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2026 DAILYLAW 16737 (HP)

Sheetal Dass v. Union of India

2026-02-25

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of complaint No.3 of 2023, titled Union of India versus M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals, summoning order dated 06.09.2025 and consequential proceedings pending before learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P (learned Trial Court). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant, Drugs Inspector, Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO), Zonal Office, Baddi filed a complaint against the accused for violation of Sections, 16, 18(a)(i), 18 (a)(vi), 18 (B), 18(C), 32 & 34 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (in short, ‘Drugs Act’) read with Rule 84(E), Rules 69-A, 70-A and 74-B read with paragraph 16.10, and 26 of Schedule M of the Drugs Rules, 1945 punishable under Sections 28(A) and 27(d) of the Drugs Act. It was asserted that the complainant drew the samples of drugs including Vemifol Plus capsules manufactured by M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. at Trilokpur Road, Kala Amb, Himachal Pradesh and marketed by M/s Vivex Pharmaceuticals, Pvt, Ltd, Mohali, from Mr. Sunil Kumar, Proprietor of the firm M/s Ranveer Medical Agency, Near Bus Stand, Baddi, Solan, for analysis. The samples were sent to the laboratory after completing the formalities. The report of analysis issued by the laboratory mentioned that the sample was not of standard quality, as the samples did not conform the claim as per the patent and proprietary in respect of the “Assay of Alpha Lipoic Acid” (result obtained as 59.91%, whereas the limit is not less than 90%). The reports of analysis were sent to Sunil Kumar, and he was asked to disclose the source of procurement of the drugs. He disclosed that he had procured the drugs from M/s Sahil Enterprises, Mohali and M/s Vivex Pharmaceuticals, Mohali. The reports were also sent to Sahil Enterprises and Vivex Enterprises. They were also asked to disclose the source of procurement of drugs. They disclosed that the drugs were procured from M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals. The report was sent to M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals. It was observed that the firm had not performed the process validation for the products and had not performed the stability study for Vemifol plus, and in this manner, violated the condition of the licence. They disclosed that the drugs were procured from M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals. The report was sent to M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals. It was observed that the firm had not performed the process validation for the products and had not performed the stability study for Vemifol plus, and in this manner, violated the condition of the licence. The firm showed its willingness to challenge the sample, and the sample was sent to the Director, Central Drugs Testing Laboratory, Kolkata (CDTL). A report was issued by CDTL, Kolkata, that the sample did not conform to the manufacturer's specification with respect to “Assay of Alpha Lipoic Acid” (result reported as 74.081% of the claim while the limit is 90% to 110% of the claim). Hence, the complainant filed a complaint before the Court to take action against the accused. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. 4. Being aggrieved by the filing of the complaint and summoning the accused, the accused/petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that they were arrayed because of their designation as active Directors. There is no evidence that they were in charge or responsible for the conduct of the company at the relevant time, which is a requirement under Section 34 of the Drugs Act. No specific role, control, knowledge, supervision or responsibility was attributed to any of the accused. The complaint describes the sampling process, testing, chain of custody and correspondence, which does not concern the petitioners. The Directors cannot be prosecuted simply because of their position in the company. The drug was manufactured under a valid licence. The summoning order is non-speaking and mechanical. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the complaint and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be set- aside. 5. I have heard Ms Shalini Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused, and Mr Balram Sharma, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India, assisted by Mr Rajeev Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent. 6. Ms Shalini Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused, submitted that the complaint does not mention the specific role of the petitioners/accused. The petitioners/ accused have been described as the active Directors, which is not sufficient, and it was required to be asserted that they were in charge and responsible for the company for its affairs. 6. Ms Shalini Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused, submitted that the complaint does not mention the specific role of the petitioners/accused. The petitioners/ accused have been described as the active Directors, which is not sufficient, and it was required to be asserted that they were in charge and responsible for the company for its affairs. The petitioners/ accused could not have been summoned in the absence of the requisite averments; therefore, she prayed that the present petition be allowed, the complaint and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. She relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shailyamanyu Singh versus State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 995 and judgment of this Court in M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals versus Union of India, 2025: HHC: 7724, in support of her submissions. 7. Mr. Balram Sharma, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India for the respondents, submitted that necessary averments have been made in the complaint. The truthfulness of allegations made in the complaint is not to be seen at this stage. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, which should be left to adjudicate it; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby preempting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 11. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed: “70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.” 12. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.” 12. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act reads as under: - 34. Offences by companies.—(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. 14. