions.” The learned Judges have also referred to some decisions on the point, including the observations in Padam Sen Vs. State of U.P. ( AIR 1961 SC 218 ). It is desirable to reproduce the same: “The following observations in AIR 1961 e also apposite in this context: “ The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. State of U.P. ( AIR 1961 SC 218 ). It is desirable to reproduce the same: “The following observations in AIR 1961 e also apposite in this context: “ The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purpose mentioned in Sec. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature.’ In view of these clear observations of their Lordships with regard to the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151, C.P.C., we are clearly of the opinion that in order to do justice between the parties or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court, the Civil courts have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police authorities to render aid to the aggrieved parties with regard to the implementation of the orders of Court or the exercise of the rights created under orders of Court. That the police authorities owe a legal duty to the public to enforce the law is clear from a decision of the Court of Appeal, reported in R.V. Metropolitan Police Commr., (1968) 1 All DR 763, where Lord Denning, M.R. observed at page 769 as follows: “I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police, as it is of every chief constable to enforce the law of the land…..but in all these things he is not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone.” The same view was expressed by the other learned Judges. We may also refer to the judgment of the Madras High Court, in Varadachariar V. Commr. Of Police (1969) 2 Mad. LJ 1, where the learned Judge, Kailasam, J., after referring to the English case cited above held that the Commissioner of Police should proceed and act in accordance with the directions indicated in the aforesaid judgment.” 8. We may also refer to the judgment of the Madras High Court, in Varadachariar V. Commr. Of Police (1969) 2 Mad. LJ 1, where the learned Judge, Kailasam, J., after referring to the English case cited above held that the Commissioner of Police should proceed and act in accordance with the directions indicated in the aforesaid judgment.” 8. In P. Shanker Rao v. Smt. B. Susheela, AIR 2000 Andhra Pradesh 214, learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh has held that the court in its inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure can grant police aid to ensure effective implementation of temporary injunction pending suit for perpetual injunction and procedure under order 39 rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure need not be followed. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “[3] The observations, in my considered view should be confined to the facts of that particular case. In that case, the defendant sought police protection on the ground that the  plaintiff  was  interfering  with  his possession despite the fact that the temporary injunction granted earlier in favour of the plaintiff was vacated. Thus, it is not a case where the order to extend police aid was granted in order to ensure compliance with an order of injunction in force pending the suit. The mere fact that the action could be taken against either party for flouting the injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A or under the Contempt of Courts Act does not come in the way of the Court taking all necessary steps for ensuring obedience of the injunction order. The Court need not wait till the injunction is breached. In a fit case, the Court can undoubtedly direct police aid as a preventive measure. This power though not expressly conferred, is a power incidental or ancillary to the exercise of the power to grant injunction pending the suit. With great respect, I am not in a position to record my concurrence with the broad observations made by the learned Judge that the civil Court cannot direct police aid for execution of its order - interlocutory or final and that the party should only have recourse to the procedure laid down under Order XXI, Rule 32 or the Contempt of Courts Act. The observations are in the nature of obiter and therefore not binding on me. The observations are in the nature of obiter and therefore not binding on me. It is therefore unnecessary to refer the matter to the Division Bench, more so in view of the decision of this Court relied upon by the trial Court. I would however like to point out that the police aid should not be granted for mere asking. The Court has to be satisfied, prima facie, that there is an imminent threat of violation of interim order, if police does not intervene and that there is no other way of ensuring effective compliance. If however an alternative could be found such as, deploying an Officer of the Court to oversee the implementation of the order, the Court can avoid granting order for police aid.” 23. The scope of interference while adjudicating the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/S GARMENT CRAFT Vs. PRAKASH CHAND GOEL, (2022) 4 SCC 181 , decided on 11.01.2024, wherein it has been held that the High Court while exercising Supervisory Jurisdiction will not act as a Court of First Appeal to re- appreciate, reweigh the evidence on facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- 15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.1 The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse,1Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and Others v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and Others, (2010) 1 SCC violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.2 has observed:- “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 24. In the opinion of this Court, learned trial Court has rightly passed the order and has come to the rescue of old aged person whereby, SHO Police Station Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. has been directed to visit the spot and to get the order dated 22.04.2025 implemented on the spot. 25. In the opinion of this Court, learned trial Court has rightly passed the order and has come to the rescue of old aged person whereby, SHO Police Station Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. has been directed to visit the spot and to get the order dated 22.04.2025 implemented on the spot. 25. Learned Trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that it is a duty of the Court to get implemented its order in letter and spirit on the spot and no one can be permitted to take law in their hands. Therefore, this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. Consequently, the present petition being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. All the pending miscellaneous application(s) if any, shall also stands disposed off.