JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 29.05.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 2nd Class, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451 and 354 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 354 and 323 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant/victim (name withheld to protect her identity) was present in her home on 15.07.2010 with her children. The accused entered her house at about 12 noon and molested her. She protested and accused gave her beatings. She shouted for help, and she was rescued by the passersby. She filed a complaint (Ext.PW1/A) before the police, and the police registered the FIR (Ext.PW4/A). Rajinder Kumar (PW9) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW9/A). The victim produced a shirt (Ext.P1) worn by her at the time of the incident, which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). The shirt was put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with four impressions of seal ‘P’. Specimen seal impression (Ext.PW9/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Vinod Kumar after use. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version. The challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451 and 354 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Complainant/victim (PW1), her daughter (PW2), and her husband (PW6) narrated the incident. The victim’s son (PW3) was not found to be a competent witness by the learned Trial Court. ASI Kishori Lal (PW4) signed the FIR. Promila (PW5) proved the entry in the daily diary. Rustam Kumar (PW7) and Vinod Kumar (PW8) did not support the prosecution's case. Rajinder Kumar (PW9) investigated the matter. 5. The victim’s son (PW3) was not found to be a competent witness by the learned Trial Court. ASI Kishori Lal (PW4) signed the FIR. Promila (PW5) proved the entry in the daily diary. Rustam Kumar (PW7) and Vinod Kumar (PW8) did not support the prosecution's case. Rajinder Kumar (PW9) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He claimed that a false case was made against him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the victim had materially improved upon her initial version. There was a delay in reporting the matter to the police, which was not satisfactorily explained. The defence taken, during the cross- examination of the witnesses, that a false case was made because of non-payment of money, was highly probable. Two witnesses did not support the prosecution's case, which also made the prosecution’s case doubtful. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; hence, the accused was acquitted. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The testimonies of the witnesses were discarded without any cogent reasons. The testimony of the victim, her son and husband corroborated each other on material aspects. The independent witnesses were declared hostile, and their testimonies should not have been used to discard the prosecution's case. Minor contradictions were bound to come with time and should not have been used to discard the prosecution's case. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Ms Sangeeta Vasudeva, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statement of the victim was duly corroborated by the testimonies of her daughter and her husband. Learned Trial Court discarded the statements of the prosecution witnesses because of minor discrepancies that were bound to come with time. Learned Trial Court had taken a view which could not have been taken by any reasonable person. The statement of the victim was duly corroborated by the testimonies of her daughter and her husband. Learned Trial Court discarded the statements of the prosecution witnesses because of minor discrepancies that were bound to come with time. Learned Trial Court had taken a view which could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Ms Sangeeta Vasudeva, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the matter was reported to the police after a delay, which was not properly explained and the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution's case because of a delay. Two independent witnesses did not support the prosecution's case. The victim materially improved upon her initial version, which made her testimony suspect. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view in the matter, and this Court should not interfere with it. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This  position  was  reiterated  in  State  of  M.P.  v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: “21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. This  position  was  reiterated  in  State  of  M.P.  v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: “21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 , and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The incident occurred at 12 noon, and the matter was reported to the police at 4:05 PM. The distance between the place of incident and the Police Station is shown to be 6 kms in the FIR (Ext.PW4/A). The victim (PW1) stated in her cross- examination that she had reached the Police Station at 12:15 PM and remained at the police station for about 30-45 minutes. Therefore, as per the victim, the incident was reported to the police within 15 minutes of the incident. 16. Her testimony is not supported by the record. Promila (PW5) stated that the victim filed an application on 15.07.2010. An entry No. 23A was registered on her complaint. This entry was recorded at 1605 hours. Thus, the matter was reported to the police at 4:05 PM and not 12:15 PM. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the victim had not explained the delay in reporting the matter to the police. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8." 17. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114 ; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].” 18. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed on page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version. 15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.” 19. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution’s case because of the delay in reporting the matter to the police. 20. The victim mentioned in her complaint (Ext. PW1/A) that she and her children were present in the house. The accused molested her, taking advantage of her loneliness. She protested, and the accused gave her beatings. She and her children shouted for help. Thus, as per the complaint (Ext.PW1/A), the incident had taken place because the victim happened to be alone in her house. 