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that a company is primarily liable for the commission of an offence punishable under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Vicarious liability has been fastened upon a person who, at the time of the offence, was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Susela Padmavathi Amma versus M/s Bharti Airtel Limited, 2024 INSC 206 that a person cannot be made liable unless, at the material time, he was not only in charge of but was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. It was observed:- 18. In the case of State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mitta (1998) 5 SCC 343 , this Court observed thus: “8. Nonetheless, we find that the impugned judgment of the High Court has got to be upheld for an altogether different reason. Admittedly, the three respondents were being prosecuted as directors of the manufacturers with the aid of Section 34(1) of the Act, which reads as under: “34. Nonetheless, we find that the impugned judgment of the High Court has got to be upheld for an altogether different reason. Admittedly, the three respondents were being prosecuted as directors of the manufacturers with the aid of Section 34(1) of the Act, which reads as under: “34. Offences by companies.—(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.” It is thus seen that the vicarious liability of a person for being prosecuted for an offence committed under the Act by a company arises if, at the material time, he was in charge of and was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Simply because a person is a director of the company, it does not necessarily mean that he fulfils both the above requirements so as to make him liable. Conversely, without being a director, a person can be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. From the complaint in question, we, however, find that except for a bald statement that the respondents were directors of the manufacturers, there is no other allegation to indicate, even prima facie, that they were in charge of the company and also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business.” 19. It could thus be seen that this Court had held that simply because a person is a director of the company, it does not necessarily mean that he fulfils the twin requirements of Section 34(1) of the said Act to make him liable. It has been held that a person cannot be made li able unless, at the material time, he was in charge of and was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. 20. It has been held that a person cannot be made li able unless, at the material time, he was in charge of and was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. 20. In the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), this Court was considering the question as to whether it was sufficient to make the person liable for being a director of a company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. This Court considered the definition of the word “director” as defined in Section 2(13) of the Companies Act, 1956. This Court observed thus: “8. ……. There is nothing which suggests that simply by being a director in a company, one is supposed to discharge particular functions on behalf of a company. It happens that a person may be a director in a company, but he may not know anything about the day-to-day functioning of the company. As a director, he may be attending meetings of the Board of Directors of the company, where usually they decide policy matters and guide the course of business of a company. It may be that a Board of Directors may appoint sub-committees consisting of one or two directors out of the Board of the company, who may be made responsible for the day-to-day functions of the company. These are matters which form part of the resolutions of the Board of Directors of a company. Nothing is oral. What emerges from this is that the role of a director in a company is a question of fact, depending on the peculiar facts in each case. There is no universal rule that a director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs. We have discussed about the position of a director in a company in order to illustrate the point that there is no magic as such in a particular word, be it director, manager or secretary. It all depends upon the respective roles assigned to the officers in a company  ” 21. It was held that merely because a person is a director of a company, it is not necessary that he is aware of the day-to-day functioning of the company. This Court held that there is no universal rule that a director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs. It was held that merely because a person is a director of a company, it is not necessary that he is aware of the day-to-day functioning of the company. This Court held that there is no universal rule that a director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs. It was, therefore, necessary to aver how the director of the company was in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company or responsible to the affairs of the company. This Court, however, clarified that the position of a managing director or a joint managing director in a company may be different. This Court further held that these persons, as the designation of their office suggests, are in charge of a company and are responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. To escape liability, they will have to prove that when the offence was committed, they had no knowledge of the offence or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence. 22. In the case of Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 1 , this Court observed thus: “17. …… Every person connected with the Company will not fall into the ambit of the provision. Time and again, it has been asserted by this Court that only those persons who were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time of the commission of an offence will be liable for criminal action. A Director, who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time, will not be liable for an offence under Section 141 of the NI Act. In National Small Industries Corpn. [National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, (2010) 3 SCC 330 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 677: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1113] this Court observed : (SCC p. 336, paras 13-14) “13. Section 141 is a penal provision creating vicarious liability, and which, as per settled law, must be strictly construed. It is therefore not sufficient to make a bald, cursory statement in a complaint that the Director (arrayed as an accused) is in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more as to the role of the Director. It is therefore not sufficient to make a bald, cursory statement in a complaint that the Director (arrayed as an accused) is in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more as to the role of the Director. But the complaint should spell out as to how and in what manner Respondent 1 was in charge of or was responsible to the accused Company for the conduct of its business. This is in consonance with the strict interpretation of penal statutes, especially where such statutes create vicarious liability. 