2026:JHHC:17286-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 664 of 2025 With I.A. No. 13839 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Principal Secretary, School Education and Literacy Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi 3. The Director, Primary Education, School Education and Literacy Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi 4. The Deputy Commissioner, Godda 5. The District Superintendent of Education, Godda ... ... Appellants Versus 1. Vinod Kumar Yadav, S/o Late Rameshwar Yadav, R/o Village- Ratanpur, PO-Ashari Madhuri, PS-Porayahat, District-Godda 2. The Accountant General, Jharkhand, Ranchi ... … Respondents ----- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR For the Appellants : Mr. Rahul Kamlesh, SC-IV For the Respondent : ----- Order No. 02 Dated: 15.06.2026 I.A. No. 13839 of 2025 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants. 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of delay of 306 days in instituting appeal against order dated 25.07.2024 disposing of W.P.(S) No. 6766 of 2018. 3. The explanation offered in the interim application is that the respondent no. 1 submitted his representation for compliance with the impugned order on 26.12.2024, i.e., five months after the State neither filed any appeal nor complied with the order. 4. The application states that it was only thereafter that a decision was taken to file the appeal. The appeal was actually filed only on 26.06.2025, i.e., almost six months after receipt of the 2026:JHHC:17286-DB 2 representation. 5. After the decision was taken to file the appeal, the I.A. refers to the usual movement of files from table to table and official to official. There is a reference to obtaining a legal opinion. Since a decision had already been made to file the appeal, we fail to understand why so much time was spent on routine bureaucratic procedures thereafter. By casually citing routine bureaucratic procedures, which are mostly unverifiable and inspire no confidence whatsoever, a case of sufficient cause cannot be made out. 6. In the case of Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012)3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1- 2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file 2026:JHHC:17286-DB 3 better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance 2026:JHHC:17286-DB 4 substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” 7. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the 2026:JHHC:17286-DB 5 litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.” 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on 2026:JHHC:17286-DB 6 account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. 10. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State 2026:JHHC:17286-DB 7 authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury,………..” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never- exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 13. Applying the above principles to the gross facts of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay. Besides, the learned counsel for the appellants 2026:JHHC:17286-DB 8 stated that by now the impugned order has already been complied with. Accordingly, this I.A. is dismissed. 14. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and I.As, if any therein, do not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 15, 2026 Manish/Ritesh Uploaded on 17.06.2026