21. The victim stated in the Court that she was present in her courtyard and was filling her bucket. The accused came and asked her why she had behaved like a boss the previous night. The accused tore her shirt and slapped her. She tried to stop the accused, but he pressed her breast. She and the children shouted for help. Her children also called their father. She tried to beat the accused with the stick, and the accused ran away. She ran after the accused. Two people stopped her on the way and told her that her shirt was torn and she should return to her home. 22. She and the children shouted for help. Her children also called their father. She tried to beat the accused with the stick, and the accused ran away. She ran after the accused. Two people stopped her on the way and told her that her shirt was torn and she should return to her home. 22. It is apparent from her testimony in the Court that she had changed the initial version completely. As per the complaint, she was present in her home and as per her statement on oath, she was present in her courtyard. The complaint does not mention that she was doing anything at the time of the arrival of the accused. She stated on oath that she was filling her bucket with tap water. She stated in her complaint that the accused had molested her, taking advantage of her loneliness. She changed this version in the Court and stated that the accused enquired as to why she had behaved like a boss the previous night. She had stated in the complaint that the accused beat her. She and her children shouted for help, and the passerby came to her house and rescued her. She changed her version in the Court by saying that she ran after the accused. She was sent back by two people, telling her that her shirt was torn. Therefore, she has changed the initial version projected by her completely in the Court, which would make her testimony doubtful. 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Dhirendra Kumar, (1997) 1 SCC 93 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 54 that when the prosecution projects a different case during the Trial, its case becomes suspect. It was observed: “11. 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Dhirendra Kumar, (1997) 1 SCC 93 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 54 that when the prosecution projects a different case during the Trial, its case becomes suspect. It was observed: “11. It was very emphatically contended by Shri Gambhir that as in the first information report (FIR), there is no mention of the dying declaration, we should discard the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 regarding the dying declaration, because of what has been pointed out by this Court in Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P. [ (1975) 3 SCC 815 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR 1975 SC 1026 ] We do not, however, agree with Shri Gambhir, for the reason that what was observed in Ram Kumar case [ (1975) 3 SCC 815 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR 1975 SC 1026 ] after noting the broad facts, was that material omission in the FIR would cast doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case, despite the general law being that statements made in the FIR can be used to corroborate or contradict its maker. This view owes its origin to the thinking that if there be a material departure in the prosecution case as unfolded in the FIR, which would be so if material facts not mentioned in the FIR are deposed to by prosecution witnesses in the court, the same would cause a dent to the edifice on which the prosecution case is built, as the substratum of the prosecution case then gets altered. The prosecution cannot project two entirely diflerent versions of a case. This is entirely different from thinking that some omission in the FIR would require disbelieving the witnesses who depose about the fact not mentioned in the FIR. Evidence of witnesses has to be tested for its strength or weakness. While doing so, if the fact deposed be a material part of the prosecution case, about which, however, no mention was made in the FIR, the same would be borne in mind while deciding about the credibility of the evidence given by the witness in question.” 24. Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the victim’s testimony because of the change of her initial version. 25. Her daughter stated that the victim was teaching her and her brother. The accused came inside the house. Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the victim’s testimony because of the change of her initial version. 25. Her daughter stated that the victim was teaching her and her brother. The accused came inside the house. The victim was filling the water. The accused caught hold of the victim and tore her shirt. He tried to slap her. The victim shouted. She and her brother called their father. However, the accused ran away from the spot. 26. The testimony of this witness does not corroborate the victim’s testimony. According to this witness, the victim was teaching her and her brother, which was never stated in the complaint (Ext.CW1/A) or in the statement of the victim. She had not stated that the accused had enquired from the victim as to why she had behaved like a boss the previous night. She stated that the accused caught hold of the victim from behind and tore her shirt, which is quite contrary to the testimony of the victim. She did not state that the accused had pressed the victim’s breast when she tried to stop her. She also did not state that the victim ran after the accused, armed with a stick. Thus, her testimony was rightly discarded by the learned Trial Court. 27. The victim’s husband (PW6) stated that the accused used to quarrel with him. The accused used to create a ruckus after consuming liquor. He (PW6) was called by his daughter. He reached the spot where the victim and the children narrated the incident to him. 28. The testimony of this witness shows that the relationship between the accused and him is not cordial. He specifically stated that the accused used to quarrel with him. The accused used to create a ruckus after consuming liquor. These admissions show that his testimony is required to be seen with due care and caution because of the inimical relationship between him and the accused. 29. Testimony of PW6 shows that he is not an eyewitness, and his testimony can only be used to corroborate the victim’s testimony. When the testimony of the victim is not satisfactory, his testimony cannot be used to prove the prosecution's case. 30. Rustam Kumar (PW7) and Vinod Kumar (PW8) have not supported the prosecution's case. Otherwise, they came after the incident, and their testimonies cannot be used to prove the prosecution's case. 31. When the testimony of the victim is not satisfactory, his testimony cannot be used to prove the prosecution's case. 30. Rustam Kumar (PW7) and Vinod Kumar (PW8) have not supported the prosecution's case. Otherwise, they came after the incident, and their testimonies cannot be used to prove the prosecution's case. 31. The statement of the passersby who had rescued the victim from the accused, as per the complaint, or the statement of the occupant of the vehicle who had asked the victim to go back, as her shirt was torn, were not recorded. Thus, this part of the prosecution's case was also not established. 32. Therefore, the learned Trial Court has taken a reasonable view of the matter, which could have been taken based on the evidence led before it. No interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, even if another view is possible. 33. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. 34. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik  Suraksha  Sanhita,  2023  (BNSS)],  the  respondent/accused is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 35. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, shall be sent back forthwith. 36. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stands disposed of.