14. A company may have a number of Directors, and to make any or all the Directors as accused in a complaint merely on the basis of a statement that they are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more is not a sufficient or adequate fulfilment of the requirements under Section 141.”(emphasis in original) 18. In Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta, (1971) 3 SCC 189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279: AIR 1971 SC 2162 ], this Court observed that a person “in charge of a business” means that the person should be in overall control of the day-to-day business of the Company. 19. A Director of a company is liable to be convicted for an offence committed by the company if he/she was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business or if it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any negligence on the part of the Director concerned (see State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand [State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand, (1981) 2 SCC 335 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 453] ). 20. In other words, the law laid down by this Court is that for making a Director of a company liable for the offences committed by the company under Section 141 of the NI Act, there must be specific averments against the Director showing as to how and in what manner the Director was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. 21. 21. In Sabitha Ramamurthy v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya [Sabitha Ramamurthy v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya, (2006) 10 SCC 581 (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 621], it was held by this Court that : (SCC pp. 584-85, para 7) “7. … It is not necessary for the complainant to specifically reproduce the wordings of the section, but what is required is a clear statement of fact so as to enable the court to arrive at a prima facie opinion that the accused is vicariously liable. Section 141 raises a legal fiction. By reason of the said provision, a person although is not personally liable for the commission of such an offence would be vicariously liable therefor. Such vicarious liability can be inferred so far as a company registered or incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 is concerned only if the requisite statements, which are required to be averred in the complaint petition, are made so as to make the accused therein vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company.” (emphasis supplied) By verbatim reproducing the words of the section without a clear statement of fact supported by proper evidence, so as to make the accused vicariously liable, is a ground for quashing proceedings initiated against such person under Section 141 of the NI Act.” 23. It could thus clearly be seen that this Court has held that merely reproducing the words of the section without a clear statement of fact as to how and in what manner a director of the company was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, would not ipso facto make the director vicariously liable. 24. A similar view has previously been taken by this Court in the case of K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora (2009) 10 SCC 48 . 25. In the case of State of NCT of Delhi through Prosecuting Officer, Insecticides, Government of NCT, Delhi v. Rajiv Khurana (2010) 11 SCC 469 , this Court reiterated the position thus: “17. The ratio of all these cases is that the complainant is required to state in the complaint how a Director who is sought to be made an accused was in charge of the business of the company or responsible for the conduct of the company's business. Every Director need not be and is not in charge of the business of the company. Every Director need not be and is not in charge of the business of the company. If that is the position with regard to a Director, it is needless to emphasise that in the case of non-Director officers, it is all the more necessary to state what were his duties and responsibilities in the conduct of business of the company and how and in what manner he is responsible or liable.” 26. In the case of Ashoke Mal Bafna (supra), this Court observed thus: “9. To fasten vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Act on a person, the law is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases that the complainant should specifically show as to how and in what manner the accused was responsible. Simply because a person is a Director of a defaulter Company, does not make him liable under the Act. Time and again, it has been asserted by this Court that only the person who was at the helm of affairs of the Company and in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business at the time of commission of an offence will be liable for criminal action. (See Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra [Pooja Ravinder Devidasaniv. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 1 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 378: AIR 2015 SC 675 ].) 10. In other words, the law laid down by this Court is that for making a Director of a Company liable for the offences committed by the Company under Section 141 of the Act, there must be specific averments against the Director showing as to how and in what manner the Director was responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company.” 27. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Lalankumar Singh v. State of Maharashtra 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1383, to which one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) was a party. 15. A similar view was taken in Shailyamanyu Singh v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1740, wherein it was observed:- 21. A holistic reading of the language of Sections 34(1) and 34(2) of the D&C Act would make it clear that every person who is in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company would be liable to face prosecution under the Act. A holistic reading of the language of Sections 34(1) and 34(2) of the D&C Act would make it clear that every person who is in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company would be liable to face prosecution under the Act. The Director or Directors, other than the one who is in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company, can also be prosecuted ‘where it is proved’ that the offence has been committed with the consent, connivance or is attributable to any neglect on the part of such Director. 