1 2026:CGHC:5627-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 35 of 2026 1 - Sanjay Mundra S/o Shri Ram Kishan Mundra Aged About 58 Years R/o Shop No. 201, Sector- 6, A Market, Bhilai, Tehsil And District- Durg (C.G.) 2 - Sanjay Kumar Agrawal S/o Late Shri Laxman Prasad Agrawal Aged About 58 Years R/o Shop No. 146, Sector- 6 A Market, Bhilai, Tehsil And District- Durg (C.G.) 3 - Dr. Basant Verma S/o Late Dr. Balram Verma Aged About 58 Years R/o Shop No. 90, Sector- 6 A Bhilai, Tehsil And District- Durg (C.G.) 4 - Smt. Lalita Jain W/o Shri Gyan Chand Jain Aged About 71 Years R/o Shop No. 199, Sector- 6a, Bhilai, Tehsil And District- Durg (C.G.) 5 - Alok Kumar Gupta S/o Late Shri Indrajeet Gupta Aged About 40 Years R/o Shop No. 106, Sector- 6A, Bhilai, Tehsil And District- Durg (C.G.) ... Appellants versus 1 - Steel Authority of India Limited Through Chairman, Ispat Bhawan, 3rd Floor, Lodhi Road, New Delhi, Pin No.- 110003 2 - Bhilai Steel Plant Through- Chief Executive Officer Bhilai, District- Durg (C.G.) 3 - Union of India Through Ministry Of Steel, Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi, Pin No.- 110011 4 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Principal Secretary, Revenue And Disaster Management, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur (C.G.) ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.02.02 14:58:38 +0530 2 5 - Collector Durg District- Durg (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Tarendra Kumar Jha, Advocate For Respondent No.2 : Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande, Advocate For Respondent No.3 : Ms. Shweta Rai, Central Government Counsel on behalf of Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Deputy Solicitor General For Respondents No.4 & 5 : Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 02.02 .2026 1. Heard Mr. Tarendra Kumar Jha, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2, Ms. Shweta Rai, learned Central Government Counsel on behalf of Mr. Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General for the Union of India/respondent No.3 as well as Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents No.4 and 5 on I.A. No.02, which is an application for condonation of 7 days in preferring the instant writ appeal. 3 2. For the reasons mentioned in the application (I.A. No.02), the same is allowed. Delay of 7 days in preferring the instant appeal is hereby condoned. 3. With the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, we proceed to hear the matter finally. 4. By way of this writ appeal, appellants have prayed for following relief(s):- “It is, therefore played that this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to allow this appeal and set aside/quash the impugned order 31.10.2025 (Annexure A/1) passed by Hon'ble Single Bench in W.P.(C) No. 2606/2025 and other connected matter and also quash the impugned offer letter/notice dated 01.04.2025 (Annexure P/3), in the interest of justice.” 5. The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order dated 31.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No.2606/2025, whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners has been dismissed. 6. The brief facts projected before the learned Single Judge were that the writ petitioners/appellants are long-standing lessees of plots situated in the Bhilai Steel Plant Township, having acquired the same either directly or through their predecessors-in-title pursuant to registered sale lease deeds executed during the years 1989–1991, each for a fixed tenure of 33 years. The lease deeds 4 categorically provide for renewal on expiry of the original term, with the only permissible enhancement being 50% of the existing ground rent, and specifically bar the levy of any premium, service charges or any other amount at the time of renewal. 7. The appellants/writ petitioners contended that the impugned demand/offers issued by respondent No.1 amount to a unilateral alteration of the contractual terms of the lease deeds, which is impermissible in law. Such action was asserted to be arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as the petitioners have been compelled to pay amounts never contemplated under the lease deeds, thereby interfering with their vested contractual rights and causing grave financial hardship and uncertainty. It was further brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge that the writ petitioners had specifically challenged the offer letter/notice dated 01.04.2025 (Annexure P/3) before this Court in the writ petition. However, the learned Single Judge, by order dated 31.10.2025, dismissed the writ petition. 8. Calling in question the legality and propriety of the order dated 31.10.2025, the appellants have filed the instant writ appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners submits that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the original lease expired on 11.03.2024 by efflux of time, and despite such expiry, respondent–SAIL has not initiated any eviction proceedings against the writ petitioners. On the contrary, SAIL 5 itself issued an offer letter dated 01.04.2025 for renewal of the lease, thereby clearly evincing its intention to continue the tenancy. The petitioners are ready and willing to renew the lease strictly in terms of the lease deeds; however, they were constrained to approach this Court due to the exorbitant and unlawful charges demanded by SAIL. He further submits that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that the valuation report relied upon by the respondents was prepared unilaterally, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioners and without taking into account the express terms of the lease deeds, historical ground rent, or the writ petitioners’ long-standing possession. Such reliance, in disregard of the contractual terms and even the directions of the District Collector, is legally impermissible. 10. It is contended that since SAIL has accepted rent after expiry of the lease, permitted the writ petitioners to continue in possession, and issued an offer for renewal, the case squarely attracts Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, giving rise to a tenancy by holding over. In support of the said contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhuneshwar Prasad & Anr. v. United Commercial Bank & Ors., (2002) 7 SCC 232. 11. Learned counsel further submits that the conduct of SAIL in assenting to the continued possession of the writ petitioners and 6 agreeing to accept rent constitutes clear consent under Section 116 TPA, creating a lease by holding over. Reliance in this regard is placed upon Albert Morris v. K. Chandrasekaran & Ors., (2006) 1 SCC 228. It is further urged that under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, the concept of “premium” is distinct from “rent,” and once the writ petitioners have already paid the premium at the time of initial grant, the demand of fresh premium —particularly manifold and exorbitant—at the stage of renewal is wholly impermissible, especially when SAIL itself seeks renewal of the lease. He also places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court in Hanuman Malla Surana v. SAIL, W.P.(C) No. 2440 of 2015, decided on 18.07.2022, wherein similar arbitrary demands raised by SAIL were quashed and reassessment was directed on rational and lawful principles. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the original lease admittedly came to an end by efflux of time, and thereafter the appellants continued in occupation only as permissive occupants without any enforceable right of renewal. It is contended that the offer letter dated 01.04.2025 was merely a conditional proposal for renewal, subject to acceptance of revised terms and payment as per the prevailing policy, and does not amount to assent so as to attract Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Mere acceptance of rent, it is urged, does not create a tenancy by holding over when renewal is expressly conditional. The demands raised are stated to be lawful, based on current 7 valuation and policy guidelines, and free from arbitrariness; hence, the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. Learned counsel for the Union of India submits that the lease expired by efflux of time and the petitioners continued in occupation only as permissive occupants. The offer letter dated 01.04.2025 was merely a conditional proposal subject to acceptance of revised terms and cannot be construed as assent for creation of a lease under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is submitted that acceptance of rent does not ipso facto create holding over when renewal is expressly subject to fresh terms. The demands raised are stated to be lawful, non- arbitrary and based on current valuation, and therefore no interference is warranted. 14. Learned State counsel submits that the impugned demand has been raised strictly in accordance with the prevailing policy and guidelines governing renewal of leases in the Bhilai Steel Plant Township. It is contended that upon expiry of the original lease term, no vested right of automatic renewal survives and the lessor is entitled to reassess the terms and conditions, including financial aspects, before granting renewal. It is further submitted that the valuation has been carried out on objective criteria and the petitioners cannot insist upon renewal solely on the basis of past lease terms. As such, the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. 8 15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order as well as materials available on record. 16. After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the parties as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge has passed the impugned order in following terms:- “37. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS : (a) Nature of Right after Lease Expiry: Upon lease expiry, no tenant including the present petitioners, has any automatic or vested right to renewal or continued possession. Renewal clauses where present in the original lease, vest the discretion with lessor (SAIL) “on such terms and conditions as may be decided by the lessor.”