22. No doubt, at the stage of taking cognisance, the standard of proof required would be much lower than that required at the stage of final decision of a criminal case. Nevertheless, there definitely has to exist a prima facie allegation in the complaint which can satisfy the Court regarding the consent, connivance or attributable neglect on the part of the Director who is sought to be prosecuted by taking recourse to the concept of vicarious liability as provided under Section 34(2) of the D&C Act. 23. This Court in the case of Dayle De'Souza v. Union of India (2021) 20 SCC 135 , while relying upon an earlier judgment in National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal (2010) 3 SCC 330 held that the primary responsibility is upon the complainant to make specific averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company. While fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every Director knows about the transactions of the company. Criminal liability can be fastened only upon those directors or persons who, at the time of the commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the day-to-day business of the company. 16. Thus, the complainant needs to aver in the complaint that the person sought to be held vicariously liable is in charge and responsible to the company for its affairs. 17. In the present case. The complainant asserted in para 17, 17(ii), 17(vi) & 17(v) as under: - “17. 16. Thus, the complainant needs to aver in the complaint that the person sought to be held vicariously liable is in charge and responsible to the company for its affairs. 17. In the present case. The complainant asserted in para 17, 17(ii), 17(vi) & 17(v) as under: - “17. That, after completing all the scrutiny, investigation and correspondence under the said Act, the complainant has found that accused No.: 1 to 9 alongwith the Role(s) and responsibility are being the Manufacturing Firm- the site where the impugned product/batch was manufactured; the Managing Director & other  Director(s)  of  the firm(s) (including the Marketing firm) as Direct Beneficiary- as in charge of the firm to conduct the day to day basis business/ production(s), controlling/supervise the technical & other staffs etc. and was involved for overall business activities through the Company/ manufacturing/ Marketing firm at that time when the impugned product was manufactured for sale & distribution across the country; and also the Approved Competent Persons, who had involved as active participants and manufactured & tested the impugned drug in question which has been declared as not of standard quality, hence, are liable for punishment for the offences committed under the said Act. The details for the accused No. 1 to 9 are as follows: xxxxxx II. Mr Jagbir Singh, Active Director, (Mobile No.: 9812810325) of the form situated at: M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., (Plant 3), C/o Ovation Remedies Situated at Trilokpur Road, Kala Amb, District Sirmour-173030, Himachal Pradesh. (Mr Jagbir Singh is the Active/Managing Director of the firm and registered with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, having DIN/PAN No.: 00821561. Further, he has issued the Authority Letter to Mrs Sneha Sharma w/o Sh. Anil to represent the Hon’ble CJM Court. Also, refer to the constitution details on the copy of licenses as on Form 25-A and Form 28-A issued by the State Licensing Authority on 22.06.2016 and the same is retained up to 21st June, 2026 vide retention letter no.: HFW-N (ADC)2016-1366 dated 26th July, 2021. The copy of the Authority Letter issued to Mrs Sneha Sharma and the copy of Licenses on Form 25-A & Form 28-A alongwith retention letter, are enclosed herewith as (Annexure P- 15) for the perusal of this Hon’ble Court. xxxx VI. Mr Satish Kumar Singh, s/o Akchhaybar Singh, Krishana Nagar Colony, Roorkee, Haridwar, Uttarakhand-247667 (approved/Competent person responsible as Manufacturing Chemist). The copy of the Authority Letter issued to Mrs Sneha Sharma and the copy of Licenses on Form 25-A & Form 28-A alongwith retention letter, are enclosed herewith as (Annexure P- 15) for the perusal of this Hon’ble Court. xxxx VI. Mr Satish Kumar Singh, s/o Akchhaybar Singh, Krishana Nagar Colony, Roorkee, Haridwar, Uttarakhand-247667 (approved/Competent person responsible as Manufacturing Chemist). The name & Signature of Mr Satish Kumar is as mentioned on the “Batch Manufacturing Record” (BMR) of the impugned product vides BMR Format No.QR/QA/012/00/F2 issued on 25th February 2022 for the impugned Batch No.: SOC- 1911A and the manufacturing stared on 28th February 2022. The copy of the aforesaid BMR is enclosed herewith as (Annexure P-18) for the perusal of this Hon’ble Court. xxxxxx V) Mr Harnek Singh, Active Director (DIN/PIN) No.09141882) of the firm situated at: M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (Plant 3), C/o Ovation Remedies situated at Trilokpur Road, Kala Amb, District Sirmour-173030, Himachal Pradesh. Mr Harnek Singh is the Active Director registered also with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, having DIN/PAN No.09141882. The copy of company information, including the Bank and all active Directors, including Mr Harnek Singh, is enclosed herewith as (Annexure P-17) for the perusal of this Hon’ble Court.” 18. Para-17 of the complaint specifically mentioned that the accused are in charge of the firm to conduct day to day basis business/production, controlling and supervising the technical and other staff and were involved in overall business activities through the company. The specific words that they were responsible for the firm are missing, but the averments that they were involved in overall business activities and were controlling/supervising the technical and other staff show that they were responsible to the company for its affairs as the company was acting through them at the relevant time. Therefore, the submission that the requirements are lacking and the learned Trial Court erred in summoning the accused cannot be accepted. 19. It was submitted that the summoning order is bad because it does not show the application of mind by the learned Magistrate, however, the summoning order has not been placed on record and only copy of summons (Annexure P-2) has been filed; therefore, in absence of the summoning order, it cannot be said that the summoning order was passed without the application of the mind. 20. No other point was urged. 21. 20. No other point was urged. 21. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 22. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.