. Both statutory law (Section 107, Transfer of Property Act) and binding precedents (Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Hede & Co. (2007) 5 SCC 614) confirm that renewal is fresh grant, not a matter of right. As per Sub-clause 6 of Clause 5 reads as under: “if the lessee wants to reatin the demised land for a further term \of 33 years, the lessee shall given noticeo f his intention to do so to the Lessor six months prior tot he date of expiry of such period and the Lessor may grant a fresh lease in respect of the land herein demised for a further period of 33 years on the terms and conditins as may be decided by the Lessor. In case, the lessee wants to retain the demised land for a further term of 33 years, subsequent 9 to the expiry of the term of the first renewal as above, the lessee shall give notice of his intention to do so six months prior to the date of expiry of the period of such renewal and the lessor may grnat a further lease in respect of the land herein demised for a further period of 33 years on the lterms and conditions as may be decided by the Lessor.” (b) SAIL’s Power to Revise Terms/Charges: The respondents, as absolute owners and managers of the public premises by virtue of assignment from the Central Government, are lawfully empowered to fix rates and frame policies for renewal after expiry. As held in Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. State of MP (1999) 4 SCC 76, and reaffirmed in the High Court precedents, Board-approved policies apply uniformly to all similar cases. The impugned conditions, including payment of premium at 25% of land value, service charges and security deposit, have statutory and contractual legitimacy and are not per se arbitrary. (c) Public Premises and Jurisdiction: The properties in question constitute “public premises” within Section 2(e) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. The procedure for eviction, renewal and adjudication of disputes lies with the designated Estate Officer;civil jurisdiction (including writ petitions of this nature) is 10 expressly barred. The Apex Court’s Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Vs. Punjab National Bank (1990) 4 SCC 406 reiterated this principle. These petitions, essentially seeking to block or modify terms of renewal is thus not maintainable in this Court. (d) Fairness, Reasonableness and Opportunity The petitioners’ contention that SAIL did not give opportunity of hearing or that premium/charges are arbitrary, is unpersuasive. All lessees were issued a uniform offer letter with break-up of charges. Board-approved policies are the benchmark for reasonableness; individualized notice or negotiation on every old allotment is administratively impractical and not mandated by law or equity unless there is manifest discrimination, which is not shown. The cited rulings (Hanuman Malla Surana Vs. SAIL) pertain to fact-specific assessments in other jurisdictions and do not unsettle the prevailing law governing SAIL-Bhilai. State or District Collector advisories or communications on premium are not binding on SAIL, which has absolute title and Board-approved powers, post-transfer and assignment. Historic low rates cannot estop a public entity from updating policies in light of market realities and financial prudence as held in Aggarwal and Modi Enterprises Vs. New Delhi Municipal (2007) 8 SCC 75. 38. Having analyzed the submissions and the applicable legal framework, it is apparent that 11 the petitioners have no enforceable right to renewal of lease on original terms, nor any entitled to disregard the charges prescribed in the current SAIL policy. Their continuing occupation post expiry is unauthorized unless fresh lease agreement is duly executed upon compliance with demand. The impugned notices and renewal conditions issued by SAIL are not arbitrary or illegal in the circumstances. 39. It is further observed that as per the offer letter dated 01.04.2025 issued by the respondent Steel Authority of India Limited, it can be seen simply in the manner for assuming that in WPC No. 2337 of 2025, the shop of the petitioner which is a public premise measuring 600 sq. ft. was originally allotted on a 33 years long term lease basis w.e.f. 12.04.1991 and valid till 11.04.2024 on the specific terms and conditions mentioned therein. If the petitioner is interest for renewal of lease for the said shop for a further term of 33 years, he was advised to make payment towards lease renewal charges as under: *** *** 40. It has been further informed that the petitioner shall carry out necessary legal formalities to execute Lease Deed/Agreement in the prescribed format at his own cost and thereafter to deposit the abovementioned amount. It has to be ensured within one month 12 from the date of issue of this offer letter, failing which this opportunity will automatically stand cancelled. The delay in payment of renewal charges will attract penal interest as per Company Rule. Likewise, other petitioners in the connected petitions have been issued the offer letter with the details of the charges levied on them. 41. From the aforesaid offer letter, it is clear that the respondent company has computed the annual rent for the renewal lease period at Rs. 8,25,000/- which amounts to a nominal monthly rent of approximately Rs. 2100/- per month considering the commercial nature of the premise and the passage of time. In addition to this, the service charge, ground rent and security deposit represent statutory and maintenance related charges, essential and justified for upkeep and management of the township premises. These charges are in line with the Board-approved policy effective from 1st April 2008 and subsequent resolutions and have been fixed after due valuation by certified professionals. The payment of such charges by lessees seeking renewal is standard, reasonable and legally sustainable, entitling the respondent to demand compliance as a prerequisite for execution of fresh leases. The respondent SAIL as of today, is recognized as one of the India’s fast growing industrial sector with significant recent expansion in production, sales and infrastructure investment. This growth has driven continuous modernization 13 and capacity upgrades, reflected by its robust financial and operational benchmarks. 42. Consistent with this upward trajectory, SAIL has fixed the lease renewal premium and related charges for the Bhilai properties by valuation conducted through certified professionals, ensuring parity with market standards and company requirements for sustained asset and township management. This process is in line with policy and statutory mandates, supporting both transparency and future readiness in one of the country’s key steel and industrial hubs. 43. The petitioners’ failure to apply within the stipulated period for lease renewal as prescribed in the original lease agreements and subsequent policies, results in the forfeiture of any entitlement to renewal or extension bases on the prior lease terms. The respondent (SAIL/Bhilai Steel Plant), acting within its statutory and contractual rights has validly fixed the renewal charges including premium, rent and statutory obligations in accordance with the Board-approved policy effective from 1st April 2008 and subsequent resolutions. The fixation of nominal rent of about Rs. 2000/- per month for 33 years, based on valuation by certified professionals, and the statutory charges are found to be reasonable, non-arbitrary and within the bounds of law and policy. 44. For all the above reasons, the petitions are devoid of merits, both in law and on facts. 14 SAIL’s demand for payment of renewal charges, premium, service charge and ground rent is not arbitrary, violative of petitioners’ rights or contrary to applicable legal principles. The Court cannot substitute its wisdom for administrative or commercial decisions of the respondent in exercise of power of judicial review unless gross illegality, malafides or clear discrimination is shown, none of which are present in the facts at hand. 45. It is therefore submitted that the petitioners have no vested right to renewal without payment of fresh premium and charges under SAIL’s current lease renewal policy. The present petitions raises disputed facts, is premature with respect of proceedings under the Public Premises Act and deserves to be dismissed. No order as to costs.” 17. Upon careful consideration of the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, and on a cumulative reading of the pleadings, documents placed on record and the law governing renewal of leases of public premises, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has exhaustively analysed the nature of rights, if any, surviving in favour of the appellants after expiry of the original lease by efflux of time and has rightly held that there is no automatic or vested right of renewal. The relevant clauses of the lease deeds unequivocally vest discretion in the lessor to grant renewal on such terms and conditions as may be decided by it, clearly indicating that renewal is a fresh 15 grant and not an extension as of right. The findings recorded in this regard are fully in consonance with the statutory scheme under the Transfer of Property Act as well as the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. We also find no infirmity in the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge that mere acceptance of occupation charges or issuance of a conditional offer letter does not ipso facto give rise to a tenancy by holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, particularly when renewal is expressly made subject to revised terms and compliance with a board-approved policy. The contention of the appellants seeking creation of rights based on holding over has rightly been repelled in view of settled legal principles. 19. The impugned demands raised by respondent–SAIL are founded upon a uniform, board-approved lease renewal policy, applicable to all similarly situated lessees, and are based on valuation carried out by certified professionals. The learned Single Judge has correctly held that historical lease rates or past concessions cannot estop a public authority from revising its policy in tune with present-day market realities and administrative prudence. No material has been placed before us to demonstrate arbitrariness, discrimination or mala fides in fixation of the impugned charges. 20. We also concur with the view that the properties in question constitute public premises, and disputes relating to continuation, 16 renewal or eviction are governed by the statutory mechanism under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. The scope of judicial review under Article 226 in such matters is limited, and unless manifest illegality or violation of constitutional guarantees is shown, the Court would refrain from substituting its wisdom for policy and commercial decisions of the competent authority. 21. The reliance placed by the appellants on judgments cited on their behalf has been duly considered by the learned Single Judge and rightly distinguished on facts and applicability. We find no perversity, legal infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order warranting interference in exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the firm opinion that the writ appeal is devoid of merit. The appellants have failed to establish any enforceable legal right to renewal of lease on the original terms or to assail the validity of the renewal conditions imposed by respondent–SAIL. 23. Consequently, the writ appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu